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SUMMARY 
Evgeniy Alekseyevich Preobrazhensky was one of the great Marxist 
thinkers of the generation of Bolsheviks that prepared and carried out 
the October Revolution. Yet his work has remained relatively unexplor- 
ed by Marxists. Those non-Marxist accounts of Preobrazhensky's writ- 
ings and political activities, even where well-intentioned, are hope- 
lessly inadequate. They grasp neither the Marxist categories he used 
nor the fact that his economic theories can only be understood within 
the context of his work as a whole and his theory of the transitional 
society. 
As a result this thesis opens with an extensive and in-depth Intro- 
duction into the nature of Preobrazhensky's Marxism, touching upon its 
most important philosophical roots and stressing the role of class con- 
sciousness in Preobrazhenzky's theory of the transition. 
The main body of the work deals specifically with Preobrazhensky's 
theory of expanded reproduction in the Soviet system during the period 
of its primitive socialist accumulation. We start with Marx's use of 
the reproduction schemes, and show their connection with his theory of 
the circulation of industrial capital and with the reproduction of spe- 
cific production and social relations under capitalism. Then we use 
Marx's theory of the reproduction of fixed capital under simple capital- 
ist reproduction to demonstrate the need for reserves within the system 
and to derive the two-sector scheme of separate industrial and agricul- 
tural sectors that Preobrazhensky was to use. Further, we use this to 
introduce the question of the importance of the material exchange of 
specific use values under reproduction, as well as their exchange on 
the basis of their value. 
Next we analyze and expand upon Preobrazhensky's theory of simple 
and expanded reproduction under concrete capitalism. Here we show that, 
given unequal organic compositions of capital in department I and II, 
and the tendency for the organic composition of capital to rise, there 
is a tendency towards under-production of means of production. This can 
be overcome by drawing the petty-commodity sector into the orbit of 
capitalist exchange, and impelling that sector to make the necessary 
adjustments in its production so as to allow the capitalist sector to 
overcome its own internal disproportions via exchange with the peasant 
sector. 
Then we open up an unexplored area of Marxist economics, the ex- 
panded reproduction of fixed capital. Starting off from a problem that 
Preobrazhensky had touched upon in an entirely different context, we ex- 
amine the effects that the extended turnover period of fixed capital 
has upon expanded reproduction: It gives rise to a chronic deficit of 
means of production. After exploring a number of possible solutions to 
the problem we find that under pure capitalism the only solution is the 
transfer of capital from department II to department I. 
In order to apply the above findings to the Soviet goods famine we 
must first take a detour and examine that goods famine in its general 
morphology. Following in large part Preobrazhensky's argument, we trace 
out the inherent, structural tendencies towards the under-production of 
means of production within the Soviet system, which it cannot overcome 
because of its backwardness. This deprives it of all the economic and 
social flexibility that a socialist economy would have for anticipating 
and circumventing these disproportions, and makes the economy inherent- 
ly weaker and more prone to crisis than even the advanced capitalist 
countries. 
From there we introduce another new aspect to the Marxist theory of 
expanded reproduction, by examining the circulation and reproduction of 
the individual components of the annual product of all sectors in the 
Soviet economy. Although we start off from Preobrazhensky's own treat- 
ment of the topic, this was sparse and incomplete. It proves necessary 
to trace out in great detail the circulation of the individual elements 
of expanded reproduction from the point of view of both their quantita- 
tive exchange as values and their material exchange as particular use 
values. Here the primary division is between those products produced 
in the private and state sectors--it turns out that no category of ex- 
panded reproduction can be reproduced except via a complex circuit of 
exchange involving all departments of all sectors. What is more, under 
Soviet conditions, this exchange involves strict proportionality between 
each distinct department and all of the others. Any disequilibrium be- 
tween two departments, either in value or material terms, will lead the 
entire system into stagnation. 
Finally, we apply these findings to our discussion of the expand- 
ed reproduction of fixed capital. We trace out the expanded reproduc- 
tion of fixed capital under both concrete capitalism and in the Soviet 
system. Here we find that the conditions of expanded reproduction dic- 
tate that the peasant sector's department I assumes an increasingly 
larger share of the production of the circulating part of the constant 
capital in all departments. Yet this condition contradicts the condi- 
tions of material exchange under a goods famine of the type that exist- 
ed in the Soviet Union. As with virtually every aspect of Preobrazhen- 
sky's analysis, this confirms the validity of his long-standing posi- 
tion that, both from an economic and from a political point of view, 
socialism in one country was impossible. Only massive material assis- 
tance from other socialist countries could help pull the USSR out of 
its impasse. Only the political intervention of the Western proletar- 
iat could save the Revolution from degeneration. 
PREFACE 
This thesis was originally intended as a study of the methodologi- 
cal foundations of the works of E. A. Preobrazhensky, the Soviet econo- 
mist who was one of the leading members, both theoretically and politi- 
cally, of the Trotskyist Oppositions of the 1920's. At the time it 
seemed to us that Preobrazhensky's economic writings were so rich in 
their political and philosophical implications, that they could only be 
properly appreciated if these basic philosophical premises were made 
explicit, and their connection with Marx drawn out as extensively as 
possible. We still believe this to be the case. Preobrazhensky's writ- 
ings in the 1920's show him to be one of the most original and exciting 
thinkers, not just of his own time, but of all of twentieth century 
Marxism. We hope that we can give at least some indication of the val- 
idity of this appraisal in the Introduction of this thesis, which deals 
with the character of Preobrazhensky's Marxism. 
In any case, a quick glance at the table of contents will tell the 
reader that little of our original plan actually made it down onto paper. 
This was essentially for two reasons. First, any such study of Preobra- 
zhensky as a methodologist and as a representative of a particular tra- 
dition within Marxism would necessitate a fairly thorough-going examina- 
tion of the philosophical evolution of Marxism itself--starting with 
Marx's own battles with his philosophical predecessors, Kant, Hegel, and 
Feuerbach, and wending its way through a critical assessment of the var- 
ious currents of Marxism that arose, and came into conflict, beginning 
with the end of the nineteenth century and the bastardization of Marx 
embodied in the dogmas of the Second International. Such a study, while 
invaluable and, as we say, still necessary to an appreciation not merely 
of Preobrazhensky, but of the entire Trotskyist movement within the Sov- 
iet Union in the twenties, simply could not have been undertaken within 
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the bounds of a PhD thesis, particularly by someone whose academic train- 
ing is not in philosophy proper. This is not to say that we have ig- 
nored this problem. To the contrary. Not simply in our Introduction, 
but throughout this thesis we have tried to draw a constant connection 
between Preobrazhensky's economic ideas and the philosophical assump- 
tions and political goals that lay behind them. 
The second reason lies in the nature of the material that eventual- 
ly did become the subject of our study. After the publication of his 
major finished work, The New Economics, Preobrazhensky published in 
article form what we can only take as drafts of chapters that he intend- 
ed to include in successive volumes as Part II of Volume I of The New 
Economics and as Volume II. The first of these was a pair of articles, 
entitled "Sotsialisticheskie i Kommunisticheskie Predstavleniya Sotsial- 
izma" ("Socialist and Communist Ideas About Socialism"), published in 
Vestnik Kommunisticheskoi Akademii (hereafter referred to as VKA), Nos. 
12 and 13,1925. These were to comprise most of the second, historical 
part of Volume I of The New Economics, with the final portion of this 
volume being promised by Preobrazhensky to go to the printer some time 
in 1926.1 To the best of our knowledge, it never did. In addition, 
there was a group of three articles, coming under the general heading 
of "Economic Equilibrium Under Concrete Capitalism and in the System 
of the USSR, " which were to form the first section of Volume II. The 
latter volume, according to Preobrazhensky, was to be "devoted to a 
concrete analysis of the Soviet economy, that is, of Soviet industry, 
Soviet agriculture, the system of exchange and credit, and the economic 
policy of the Soviet state, together with an examination of the first 
rudiments of socialist culture., 
2 The first of these articles, VKA 17, 
is marked, "A chapter from Volume II of The New Economics; " all three 
carry the words "To be continued" at their close. In addition, we can 
infer from the closing passage of VKA 22 that together they were to 
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constitute the theoretical portion of Volume II, presenting an analysis 
of the regularities of expanded reproduction, both under modern capital- 
ism and in the particular economy of the Soviet Union. The remainder 
in 
of Volume II was to take up the task of "filling/the algebraic scheme 
of reproduction in the USSR that we have outlined here with concrete 
data provided by Soviet statistics and, above all, by the Control Fig- 
ures of Gosplan. " It would as well "touch upon certain theoretical 
questions that, in the interests of shortening the purely methodologi- 
cal section of the study, we prefer to illustrate with figures from the 
present-day living Soviet economy. "3 
These three articles are in no way complete. In the first place, 
they were written in obvious haste, no doubt due to the pressures of 
the political struggle in which Preobrazhensky was so actively involved. 
There are numerous misprints, especially in the numerical examples, and 
the arguments themselves are usually presented only in the barest form. 
Preobrazhensky rarely followed up the particular analyses to their log- 
ical concluions, and the mode of elucidation of the individual theor- 
etical points is often jumpy and leaves a lot to be presupposed by the 
reader. In addition, many of the seemingly obvious political conclusions 
are left unstated. The arguments, which are on the surface highly tech- 
nical, rarely draw out the conclusions to which they are pointing, ex- 
cept in the most round about way. This again must be explained in terms 
of the political context within which they were written. As theoreti- 
cal, academic pieces, Preobrazhensky must have certainly felt that, by 
1926 and 1927, he was not free to draw the openly political conclusions 
from his work that he had done in The New Economics. Once more, it was 
left to the reader to cull out of the mass of reproduction schemes and 
the sparse political commentary the inferences that Preobrazhensky had 
clearly intended. 
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Even so, there is a clear coherence to these works which in its 
turn also helps explain their overtly abstract and even technical char- 
acter. They represent a rigorous attempt to work out for the emerging 
Soviet economy the regularities of economic reproduction and their re- 
lation to the highly unstable social relations within the Soviet system, 
on the one hand, and the proper development and application of the an- 
alytical categories needed for such an analysis, on the other. In this 
Preobrazhensky, as we will demonstrate at some length in the body of 
this thesis, was undertaking a task quite similar to that which Marx had 
embarked on in Volume II of Capital. 
Originally we had planned our discussion of these articles to oc- 
cupy one part of one chapter. Once we began to pore over Preobrazhensky's 
use of the reproduction schemes, however, more and more problems arose 
that demanded our attention and attempted solutions. This was almost 
inevitable, given the fact that in his treatment of Marx's schemes Preo- 
brazhensky was himself breaking entirely new ground. In the first place, 
Preobrazhensky's argument in VKA 17--which lays the basis for all his 
subsequent analysis--is less than straightforward. In this article he. 
made two fundamental alterations in Marx's schemes. First, he added 
two new departments to those that Marx worked with: To Marx's scheme 
for capitalism he added a sector of petty-commodity production. The 
object was then to define the regularities of expanded reproduction 
under the historically more realistic conditions of capitalist and pre- 
capitalist production coexisting with each other. Second, he dropped 
Marx's assumptions that a)the organic composition of capital remains 
constant over time and b)that accumulation in department II "adjusts" to 
that in department I (which was the expositional procedure employed by 
Marx). The problem, as we will go into in some detail below, was that 
all of these represent distinct tendencies in capitalist development, 
which must be analyzed separately from one another. Preobrazhensky 
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failed to do this in his treatment of the organic composition of capital, 
where his analysis of what happens when the organic composition of cap- 
ital rises runs into that which traces out the effects of equal rates 
of accumulation, given unequal organic compositions of capital in the 
two capitalist departments. In addition, his numerical examples are 
constructed in such a way that it is less than obvious to the reader 
exactly how he has worked things out. The end result has been that we 
have had to radically rework Preobrazhensky's argument, often construct- 
ing entirely new examples, in order to make what he was saying clear. 
The second important innovation Preobrazhensky introduced was to 
apply (in VKA 22) Marx's reproduction schemes to the Soviet economy. 
Preobrazhensky's problem was far more complicated than Marx's, since 
the latter's categories of political economy could be applied to both 
the state and peasant sectors only conditionally. Both the state and 
peasant sectors differed significantly from capitalist production; yet 
they did so in different ways, and this further complicated the applica- 
tion of Marx's categories to them. There was the further difficulty 
in that the argument in VKA 22 is based almost entirely on the princip- 
les of reproduction in a mixed peasant-industrial economy worked out 
in VKA 17. But not only did Preobrazhensky not make the connection 
clear where it would have helped him elucidate his argument, he at 
times failed to even notice where certain results that were conditional 
upon the peculiar circumstances of the USSR would undergo profound 
change as long-term tendencies. 
So once again we had to make substantial additions to what Preo- 
brazhensky had done, in order to draw out the full impact of the ten- 
dencies he had uncovered. 
In going over Preobrazhensky's use of the reproduction schemes it 
seemed to us that Marx's discussion, in Volume II of Capital, of the 
reproduction of fixed capital and of the difficulties posed for a 
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capitalist economy by the fact that fixed capital does not turn over 
all in one year, was key to Preobrazhensky's entire theoretical con- 
struction. First, it allowed us to trace the basis of Preobrazhensky's 
two sector scheme back to Marx, thus highlighting the methodological con- 
tinuity between the two thinkers. Second, it permitted us to work out 
a more elaborate analysis of the material basis of reproduction, as dis- 
tinct from, but also in addition to an analysis of the necessary value 
relationships. For expanded reproduction, whether under capitalism, 
or a commodity-socialist economy like the USSR, has two dimensions. 
On the one hand, expanded reproduction can only continue if the products 
that must exchange between the various departments and sectors are pro- 
duced in the right value proportions--that is, if the quantities to 
be exchanged against each other have equal values. On the other hand, 
these products must also exist in the correct material form. If, say, 
department I of the capitalist sector has 1500 in means of production 
to exchange against 1500 in means of consumption in department II, but 
department II requires 1500 in heavy machinery, whereas department I 
produced only 1500 in rakes, then exchange simply will not take place, 
even though proportionality in value terms has been satisfied. Preobra- 
zhensky had begun an analysis of this problem in VKA 22, but it was 
sketchy and incomplete. It was only by first dissecting and then build- 
ing upon Marx's discussion of fixed capital that we could elaborate both 
the essentials and the finer implications of Preobrazhensky's analysis. 
This, however, did not exhaust the problem. Both Preobrazhensky 
and Marx had examined the question of the material composition of ex- 
change and reproduction in terms of simple reproduction, i. e., without 
taking into account any changes that would take place in the conditions 
of proportionality with accumulation. As it turned out, we--somewhat 
unexpectedly--found at least the key to solving this problem in a book 
Preobrazhensky had written in 1931 when back inside the Communist Party, 
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entitled Zakat Kapitalizma (The Decline of Capitalism). This was alleg- 
edly a book designed to put forward a theory of the contemporary capi- 
talist crisis, but in it Preobrazhensky stated in no uncertain terms 
that he was building upon the analytical tools he had forged in his 
Trotskyist days, i. e., the analyses of VKA 17,18, and 22. In his dis- 
cussion of capitalist reproduction in Zakat Kapitalizma Preobrazhensky 
proposed that a further modification was needed in Marx's schemes of 
reproduction, over and above those he had already introduced in his 
previous works. This was that we could no longer assume that the value 
of the fixed capital turned over all in one year. (We found this a 
little surprising, since we had not been able to find a single reference 
to this part of Marx's analysis of reproduction in Preobrazhensky's 
writings before this date. ) 
Preobrazhensky had raised this point in order to address himself 
we 
to a problem quite distinct from the one/were concerned with. He wanted 
to illustrate what he considered crucial structural differences in the 
patterns of capitalist accumulation between the era of so-called free 
competition and the era of monopoly capitalism and finance capital that 
succeeded it. As a result he did not even begin to work out the solu- 
tion we needed. But the way he set up the reproduction schemes in or- 
der to reflect this new condition of a prolonged turnover of fixed cap- 
ital proved exactly the key we required to unravel the question of the 
material composition of expanded reproduction. 
By working out, on the basis of Preobrazhensky's altered reproduc- 
were 
tion schemes, the process of accumulation of fixed capital we/able to 
do three things: 1)We could extend Marx's analysis of the reproduction 
of fixed capital under simple reproduction to expanded reproduction; 
2)we could then work out the conditions of proportionality not just in 
value terms but in terms of the material composition of expanded repro- 
duction, as well as the necessary conditions for exchange that flowed 
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from this; 3)we could then apply these results to the problem of the 
goods famine in the Soviet Union during the New Economic Policy--an an- 
alysis which, not surprisingly, led us to virtually identical conclu- 
sions to those Preobrazhensky had reached in VKA 22. 
It should be fairly evident from the above account that this is 
not properly a thesis about Preobrazhensky per se. It is rather a study 
of Preobrazhensky and Marx, and our own application and extension of 
the incomplete work of both these men to the reproduction schemes in 
general and to the specific question of the Soviet goods famine. Yet 
at all times we have used Preobrazhensky's basic approach as a starting 
point. We have in a sense taken the rudiments of his theory of repro- 
duction to the conclusions he himself might have reached if he had had 
the opportunity to continue his work. This is why we said above that 
it is not surprising that our own conclusions are so similar to his. 
By the same token we think the fact that we could arrive at virtually 
identical results by using what we consider were more developed and re- 
fined tools testifies to the genuine insight that Preobrazhensky brought 
to his analysis of the Soviet economy, an analysis which, for political 
reasons, was left woefully incomplete and embryonic. Preobrazhensky 
did not need embellished presentations of Marx's reproduction schemes 
in order to see where Soviet society was heading. He could do this 
readily enough on the basis of the overall analysis of the transitional 
period that he had been developing since the turn of the twenties, and 
whose outstanding feature was methodological solidity and freshness, 
not sophisticated algebra. It was, we might add, an analysis of the 
Soviet Union that excelled anything else we have come across, either 
from that period or since. 
*** 
The plan of the thesis is as follows: 
The Introduction deals with the character of Preobrazhensky's 
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Marxism. Since the main body of our study has a distinctly technical 
slant, and since the reproduction schemes have been so often subject 
to an improperly technicist interpretation ever since the publication of 
Volume II of Capital, we felt it essential to give some idea of Preobra- 
zhensky's methodological approach and where he fits in among the diverse 
philosophical traditions that have claimed to be Marxist. Here we have 
given particular attention to Preobrazhensky's theory of class conscious- 
ness. The Introduction then, affords what we see as the necessary theor- 
etical context within which Preobrazhensky's and our own discussion of 
the reproduction schemes must be seen. 
We next take up Marx's use of the reproduction schemes--not to cover 
ground that other Marxists have already gone over in terms of their 
mechanics, but in order to deal at some length with the question of the 
material basis of reproduction. Our major illustrations are his discus- 
sion of the reproduction of articles of luxury and articles of neces- 
sity and--more important--his treatment of the reproduction of fixed 
capital. From both of these we hope to establish the foundations of 
the two sector scheme that Preobrazhensky was to use, as well as some 
fundamental conclusions that are, we think, indispensable to understand- 
ing Preobrazhensky's theory of the goods famine. 
In Part II we turn to Preobrazhensky's analysis of expanded repro- 
duction under concrete capitalism. We have structured our presentation 
with the specific purpose of establishing here only the basic tools 
that we will need in our further application of the reproduction schemes, 
and have emphasized two aspects of Preobrazhensky's argument in VKA 17: 
First, the use of a two sector scheme, involving capitalist and petty- 
commodity production in mutual interaction; and second, the pattern of 
expanded reproduction under both pure and concrete capitalism that e- 
merges when we assume unequal organic compositions of capital in the two 
capitalist departments, and a constant rise in the organic composition 
of capital as a whole. 
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Following this duscussion we turn to the problem of expanded re- 
production of fixed capital, which is perhaps the key to all of our fol- 
lowing analysis. Here we will find that the tendencies Preobrazhensky 
thought he had uncovered in VKA 17, namely that towards over-accumulation 
in department II, hold true even at a more concrete level of analysis. 
At the same time we will see that an attempt to solve the problem of 
over-accumulation in the department producing means of consumption from 
the value side compells us to simultaneously find a solution in terms 
of its material aspect as well. 
Finally, we take up the question of the goods famine in the USSR. 
This discussion has three parts. 1)We will briefly outline Preobra- 
zhensky's general presentation of the problem in VKA 22, with regard 
to his theory of non-equivalent exchange between the state and private 
sectors; his determination of the need for maximum contact with the world 
division of labor as a means of overcoming the worst disproportionali- 
ties inherent in the Soviet economy; and the implications of the con- 
clusions from VKA 17 for the question of economic reconstruction in the 
context of the Soviet Union's backwardness. 2)We will go into Preobra- 
the 
zhensky's analysis of the separate elements of reproduction and/complex- 
ities that arise from an economy based on exchange, but where the two 
sectors operate with different levels of technique and according to dif- 
ferent modes of regulating the application and distribution of human 
labor. It is out of this discussion that we will try to demonstrate 
the basic patterns of exchange in such an economy in both their value 
and material aspects. 3)We will return to the question of the expanded 
reproduction of fixed capital. First we will see how the reproduction 
of fixed capital takes place under concrete capitalism and how this 
affects the inter-relation between the capitalist and petty-commodity 
sectors. Then we will examine the same problem from the point of view 
of the Soviet Union, in particular in terms of the Soviet goods famine. 
-11- 
Here we will see, on the one hand, how such a solution, though hypothet- 
ically possible, contradicts the very conditions of economic scarcity 
(especially a poverty of fixed capital) that existed within the Soviet 
economy. As such we are led back to the conclusions Preobrazhensky had 
drawn out with such force in VKA 22--namely that the Soviet Union was 
a highly contradictory society which could not possibly develop on its 
own resources. If the socialist character of the workers' state was to 
be preserved, the USSR would require substantial material assistance 
from other socialist countries. In other words, the necessity for a 
revolution in the West was the inexorable conclusion not just of the 
overall political analysis of Preobrazhensky and the Left Opposition, 
but of his specific economic analysis of the conditions of expanded 
reproduction under Soviet conditions. 
We should perhaps say a concluding word as to why we have ignored 
a topic that would seem to follow logically from our discussion, that 
is, Preobrazhensky's theory of capitalist crisis. We know of nowhere 
where Preobrazhensky presented a unified theory of crisis. Even Zakat 
Kapitalizma, despite its comparative intellectual freshness when compared 
to other works of the period, is a highly flawed and inadequate work. It 
deals with only one aspect of crisis, the disproportionality and struc- 
tural obstacles to capitalist accumulation that arise from the evolu- 
tion of monopoly capitalism. We think that such a one-sided and almost 
monistic theory is highly questionable as a sufficient explanation of 
crisis, although in places Preobrazhensky's analysis shows the same kind 
of sophistication and insight as his works of the previous decade. Nor 
would we consider this work an adequate summary of Preobrazhensky's 
other writings about capitalism. From the side of production we would 
have to deal at some length with the argument in VKA 18, which was spe- 
cifically devoted to the problem of declining capitalist reproduction 
and which, though following directly on from the analysis in VKA 17, stands 
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apart from it in terms of its subject matter. VKA 17, though dealing 
with capitalist development, actually describes the specifically Russian 
capitalism out of which the Soviet regime emerged and is quite clearly 
anticipating the equally specific conditions of the commodity-socialist 
economy of the USSR. VKA 18, on the other hand, is genuinely about the 
decline of capitalism during the twenties, and shows, by the way, almost 
uncanny insight into the onslaught of the great depression. 
To deal with Preobrazhensky's theory of crisis would also neces- 
sitate a detailed look at his monetary writings. The seminal work here 
is that which he wrote in 1930, Teoriya Padaiushchei Valiuty (A Theory 
of Depreciating Currency), a work which deserves to be translated into 
English, since it is one of the few--and extremely stimulating--Marxist 
treatments of the theory of money. Yet Teoriya builds heavily upon 
Preobrazhensky's other monetary writings from the early twenties, which 
dealt specifically with the Soviet Union, especially the book, Prichiny 
Padeniya Kursa Nashego Rublya (The Reasons for the Fall in the Exchange 
Rate of Our Ruble). 
4 
In short, any discussion of the theory of crisis 
would require the quite extensive examination of Preobrazhensky's theory 
of money in general, which would itself be enough to exhaust another 
thesis. 
Finally, there is the way in which Preobrazhensky actually present- 
ed the various snippets of his theory of capitalist crisis. Not only 
are they disparate and scattered throughout the twenties and early thir- 
ties, but the connections between them are by no means always made clear. 
Preobrazhensky must have understood their interdependence well enough, 
but he very often neglected to let the reader in on the secret. There 
are, for instance, entire passages in VKA 18 that are virtually incom- 
prehensible unless the reader is already familiar with the argument in 
Teoriya Padaishchei Valiuty. Yet the latter was published four years 
after the former! 
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As a result we have had to confine our remarks about Preobrazhen- 
sky's theory of crises to a handful of passing remarks in the main body 
of the thesis. This is unfortunate, for the most provocative aspect 
of his work on this subject was not in fact the strictly economic side 
of it, but the way in which he treated the category of human labor, 
and the transformations that profound crises bring about in the basic 
relationship between the working class as the sellers of labor power 
and the capitalist class as its purchasers. For Preobrazhensky, as we 
shall describe in the Introduction, this was the most crucial bedrock 
of any analysis of a society, be it capitalism or the transitional soc- 
iety of the USSR--how was human labor to be or ganized, through what 
structures, towards what goals, and under whose control? 
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INTRODUCTION 
PREOBRAZHENSKY'S MARXISM 
It is truly surprising that such a prolific writer and thinker and 
someone so active politically as Preobrazhensky was during the Soviet 
twenties should receive so little attention from Marxists. In Preobra- 
zhensky's case it is even more striking, since his major theoretical 
work, The New Economics, is cited by most secondary sources as provid- 
ing the conceptual underpinning for the economic ideas of the Trotskyist 
is 
Opposition, at the same time as he/credited with the leading political 
role in the 1923 Opposition (which grew up around the "Platform of the 
46"), and a place second only to that of Trotsky in the Opposition of 
1926-27.1 
As a result the English-speaking audience, including Marxists, 
knows Preobrazhensky more or less only second-hand. Only two of his 
books, The New Economics and From NEP To socialism, currently exist in 
translation, while his very important article, published in Vestnik Kom- 
munisticheskoi Akademii (No. 22,1927), used to be available in Spulber's 
anthology, which is now out of print. 
2 The effect has been that virtual- 
ly the only studies that have even pretended to examine a major portion 
of Preobrazhensky's work have been carried out by non-Marxists, primari- 
ly by bourgeois economists. 
3 It is from these sources that many, if 
not most interested scholars have received their impressions of Preo- 
brazhensky's theory of the Soviet transition in the 1920's and of his 
contribution to Marxist thought in general. 
For reasons that will become obvious, we think, in the course of 
this Introduction, we consider these accounts wholly inadequate. Preo- 
brazhensky was perhaps one of the richest Marxist thinkers of his age, 
and he can only be properly understood within a Marxist framework and 
by utilizing Marxist concepts and categories. This is something that 
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no non-Marxist can possibly do, no matter how well-intentioned. To 
make Preobrazhensky--or any Marxist--comprehensible the non-Marxist 
must translate their ideas into bourgeois categories, i. e., into a con- 
ceptual framework that is simply too poverty-stricken to retain the 
depth, complexity, and subtlety of Marxist theory. The result is an 
interpretation that emasculates the ideas in question, strips them of 
their vitality, and as such actually falsifies what was said. 
Hence logical contradictions appear where none existed. The most 
wildly divergent interpretations are given to positions that to a Marx- 
ist would seem straightforward. Alexander Erlich, for example, strongly 
implies that Preobrazhensky was admitting having worked himself into 
a theoretical and logical dead end when, in 1927, he concluded that the 
autonomous development of socialism in the USSR was impossible and that 
the proletarian dictatorship could only survive if its political isola- 
tion was ended via revolution in the West. 
4 It is interesting that in 
taking this position Erlich, and others who share this view, come very 
close to adopting the standpoint of socialism in one country--that is, 
they implicitly accept the premise that the construction of socialism 
should have been possible under Soviet conditions, if only the economy 
hadn't been quite so under-industrialized. Such a point of view should 
not surprise us, since bourgeois economics sees development as taking 
place in abstract, isolated national units, where industrialization is 
a technical problem pure and simple. The primary value of this sort 
of analysis, in our view, is that it at least gives us some insight into 
the ideological genesis of the "theory" of socialism in one country and 
its incompatibility with Marxism. 
At the other extreme Richard Day, whose feigned familiarity with 
Marxism and genuine sympathies for Trotsky have given his ideas a cer- 
tain persuasiveness, arrives at a conclusion precisely opposite to that 
of Erlich. Day considers that Preobrazhensky had made some sort of 
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tacit accommodation to the "theory" of socialism in one country--a thesi! 
he then uses to "explain" Preobrazhensky's capitulation in 1928. 
Such interpretations, no matter how much they are at odds with 
each other, share one major thing in common. They all treat Preobra- 
zhensky strictly as an economist and divorce his economic theories from 
both his general methodology and the goals to which they were applied. 
This approach can be countered in two ways. At one level we can engage 
in textual refutations by referring to the material various authors have 
allegedly gone over and showing that certain facts are wrong, they have 
been misinterpreted, or that they have been inadequately selected at 
the expense of other essential pieces of information. 
5 This can be a 
useful and often necessary exercise, but in and of itself it will not 
suffice. We must go further. First, we must challenge the validity 
of employing bourgeois categories in an analysis of someone like Preo- 
brazhensky. Second, we must counter the propensity that non-Marxists 
have of equating industrialization with the construction of socialism, 
a tendency that is almost ubiquitous in non-Marxist (and many Marxist) 
writings about the industrialization controversy in the 1920's. Against 
this we would argue that it is impossible to properly comprehend the 
ideas of Preobrazhensky, Trotsky, and others on the Left except as part 
of a political struggle to create a very particular type of society, 
and within the context of their conception of what socialism was and 
how it would--and would not--be built in the USSR. Before examining 
r 
any particulate theory of such thinkers we must first establish the 
goals they worked towards and the premises behind their ideas and ac- 
tions. Having done that we can then evaluate the premises, as well as 
the ideas and actions that sprung from them, and assess whether such 
premises and/or such actions would actually allow the goals to be 
achieved. 
This approach necessarily leads us to try and reconstruct exactly 
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what Preobrazhensky's concept of socialism was. No one that we know 
of who has written about Preobrazhensky (at least in English)--not even 
Deutscher--has done this. They have all, Marxist and non-Marxist alike, 
tacitly accepted the terms of reference created by the non-Marxists and 
0 
consistently treated Preobrazhensky is an economist who wrote about 
nothing other than economics. The version of Preobrazhensky we get is 
therefore technicist and one-sided. What is called for is a presenta- 
tion of the totality of Preobrazhensky's thought and an investigation 
into its philosophical foundations. 
We believe that this would be a momentous task, and we propose in 
the Introduction to make only a modest start in that direction. For 
the moment we would be content to give some indication of Preobrazhen- 
sky's views on the emerging socialist society in the Soviet Union and 
of how they evolved in the course of the twenties, with particular ref- 
erence to the role that class consciousness played in his theory of the 
transition. If we can do that, then it will become clear that Preobra- 
zhensky, Trotsky and the many Bolsheviks who came to joint the Left 
Opposition, fit within a much larger philosophical tendency inside the 
Marxist movement. We feel it particularly important to give this over- 
view, since the main body of this thesis--which deals with some of the 
more intricate and narrowly economic theories that Preobrazhensky de- 
veloped in the mid-to-late twenties--could otherwise very easily serve 
to reinforce the economistic interpretation that we reject in its entir- 
ety, and no matter what intellectual or political guise it appears under 
I. The Recrudescence of Marxism Following the Bolshevik Revolution 
It is an indisputable fact that the decade following the Bolshevik 
Revolution witnessed a virtual rebirth of Marxist theory. In the Soviet 
Union the twenties saw a flowering not just in the traditional realms of 
Marxist thought, such as politics and economics, but also in literature 
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and (a sphere often sadly overlooked) science. 
6 
Yet this creative out- 
burst was by no means confined to the Soviet Union (where its presence 
would be more immediately understandable). Throughout Western Europe 
Marxist ideas gained a new currency, a process which had as its reflex 
the further development of that theory itself. We do not pretend to 
be able to give even a summary of these intellectual events, for we are 
concerned with one specific field of human knowledge here, that of phil- 
osophy. Nor is it difficult to explain why, after decades of stultifi- 
cation, Marxism should suddenly experience this kind of awakening. The 
Bolshevik Revolution, and the mass upsurges that seized much of Europe 
in the years immediately following it fundamentally altered the entire 
practice of the workers' movement. Revolution and decisive changes in 
the existing capitalist social fabric were now on the order of the day. 
do 
People/not simply act with their feet and hands. They act with their 
heads as well. And so it was only to be expected that once the Bolshe- 
vik achievement had posed anew problems of revolution and social trans- 
formation, Marxists would respond to these problems with new ideas. 
The existing conceptual apparatus of the Second International--which 
had more than adequately corresponded to the reformist practice of that 
movement--was simply inoperative. It could not cope with the tasks at 
hand. 
Two, inseparable questions arose for philosophers. How was the 
previous ossification of Marxist theory to be explained; and what new 
theory would have to supplant it if the revolutionary movement was to 
succeed in establishing a world socialist order? The most decisive at- 
tempts to tackle these problems did not, as it turned out, come from 
within the USSR. They came from Western Europe, primarily through the 
intellectual and political work of Georg Lukäcs, Karl Korsch, and Anton- 
io Gramsci. 7 Although there were definite differences between them, 
especially in the evolution of their ideas in response to the deadening 
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hand of Stalinism upon the international Marxist movement, they broad- 
ly speaking crystallized a tendency in Marxist philosophy that was suf- 
ficiently distinct from most of what had gone before and from what sur- 
rounded it, that we feel safe in referring to them as a coherent school. 
They were certainly not the sole possessors of its tradition. The 
novelty of their work was not that they developed any new philosophical 
"system" or radically redefined Marx in response to the new historical 
conditions, but that they in fact went back to Marx, not as quotation- 
mongers or hagiographers, but as rediscoverers of the vital aspects of 
Marx's theoretical achievements that had long been abandoned by the 
official movement. Other thinkers were profoundly influenced by their 
work. In the early thirties the American philosopher Sidney Hook open- 
ly expressed his debt to Lukäcs and Korsch, as did Paul Sweezy in his 
Theory of Capitalist Development, published in 1942.8 Both these men 
have, in our view, made important contributions towards systematizing 
the essentials of Marx's methodology. Of more modern thinkers whose wor] 
clearly shows the profound effect of Lukäcs, Korsch, and Gramsci, per- 
haps the most important--at least among British Marxists--has been 
Lucio Colletti. 9 
If there existed fairly crucial differences in content and approach 
among the three initial philosophers we mentioned, this was even more 
true of their later followers. Hook has become a violent anti-commun- 
ist; Sweezy a Maoist; and Kolakowski the archetype of the ex-Marxist-now. 
liberal emigre. Yet it was what they shared in common that was and re- 
mains so important. For although their achievements were far surpassed 
in the field of politics by countless other men and women, Lenin, Trot- 
sky, and Luxemburg not the least among them, these men systematized and 
put in coherent form the premises and assumptions upon which others 
were to operate. 
There is an interesting unanimity with which virtually all of these 
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individuals identified similar problems as the object of their investi- 
gations, specifically what they termed as the positivist-deterministic 
Marxism that had gained currency under the Second International. All 
of them quite correctly cut beneath the open "renegades, " such as Bern- 
stein, and found the roots of the degeneration of Marxism within the 
official movement. We do not wish to recapitulate their arguments, 
either as expressed collectively or separately. This has been adequate- 
ly done by the authors themselves. 
10 Our concern is rather to attempt 
to distill out, in concise form, the positive formulation of Marxism 
that they did so much to resuscitate. 
First, there is the emphasis on the active side of Marx's theory 
of knowledge and their opposition to the reflection/cognition theory 
that gained such prevalence (largely due to certain, highly selectively 
emphasized statements by Engels) under the influence of late nineteenth 
century positivist science. Hand in hand with the battle against the 
reflection theory went an attack on the false dichotomy that this same 
scientific influence had established between man, on the one hand, and 
an "objective" nature, or external world, which man passively perceives, 
on the other. 
What to put in place of these theories? We can start with Marx 
himself. It is remarkable that neither Korsch, Gramsci, nor Lukäcs had 
access to the full manuscript of The German ideology (which was not 
published in its entirety--including the crucial section on Feuerbach-- 
until the 1930's, and which was the direct stimulus to Hook's two im- 
portant books), since this is possibly the most direct statement Marx 
made about the relationship between man's consciousness and his practi- 
cal activity. In any society human beings must enter into definite re- 
lations with each other in order to ensure their subsistence and con- 
tinuation of themselves as a species--continuation not simply in a bio- 
logical sense, but in terms of preserving the social structures through 
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which these relationships take place and through which man's laboring 
activity finds coherence and meaning. When Marx emphasized time and 
again throughout his life that man's consciousness of his environment 
and his relationship to it (which included his relations with other hu- 
man beings) is determined by the production relations through which all 
his activities are channelled, this is not a one-sided, deterministic 
statement. There is not some previously-given activity that automatical- 
ly produces a given consciousness; ideas do not passively reflect ex- 
ternal reality. If that were the case we could never explain social 
change and the fact that these changes are desired and theorized by 
people before such acts take place. These theories are not, of course, 
always totally accurate accounts either of the existing society or of 
that which emerges--prior to Marx's discoveries about the nature of cap- 
italist production this was, in fact, impossible. That is not the point. 
People reflected upon (not reflected) their world, they formed concep- 
tualizations about it, and these became motivations and knowledge for 
subsequent action. 
Marx's statement that human consciousness corresponds to (and not 
reflects) human productive activity is not, then, a statement about 
mirror or reflex mental activities. it is a cognitive statement. Human 
beings learn through a constant and active interaction with their en- 
vironment, where they must necessarily conceptually break down its el- 
ements, manipulate them, and form concepts on the basis of this mental 
activity. Nor is the environment in any way simply "matter. " Language 
and the manipulation of other ideas are also objects which people en- 
counter and out of which their ideas and mental activities develop. 
If consciousness is determined by reality, this only makes sense if we 
first of all recognize that reality is social, and second of all if we 
are very careful about how we use the notion of "determination. " People 
encounter their environment through various structures, and these are 
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always broadly defined by the mode of production. Capitalism has cer- 
tain specific premises without which it would not be capitalism. For 
example, the fact that capitalism has as its motive force the production 
of surplus value already presupposes the social relationship of wage 
laborers to capitalists; it presumes that large sections of the popula- 
tion have been forced out of previous occupations as small farmers or 
petty producers; that production takes place on a more or less mass 
scale, in large manufactories or factories. Thus the kinds of activity 
that people engage in will be decisively different from what they would 
do if they still tilled the land or if, as under socialism, they col- 
lectively controlled social resources. This does not just refer to 
their specific laboring activities: Their types of recreation, culture, 
and art will all differ, depending upon these basic forms of economic 
organization. 
The first point is that natural conditions are not just passively 
accepted. What is more they do not exist in their own right for 
they are a function of the techniques and way of life of the people 
who define and give them a meaning by developing them in a partic- 
ular direction. Nature is not in itself contradictory. It can 
become so only in terms of some specific human activity which takes 
part in it; and the characteristics of the environment take on a 
different meaning according to the particular historical and tech- 
nical form assumed in it by this or that type of activity. On the 
other hand, even when raised to that human level which alone can 
make them intelligible, man's relations with his natural environ- 
ment remain objects of thought: man never perceives them passive- 
ly; having reduced them to concepts, he compounds them in order 
to arrive at a system which is never determined in advance: the 
same situation can always be systematized in various ways. 11 
This statement by Levi-Strauss, which more accurately captures the 
spirit of Marx's theory of knowledge-creation than do most "Marxists, " 
has some fairly profound implications. Man's relationship with nature 
is one of constant struggle and attempted mastery. What is more, this 
activity is not blind, but is at all times a cognitive process--i. e., 
men conceptualize it and learn from it. From this we see that ideas, 
and such ideologically-determined institutions as culture and even sci- 
ence, have a very palpable independence from the so-called economic 
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infrastructure. Ideas from previous epochs almost always survive, though 
in drastically modified form, into the present; there they become part 
of that present and influence the further activities that people engage 
in. At the same time man is always working out new ideas, which provide 
much of the basis for the development of yet newer concepts and theories. 
If this were not the case all science and philosophy would be impossible. 
However, within this independence consciousness is determined by 
activities which are themselves molded and shaped in a highly particu- 
lar fashion by any mode of production. Modes of production, as we said 
above, have certain premises without which they could not continue. 
And it is around these premises that people both find their activity 
structured for them, and out of which arise specific choices through 
which they can structure it in the immediate future. Social for- 
mations are not simply matters of what people desire. The desires will 
themselves be socially and historically determined; but, far more to 
the point, radically new forms of social activity can only come about 
with the abolition of the premises of the old social formations people 
seek to supercede. It is here that we see the unavoidable need for 
social revolution as the precondition for socialism. 
If the desirability, the need, and the means of achieving social- 
ism were all readily transparent, however, the revolutionary overthrow 
of capitalism would have proven far easier than it has done historically. 
It was for this reason that Korsch, among others insisted upon the mater- 
iality of ideas. They exist as social facts and constitute an integral 
part of the social relations out of which they grow. People's conscious- 
ness of reality is part of what makes that reality what it is. 
... the coincidence of consciousness and reality characterizes every 
dialectic, including Marx's dialectical materialism. Its conse- 
quence is that the material relations of production of the capital- 
ist epoch only are what they are in combination with the forms 
in which they are reflected in the pre-scientific and bourgeois- 
scientific consciousness of the period; and they could not subsist 
in reality without these forms of consciousness. Setting aside 
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any philosophical considerations, it is therefore clear that with- 
out this coincidence of consciousness and reality, a critique of 
political economy could never have become the major component of 
a theory of social revolution. The converse follows. Those Marx- 
ist theoreticians for whom Marxism was no longer essentially a 
theory of social revolution could see no need for this dialectical 
conception of the coincidence of reality and consciousness: it 
was bound to appear to them as theoretically false and unscientific. 
The second passage in italics is worth noting. For it reveals a second 
common theme that the philosophers we are discussing all shared: A re- 
emphasis of the central importance of Marx's theory of commodity fetish- 
ism. If man's activity gives rise to particular forms of consciousness; 
and if the latter are part of what sustains the social relations which 
define that activity, then overcoming those conceptions of society be- 
comes an inseparable part of overthrowing it. It is interesting that 
all of the men we are referring to thought it necessary to directly 
challenge the view, prevalent in the Second International, that Marx's 
economics was an "objectively neutral" theory of the capitalist economy. 
Against this interpretation they unanimously asserted the practical-pol- 
itical goal of Marx's critique of capitalist production. By laying 
bare the realities of capitalist production Marx was equipping the pro- 
letariat with the means to throw off the reified view of capitalist rela- 
tions that it derives from the normal course of its existence within 
capitalist society. Capital, as Korsch emphasized, was not a critique 
of bourgeois economics, but a critique of the bourgeois social order 
in its entirety. 
13 
Without appropriating the knowledge contained in 
that critique the proletariat could never comprehend either the neces- 
sity or the possibility of overthrowing capitalism. 
This requires some further clarification. It was not sufficient 
to simply draw the attention of Marxists to the importance of Marx's 
theory of commodity fetishism. That theory had itself to be properly 
understood. In it Marx is not saying that people have some fantastic 
conception of capitalism foisted upon them, as some sort of sophisticated 
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halucination. This would be a completely idealist understanding of 
fetishism, which would leave its origin and social function completely 
unexplained. Commodity fetishism arises out of the specific form in 
which social relations between producers are established in capitalist 
production. It is only through the translation of man's concrete labor 
into value, into abstract, alienated labor that has had its concrete 
and useful characteristics completely effaced from it and is thus com- 
mon to all producers, that exchange, as the sine qua non of capitalist 
production, can take place. The act of exchange requires and presup- 
poses that direct relations between producers are abolished and that 
all production and social relations are mediated through things. Hence 
these relations become objectified in human consciousness precisely 
because they have become objectified in social life. 
14 
To fully appreciate the political implications of the theory of 
fetishism we should back track a bit. Some years before fully elabor- 
ating the theory of commodity fetishism in Volume I of capital, Marx 
had presented it in more general form in The German Ideology. There 
he did not specify the particular relations of commodity production and 
exchange as the critical factor in the determination of bourgeois con- 
sciousness, but the division of labor, which had, according to Marx, 
reached its height under capitalist production. By necessity man could 
only obtain a distorted consciousness of capitalist society given the 
narrowness of the social activity to which he was confined by the div- 
ision of labor. This pertained not just to the realm of direct produc- 
tion, but to the production and perpetuation of ideology. 
The hitherto existing production relations of individuals are bound 
also to be expressed as political and legal relations... Within the 
division of labor these relations are bound to acquire independent 
existence in relation to individuals. All relations can be express- 
ed in language only in the form of concepts. That these general 
ideas and concepts are looked upon as mysterious forces is the 
necessary result of the fact that the real relations, of which 
they are the expression, have acquired independent existence. 
15 
The particular--and mystified--ideas that people have about capitalist 
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society arise directly from the way their activity is organized in that 
society. If consciousness is something active, and is both determined 
by social activity and in its turn influences human action, then certain 
political conclusions follow--conclusions, we might add, that absolutely 
do not follow from a reflection theory of knowledge and a positivist 
conception of the relationship between man and nature. 
Political activity becomes, on this theory of consciousness, at 
all times a question of altering human consciousness from the alienated 
and reified view of the world that people will spontaneously develop 
in the course of their daily lives towards that self-consciousness of 
the proletariat which alone will allow it to see its way clear to ef- 
fect a political revolution. It is this, we think, that forms the basis 
of Lenin's theory of revolutionary organization. When Lenin asserts 
that trade union consciousness is what the working class will spontane- 
ously arrive at out of its normal existence, he is merely saying--some 
two decades before The German Ideology came to light--that as a result 
of the division of labor the working class's experiences will be so nar- 
row and constricted that it cannot, at least solely on the basis of 
these experiences, work out a full understanding of the totality of 
capitalist relations that it would require to carry out a revolution. 
Such knowledge can only come through a political organization which has 
the capacity to synthesize these particular experiences and disparate 
shreds of knowledge into precisely that totality that the individual 
worker or group of workers (or anyone else in the society, for that 
matter) cannot possibly develop on their own. 
In addition, once we accept that consciousness is conditioned by 
the structure of activity that people engage in, it follows that only 
by altering that activity can revolutionary consciousness be acquired. 
This is why it has always been a central premise of Marxist political 
organizations that their members receive a thoroughgoing education in 
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political, economic, and philosophical theory, and that the focus of 
their daily work move from the locale where they are compelled to earn 
their living to that of the organization. The place where people carry 
out much, if not most of their political work may well continue to be 
the individual factory, hospital, school, etc., where they spend much 
of their laboring time; but the work is no longer orientated to a single 
site, but to the aims and structures of the revolutionary organization-- 
i. e., to the goal of changing society as a whole. 
In conclusion, we have tried to establish three basic points: First, 
that consciousness is intimately bound up with the totality of praxis 
that human beings undertake in society. Second, that a transformation 
of that consciousness, at least to the extent of breaking with the re- 
ified view of the world that spontaneously develops in the course of 
daily life, is one of the conditions for altering human activity on a 
where 
scale/the changes become generalized and socialized, and are reproduced 
from one generation to the next. And finally, that this is basically 
a political task. 
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II. Preobrazhensky's Treatment of Economic Categories 
As we have already intimated, the practico-active tradition in 
Marxism was in no way restricted to simply philosophical elaboration. 
In the Soviet Union, and in the Russian Social-Democratic movement prior 
to the Revolution, it had found its political expression in the activi- 
ties of Lenin, Trotsky, and, after the Bolsheviks seized power, in the 
struggle of the Left Opposition. Philosophies need not always be made 
explicit. 17 In the case of Preobrazhensky, his implicit philosophy per- 
fuses all of his writings, be they on economic theory, culture, finan- 
cial policy, or politics. In the rest of this Introduction we will 
demonstrate this by concentrating on his theory of the inter-relation 
between economic activity and the transformation of class consciousness. 
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One aspect of the positivist legacy within Marxism is that it posits 
an essentially fixed, static relationship of man to nature. Nature is 
seen as something objectively real; its order exists independently of 
human intervention and attempts to discern that order; all that remains 
for theory is to uncover this pre-determined natural structure. The 
political consequences of such a theory proved devastating for the Marx- 
ist movement. If nature is fixed, and the task of science is simply 
to uncover that which already exists, then there is no room for human 
beings to try and change this outside world. We are caught in a dead 
end. Ideas are a reflection of reality. Yet the task of socialism is 
to change that reality. This in turn cannot occur unless people alter 
their ideas about the world. The dog chases its tail. 
The Second International got out of this dilemma the only way pos- 
sible. It opted for an essentially religious solution. Socialism was 
no longer a contingent phenomenon, for which capitalism had established 
the prerequisites and objective possibility; socialism became inevita- 
ble, an abstract historical "process" that would arrive regardless of 
human desires and activities. The obverse of this conception was bound 
to be political passivity. If socialism was to be a product of divine 
creation there was no need to struggle for it, to take risks, to jeopar- 
dize anything already gained in order to shatter the integument of 
capitalist production and social relations. 
It seems to us that the nexus of this theory of cognition is very 
close to Kant's thing-in-itself. Real matter always exists objectively 
and outside our perceptions. It is unknowable. We can never discern 
the pure essence of things, for we can never abstract out that which 
the human mind imparts to our investigation and which immediately rend- 
ers our perceptions imperfect. 
This problem has been the subject of much debate within modern 
Marxism, not to mention more conventional philosophy. Kolakowski's 
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solution was to deny that the problem even existed and to conclude that 
the thing-in-itself was simply irrelevant, once we accepted that all 
that exists in nature is what we encounter and define through our prac- 
tical activity within and against it. 18 Although we think Kolakowski 
is basically correct, his formulation can give rise to a certain confu- 
sion, one which, moreover, we doubt he would have intended: He might 
be taken as implying that reality is only what we make it to be through 
our conceptualization of the environment; reality is a construct of the 
mind. Gramsci seems to us to have posed the question in similar terms, 
but subject to less ambiguity: 
What are phenomena? Are they something objective, existing in and 
for themselves, or are they qualities which man has isolated in 
consequence of his practical interests (the construction of his 
economic life) and his scientific interests (the necessity to dis- 
cover an order in the world and to describe and classify things, 
a necessity which is itself connected to mediated and future prac- 
tical interests). 
Accepting the affirmation that our knowledge of things is nothing 
other than ourselves, our needs and interests, that is that our 
knowledge is superstructure (or non-definitive philosophy), it is 
difficult not to think in terms of something real beyond this 
knowledge--not in the metaphysical sense of a "noumenon", an "un- 
known God or an "unknowable", but in the concrete sense of a "rel- 
ative" ignorance of reality, of something still unknown, which will 
however be known one day when the "physical" and intellectual in- 
struments of mankind are more perfect, when, that is, the techni- 
cal and social conditions of mankind have been changed in a prog- 
ressive direction. We are then making an historical prediction 
which consists simply in an act of thought that projects into the 
future a : process of development similar to that which has taken 
place from the past until today. 19 
There is no denial of the "real" world or of the fact that matter exists 
outside our perceptions of it. The crucial point, it seems to us, how- 
ever, is that as soon as we begin to make any statements about that 
"real" world its primieval purity must certainly vanish. Matter exists 
apart from our observations, well enough, but in and of itself this is 
completely uninteresting and has no meaning for human beings. It is 
the starting point of our apprehension of reality, and nothing more. 
This, we think, is the only valid meaning that can be given to the oft- 
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cited passage in the Introduction to the Grundrisse, where Marx affirm- 
ed the "autonomous existence outside the head" of the real world, but 
countered that the only way we can know that world as a "concrete total- 
ity, " is as "a product of thinking and comprehending, " as "a product... 
of the working-up of observation and conception into concepts. "20 The 
passage from Gramsci we just quoted, which is quite faithful to Marx's 
formulation, stresses perhaps the most fundamental point of all: The 
universe is always potentially knowable; what we do not know is not in- 
herent in the nature of matter, but is a product of the limitations of 
human knowledge at any given point in history. No one would deny that 
iron ore "existed" prior to its discovery. The physical entity that 
we eventually came to recognize as iron long antedated man's finding 
and using it. But at another level this matter only became "iron ore" 
through the process of its social utilization. Men had to discover it, 
they had to test out its various properties, they had to relate the 
latter with other pieces of knowledge that they had already discerned 
from the environment; only then could they decipher how to work it up 
and give it the social function that we associate with the concept of 
"iron ore. " If men had simply uncovered rocks containing the mineral 
and treated them as trinkets, they could have quite legitimately endow- 
ed them with any name, say, "jewelry. " And so long as their social 
function remained ornamental the properties of "iron ore" would have 
been unknown--in a social sense they would not have existed. It was 
only human activity that gave what once were no more than rocks their 
properties of ore. 
What, then, are laws? Do they exist outside of human activity, 
reposited in nature, only to be unveiled by objective enquiry? We would 
say, no. The ordering and inter-relation of the objects of our environ- 
ment are very much a product of human enquiry, which is why what we know 
as scientific "laws, " for example, undergo such profound change. It 
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is not "nature" that is changing, but the complex of human action within 
nature, in the process of which man uncovers new relationships that had 
been inaccessible to "discovery" previously. And he will discover still 
newer relations and associations in the future. In short, knowledge 
is a social process. The concepts and categories that we employ in or- 
der to make sense out of the world are not simple reflections of that 
world, but products of the very particular forms of activity that we 
undertake within it. 
The positivist conception of nature, on the other hand, attributes 
to analytical categories fixed, naturalistic properties, as though they 
were physical entities. Yet if this is the case, how does analysis 
take place; how is theory developed? The entire question of the logical 
order of categories in the movement from the abstract to the concrete 
becomes irrelevant. 21 Science once again becomes mere description. 
If, for instance, surplus value is seen as something tangible and mater- 
ial, it is hard to see how political economy could be anything more 
than an account of the technique under which this material is created 
and of the property relations by which it is then "stolen" from the 
working class. The importance of surplus value as an analytical cate- 
gory that conceptually expresses particular social relations is lost; 
and with it goes the ability to use this category to derive other, more 
complex categories that afford us a richer conceptual picture of social 
being. From another standpoint, the naturalization of categories is 
itself a consequence of the fetishization of social relations, where 
the latter appear as crystallized things. It is a direct capitulation 
to bourgeois economics, which sees capital as machines and quantities 
of money, rather than as the basic social relation that defines an his- 
torically-specific form of society. 
Against this notion Rubin, among others, argued that "economic 
categories express different production relations among people and the 
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social functions which correspond to them, or the social-economic forms 
of things. These functions or forms have a social character because 
they are inherent, not in things as such, but in things which are parts 
of a definite social environment, namely things through which people 
enter into certain production relations with each other. These forms 
do not reflect the properties of things but the properties of the 
social environment. "22 
Preobrazhensky, with whom Rubin seems to have shared a great deal 
in common from the point of view of method, delivered what is probably 
the best clarification of the role of categories in Marxist analysis: 
What we call the categories of political economy are the logical- 
ly pure, ideal descriptions of the real relations of production, 
exchange, and distribution which take shape on the basis of com- 
modity-capitalist production. Under this economic system we have, 
if the expression may be used, congealed groups of people engaged 
in the process of production and distribution, as they are formed 
on the basis of spontaneous self-regulation of the economy by the 
law of value; with all the fluidity of their individual composition, 
these groups are constantly reproduced at each fresh state of cap- 
italist development, forming the definite types of relations of 
production and distribution. The scientific descriptions of these 
types of relations of people to people (and not of things to things 
or people to things), on the basis of commodity and commodity-cap- 
italist production, are called by Marx the categories of political 
economy; these categories adequately describe, therefore, the real 
relations under capitalism in the sphere of everyday life, but in 
science these relations are reproduced abstractly, in their pure 
forms. Rent, as a category of capitalist economics, is not the 
real values which the capitalist tenant pays to the owner of the 
land, but the distributive relation between tenant and owner which 
guarantees the regular pumping of part of the surplus value from 
one to the other. Wages and surplus value are the essence of the 
relations of production and distribution between workers and cap- 
italist. . . the commodity is the most general category of political 
economy, characterizing as a whole the type of production-relations 
between people which is under examination as one of relations be- 
tween separate independent commodity-producers, connected up into 
a single economic whole by a system of market relations... 
... Behind the stream of things which flow, say, from the exploited 
workers to the capitalists, from the capitalists to the bankers 
or the landowners, from one branch of production to another, which 
are bought and sold on the market and then consumed, and so on, 
they [Soviet students] often fail to see the constancy of the groups 
of people from whom and to whom this movement goes on, that cons- 
tancy of the production-re]+e- ons between men under the sytem of 
commodity economy which is p: cisely the subject of political 
economy. This mental materialization of human relations which are 
also outwardly materialized in real life leads, likewise to an 
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incorrect conception of many relations in our own economy. Here, 
too, behind the movement of material values which in natura are 
the same as under capitalism and which often move along lines which 
outwardly are the same (wages, "accumulation, " "rent"), behind 
the identity of the relation of people to nature (the same tech- 
nique, "the same" workers), the changes which have taken place in 
production-relations are not seen. 23 
We have quoted Preobrazhensky at such length because it is on this in- 
terpretation of analytical categories that his entire theory of the 
Soviet economy stands or falls. Preobrazhensky's theory, that the Sov- 
iet economy was governed not by the existence of a single economic regu- 
lator, but by the conflict of two historically distinct laws of economic 
activity, would not hold up without it. We will clarify this point in 
much greater detail below, when we discuss his theory of class 
consciousness. 
Most Bolsheviks agreed that with the end of capitalism political 
economy as a science would cease to exist; after all, its object, cap- 
italist society, would have vanished from the historical scene. Yet 
it would seem to have followed from this that the economic categories 
which formed the basis of political economy would undergo a profound 
transformation during the period of transition. Now, this point of view, 
which, as we say, would appear to ensue logically from its historical 
premise, was held by Preobrazhensky, but not by his opponents. Preo- 
brazhensky was arrayed against the maintstream Bolshevik economists on 
this question and was almost alone in drawing this premise out to its 
proper conclusion. 
For Preobrazhensky all economic categories were historically spe- 
cific. They had to be, for they were the mental representations of 
social relations that were transient insofar as they were structured 
by a particular mode of production. 
Though this proposition might seem fairly uncontroversial to a 
Marxist, its converse certainly was not. For if the categories applic- 
able to the analysis of the Soviet economy were in a process of 
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transformation, that is, they no longer purely represented those that 
Marx had employed in his analysis of capitalism, yet had not attained 
the level of crystallization we would associate with a socialist society, 
then it automatically followed that at least two different principles 
were at work which were determining the structure of human activity 
within the society. If it could be shown, as Preobrazhensky attempted 
to do in The New Economics, that the categories of political economy 
no longer applied to the Soviet economy, then this fact could only be 
explained by the existence of two regulators. In other words, Preob- 
razhensky's theory of primitive socialist accumulation, which was the 
focus of controversy during the intra-party struggle, necessarily de- 
pended upon his methodological premise that analytical categories were 
both historically transient and the ideal representations of specific 
types of social relations. It was impossible to grant the latter with- 
out conceding the former. 
24 
In terms of the development of his theory things obviously went 
that 
the other way around. It was on the basis of the analytical abstraction/ 
two regulators were at work within the economy that Preobrazhensky was 
able to determine the transformation of categories within the Soviet 
economy. This is not the point. In the first place, this would in no 
way negate the fact that the two theoretical strands are inseparable. 
Secondly, it was only on the basis of his philosophical understanding 
of Marx's use of categories and of the method of abstraction in gener- 
al, that Preobrazhensky was able to derive the law of primitive social- 
ist accumulation. 
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Preobrazhensky's treatment of economic categories is but one indi- 
cation of his appreciation of the active content of Marx's theory of con- 
sciousness. Within his general method it also showed up in the analyt- 
ical primacy that he gave to the organization of human labor. It is 
interesting that in almost every one of his economic writings, whether 
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they dealt with the Soviet Union or the rise of fascism in Western Eur- 
ope, his starting point was always to first define, and then explain, 
how human labor was organized within production. Economic theory was 
nothing if it was not a theory of social relations. 
But Preobrazhensky was also a revolutionary. His interest in the 
social relations of Soviet society was not descriptive or academic. 
The point, as Marx's dictum goes, was to change them. 
III. Preobrazhensky's Theory of the Soviet Transition 
Marxists have always held that socialism entails the conscious 
control by society over the distribution and utilization of both its 
Eeans of production and labor power towards particular ends. This pre- 
supposes that in this process society is working out qualitatively new 
social relations and the socialist consciousness appropriate to them. 
When dealing with the transition period we have the further complica- 
tion that unless these social relations and this embryonic socialist 
consciousness are already in the process of formation the post-revolu- 
tionary transition to socialism will of necessity be abortive--at least, 
that is, without further fundamental social upheaval. If the division 
of labor, commodity fetishism, or reified production and social rela- 
tions exist we cannot call such a society socialist. This, however, 
is not the end of the matter. The capitalist legacies that very post- 
capitalist society will have to overcome can either be deprived of their 
material basis, that is, their basis in the specific production rela- 
tions of society--in which case they will whither away--or they can be 
more fundamentally embedded in those production relations and find there 
the soil for their persistence and reproduction, as was the case with 
the Soviet Union. Only a detailed examination of the concrete produc- 
tion relations of the society in question can tell us which way these 
manifestations of capitalism--which we must also view as analytical 
categories expressing particular social relations--are tending. 
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It is in this context that we have to situate the controversy over 
industrialization. Marxists have never claimed that economic develop- 
ment pure and simple guaranteed either the abolition of the vestiges 
of capitalism during the transition period or the smooth path to social- 
ism. Material wealth and highly developed techniques make these possi- 
ble and nothing more. Preobrazhensky, like all Marxists, held this view. 
Those who describe Preobrazhensky (or Trotsky and other members of the 
Left, for that matter) as a "super-industrializer" are themselves vic- 
tims of the most banal Stalinist propaganda. Industrialization offvr- 
ed nothing more than the material prerequisite for building socialism. 
It made the development of socialist education and the acquisition of 
socialist culture, for example, possible, but not necessary. 
In the Soviet Union, however, the very absence of a class conscious 
proletariat meant that both industrialization and education had to be 
the conscious decisions of the party. The problem that both Trotsky and 
Preobrazhensky faced was that even by the early twenties the party had 
already become bureaucratized. Even if there had been sufficient mat- 
erial wealth to industrialize the country the party would still have 
had to act as guardian of the proletariat's interests until the latter 
had acquired the numerical strength and political sophistication to 
manage its own affairs, something we could not expect a bureaucratized 
party to do. And without that wealth, we would argue, the political 
awakening of the working class was made virtually impossible by virtue 
of the Soviet Union's backwardness and political isolation. 
By 1927 Preobrazhensky had concluded that the Soviet Union could 
successfully overcome its burdensome inheritances from capitalism in 
the following manner: a)The state sector must expand its material re- 
sources absolutely. By doing this it would extend the field of social- 
ist production relations and would group ever-larger numbers of the 
population around collective production. Simultaneously socialist 
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education and party democracy must be extended as far as was materially 
possible. b)The state sector would have to accumulate the major part 
of its resources off of petty production and the private trading network. 
This was necessary to ensure the expansion of the state sector, which 
was too weak to accumulate what it needed on its own; to reduce the 
challenge of the private economy against the state sector, especially in 
the countryside; and to provide the basis for collective agriculture. 
c)While these were essential in order to attenuate the country's eco- 
nomic and social conflicts, they could in no way eliminate them. There 
could be no question of enduring success without a revolution in the 
West. This was true economically, so that the Soviet Union could over- 
come its backwardness. And it was true politically, in order to relieve 
the distortions imposed upon it by a hostile capitalist encirclement. 
At the same time Preobrazhensky's assessment of the prospects of 
achieving these aims had become extremely austere. As we will show in 
Part IV of this thesis, he had demonstrated that, at the economic level, 
the contradictions within the economy were simply too deep to be resol- 
ved domestically. Every attempt at primitive socialist accumulation 
would entail so many other fundamental economic disruptions and set in 
motion such potentially dangerous social upheavals that the process as 
a whole could not be carried beyond a certain point without massive 
aid from the West. Moreover, this had to be socialist aid, since the 
integration of the Soviet Union into the international capitalist div- 
ision of labor would effectively spell the end of the Soviet state. 
26 
The impasse, however, was not solely economic. Although Preobra- 
zhensky never expressed it as such--at least not in writing--his entire 
analysis of the country's backwardness, the extent of bourgeois privil- 
ege, and the cultural primitiveness of the working class and the peas- 
antry leads to the conclusion that the Soviet working class could not 
have offered a sufficient counterweight to the bureaucracy and 
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exercized the effective control over the transition to socialism that 
alone could have defended the revolution. This, too, required the 
guardianship of a mass-based workers' movement which could only come 
from outside the Soviet Union. Thus for Preobrazhensky revolution in 
the West becomes the lynch-pin in the entire transitional process. 27 
III-a. The Concept of "Two Regulators" 
Perhaps the pivotal concept, around which Preobrazhensky built up 
his entire theoretical edifice, was his recognition that the USSR's 
course of development was governed by the conflict of two historical- 
ly antagonistic types of regulation of economic life: The law of value 
vs the so-called principle of planning. It was from this that Preobra- 
zhensky worked out his famous law of primitive socialist accumulation, 
which he termed the historically specific form the planning principle 
took during the period of the Soviet Union's transition to socialism. 
Preobrazhensky did not deny that some form of conflict between these 
two laws would take place in any post-revolutionary society. Given 
that the socialist revolution would not take place simultaneously in 
every advanced country, so that the emergent socialist states would 
have to make certain adaptations to the capitalist market, and given the 
fact that some forms of private production and exchange would remain 
in the period immediately following the proletarian seizure of power 
and the socialization of the means of production, central credit in- 
stitutions, transport, etc., this conflict was inevitable. There was 
no reason to suppose, however, that the law of value would find in the 
transitional society any basis for its prolonged survival, much less 
the constant reproduction of the specific production relations to which 
it gives rise. 
What was unique about the Soviet Union was not that the law of 
value existed, but that it thrived. Far from being transformed "simply 
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into laws of resistance to the new form, " i. e., socialism, the law of 
value penetrated in some way or another into every aspect of the Soviet 
economy and society. It is important, however, to distinguish the var- 
ious forms the law of value assumed in the Soviet Union at this time, 
for only then can we properly assess the distortions it imposed upon 
the state sector's economic development and the depth to which it penet- 
rated its production relations. 
It is almost self-evident why Preobrazhensky considered this eco- 
nomic duality so crucial. The law of value and the law of primitive 
socialist accumulation each represent distinct modes of organizing hu- 
man labor power and each, therefore, will give rise to qualitatively 
different types of social relations. The social relations correspond- 
ing to a society organized on the basis of the law of value (simple 
commodity and capitalist production) have nothing in common with, and 
are indeed incompatible with those that arise out of socialism and plan- 
ning. If, as Preobrazhensky often chided his critics, the law of val- 
ue was the sole regulator in the economy, how was it that the Soviet 
Union was constructing different production relations and a different 
distribution of the productive forces--means of production and labor 
power--than we find under capitalism? 
In our state economy we have a distribution of labor which could 
not be maintained if the law of value were operating, nor if the 
law of labor-expenditure were operating in its pure form, that is, 
if production for demand prevailed. This is because the existing 
distribution of labor has also to meet the task of reproducing the 
given system (that of collective state economy) on an expanding 
scale, in spite of the fact that, technically and economically, 
the state economy is as yet weaker than capitalism, and expanded 
reproduction of relations of a certain type, which are linked with 
a backward level of technique is quite irrational from the stand- 
point of the world law of value and can take place only on the 
basis of struggle against this law. 
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It is significant that Preobrazhensky had first arrived at this 
theory of conflicting regulators quite early in the twenties, in an ar- 
ticle published in 1921, and that he had done so by examining the pal- 
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pable reality of the class conflict that existed within the country. 29 
This had its roots in the fundamentally different ways in which petty 
production (primarily agriculture) and the state economy were organiz- 
ed, and found its expression in "two different 'natural laws of devel- 
opment' in the territory of the Soviet republic-. -two laws that are cen- 
turies apart on the scale of history, but which, by the irony of fate, 
are operating in the same country and at the same time. " One of these, 
the "natural law of development" of petty-commodity production, was 
known well enough from the past history of capitalism and of pre-revo- 
lutionary Russia. The other, however, the "laws of development of soc- 
ialist accumulation and the development of socialist relations" were 
historically unprecedented and were known only in their barest outlines. 
What is more, these laws would work themselves out in the historically 
peculiar circumstances of the USSR which, as Preobrazhensky emphasized, 
were "by no means characteristic of the future development of social- 
ist relations in the West. ""30 
Preobrazhensky went on in this article to explain how these two 
systems of production could coexist for a time, until the state and 
private economies had each got back on their respective feet and faced 
the problems of positive accumulation. Then the conflict between their 
particular types of production relations would come to the fore. The 
kulaks and private merchants would press for a widening of market rela- 
tions, the employment of wage labor, the relaxation of the monopoly of 
foreign trade, etc. On its part the state would find that it would have 
"to make deductions" from the private sector. Preobrazhensky left open 
the actual political form this collision would take, whether via attempt- 
ed foreign intervention and open domestic revolt, or through an attempt 
on the part of the private merchants and producers to strangle the state 
economy by means of their control over agricultural supplies (which is 
how events actually unfolded in the mid-twenties). What is important 
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is that Preobrazhensky had here put forward the basic shell of most of 
his later analysis of the twenties, including the embryo of the theory 
of primitive socialist accumulation and its assertion that sooner or 
later the state sector would have to subordinate and subsume the pri- 
vate one. 
Private production, then, was one form--and the most visible--that 
the law of value took in the Soviet economy; and it was clear that the 
state sector could subordinate it only through the market, which was 
the common meeting ground of the two systems. This was due to the na- 
ture of private production. Agriculture was not even remotely subject 
to state control and/or planning for the simple reason that it could 
not be planned. Had Soviet agriculture grown up on the basis of large- 
scale capitalist, i. e., industrial farming, with large units worked by 
relatively few workers, the matter would have been different. But this 
was petty production, peasant agriculture, with its millions of small 
holdings, whose relationship with each other was through commodity ex- 
change, via the market. Thus the junction at which the state and pri- 
vate economies would meet would itself be the market. The state could 
subordinate private production and trade by means of its price policy 
and by developing the technical superiority of state industry as a lev- 
er of competition; it could accumulate off of the private sector by is- 
suing loans through the state bank and accumulating the interest; it 
could develop its own trading network and oust that of private trade; 
it could use the monopoly of foreign trade to purchase peasant grain 
below world market prices and export it at world prices, thus using 
the differential to purchase relatively cheaper foreign-made producer 
goods. But all of these methods of gaining economic, and ultimately 
political and social superiority over the private sector meant that the 
state made adaptations to the private economy's structure, either to 
peasant agriculture and private trade inside the country, or to the 
-41- 
world market. Preobrazhensky consistently emphasized that by exerciz- 
ing political control over this process, and by achieving economic con- 
tröl through the development of state industry, the state would trans- 
form the essence of these market relations. Their external form might 
be that of capitalism, but their content would alter, and the market-- 
along with the economic relations it presupposed--would become a tool 
for advancing the state economy and concurrently subordinating petty 
production. 
It is not difficult to imagine the extent to which this conflict 
introduced severe distortions into the state economy. The state was 
not free to allocate its means of production and labor power according 
to its own inherent needs, but always had to adjust its internal divi- 
sion of labor to meet the demands of the peasant market. Similarly, it 
depended on private agriculture for vital supplies of grains and raw 
materials which, if not forthcoming, would disrupt the entire process 
of reconstruction. The same held true for the inter-relations between 
the Soviet economy and the world market, although the distortions here 
were somewhat tempered--negatively by the relatively low level of inter- 
action between the two, and positively by the monopoly of foreign trade. 
The aspect of the law of value that we have just described is 
quite independent of its other side, which consisted of the persistence 
of bourgeois norms in the production relations of the state sector, pri- 
marily in industry. In analyzing the influence of the law of value 
upon the state economy it is absolutely essential that we distinguish 
between those capitalist forms the state was compelled to adopt because 
it was producing for the market and those that were forced upon it be- 
cause of its own internal weaknesses. Phenomenologically the consequen- 
ces of these two factors may have been indistinguishable, but con- 
ceptually we must keep them apart. 
31 The fact that the state had to 
produce more tractors for sale to the countryside, that to do so it 
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first had to build factories it did not possess, and that as a result 
it had to accumulate at the expense of the wages of the working class 
and thus retard the growth of the latter's standard of living--all this 
had little directly to do with the fact that the state had to use piece- 
rates as the only means to get the workers in the plants to labor at 
maximum productivity, or that the factories themselves were managed by 
non-proletarian specialists. The latter derived from the combination 
of a low level of technology, an unskilled and historically young (and 
hence uncultured) labor force, and the absence of extensive intercon- 
nections between the various branches of the state economy--all of 
which meant that under NEP state enterprises and trusts had to produce 
according to capitalist methods of accounting and management. The fact 
that the need to restore industry so rapidly and to such a sweeping ex- 
tent coincided with tremendous material scarcity and a working class 
that was both numerically weak and politically and culturally unable 
to manage industry on its own had a special significance. For as a 
result the state sector had to employ strictly bourgeois labor incen- 
tives at the same time that non-Bolshevik, non-socialist specialists 
dominated managerial ranks and enjoyed bourgeois material privileges. 
If we accept that planning requires the direct democratic control 
of the producers over the distribution and application of society's 
productive resources, then planning in any meaningful sense of the term 
was impossible in the Soviet Union. While it is true that state indus- 
try could act as a concerted whole more than any capitalist economy, 
nevertheless the capitalist and bourgeois forms that the state sector 
either inherited from the old society or had to adopt effectively meant 
that planning was something towards which the state economy was tend- 
ing but for which it did not currently have either the material or 
human resources. 
Ultimately, of course, these external and internal manifestations 
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of the law of value shared a single cause--the tremendous poverty of 
the country. Suppose, to pursue our original example, there had been 
a revolution in Western Europe and a sudden infusion of tractors into 
the Soviet Union. This would have greatly relaxed the pressures on Sov- 
iet industry and alleviated many of the distortions associated with 
them. But it would not have done away with the need for a bourgeois 
wage system and a hierarchical system of plant management, which were 
a function of the low level of working class culture. The material means 
for gradually doing away with these bourgeois norms would have now been 
on hand, but the norms themselves would have remained. 
Therefore the bourgeois forms that interlaced state production (and 
there was no revolution in the West to help overcome them) were not 
just capitalist residua of the kind Marx described in The Critique of 
the Gotha Program--that is, their withering away was not guaranteed. 
Rather they were fundamentally rooted in the very process of production 
and distribution. As such, if left to develop on their own they would 
perpetuate bourgeois consciousness within the working class and would 
reproduce alienated, if not fetishized and reified social relations 
within the state sector; it goes without saying that the abolition of 
capitalist relations in the countryside would have become virtually im- 
possible under such circumstances. 
We say "if left to develop on their own" precisely because these 
forms were not allowed to. That is how things would have turned out 
if the law of value had enjoyed free rein. We do not, however, mean 
to imply that the production relations in the state sector were bourge- 
ois. They were not. Instead these production relations were highly 
unstable and contradictory, where the bourgeois tendencies in them were 
organic, rather than residual. 
It is consistent with the economistic interpretation of Preobra- 
zhensky that most people pay almost exclusive attention to the parts 
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of The New Economics devoted to the law of primitive socialist accumu- 
lation and the conflict between the private and state economies. Even 
here the subject is treated from a narrow economic point of view. As 
a result the whole question of production relations in the Soviet Union 
gets pushed to one side, in spite of the fact that Preobrazhensky dealt 
with this question at great length in the chapter entitled "The Law of 
Value in the Soviet Economy, " a chapter which from a methodological 
standpoint is crucial to understanding Preobrazhensky's theory of the 
transitional society. It is here that Preobrazhensky assessed the ex- 
tent to which the law of value influenced the internal workings of the 
state economy. His starting point was his view--already discussed by 
us in the previous section--that in the transitional society Marx's 
categories of political economy, such as commodity, surplus value, wages, 
profit, etc., would undergo such substantial modification as to become 
new categories expressing the essence of the qualitatively different 
production and social relations that were emerging. For instance, the 
commodity would become the product of state industry, surplus value 
would become simply surplus product, wages would become the consumer 
ration of the worker, and so on. It was only by analyzing the degree 
to which these categories had already withered away and the tendencies 
of this movement in the future that one could properly define the pro- 
duction relations within the state economy. 
The property relations in the state sector were naturally any- 
thing but bourgeois. The fact that the "commanding heights" of indus- 
try and finance had been socialized brought with it a certain logic 
which demanded the extension of these gains at the expense of the non- 
socialist elements of the economy. This was what Preobrazhensky's law 
of primitive socialist accumulation was intended to explain. To the 
extent that the state was successful it meant the further erosion of 
the bourgeois legacies within state production, e. g., increasing cen- 
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tralization of industry and the abolition of the market would be reflec- 
ted in the attenuation and gradual elimination of the category of com- 
modity. But against this were arrayed a whole series of characteristics 
that tended in a capitalist direction: The piece-wage, the need for 
labor power to be sold as a commodity, bourgeois privileges for special- 
ists and managers, etc. 
What Preobrazhensky did not, and probably could not have seen at 
the time was that the social relations these bourgeois forms implied 
were so potentially strong, even within the state sector. We are re- 
ferring specifically to the bureaucracy, which was a non-proletarian 
stratum within the state economy and apparatus and which found its ma- 
terial basis precisely in the capitalist elements of state production. 
On the surface these appeared mainly as bourgeois forms of distribution. 
But in the USSR bourgeois labor incentives and bourgeois norms of dis- 
tribution were not distributive problems. They stemmed from production 
relations which had not yet congealed in a socialist direction and 
which eventually--with the appropriation of power by the bureaucracy-- 
allowed these distributive relationships to be reproduced. If, as Pre- 
obrazhensky determined, the category of surplus value was only in the 
process of being transformed into surplus product, or if the category 
into 0 
of wages was merely growing over/a consumer ration, then the social re- 
that the transitional status of these categories described were lations 
themselves highly contradictory and were embodied, at least potentially, 
in coherent social forces. Within the conflict between the law of value 
and the law of primitive socialist accumulation there stood not just 
the class conflict of the proletariat with capitalist social groups, 
but also the nascent conflict between the proletariat and the bureauc- 
racy. In terms of production this found expression in the particular 
relationship between the working class and the layer of managers, spec- 
ialists, and party functionaries who came to exercise control over the 
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means of production and the system of distribution. This does not mean 
that the bureaucracy was a new class of capitalists. The law of value 
was genuinely abolished in the Soviet Union, but only by establishing 
relations of production which, though capable of a temporary consolida- 
tion and consequent reproduction, are nevertheless inherently unstable. 
This is explained by the fact that the bureaucracy was unable to approp- 
riate power and control other than through the property relations that 
had survived with the revolution and on the basis of adopting "marxism" 
as its legitimating ideology. 
There is a certain symmetry to the bourgeois influences upon the 
state sector which is worth noting because of its profound consequen- 
ces. The very circumstances that allowed the bureaucracy to nurture 
itself on the bourgeois tissue within state production at the same time 
undermined the social basis of that sector's socialist element, i. e., 
the proletariat. For it was precisely the weakness of the proletariat 
and its cultural backwardness that made the application of bourgeois V/ 
norms unavoidable. The working class--and even more so the peasantry-- 
could only enter into production relations where there were strong bour- 
geois elements because they could not be induced to work at any reason- 
able level of productivity in any other way. Preobrazhensky emphasized 
this point time and again during the twenties and, as we shall show, 
noted that at a certain moment it would act as a real brake upon the 
progress of the state economy. Bourgeois norms, which largely arose 
out of the fact that the working class was not able to manage production 
in its own interests, soon became one of the factors that ensured the 
perpetuation of that state of affairs. Their persistence effectively 
deprived it of the internal cohesion and the rudiments of socialist 
consciousness that would have allowed it to contest with the bureauc- 
racy for power. 
Preobrazhensky had defined the production relations in the state 
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economy as being a highly contradictory and untenable cohabitation of 
capitalist and socialist elements. His theory of primitive socialist 
accumulation was intended to show what was necessary if these production 
relations were to change and the conflicts resolved in a socialist di- 
rection. He accorded the acquisition by the proletariat of socialist 
consciousness a central role in this process, for without it the Sov- 
iet Union's social relations could never take on a truly socialist char- 
acter. And this, we would argue, led him into a political position 
that was itself contradictory. 
III-b. Culture, Class Consciousness, and the Development of Industry 
Throughout his writings in the twenties Preobrazhensky noted that 
the development of state industry was always limited not just by eco- 
nomic factors, but by the low cultural level of the population in gen- 
eral and of the working class in particular. There was, however, an 
important shift in emphasis over the course of this period. The early 
writings, while defining the problem, more or less confined themselves 
to outlining what would have to be done to overcome this particular 
aspect of Soviet backwardness. The later works, on the other hand, 
focus on the working class's level of culture and class consciousness 
as a fundamental source of tension and contradiction within the Soviet 
system. The need to accumulate conflicted with the need to rapidly 
provide the material resources essential for the expansion of socialist 
education and culture. Without the latter, however, industrialization 
of a socialist type would soon run into a dead end. 
In 1927 he complained that "the enormous non-productive expendi- 
tures of the state and cooperative trade and industrial apparatus... are 
due not only to the general low level of development of the productive 
forces in the state sector, but also to the rudimentary level of soci- 
alist culture of the working class itself. The culture of all bodies 
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of society always tends to be drawn to the same level as that of the 
ruling class. Raising the cultural level of Soviet society means above 
all raising the cultural level of the working class. A steady rise in 
the material standard of living of the proletariat is necessary not 
only for social reasons, but for economic reasons as well. "32 Behind 
this conclusion stood a well-worked out theory of consciousness and 
culture that Preobrazhensky had stated most explicitly in his two books 
From NEP To Socialism and On Morality and Class Norms, which appeared 
in 1922 and 1923 respectively. Of these the latter is the more impor- 
tant from this aspect, as it contains the most detailed statement on 
the topic of culture Preobrazhensky was to make. 
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One of the striking things about on Morality and Class Norms is 
its consistency with Preobrazhensky's economic writings and his general 
methodological approach to the transitional society. Like his early 
formulations of his economic theories, this book was also written to 
tackle a specific political problem, namely the inadequacy of previous 
Marxist investigations into the questions of morality and norms of be- 
havior, primarily from the direction of analyzing their class content, 
forms of ideological expression, and their historical specificity and 
transience. In overthrowing capitalism the proletariat breaks through 
the old norms of behavior of the ruling class, but does so before it has 
worked out new norms appropriate to a socialist society, or even to its 
struggle to create such a society. The content of the book was there- 
fore highly practical. It was written as a popular manual for party 
activists to enable them to clarify their ideas on what he considered 
a critical aspect of socialist construction. In discussing the book 
we should keep in mind that it is not a theory of class consciousness 
per se, much less a theory of how the individual acquires knowledge or 
how individual consciousness is formed. 
Morality, as a constituent part of ideology in general, obviously 
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has a determinate link with the historical and material interests of 
a class. It would be wrong, however, to assume either a crude corres- 
pondence between class interests and articulated morality or that a 
class is fully conscious of its own interests in the first place. 
Classes, and ruling classes in particular, have always formulated their 
momentary, historically-determined needs as general moral truths, and 
it is in this way that ruling classes have been able to impose their 
morality upon subordinate classes and reinforce their class domination. 
Matters become extremely complex, however, with regard to these 
subordinate classes. They too, have class interests, which necessarily 
conflict with those of the ruling class. In the course of their daily 
life and the development of the class struggle they work out a system 
of class norms and moral principles that correspond to the demands of 
that struggle and help give the subordinate classes coherence and in- 
ternal strength. The problem is that these principles never emerge in 
pure form. They are constantly influenced by, and intermingle with the 
moral values inherited from the dominant class, or which the latter im- 
poses upon them. Thus historically we see that the ruling class uses 
religion to justify its wealth and domination, while the masses invoke 
it (to the extent that they have not completely freed themselves from 
religious mystification) as an ideological basis for their opposition 
to this same wealth and class oppression. This, of course, was par- 
ticularly true of utopian movements. 
Like any other ideological form, e. g., art, literature, philosophy, 
etc., the morality of the ruling class must broadly conform to its class 
interests. If it did not, if its morality constantly demanded that 
the ruling class act in opposition to its objective interests, to its 
role in production, or to its historical role at a given point in soci- 
ety's overall development, then the ruling class would find itself in 
an impossible position: Everything it did would contradict everything 
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that its system of morality said it ought to do. This much should be 
obvious. Preobrazhensky then adds: 
Matters stand otherwise as regards the morality of the oppressed 
class, in the sense that here it is difficult to follow the connec- 
tion between the morality that actually dominates the practice of 
a class and the interests of the given class. This is because the 
oppressed class is not always conscious of its class interests; 
and its functioning morality at a given stage of the class's devel- 
opment thus might not correspond to its class interests. The op- 
pressed class first takes shape as a class in-itself (an sich), 
that is, it occupies a definite social position with regard to the 
other classes of society; and only then, sometimes by means of a 
formation of its class consciousness that takes many years, is it 
transformed into a class for-itself (für sich), that is, into a 
class which is conscious of its interests and which has consti- 
tuted itself under the circumstances of being surrounded by other 
classes. And here, while the oppressed class still has not con- 
stituted itself in this way, at a definite period of its existence 
it is led not by its own inherent class norms, which answer its 
own class interests, but is under the thumb of the ruling morality, 
that is, of the morality of the class which dominates economically 
and politically. 34 
... we see that morality in class society 
is always class morality; 
but often a class is led by the morality of another class, to 
which it is economically subordinated, and with the ideology of 
which it has not yet broken. Thus for the oppressed classes it is 
necessary to seek their specific class norms not in the period of 
the birth of these classes, and not in the first steps of class 
struggle, but in the period of the formation of the class "for- 
itself, " in the period of sharp class conflict with enemy classes, 
and finally in the period of rule of the new class in the economy 
and politics of the country. 35 
Class norms do not cease to exist merely with the seizure of power, 
any more than other vestiges of bourgeois society regarding either the 
economy or the state. The proletariat will have evolved a system of 
class norms during the period of its struggle for power, when it util- 
ized them to help bond itself, as Preobrazhensky calls it, into a unified 
fighting force. But though some of its interests may change after the 
revolution, so long as the proletariat continues to exist as a class 
it will require some form of class norms. These norms will change their 
content, to be sure; but they will still remain until such time as class 
divisions themselves have been liquidated and class norms have been 
transformed into general social norms. 
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In The New Economics Preobrazhensky elaborated in some detail the 
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structural and historical differences between capitalist primitive 
accumulation and the period of primitive socialist accumulation. In 
the former case, capitalism of necessity began its primitive accumula- 
tion within "the pores" of feudal society. It could conquer economical- 
ly simply by building a handful of manufactories, which immediately 
demonstrated their superiority over craft production and made the lat- 
ter's eventual destruction inevitable. In the same way the establish- 
ment of these manufactories presupposed a prior accumulation of resour- 
ces which had also been acquired within pre-capitalist economy, i. e., 
the plunder of petty production by merchant capital. In this sense the 
political revolution under capitalism "is only an episode in the process 
of bourgeois development, which begins long before the revolution and 
goes on more rapidly after it. " It is both an affirmation of this al- 
ready-established capitalist superiority and one of the preconditions 
for generalizing it and placing capitalist production relations on a 
footing where they attain constancy and reproduction. 
The proletariat enjoys no such luxury. Its primitive accumulation 
can begin only after the proletarian revolution, when the forms of pro- 
perty have been completely altered and adapted to the future construc- 
tion of socialism. It is impossible to socialize the economy piecemiel, 
within capitalism. Capitalist property relations and political insti- 
tutions simply do not permit it. It is only after the working class 
has taken power that it can organize the economic resources into that 
real infrastructure which will give socialist production relations that 
reproducible stability which makes it a mode of production. Here again 
we see the importance of the conscious element in the transition period. 
A socialist economy, like socialist society as a whole, will not evolve 
spontaneously. It must be planned for, with each step along the way 
anticipated in advance and consciously put into practice. 
It is similar with the question of class consciousness. The pro- 
-52- 
letariat cannot create a genuinely socialist culture until after the 
revolution, because such a culture can only grow up out of new social 
relations that have yet to be built and developed. Of course the rudi- 
ments of that culture will be formed under capitalism out of the spe- 
cific practice of the proletariat in its struggle to overthrow the old 
regime. Nevertheless, the fact remains that culture is not something ab- 
stract that can be willed or "consciously" adopted. It must come organ- 
ically out of relations of production who4e emergence requires prior 
planning and control by the working class. The contrast that Preobra- 
zhensky drew between capitalist and socialist primary accumulation ap- 
plies not simply to economics but to his conception of the transitional 
society in general. Socialist consciousness presupposes the preliminary 
"accumulation" of a certain level of culture and certain habits of work 
and behavior on the part of the working class which, though beginning 
under capitalism, cannot be completed until after its overthrow. 
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In the field of culture, as in economic development, the Soviet 
Union suffered from a chronic lack of correspondence between what it 
had to do and what it had the means to accomplish. Here it was a ques- 
tion not just of physical wealth but of the so-called "human material" 
the country had inherited from capitalist Russia. Rather than having 
a cohesive working class with a mature class consciousness, the most 
class conscious sections of the proletariat--which had been a minority 
of the population in any case--had been killed in the civil war, leav- 
ing a working class which was raw, which was newly recruited from the 
countryside, and which brought with it not a proletarian consciousness 
formed in the course of the class struggle, but a peasant consciousness 
which was only on the verge of becoming proletarian. We should not 
underestimate the depth of this "medievalism"38 in Soviet society. 
Lenin, in his last article, "Better Fewer, But Better, " lamented the 
absence of even real bourgeois culture among the working class, not to 
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mention the remainder of the population, and characterized Russia as 
having a "pre-bourgeois culture, i. e., bureaucratic culture or serf 
culture, " which had still to be supplanted. "Our state apparatus, " 
Lenin went on, "is so deplorable, not to say wrteched, that we must 
first think very carefully how to combat its defects, bearing in mind 
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that these defects are rooted in the past, which, although it has been 
overthrown, has not yet been overcome, has not yet reached the stage 
of a culture that has receded into the distant past. I say culture 
deliberately, because in these matters we can only regard as achieved 
what has become part and parcel of our culture, of our social life, our 
habits. " "... the workers... are not sufficiently educated. They would 
like to build a better apparatus for us, but they do not know how. 
They cannot build one. They have not yet developed the culture requir- 
ed for this; and it is culture that is required. "39 Preobrazhensky 
echoed this theme throughout the twenties. In From NEP To socialism 
there are repeated references to the backward culture of the Soviet 
working class, which lagged far behind that of the bourgeois enemies 
of the Soviet state both at home and abroad, and which placed the pro- 
letariat at a serious disadvantage in its struggle against them. A 
few years later, as we have already cited, he identified this lack of 
culture as an actual impediment to the further advancement of industry. 
We could draw an apt analogy with the theory of permanent revolution. 
It was not the Russian bourgeoisie but the proletariat that would have 
to lead the masses out of their semi-feudal way of looking at the world 
and their semi-feudal way of life. In this sphere, as in those of pol- 
itics and economics, the proletariat and the mass of the population 
would have to work out during the transition to socialism what they 
should have acquired under capitalism. 
This is why we emphasized in the previous section that it was the 
existence of the market, nor the internal disarray of the state economy 
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that necessitated the application of bourgeois norms of distribution 
and labor incentives within the state sector, but primarily this low 
level of culture among the proletariat. 40 The other side of this dilem- 
ma was that attempts to rectify the situation came up against the in- 
tense poverty of the country. 
In his discussion of wages in From NEP To Socialism Preobrazhensky 
dwelt at length on the connection between the "human material" inherit- 
ed from capitalism and the Civil War and the application of capitalist 
labor incentives. Even communists, he noted, did not know how to trade 
or how to manage enterprises, while the mass of the people was, as he 
said, "tainted by capitalism, with a psychology which is a field of 
battle between 'yesterday' and 'tomorrow. "' And so it was the piece- 
rate system--the capitalist wage form par excellence--that predominated 
in Soviet industry under NEP. The question Preobrazhensky posed was 
how would the evolution of new wage forms correspond to and facilitate 
the emergence of new attitudes towards work more in keeping with the de- 
velopment of socialist consciousness? Preobrazhensky maintained that 
there had to be a gradual transition away from individual work incen- 
tives towards collective ones. He insisted that the piece-wage must 
go as soon as possible and that it was necessary to begin paying workers 
not according to their individual output, but in line with the output 
and relative efficiency of the plant or even branch of industry in 
which they worked. He advocated a system of collective bonuses, where, 
in addition to the individual wage, all of the workers in a section, 
plant, or industry would receive a bonus insofar as they economized on 
production costs, boosted output, improved quality, etc. He hoped that 
eventually all wages would be paid in this way. The objective, as it 
should be fairly clear, was to move workers away from a consciousness 
of themselves as part of a collective. Gradually the very incentive 
to work would change, and the next generation of workers would feel 
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responsible not to the individual job and their private remuneration, 
but to the entire factory or branch of production, i. e., to their fel- 
low workers. 
41 
Preobrazhensky repeated this argument in The New Economics, stat- 
ing that "socialist incentives to labor do not drop from heaven; they 
have to be developed through prolonged re-education of human nature as 
it has been shaped in commodity economy, re-education in the spirit of 
collective relations of production. " He warned that "the piece-wage 
system may at a certain moment begin to act as a brake on the new sys- 
tem of organizing labor and the education of people in new stimuli to 
labor, even where it is applicable technically. Undoubtedly, in pro- 
portion as the socialist elements in our economy are intensified we 
are brought up against the need to go over to a combined method of indi- 
vidual and collective payment and we can regard as certain a transition 
in the future to payment of the 'collective worker' instead of payment 
to the individual worker for an individual job of work. "42 His admoni- 
tions were fully justified. In the same passages he attacked the inac- 
tion of the leadership in implementing any sort of new wages policy. 
"We undoubtedly often copy capitalist relations even where this is not 
only not necessary in order to raise the productivity of labor but 
where such copying is directly harmful from the economic and cultural 
standpoint. " 
Yet even in the early stages of his thinking Preobrazhensky noted 
that such transitional forms of wage payments could eliminate only some 
of the inherent inequalities within the working class. Others would 
inevitably remain. There were, for instance, inequalities between more 
economically favored enterprises (those that were very productive, had 
special strategic importance, or could return to full output with lit- 
tle capital renewal) and those whose productivity was low. Obviously 
the workers in each of these would earn different incomes so long as 
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equal norms were applied. Likewise there would continue to exist in- 
equalities between workers who would be paid the same, but who had dif- 
ferent needs, e. g., married versus single workers. And of course there 
was the most basic inequality of all, in the division between skilled 
and unskilled workers. These inequalities, Preobrazhensky pointed out, 
went beyond the capacity of transitional methods of wage payments and 
labor incentives to solve them. Their solution lay in overall economic 
growth and the attainment of greater proportionality between the sec- 
tors of the economy--that is, the economy as a whole would have to 
overcome its basic poverty. 
The situation was very similar with regard to the family, which 
Preobrazhensky wrote about in on morality and Class Norms. In dealing, 
he said, with questions of personal behavior such as sexual relations, 
one had to be careful to distinguish between those aspects which had 
genuine public political consequences and those which were purely per- 
sonal and did not actually affect the struggle for socialism. Preobra- 
zhensky considered that the type of sexual relations that individuals 
entered into were just such questions of taste and could not be dictated 
from outside, provided that society could solve the problem of intro- 
ducing collective education and social upbringing of children. As for 
personal sexual relations, society would work out its own patterns of 
sexual conduct in the course of the transition. The matter was made 
all the more complicated, however, by the fact that people tended to 
pass off their personal preferences as universal political truths. A- 
gainst this Preobrazhensky maintained that once the question of person- 
al sexual relations was divorced from the social problem of the family 
and particularly the raising of children, these would cease to be of 
political concern to society. Thus he gave paramount importance to two 
questions: 1)Social responsibility for educating and rearing children 
and 2)the related question of the economic and political liberation of 
women. 
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Preobrazhensky insisted that communists must defend the principle 
of equality between the sexes in sharing responsibilities and social 
obligations. Under no circumstances could the major burden of educat- 
ing and raising children fall upon women workers, who were in, in fact, 
materially worse off than men. It is quite obvious that so long as wo- 
men remained tied to the household they could not participate fully as 
communists in the task of social reconstruction. Ideally society would 
be rich enough to afford a comprehensive system of social education 
and bringing up children. As in every other aspect of the society, new, 
socialist forms of education would be needed in order to produce future 
generations of socialist cadre. The problem in the Soviet Union was 
that these material resources did not exist, and such forms of social 
education could only remain embryonic. Given this fact, Preobrazhensky 
said, the family would continue as a primary unit of raising children, 
with the result that within the household these responsibilities must 
be shared equally between women and men. 
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This is where Preobrazhensky left the matter, but the dilemma he 
posed here is revealing. If the society were wealthy enough to social- 
ize education and child rearing, then the personal relations between 
men and women would, at least to a significant extent, lose their pol- 
itical character. They would continue as questions of "personal taste" 
until such time as society had evolved new types of personal relations 
in line with its other new forms of economic and social organization. 
But in the Soviet Union this could not happen. Precisely because it 
did not have the resources to socialize education, personal and family 
relations between the sexes retained a social function, as under capi- 
talism. What should have been relegated to the essentially non-politi- 
cal realm of free choice and experimentation could not be. Once again 
a real qualitative break with bourgeois modes of behavior was not ma- 
terially possible, and would not be possible until the society had ac- 
quired sufficient economic wealth. 
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Of all the examples we could cite from these early writings to 
show how closely the persistance of bourgeois patterns of behavior and 
bourgeois consciousness were linked to the country's poverty, the most 
politically important is undoubtedly Preobrazhensky's discussion of the 
internal life of the party (again in On Morality and Class Norms). 
Here Preobrazhensky went out of his way to attack two ailments in par- 
ticular: The pervasiveness of lying and deception within party ranks, 
and the emerging bureaucratism associated with material inequalities 
and privileges. This aspect of Preobrazhensky's work is hardly sur- 
prising, since it clearly went hand in hand with the political fight 
the Left was preparing at this same time. 
As to the first of these, the propensity of party members and 
other government officials to deceive one another as a more or less com- 
mon practice, Preobrazhensky drew the distinction between conduct which 
may have been necessary before the revolution, and that which is per- 
missable during the period of socialist construction. When the party 
operated under conditions of clandestinity then obviously members had 
to resort to all kinds of ruses and lies in order to advance the strug- 
gle and keep the movement intact. But what might have been unavoidable 
then was now impermissable in relations within the working class and 
between communists. This was far more than a question of "re-educat- 
ing" the working class: It was a serious problem within the party it- 
self. And it was here, inside the party and among the vanguard of the 
working class that the effort to do away with this especially pernici- 
ous legacy of capitalism had to begin. Preobrazhensky's prognosis of 
what would happen if matters continued to drift in this sphere is most 
interesting. On the one hand, economic efficiency would be impossible. 
When you had, as he described, people within the state apparatus fab- 
ricating statistics and tables as a matter of course, and simply having 
no sense of responsibility for the veracity of their word, the economy 
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simply could not function. On the other hand, such behavior could only 
lead to profound demoralization within the ranks of the party and work- 
ing class. In light of the Soviet Union's subsequent development and 
the institutionalized misinformation that passes from plant level to 
the center, we can appreciate Preobrazhensky's insight. Here again 
was an instance of the worst bourgeois habits directly impeding the 
development of a socialist economy. 
Related to the question of lying and deception was that of mater- 
ial inequality, graft, and corruption within the party and state mach- 
ine. Preobrazhensky rejected what he termed reactionary cries for the 
blanket levelling of standards of living, arguing that any analysis of 
the question had to start from what could actually be achieved in the 
given material conditions, and not from some abstract principle. He 
went on, however, to make a strong attack on the growth of inequality 
within the party, which had far exceeded what was called for by the need 
to sustain the party's most important cadre, and which posed the danger 
of a bureaucratic degeneration. 
Thus as regards the situation within the working class as a whole 
this protest against inequality is in essence a protest against 
the fact that socialism grows out of capitalism. This protest is 
reactionary if at its basis lies a striving for a petty bourgeois 
equality which takes no account of the needs of production. It 
can be progressive to the extent that it represents a protest on 
the part of the growing socialist consciousness of the workers 
against the residue of capitalist relations and is directed above 
all against those forms of inequality which in no way arise out 
of the necessities of production... This inequality within the 
communist party and the privileged position of certain of its 
layers, which goes far beyond the bounds of the purely physical 
protection of the party's most important cadre from exhaustion, 
is extraordinarily harmful in that it can lead to a struggle to 
maintain these privileged positions, to the ossification of the 
tissue of the party, to careerism, and to the bureaucratic degen- 
eration [chinovnichee pererozhdenie] of certain party layers. 
This process will be all the more dangerous as increasing numbers 
of newly-trained youth pour into leading posts within the party 
and Soviet apparatus and as these forces encounter an opposition 
that isinnoway dictated by the interests of socialist construction. 
44 
It is worth observing that what Preobrazhensky did not warn against here 
was the fact that these youth who did take up party and state jobs 
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would not necessarily be trained and educated to defend "the interests 
of socialist construction, " but would themselves enter into a bureauc- 
ratic structure where they would enjoy--and learn to defend--a privileg- 
ed position. 
The unifying thread of all these examples--wages, the family, and 
internal party life--is that none of the problems they refer to could 
be resolved in an environment of scarcity and where the working class 
was in a position to exercise control over the reconstruction process. 
Man's consciousness, as Marx emphasized time and again in The German 
Ideology, is molded by the way he is organized to satisfy his material 
needs. In these terms the Soviet Union was clearly contradictory, as 
we attempted to show in the preceding section. The state sector was 
compelled towards greater planning, greater socialization of production, 
and ultimately towards greater self-consciousness of its own paths of 
development. Yet it was also forced to organize production and to or- 
ganize labor in ways that were incompatible with socialism, but which 
were borrowed from its capitalist past or were imposed upon it by its 
encirclement, both internally and abroad. State industry worked not 
just for itself, but for the peasant and international markets. And 
to 
so it had/distribute its resources accordingly. It could not even be- 
gin to produce strictly for human need. At the same time, even where 
it did produce for itself it had to organize labor power largely accord- 
ing to capitalist methods. Up until 1924 Preobrazhensky did not really 
treat this antagonism as an integral contradiction of the Soviet sys- 
tem, although he had both identified its individual aspects and analyz- 
ed them in some detail. Because he was speaking largely hypothetical- 
ly, because he was using "descriptive" accounts to actually advocate a 
political position inside the party, he assumed, at least on the surf- 
ace, that these problems would be overcome. His aim, we think, was to 
defend and fortify a very basic Marxist principle within the party: 
-61- 
Socialist development in the Soviet Union had certain fundamental eco- 
nomic and political prerequisites, specifically the industrialization 
of both industry and agriculture and a simultaneous, but dependent, re- 
shaping of the "human material" that had to carry out this task. 
It is true that matters advanced very slowly in this respect [the 
institution of the collective wage system], because the triumph 
of the new form of wages was closely connected, as we have already 
said, with a growth in the level of culture and consciousness of 
the working class which was not attained in a few years. How dif- 
ficult was the advance in this direction can be seen from the fact 
that we have still not acieved communist distribution. 45 Here it 
is a question of transforming the human character in the expecta- 
tion that there will come to be done by instinct what was former- 
ly done by compulsion or by the promise of material reward, or 
else was an act of collective enthusiasm and self-scrifice. The 
replacement of one generation by another, and a new system of ed- 
ucation, was needed before the new collective man could replace 
the individualist of the period of commodity production. The 
moment when collective incentives become dominant in the working 
class, as compared with individual incentives, is a triumphant 
moment in the building of socialism, of no less importance for the 
future than the socialization of the instruments of production. 46 
Preobrazhensky repeated this theme in On Morality and Class Norms: 
This revolution in public opinion, with which the revolution in 
norms of behavior is connected, has a colossal significance. The 
construction of socialism in those areas which concern man, his 
habits, his instincts, class norms, this construction begins with 
the beginning of this revolution in the psychology of the average 
worker-organizer. Now the industry of the workers' state begins 
to acquire the worker it deserves, without whom it is not social- 
ist industry. 47 
It would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of these 
passages. For a long time in the Marxist movement, and in the Trotsky- 
ist movement in particular, there has been a tendency to equate "the 
productive forces" with the means of production, and to perceive the 
working class as standing outside and apart from the latter as a so- 
called "subjective factor. " This introduces a specious and politically 
dangerous dichotomy between the so-called "objective factors" (the pro- 
ductive forces-qua-means of production and the historical presence of 
the working class) and the "subjective factors" (i. e., the conscious- 
ness of the working class) in revolutionary politics. Thus being is 
counterposed to consciousness. Such formulations beg the questions of 
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how this consciousness is formed in the first place and its relation- 
ship to the way in which the working class is organized around the 
means of production. At the same time it excludes the working class 
as an active agent in actually defining the stage of development the 
productive forces have attained at any given moment in history; it need 
only be "convinced" of the necessity of revolution and events will take 
care of themselves. Trotsky himself made a number of such statements, 
which has left a rather unfortunate political legacy--although Trotsky's 
own politics implicitly contained an altogether different conception 
of the relation between consciousness and praxis. 48 Although Preobra- 
zhensky referred, both in The New Economics and his 1927 article, to 
the rudimentary level of class consciousness impeding the development 
of the productive forces, he elsewhere carefully defined the productive 
forces as embracing both means of production and the proletariat. 
49 
Therefore, both in a formal linguistic sense and in his usage of his 
terminology in the passages cited above (in addition to numerous others), 
Preobrazhensky explicitly denied this duality between the activity of 
the working class and the way it is organized in relation to the means 
of production, on the one hand, and its consciousness of that activity 
on the other. The productive forces are not synonimous with the means 
of production, but encompass the proletariat as an active, and not as 
a passive agent. Any talk about the "development of the productive 
forces" must therefore include the proletariat and its level of class 
consciousness. Otherwise we have no way of differentiating the parti- 
cular stages through which capitalism and the class struggle pass. 
This is not to say, as some Maoists maintain, that class consciousness 
is "a productive force. " Quite the contrary. It is the working class, 
as the embodiment of human labor power, that is a productive force, 
and its class consciousness is one of its defining characteristics. 
This is especially true under socialism, where the development of class 
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consciousness must be a consciously-articulated aim of the workers' 
state. Socialism cannot be conceived as consisting of the development 
of the means of production alone--no Marxist could take such a view-- 
but only in terms of the development of the productive forces as a 
whole, that is, the material and human resources of society simultane- 
ously. If the lack of correspondence between the development of the 
human and technical aspects of the productive forces is too great, if 
the material resources do not exist or if, conversely, the working 
class's relation to them is structured in such a way that "the new col- 
lective man, " as Preobrazhensky called it, does not emerge, the transi- 
tion to socialism will be bottled up and will flounder. 
III-c. The Impossibility of Socialism In One Country 
Although Preobrazhensky insisted upon and defended Marx's position 
on the indissoluble and organic connection between consciousness and 
the material basis of man's economic and social existence, it is doubt- 
ful, at least judging from his writings of 1922-23, that he considered 
the Soviet Union incapable of solving the specific contradictions en- 
gendered by this inter-relationship. His works from these years have 
an almost strict logicality to them that caused him to pose the Soviet 
Union's dead end primarily in economic terms. 
Allowing that industrialization was the precondition for socialism, 
his argument then turned on showing that this was impossible under Sov- 
iet conditions. Industry, after all, could not revolutionize itself 
without sufficient resources from agriculture. Yet agriculture was 
itself the most backward sector of the economy. The economy was there- 
fore caught in a vicious cirLte. Industry could not provide agricul- 
ture with the technical means to lift it out of its semi-feudal methods 
of production; and agriculture could give industry neither adequate 
foodstuffs and raw materials for sustained accumulation in the state 
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sector nor an export fund of a size needed to purchase means of produc- 
tion abroad. The conclusion followed almost automatically for Preobra- 
zhensky that revolution in the advanced capitalist West was the only 
way out for the Soviet Union. 
Beginning in 1924, the time of publication of the first extracts 
of The New Economics, this analysis began to change--not in detail or 
even in structure, but in the central role the problems of culture and 
class consciousness now occupied among the basic contradictions within 
Soviet society. It was in The New Economics that Preobrazhensky detail- 
ed what he considered the conflict between the "automatic, quantitat- 
ively-increasing reproduction of socialist production relations" embod- 
ied in the law of primitive socialist accumulation, and "the quality 
of socialist relations" which would be retarded by the demands of 
accumulation. 
The law of primitive socialist accumulation, in so far as it reg- 
ulates the level of wages in the state economy, conceals within 
itself an internal contradiction. As the law which expresses all 
the conscious and elemental tendencies towards increasing the tempo 
of expanded reproduction in collective state economy, it is there- 
by the law of development of socialist production relations gener- 
ally . But, on the other hand, as the law of the restriction of 
wages in the interests of socialist accumulation it restricts the 
tempo of transformation of wages into the consumers' ration of the 
worker in socialist economy, a transformation which, ever since 
the instruments of labor have been socialized, is assisted by a 
rapid increase in wages, because that leads both to the divorce 
of wages from the value of labor power and to the material pre- 
condition for the development of socialist, proletarian culture. 
This internal contradiction of the law results entirely from its 
historically transitional character. The tendency to overcome the 
category of wages, that is, the tendency to intensify the quality 
of production relations, comes into contradiction with the tenden- 
cy to quantitative extension of the territory of the state econo- 
my and its production relations in their present form, that is, 
production relations at an extremely low stage of development in 
their socialist character. Already the term "primitive socialist 
accumulation" expresses this dual nature of the law; the adjec- 
tive "socialist" comes into contradiction with the noun "accumula- 
tion" to which it is bound not only grammatically but also in the 
real historical process. SO 
Just after this, Preobrazhensky was to go even further, in the article, 
"Economic Equilibrium in the System of the USSR" (VKA 22), which we 
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have referred to on several occasions: "If the growth of socialist 
culture lags behind the development of the productive forces of the 
collective sector of the economy, this lag itself can become an obstac- 
le to the further development of the productive forces. "51 This obvi- 
ously led to an impasse. If raising the level of culture of the pro- 
letariat is a condition for being able to reconstruct the economy on 
a modern footing, while the latter is at the same time a prerequisite 
for the development of socialist culture, then clearly there was no 
possible way forward. Yet it is important to keep in mind that the 
"cul de sac" had relevance only within the context of the Soviet Union's 
isolation--it could not break out of the circle if left to its own 
resources. 
This argument was of course consistent with Preobrazhensky's em- 
phasis on the "qualitative" aspect of production relations and his gen- 
eral conception of socialism. As such it mirrored his analysis of the 
industrial contradictions which he also concluded were inaccessible to 
solution without the intervention of the Western proletariat. 
What is essential here is that the economic and political strands 
of Preobrazhensky's argument had become inextricably meshed together. 
The New Economics, in spite of its abstractness, is a highly political 
work. Nearly half its pages are devoted to polemics against Preobra- 
zhensky's various opponents, and it is through these that he refines 
and elaborates many points of basic theory contained in the main text. 
Even the latter has this consistently polemical undertone--and small 
wonder. For The New Economics, while being a tentative step in con- 
structing a theoretical analysis of the Soviet economy, is at the same 
time a statement about the politics of the transition. It is a "neg- 
ative" politics, to be sure, in that it is largely an attack against 
what roust not be done if socialism is to be possible. But there is 
an unmistakable theoretical depth to this book that none of his earlier 
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works possess, something that can only be explained by the political 
struggle that was coming to a head at this same time. 
Theoretically this had two consequences. First, it compelled Pre- 
obrazhensky to explicitly link the purpose of industrialization with 
the means for carrying it out. He did this by locating the question 
of the development of class consciousness within the abolition of the 
of 
division of labor and the generalization/knowledge throughout the work- 
ing class, and by demonstrating how the failure to effect these two 
tasks was concurrently the result of continued economic backwardness 
and a cause of its prolongation. 
This situation [the divisions and inequalities within the working 
class] is connected with the heterogeneity of the working class 
as regards the management of industry, its heterogeneity in tech- 
nical training, organizing abilities, and so on. The new system 
receives this heterogeneity as a legacy from capitalism, and it 
can abolish it gradually, as the productivity of labor rises, as 
the cultural and technical training of the entire mass rises on 
the basis of the new educational system and the development of the 
system of workers' democracy in all spheres of leadership and 
management; finally, on the basis of a quite conscious struggle 
against tendencies toward conservatism and stagnation. The exist- 
ing material inequality and the comparative slowness of the rise 
of the general mass of the working class to the level of the or- 
ganizing cadres result not from the present structure of production 
relations, they persist in spite of this structure, and they will 
be abolished as the hard-set division by occupations is eliminated, 
as the gap between science and labor is abolished, as there passes 
away that "enslaving subordination of the individual to the divi- 
sion of labor, " inherited from bourgeois soý_ýety, of which Marx 
spoke in his Critique of the Gotha Program. 
So long as the division of labor persisted and the movement towards its 
supercession was so ephemeral, reification and fetishism would continue 
to characterize the social relations in the USSR, and the progress of 
the working class towards socialist consciousness would be cut short. 
Transcending the division of labor is, then, both a political and an 
economic problem. In the first case, a certain development of the 
means of production was required before there could be a general sys- 
tem of proletarian education and before the country could do away with 
the differentiation between skilled and unskilled workers. Only then, 
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for instance, would it be possible to rotate jobs and eliminate rigid 
occupational divisions within the economy and state apparatus, as well 
as do away with the material privileges that accompanied them. Conver- 
sely, Preobrazhensky warned, "the congealing of cadre and occupational 
divisions can be a consequence of the checking or slow development of 
the productive forces. "63 
If material inequality and the division of labor persist during 
the transition period this, we would argue, expresses above all else 
the fact that society is still encumbered with, in Preobrazhensky's 
words, a "de facto inequality as regards possession of knowledge, 
technical information, and organizing experience. " Hence the primary 
task is for knowledge to be generalized and made the "property" of the 
entire working class. Behind this lies the fundamental assumption that 
knowledge is public and is potentially accessible to every member of 
ýf - 
the working class. Without this assumption both the proletarian revo- 
lution and socialism are unthinkable. And without it the struggle of 
the Left against Stalin is reduced--as the bourgeois voyeurs of this 
period reduce it--to a debate over economic policy. Once put in these 
terms the argument about transcending the division of labor becomes im- 
mediately political. Along with the augmentation of social wealth there 
must be proletarian democracy and a struggle against bureaucratization. 
No matter how highly skilled the working class, if the division of 
labor and reified social relations remain entrenched in the society, 
without proletarian democracy the working class could never generalize 
the knowledge that each individual or each sector of the class had ac- 
quired out of their experience and practice. Knowledge would not be 
the public possession of the class as a whole and, what is more, the 
class would have no means to act upon that knowledge in order to control 
its own destiny. The inability to generalize and act upon this know- 
ledge makes its further acquisition fragmented and haphazard at the 
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precise moment when the major task is to make this process self-con- 
scious and systematic. The validity of this view is amply demonstrat- 
ed by the Soviet Union today, where there is a skilled and relatively 
well-educated working class, but where the regime is able to rely on 
overt political repression and the atomization of the proletariat to 
maintain its domination. 
The political battles of the Left had a second profound effect 
upon Preobrazhensky's theoretical evolution, namely its methodological 
refinement and its use as a weapon in the political struggle. 
Even though he had discussed the conflict between the law of val- 
ue and the logic of planned production as early as 1921, The New Eco- 
nomics is the first place where Preobrazhensky actually tried to work 
out the laws of development of Soviet society and to elaborate the pro- 
a 
cesses whereby production relations of/particular, socialist type would 
be reproduced. What were the laws of their reproduction; what contra- 
dictions arise from within these laws or out of their conflict with 
those regulating other systems of production? In taking up these ques- 
tions Preobrazhensky was attempting to do for the Soviet economy what 
Marx had done in the first two volumes of capital, though Preobrazhen- 
sky's effort was a good deal more modest. No matter how seemingly 
"technical" Marx's discussion becomes, e. g., in his treatment of the 
reproduction schemes in Volume II, he is at all times showing that the 
regularities of capitalist production are not simply technical (though 
they certainly have a technical dimension, as does any system of social 
production), but govern the reproduction of capitalist social relations. 
Marx employs the reproduction schemes to show how wage labor is con- 
stantly reproduced, to reappear on the market with each new production 
cycle as wage labor. Similarly with capital, and how the capitalist 
class is reproduced cycle after cycle in its social relation to wage 
labor. What emerges from Marx's discussion is a sense of the constancy 
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of bourgeois social relations and an understanding of the connection 
between their reproduction and that of the economy. In The New Econom- 
ics Preobrazhensky undertook an analysis of the same order and set out 
to define the regularities of the economic processes at work within the 
society and to show how they gave rise to the reproduction of very def- 
finite social relations. The difference is that The New Economics, much 
more so than Capital, is about social change and how the society will 
have to develop in the future if the given social relations--which are 
not socialist--are to evolve into socialist ones. 
The original political and economic problems of his previous works 
still preoccupied and guided Preobrazhensky's thinking. This is un- 
deniable. But there was now a further problem, the deeper and more 
abstract one of formulating a theory of the Soviet economy and of giv- 
ing that theory an analytical framework. In short, it was only in The 
New Economics that Preobrazhensky began to articulate his method. Had 
he not done this the theory of the Soviet economy that he was working 
out could not have developed beyond certain limits. From the political 
point of view, without making his theory more abstract and his method 
explicit the theory could not have been generalized and made acces- 
sible to others. His students would not have been able to see where 
it had come from, nor would they have been able to use it to arrive at 
similar and consequent conclusions on their own. In addition, unless 
the method had been articulated in this manner the theory would not have 
been adaptable and capable of changing to meet new, historically evolv- 
ing stages in the Soviet Union's development. 
Preobrazhensky was quite aware that his theory of the Soviet tran- 
sition was itself part of the process of educating the working class 
and providing it with the tools it would need to construct socialism. 
Its usefulness resided in the fact that it was capable of generaliza- 
tion, i. e., that it was communicable and therefore the potential 
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property of others, who would use it for political ends. This in turn 
was conditioned by the fact that under the dictatorship of the prole- 
tariat the concepts of law, development, and regularity all undergo a 
profound change: They now have a conscious element of them, as we ar- 
gued at the outset of our discussion of Preobrazhensky's theory of the 
transition. Capitalism could drive feudalism from the historical stage 
in complete spontaneity and in virtual oblivion of its own inner work- 
ings. This is not true of the proletarian state. The outcome of the 
transition period is not given in advance, but depends on the conscious 
policies of the proletariat. If the working class in the Soviet Union 
did not understand how petty production functioned and how it interact- 
ed and conflicted with the state economy, the state would not be in a 
position to control this process. This does not mean that the regular- 
ities of the economy would not operate simply because the state didn't 
recognize them. That would be absurd. The peasant market would still 
exert its pressures upon state industry; the latter would still have 
crises of disproportionality which would stifle its growth. The dif- 
ference is that these regularities would then make themselves felt 
blindly, after the fact. The workers' state would always be reacting 
to events, and not anticipating them. It is clear, therefore, that 
Preobrazhensky's theory of primitive socialist accumulation both un- 
covered the need for self-consciousness in the transition period and 
attempted to introduce that self-consciousness in order to ensure its 
socialist result. 
This, however, did not solve the question of who this conscious 
agent was to be. Here we come up against the basic dilemma of Trotsky- 
ism in the Soviet twenties, namely that the platform of the Left Opposi- 
tion presupposed itself. Its prior implementation was a condition for 
its adoption. The rationale behind industrialization was that, by in- 
creasing its numerical size and preparing it politically to take charge 
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of the party and the state, it would provide the proletariat with the 
means to control society. This is also why the struggle against the 
bureaucracy and industrialization program were inseparable. But the 
Left could only win such a struggle within a party that was already 
democratic and had a class conscious proletarian base. As such the 
Left was in an intractable position: The party that could have debated 
the Left's platform and given it the rational assessment that proletar- 
ian democracy presupposes simply did not exist. Rather the Left had 
to wage its fight within a party that was bureaucratized to the point 
where decisions were not made rationally and with the conscious inter- 
ests of socialism and the international revolution in mind, but on the 
basis of self-interest--in the first case that of the bureaucratic 
strata that comprised Stalin's base of power, and in the second of 
those who had political positions to protect, old scores to settle, etc. 
Given the very nature of its struggle, the Left could only have 
triumphed had it access to a mass base in the working class and if that 
base could have exercized the power to put its decisions into practice. 
For this the Left would have had to go outside the party and form its 
own revolutionary organization, which was something it could neither 
have seen the necessity for nor had the means to do at that time. 
In effect the Left could only have appealled to the bureaucracy to 
reform itself and to adopt policies that would eventually have meant 
an end to the latter's authority and ii luence. If the Left found it- 
self in such a position it was not simply because the Stalin group con- 
the party machine. The latter was only possible because the trolled 
proletariat was too weak in numbers, too politically young, and too 
culturally backward to challenge the bureaucracy and defend the gains 
of October against usurpation. The sophistication of the Left's program 
demanded a working class of equal maturity, experience in political 
struggle, and education to understand precisely what was at stake. This 
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task was incompatible with a proletariat that was recruited directly 
from the countryside and whose attitudes were still rooted in a petty- 
craft mentality. 
Any "dispute" over Preobrazhensky's attitude towards the question 
of socialism in one country can finally be laid to rest. Even in "Eco- 
nomic Equilibrium in the System of the USSR, " where his argument had 
taken on an overtly technical character, Preobrazhensky stated plainly 
that all economic disequilibria were at the same time social and affect- 
ed the Soviet Union's ability to reproduce social relations of a social- 
ist type. It was here that he included the acquisition of proletarian 
culture and socialist consciousness as one of the central conditions 
for seeing the society through its period of primitive socialist accu- 
mulation. 
54 Yet, as we also stated, and will develop in great detail 
in the rest of this thesis, his evaluation of the state of the Soviet 
economy had become extremely sober. What we have tried to show so far, 
however, is that the "economic" contradictions within the society were 
at all times highly political. 
One of the central themes of this Introduction has been that the 
law of value did not introduce distortions into the Soviet economy merely 
from the outside, but made its influence felt within state production 
as well. We also noted that these legacies of bourgeois society were 
in no way ephemeral but permeated to the very core of state production 
relations. There they coexisted and conflicted with the logic of state 
planned production, which demanded that they be ousted and replaced by 
socialist production relations. We have tried to show that there was 
no way in which the Soviet economy alone could have eradicated these 
bourgeois forms. They were too deeply implanted in the consciousness 
of the working class (and, of course, even more so in the peasantry) 
and were perpetuated by the need to employ capitalist methods of pro- 
duction, by the privileges of the non-socialist specialists, and by the 
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bureaucracy which was rapidly entrenching itself. We should make it 
clear that we do not mean this in a tactical sense. The tactical er- 
rors and misassessments of Trotsky in particular, not to mention those 
of the Bolsheviks before Lenin's death, might, if avoided, have caused 
the struggle for the succession to have gone in another direction, in 
favor of the Marxists. In an historical perspective, however, unless 
the USSR had broken its isolation--something that would have been far 
more likely if the Left had managed to win out over the Stalin group-- 
it is difficult to imagine that some form of degeneration could have 
been avoided. The crucial difference would have been that the party 
would have been better equipped to anticipate events and steer clear 
of the excesses that in large part arose from Stalin's perpetual need 
to react pragmatically to individual situations after they had gone 
out of control. Still, the social and material foundations of social- 
ism would not have existed, and it is hard to see even the Marxists 
holding out for any protracted period of time before the emergence of 
a politically powerful bureaucracy. Engels' famous dictum about the 
party that comes to power before the social basis for its rule has 
been established would have found its relevance once again. 
If the Soviet Union could somehow have miraculously industrial- 
ized overnight this situation would not have appreciably altered. Its 
isolation in the midst of a hostile capitalist environment would have 
continued to impose certain scarcities and a need to produce for the 
capitalist world market. The monopoly of foreign trade would have per- 
mitted the state to control these relations, but the latter would still 
have had to adjust production and its internal division of labor in some 
way or another to this market. At the same time the exigencies of de- 
fense and the rigid divisions within the society in terms of access to 
technical knowledge would have exerted strong bureaucratic pressures. 
Nor would industrialization have brought with it any automatic 
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awakening of the working class or the lifting of the masses out of that 
feudal past "that had been overthrown but not yet overcome. " This could 
only have taken place gradually. For a very long time, for generations 
perhaps, there would still have been a need for a "moral" and political 
guardian of the class's historical interests, namely a revolutionary 
Marxist party which would have overseen the society's advance towards 
modernization and full proletarian democracy. We would argue, however, 
that such a party cannot avoid degneration, either under capitalism or 
in the transition period, without a class conscious proletarian base, 
regardless of whether or not it must rely on bourgeois specialists or 
accord non-socialist or even party workers special privileges. Once the 
fulfillment of certain functions or the possession of technical knowledge 
becomes fixed in the hands of a few, the perpetuation of rigidity can 
only be blocked through control from the bottom. There can be no ques- 
tion of relying on a bureaucracy to carry out those political and eco- 
nomic decisions that might lead to socialism, as these will in the 
long run threaten its own interests. 
Preobrazhensky never articulated the problem in terms of a bureau- 
cratic degeneration that would take power away from the proletariat for 
the simple reason that this outcome was unforeseeable in the 1920's. 
It was only in the mid-thirties that Trotsky was willing to commit him- 
self to the viewpoint that a non-proletarian stratum had appropriated 
control over Soviet society and that the bureaucracy was an outgowth 
of production relations that were in many ways still fundamentally bour- 
geois. By that time Preobrazhensky, for whatever personal and politi- 
cal reasons, and along with a large number of Oppositionists, had made 
his uneasy peace with the new ruling apparatus. Nevertheless, by ap- 
plying Preobrazhensky's method in an examination of the production re- 
lations of Soviet society, and by incorporating into that analysis his 
own theory of the role of class consciousness and culture in the Soviet 
-74- 
transition period, we are necessarily led beyond the Soviet Union to 
the revolution in the capitalist West. The inherently socialist ten- 
dencies in the Soviet economy could only have gained the ascendancy 
over the law of value if the proletariat itself could have acquired 
direct political control over this process. By 1923 it was unlikely 
that the Soviet working class could have done so. Only the Western 
proletariat could have overseen that transitional process that might 
have led to socialism in the USSR. 
*** 
This concludes our all-too-sketchy account of the backgound of 
Preobrazhensky's theory of the transitional society. To elaborate his 
method would have required, as we cautioned in our Preface, a thesis 
certainly as long as the present one. We have chosen to try and il- 
lustrate the essential components of it instead. We will now turn to 
another aspect of Preobrazhensky's writings which have also received 
inadequate attention: His analysis of expanding reproduction in the 
commodity-socialist economy of the USSR during the New Economic Policy. 
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PART I 
MARX'S REPRODUCTION SCHEMES AND THE ANALYSIS OF A MIXED ECONOMY 
CHAPTER 1 
CIRCULATION AND SIMPLE REPRODUCTION 
I. Marx's Three Formulae for the Circulation of Industrial Capital 
In the opening of Volume II of Capital Marx analyzes the three 
forms by which industrial capital circulates. Industrial capital for 
Marx is that which engages directly in production, i. e., as opposed to 
merchant capital, ownership of land, finance capital, etc., forms which, 
in the last instance, draw their income out of the surplus value gener- 
ated in production proper. If we look at the three forms through which 
capital is "metamorphosed" we will see a)that there can be three and 
only three formulae for the expression of circulation, and b)that these 
forms, and the reproduction process as a whole, are historically speci- 
fic--that is, they pertain only to capitalist production. 
First there is the formula for money capital. This derives direct- 
ly from the basic relationship Marx derived in Volume I of Capital, that 
of money-transformed into commodities-transformed back into money. 
This is the familiar formula, M-C-M'--money invested in commodities 
which are then transformed into more money. 
' But now the formula for 
circulation must encompass the entire production process. It goes: 
M-C... P... C'-M' 
Money purchases commodities. Only now this is not just money in ab- 
stract, and these are not just any commodities. This is money which 
functions as money capital, i. e., as the money form of the capital 
relationship, of the expansion of value. As for the commodities, they 
are also very specific. The capitalist with money capital doesn't use 
the money to purchase items for his personal consumption. He uses them 
to purchase first, means of production (machines, plant, raw materials, 
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intermediary products, fuel, etc. ) and, second, labor power. In short, 
he converts the money into productive capital. So, the full form of 
the first half of the circuit is really: 
- LP M-C-MP P... 
The capitalist goes out on the market with money, as the potential pur- 
chaser of commodities. There he finds means of production (MP) and 
labor power (LP). We should add that it is only when he finds these 
commodities and actually buys them that his money functions as money 
capital. Up till then it is only potentially money capital. In any 
case, this is not the main point. Once the capitalist has found his 
two elements of productive capital, he can set them to work in the pro- 
cess of production. The P in our scheme represents productive capital; 
and the dots on either side indicate that the process of circulation is 
interrupted while MP and LP function as productive capital in the pro- 
duction process. 
What emerges from this production process is a new quantity of com- 
modities. In their physical form these will be entirely different from 
the commodities that our capitalist purchased. This will depend on what 
branch of production our capitalist is engaged in. They might be ma- 
chines (though only by coincidence would they be the same type of ma- 
chines that he initially bought), they might be shoes, they might be 
jute, or what have you. They are his commodity-product, the product 
that the labor power he has purchased has produced but which he, as a 
capitalist, appropriates for his own use and sale. 
Sale here is the key word. For if the capitalist is to be a real 
capitalist, and not a one-shot sensation, he will have to ensure that 
his production can continue. The commodities he has in hand do not 
allow that. They have the wrong shape. So he must sell them. He must 
transform them back into money, for as money, which is the universal 
equivalent of value, he can once again go out on the market and purchase 
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new means of production and new labor power. 
There is one thing, however, peculiar about these commodities that 
emerge from production. Not only is their form different from the or- 
iginal commodities the capitalist bought, but so is their value. The 
original value of the means of production has been transferred to the 
commodities in the course of production. And the labor power has added 
more. 
a new value equal to its own. But it has also added something/ It has 
added surplus value. It has augmented the value of the original cap- 
ital. C has, via the production process, become C' (or, to follow Marx, 
the original value of C, plus an increment, c; C' =C+ c). Thus when 
the commodity-product--which now exists as the capitalist's commodity 
capital, that is, as his capital-value tied up in the form of commodi- 
ties--is sold it does not bring in simply the initial value, M, but 
M augmented by surplus value, M' (i. e., M+ m). The capitalist now is 
truly a capitalist. He has invested money, which was temporarily tied 
up in production, and has got out of it a greater sum than he put in. 
Now, in this circulation process of the money capital, the origin- 
al capital-value has at all times remained in the hands of the capital- 
ist. He has always possessed some repository of value equal to that of 
his first sum. At the start it had the form of money; from there it 
took that of commodities, but the particular commodities that could 
function as productive capital, namely means of production and labor 
power; the intervening production process saw these transformed into 
still other commodities, a commodity-product, which functioned as com- 
modity capital; and finally, through their sale these commodities once 
again became money, where the entire process could begin again. And, 
as an added bonus (or so it seems to our capitalist, who understands 
little other than that he has invested a certain sum of money and has 
come out with more of it) there is now an increment, surplus value, 
over and above what our man began with. 
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Marx termed the money formula as the most typical form of capital- 
it 
ist production. For as money capital/reveals most clearly of all the 
compelling drive behind capitalist production: The self-expansion of 
value. And because money is the general form of value this process of 
value expansion appears as the basic process of money-making, which is 
the only way in which the capitalist perceives his activities. The 
fact that none of this could happen without the intervention of produc- 
tion, without the application of labor power to means of production, 
is lost sight of. Money is both the beginning and the end of the 
process. 
2 
What of the other two forms of circulation? Aside from money cap- 
ital, capital-value takes on two other functional forms: Productive 
capital and commodity capital. It is these, which are based in the 
real process of value-creation (i. e., production) on the one hand, and 
in the material result of that process (i. e., commodities), on the 
other, that we must oppose to the illusory formula of money capital. 
The circuit for productive capital is precisely the opposite of 
that for money capital. It goes: 
P... C'-M'-C... P 
Whereas production was an interruption in the process of circula- 
tion in the circuit M... MI, circulation is here an interruption in the 
process of production. It is only as productive capital that capital 
can actually give rise to value-creation and, more important for the 
capitalist, value-expansion. The capitalist begins with productive 
capital, that is, means of production and labor power. These give rise, 
out of the process of production, to the commodity-product, C', which 
is now the capitalist's capital existing as commodity capital. But 
in this form they are, as we saw in examining M... M', completely unsuit- 
able for the renewal of the productive process. The commodities must 
be sold for money. And as before, this money can be broken down into 
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two components. The first is the renewal of the value of the original 
productive capital, P. P's value is embodied in a quantity of commodi- 
ties whose value is C; and in addition the production process has yield- 
ed surplus value, first in the form of an increment to C, c, and then 
after the sale of C', in the form of an increment to M, m. Thus the 
formula really looks like: 
CM-C (L & MP) ... P P... C' +- M' + 
cm-c 
This looks a bit complicated, but it is not really so difficult to fol- 
low. C' is converted into M'. This much is straightforward. M' in 
turn represents two magnitudes: M, which contains the value of the 
original productive capital; and m, which contains the value of the 
surplus value. The capitalist then takes the first of these, M, and 
returns to the market and purchases labor power and means of production 
--that is, he purchases commodities, but commodities that are specific- 
ally suited to serve as a replacement for his initial productive cap- 
ital. Thus M is transformed into C (L F MP), which serve as a renewal 
of P. But the capitalist also has his surplus value, represented by 
m. He devotes these to his personal consumption. Thus he takes the 
money, m, and buys commodities, c. But these commodities can be any of 
a whole range of commodities that he can individually consume. 
As a result we see an interesting thing. The capitalist advances 
a quantity of value equal to P, the value of his productive capital. 
This functions in the process of production, gives rise to a commodity- 
product, which is then sold for money, which is then used to buy more 
commodities which restore the value of the productive capital in their 
original functional form. He advances a value equal to P and at the 
end he gets back a value equal to P. But he also gets something more. 
Not only has he restored his initial value of P (and in a shape that 
can once again serve to produce more commodities), but he has also wound 
up with an additional quantity of commodities for his personal susten- 
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ance. He has appropriated surplus value. He advances P, and receives 
at the end not only P but something extra to live on. This formula, 
P... P, then, expresses the real driving force of capitalist production 
--the generation of surplus value out of the process of production. 
If we look at our formula a little closer, we see that this is the 
formula for simple reproduction. Production in the next year stays on 
the same scale as the year before. The capitalists have consumed their 
entire surplus value. Production gives rise to more value than when 
it began, but it continues at the previous level. The productive cap- 
ital is not increased. All the surplus value is consumed individual- 
ly by the capitalist class. 
This is not the only alternative. The capitalists could have 
turned all or part of the second c in the formula into means of produc- 
tion and labor power. Then the formula would, assuming, let us say, 
that all of c goes to productive capital, appear as: 
P... C'-M'-C' (L F MP)... P' 
The money, M' is used exclusively to purchase more means of production 
and labor power. Of course there may be certain technical difficulties. 
The scale of production of this particular capitalist enterprise may 
be such that the capitalist cannot purchase with his surplus value, m, 
enough means of production and/or labor power to actually fit into the 
technical structure of his production. Then he simply holds onto his m 
until the next period, when he has earned a new quantum of surplus value, 
a new m. Then, perhaps, he can add the two together and he will have 
enough to expand production. This is not the crucial issue. The point 
is that the capitalist takes his surplus value and uses it to expand 
production. He accumulates it as capital, as an augmentation of the 
scale of his capital relation between wage labor and capital. He car- 
ries out expanded reproduction. 
It is obvious that the capitlist must, in reality, take something 
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to live on. He will not capitalize all of his surplus value. He will, 
then, devote part of the m to purchasing commodities for his own con- 
sumption; and the rest he will use Lo buy new means of production and 
labor power. He will accumulate it. We could then amend Marx's formu- 
la for expanded reproduction to look something like this: 
CM-C (L & MP ) 
P... C' +- M' + .. Pit cm- c/x (L & MP) 
- (c - c/x) 
In other words, part of m is used to purchase a quantity of commodi- 
ties, c/x, where x is a fraction of c, and these are means of produc- 
tion and labor power, which are added to P to form P" (where P" is less 
than or equal to P'). The remainder of m is used to purchase commod- 
ities equal in value to c minus the part that has been devoted to ac- 
cumulation, or a sum equal to c- c/x. These are for the capitalist's 
personal consumption. Marx did not present such a formula algebraic- 
ally like this; but he did describe it exactly in this way, and we 
have only filled in his account of the accumulation process with an 
additional formula. 3 
Of all the formulae Marx presented for the circulation of capital, 
that of commodity capital is undoubtedly the most complicated. On the 
surface it might appear straightforward: 
C'-M'-C... P-C' 
We start with the capitalist's commodity-product after the process of 
production has been completed. The capitalist must, as in our other 
circuits, sell his commodities on the market for money. Now, each of 
these already contains an original capital-value, P, plus the surplus 
value. Thus when the capitalist reconverts the money he has ob- 
tained from the sale of C' back into commodities, he immediately dif- 
ferentiates these commodities into those for continued production 
(MP and L) plus those for personal consumption. Marx presented it 
as follows: 
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C M-C(L F, MP)... P... C' 
Cl -- M' 
c m-c 
That is, the initial commodity-product, C', already contains an orig- 
inal capital-value and the surplus value produced in the course of 
production. When these are sold, of course, the money they fetch is 
homogeneous--it is money, an undifferentiated mass of a universal meas- 
ure of value. But for that money to then act as money capital the cap- 
italist must then make a real differentiation. He must take part of it 
to purchase new commodities that will serve as productive capital; and 
part for his own consumption. 
Now, what is peculiar about this form, as opposed to the other 
two? Marx notes two things. First, the entire act of circulation is 
the precondition for the continuation of the circuit as a whole. In 
the formula M... MI the act of production interrupted two separate acts 
of circulation: The first circulation of capital as money capital being 
converted into productive capital; and the second circulation of the 
commodity capital which has emerged from production back into money 
capital. In the formula P... P(P') the act of circulation taken in its 
entirety interrupts the process of production. But in C'... C' every- 
thing starts with circulation; without it production cannot even begin. 
The practical significance of this lies in the difference between 
the functions of the circulation of capital and production. In both 
of the first two formulae the last act of the circuit [C'-M' for money 
capital, and M-C(L ? MP)... P for productive capital] is an act of cir- 
culation only. It is an act that allows the capital to change its 
functional form, from one not suitable for the renewal of the circuit 
in the following period, to a form that is. In the formula C'... C', 
on the other hand, the last act is the act of production. As a result 
the change between P... C' is not just a change of functional form, but 
a change of value. 
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To understand why Marx thought this was an important distinction 
to make, we should look at the second special characteristic of this 
formula as opposed to the other two. In the formula for money capital, 
the capitalist holding the original money could very well have been 
the very first money capitalist and his money the first money capital. 
He could find his means of production from commodity producers who were 
not capitalists; and he could find labor power as embodied in workers 
who were the first free laborers to sell their labor power to a capi- 
talist. It is only in the very last part of his circuit, when he has 
to sell his commodity-product for money that this capitalist presupposes 
the existence of other money capitalists, i. e., other capitalists who 
themselves have money they must transform into commodities in order to 
begin production or in order to live (and we should note that these 
other money capitalists may need these commodities only indirectly, that 
is, as means of subsistence for their workers, to whom they have paid 
part of their money capital as a wage). 
Similarly, the productive capital that begins the circuit P... P(P') 
could have been the very first productive capital in existence. As soon 
as production was complete, however, that capital would have to suppose 
the existence of other capitals, both so that its owner could transform 
his product, C', into money (and hence back into productive capital 
purchased from other commodity producers) and in order to live (since 
he does not produce his own means of subsistence). 
C'... C' is different. Commodities must exist already as a basis 
of the economic system if this circuit is ever to get off the ground. 
It must first be sold for money, thus presupposing a money capitalist. 
It must then purchase commodities, MP and L, which are either commodity 
capital for their direct producers or for the merchants who act as 
their link with the market. This commodity capital cannot be the first 
commodity capital in existence; it right from the start assumes commod- 
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ity production as the general form of production and that other commod- 
ity producers have entered the market and will supply it with the ele- 
ments, MP and L, without which the aim of the circuit, the transforma- 
tion of P into C', cannot proceed. 
Perhaps this all seems like hair-splitting. After all, at what 
point in the circuit the capital presumes the existence of other capi- 
talists would appear irrelevant. They all presuppose general commodity- 
capitalist production at some point; and in fact that is their rele- 
vance. They are the formulae for the circuits of capitals, i. e., for 
the premise of capitalist production itself. 
Marx wasn't nitpicking here. He had a good reason for making these 
distinctions. Let us just ask a question that is very important from 
the point of view of our subsequent discussion. Which of these formu- 
lae would we choose for the basis of our reproduction schemes? 
Our first inclination might probably be to say, P... P. That, af- 
ter all, roots the circuit of capital directly in production. More 
than that, it gave rise directly to an expression for expanded repro- 
duction, as we just saw. Yet if we look at this formula it presents 
certain problems. When P' appears at the end of the circuit (or M' at 
the end of M... M') and begins the next circuit as P (or M) it functions 
as a totality, as a single block of capital-value. It has already been 
differentiated (in the case of P... P') form that part of the value of 
the product that goes for individual consumption (assuming, as is more 
than reasonable, that not all of the surplus value can be capitalized). 
Even in the case of M... M1, or where all of P' goes to start the new 
circuit in P... P', all distinctions between the various constituents 
of production and between capital and revenue are lost. In short, 
these formule can describe the circuit of a single capitalist, but they 
can never describe that of society as a whole. 
C'... C' is quite different. It starts with the total production 
-93- 
of the previous year. Before that production can begin anew C' must 
first be broken down into C and c, into productive capital and the ele- 
ments of personal consumption, and the ýntire process of circulation 
must be complete before production is possible. The premise for this 
circuit is the annual production of the year before. The premise for 
the other circuits is either only part of it (P... P') or the conversion 
of the capital into only a portion of those commodities that make up 
the total commodity stock of society (M... M'). Marx explained it this 
way: 
But just because the circuit C'... C' presupposes within its sphere 
the existence of other industrial capital in the form of C (equal 
to L+ MP)--and MP comprises diverse other capitals... --it clamours 
to be considered not only as the general form of the circuit, i. e., 
not only as a social form in which every single industrial capital 
(except when first invested) can be studied, hence not merely as 
a form of movement common to all individual industrial capitals, 
but simultaneously also as a form of movement of the sum of the 
individual capitals, consequently of the aggregate capital of the 
capitalist class, a movement in which that of each individual in- 
dustrial capital appears as only a partial movement which inter- 
mingles with the other movements and is necessitated by them... 
4 
M... M' indicates only the value side, the self-expansion of the 
advanced capital-value, as the purpose of the entire process; 
P... P(P') indicates the process of production of capital as a pro- 
cess of reproduction with a productive capital of the same or of 
increasing magnitude (accumulation). Revealing itself already in 
its initial extreme as a form of capitalist commodity production, 
CT... C' comprises productive and individual consumption from the 
start; productive consumption and the self-expansion of value 
therein included appear only as a branch of its movement. Finally, 
since C' may exist in a use-form which cannot enter any more into 
any process of production, it is indicated at the outset that C ''s 
various constituents of value expressed by parts of the product 
must occupy a different position, according to whether C'... C' is 
regarded as the form of the movement of the total social capital 
or as the independent movement of an individual industrial capi- 
tal. All these peculiarities of the circuit lead us beyond its 
own confines as an isolated circuit of some merely individual cap- 
ital. 5 
In other words, from the very outset the circuit of commodity cap- 
ital must interlink with the commodities of other capitalists, commod- 
ities which represent all aspects of commodity production--means of in- 
dividual consumption as well as those of productive consumption. It 
is in this sense that we must take the last sentence in the passage 
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just cited. What for one capitalist is, as his commodity-product, his 
commodity capital, is for its purchaser either an element of individ- 
ual consumption or of productive capital. What is more, taken from the 
standpoint of the total capital of society, it is clear that all these 
types of commodities are necessary for the continued reproduction of 
the economy as a whole. For the individual capitalist his commodity- 
product, C', is simply his commodity capital. But for the society at 
large it matters a great deal what the material, use form of these 
commodities is. It is thus from here that Marx began to study the re- 
gularities of simple and expanded reproduction. 
Since in C'... C' the starting point is the total product (total 
value), it turns out that... reproduction on an extended scale... 
can take place only when the part of the surplus product to be 
capitalized already contains the material elements of the addition- 
al productive capital; that therefore, so far as the production 
of one year serves as the premise of the following year's produc- 
tion or so far as this can take place simultaneously with the pro- 
cess of simple reproduction within one year, surplus product is 
at once produced in a form which enables it to perform the func- 
tions of additional capital. Increased productivity can increase 
only the substance of capital but not its value; but therewith it 
creates additional material for the self-expansion of that value. 
6 
It was indeed on this basis that Marx cited the "great and true discre- 
tion" of Quesnay, who made the circuit C'... C', and not P... P, the 
foundation of his Tableau Economique. 7 
We see, then, that all three formulae express different functional 
forms that any individual capital must assume in the process of repro- 
duction. But C'... C' is peculiar. Because it presumes other capitals 
and other capitalists, as well as workers, at the very outset, and be- 
cause the production process cannot begin without the complete circula- 
tion of the commodity capital, involving all the other capitals of so- 
ciety; because a distinction is immediately made between the particular 
use forms of the various commodities produced by these other capital- 
ists (and hence a similar distinction is made by them as purchasers of 
our first capitalist's commodities); and because the circuit starts 
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out by analyzing what happens to the total product of the year before-- 
for all these reasons Marx discerned that this had to be his starting 
point for the analysis of the movement of the total social capital. 
Marx, of course, examined the various circuits of industrial cap- 
ital in far more detail than we have done. This was natural, since he 
wanted to explore the paths by which capital is "metamorphosed" in all 
their details and subtleties; he wanted to use them to reveal as much 
as he could about the process of capitalist production as a whole. 
Our aims were much more limited. 
First, we think it important to show that Marx did not dream up 
his reproduction schemes out of thin air. Although he derived them 
from Quesnay, 8 he quite clearly based them on the analysis put forth 
right at the beginning of Volume II of Capital. In that sense the re- 
production schemes presume Marx's analysis of the metamorphosis of 
individual capitals. 
Second, already the various circuits of industrial capital show 
that capitalist production is a process of reproduction. Each year's 
end product represents the basis upon which production will start anew 
in the following year. Production is a continuous process through 
which the capitalist system is reproduced. In order for capital, in 
any of its forms, to function in that form year in and year out, it 
must undergo a continuing series of transformations where in each and 
every case what we began with represents what we end up with--and in 
this way the cycle can be recommenced. 
Third, this process of reproduction is premised upon the histori- 
cally-specific relations of capitalist production. Production can 
never take place directly. At all times it requires the intervention 
of commodity circulation, whether at the beginning or in the middle of 
the overall circuit. Capitalist production is production for exchange. 
It is the production of commodities, which rarely emerge from the 
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production process in a form in which they can reenter it for the spe- 
cific capitalist who produces them. They must at all times be trans- 
formed, first into money, and then into other commodities that have the 
appropriate use form. This further presumes that the latter class of 
commodities exists and that other capitalists have already produced 
them and offer them for exchange on the market. 
This last point bears looking into a bit more. What are the com- 
modities that make up a capitalist's productive capital? Throughout 
this section we have designated them as means of production and labor 
power. The production and circulation of means of production is simple 
enough to understand. They are, after all, the tangible physical pro- 
ducts of the productive process of some particular capitalist. But 
the production of labor power is another matter altogether. If the 
capitalist in any one of our circuits takes part of his money capital, 
M, and purchases labor power, he advances a certain sum of money in ex- 
change for the laboring abilities of a worker (or group of workers). 
The worker sells the capitalist the only commodity he or she has, his 
or her capacity to work. The capitalist engages in an even exchange. 
He advances money and receives a comparable quantum of laboring abil- 
ity. Of course, according to Marx, the capitalist also receives much 
more--in the process of production this laboring ability translates it- 
self into commodities produced by this labor power. The ability to 
work endures in the process of production for a great deal longer than 
the corresponding labor contained in the commodities that allow the 
laborer to work. The laborer consumes in labor values much less than 
he or she produces. But this is not the point we are raising here. 
We are not out to either repeat or prove the validity of Marx's theory 
of value. Marx did that well enough himself; for us it is only an 
assumption. 
What is crucial is the series of exchanges that goes on here. For 
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the worker must take the money he or she receives from the capitalist 
and spend it on means of subsistence 
not live--that is childishly obvious 
Without these the laborer could 
But here we see the peculiar 
quality of this exchange process between laborer and capitalist. The 
capitalist possesses capital, that is, a command over means of produc- 
tion and labor power that is constantly reproduced. We saw from our 
various circuits that merely by producing and selling at a constant 
level the capitalist will both renew his capital and his source of in- 
dividual consumption. He need never go out on the market empty-handed. 
His capital, in at least one of its various forms, always remains in 
is 
his possession. This/simply not so for the worker. When he or she has 
consumed their means of subsistence, they have nothing--nothing, that 
is, except their further ability to work. This is a commodity, well 
enough, but it is a source of revenue only potentially. The worker 
must first sell it to the capitalist for money-cum-other-commodities. 
And so the cycle goes. The worker receives money; the worker spends 
it on his or her individual consumption. The worker must return to the 
market as a seller of labor power in order to live. Just as the con- 
tinued reproduction of capital presumes that a capitalist will find the 
means of production he needs for sale, so it presumes that he will find 
labor power, period after period, available for purchase. Thus we see 
that the process of reproduction is not just a process whereby the tech- 
nical proportions of production are maintained or expanded. It is the 
reproduction process of a given set of social relations--that between 
capital and wage laborer. This is the real basis of capitalist repro- 
duction, for it is only this social relationship that gives capitalism 
its specific historical character. If capitalism could not reproduce 
this social relationship between capitalists and wage laborers, it could 
not go on, it could not establish itself as a particular mode of produc- 
tion. Conversely, if capitalist production is to be halted this social 
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relationship must be irrevocably destroyed--something that can only 
happen through revolutionary action. 
For us these are the most important implications of Marx's analy- 
sis of the circuits of industrial capital. Many of the difficulties 
that students of Marxist economics have with the reproduction schemes 
emanate, we think, from the fact that they are usually presented in a 
strictly algebraic manner. In reality the schemes are a device through 
which Marx highlighted a particular--but crucial--dimension of his an- 
alysis of capitalist production. Marx's analysis of the rudiments of 
circulation is not difficult to grasp (although this not true of the 
more detailed investigations in Volume II that were based on it). Nor 
need his analysis of reproduction as a reproductive process of capital- 
ist production relations leave anyone in a fog. Yet both of these are 
at the root of Marx's use of the reproduction schemes. Hence, by of- 
fering a brief survey of the metamorphoses of industrial capital between 
its different functional forms, and by stressing the social-relations 
aspect of reproduction, we hope we will make all of our subsequent 
discussion easier to follow. 
II. The Basics of Simple Reproduction 
6 
In dealing with Marx's use of the reproduction schemes we do not 
wish to give a detailed account of their mechanics. This is more than 
adequately done in other, long-standing classical works on Marxist eco- 
nomics. 
9 As for the intricacies of expanded reproduction, they will 
become quite clear in our treatment of Preobrazhensky's use of the 
schemes in VKA 17. Instead we want to draw out of Marx's discussion 
of simple reproduction what we need in order to: 1)Clarify certain 
methodological points about the reproduction schemes and their role in 
analyzing a given society, and 2)further develop Marx's analysis of the 
replacement of fixed capital, which is the specific aspect of his 
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discussion of the schemes that is most immediately related to our own 
study of Preobrazhensky. In the latter, dealt with in the next chapter, 
we will show that within Volume II of capital there is the basis for 
deriving the schemes for simple and expanded reproduction in a mixed 
economy of petty and capitalist (or developing-socialist) production 
that Preobrazhensky was to use in his "Equilibrium" articles of 1926 
and 1927. 
Marx's scheme for simple reproduction under capitalism is well 
known. He divides social production into two departments, that which 
produces means of production (department I), and that which produces 
means of consumption (department II); and it is from here that he begins 
his analysis of how, under the simplest of conditions, i. e., where no 
accumulation of capital takes place, the individual elements of produc- 
tion circulate and are restored, so as to begin production once again 
in the next year. His numerical scheme is as follows: 
1.4000c + 1000v + 1000s = 6000 means of production 
II. 2000c + 500v + 500s = 3000 means of consumption 
Although each of these branches of production is but the sum total of 
the production of all the individual sub-branches and enterprises which 
produce either means of consumption or means of production, we are no 
longer dealing with simple aggregates. The process of reproduction of 
the social capital takes place, of course, only because under capital- 
ism each particular unit of production is able to procure its needed 
elements of constant and variable capital (i. e., all of its productive 
capital) on the market, and is able to dispose of its own product in 
the same manner, thus being able to begin the process all over again. 
of 
The two processes/ reproduction, however--the reproduction of the var- 
ious individual capitals, on the one hand, that of the social capital 
on the other--are not identical, as Marx goes to great lengths to 
explain. 
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For our present purpose this process of reproduction must be stu- 
died from the point of view of the replacement of the value as 
well as the substance of the individual component parts of C' [the 
commodity-product]. We cannot rest content any longer, as we did 
in the analysis of the value of the product of the individual cap- 
ital, with the assumption that the individual capitalist can first 
convert the component parts of his capital into money by the sale 
of his commodities, and then reconvert them into productive cap- 
ital by renewed purchase of the elements of production in the com- 
modity market. Inasmuch as those elements of production are by 
nature material, they represent as much a constituent of the social 
capital as the individual finished product, which is exchanged for 
them and replaced by them. Contrariwise the movement of that por- 
tion of the social commodity-product which is consumed by the lab- 
orer in expending his wages, and by the capitalist in expending 
his surplus-value, not only forms an integral part of the movement 
of the total product but intermingles with the movements of the 
individual capitals, and therefore this process cannot be explain- 
ed by merely assuming it. 
The question at confronts us directly is this: How is the cap- 
ital consumed in production replaced in value out of the annual 
product and how does the movement of this replacement intertwine 
with the consumption of the surplus-value by the capitalists and 
of the wages by the laborers? It is then first a matter of repro- 
duction on a simple scale. 10 
With this in mind let us take another look at the scheme for sim- 
ple reproduction. Because department I produces only means of produc- 
tion it can in the first place reproduce its own constant capital com- 
ponent. This will no doubt require internal exchange between the var- 
ious enterprises within the department--nonetheless, the reproduction 
of the constant capital in its material form for the department as a 
whole takes place entirely within it. In the second place, it cannot 
reproduce its variable capital, i. e., it cannot provide its workers 
with their means of subsistence, nor reproduce its surplus value, i. e., 
the means of consumption off of which department I's capitalists live, 
in natura. People simply cannot eat means of production. Therefore, 
even though department I possesses in its annual commodity-product a 
value equivalent for both v and s, it does not possess them in a mater- 
ially useful form. It must exchange this value equivalent, which con- 
sists of means of production, for useful means of consumption. 
Department II, on the other hand, has just the opposite problem. 
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It produces only means of consumption. It can provide both its workers 
with their necessary means of subsistence (that is, reproduce its var- 
iable capital), and its capitalists with their fund of consumption (that 
is, reproduce its surplus value, so long as there is no accumulation 
and the surplus value is entirely consumed individually) out of its 
own annual product. Once again, this may require some internal exchange 
within the department, but as a whole the entire fund of consumption 
of both workers and capitalists is reproduced within department II. 
Unfortunately, department II cannot produce just by feeding its workers 
and capitalists, any more than the workers and capitalists of depart- 
ment I can consume just by laboring upon (or investing in) the produc- 
tion of means of production. Department II must replace the worn out 
constant capital component of its capital, which is represented in its 
annual product by a value equivalent of the means of production it re- 
quires--it exists, however, in the physical form of means of consumption. 
It, too, must exchange this value equivalent of means of production for 
the productively-useful means of production themselves. 
What we have is department I, which possesses means of production 
that it must exchange for means of consumption, and department II, which 
possesses means of consumption that it must exchange for means of pro- 
duction. Quite naturally they will exchange with each other. Thus Marx 
immediately concluded that the basic condition for simple reproduction 
to take place is that department I would exchange its value equivalent 
of v+s (existing as means of production) for the value equivalent of 
c of department II (which exists as means of consumption). In terms 
of material exchange, department I obtains the means of consumption it 
needs, and department II receives the constant capital, that is, the 
means of production it needs as well. This is not all. The value of 
the material elements required by the respective departments must be 
equal. If department I has means of production worth 2000 for which 
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it needs the same amount in means of consumption, the deal will only 
work if department II needs means of production worth 2000 and has 
means of consumption of the same value to offer. If department I had, 
say, a need for only 1800 in means of consumption and had only 1800 in 
means of production to exchange; but if department II still required 
2000 in means of production and had 2000 in means of consumption to 
dispose of; then department I could reproduce its fund of consumption 
[1800(v+s)] in full, but department II would still have a deficit of 
200 in means of production (which department I did not have to offer) 
and a surplus of 200 in means of consumption (which department I did 
not need). Then the conditions of even simple reproduction would not 
be satisfied and department II could not continue to produce on the 
same scale in the future. It would suffer a loss of values (here 200 
in unsold means of consumption), and a crisis would ensue as it cut 
back production, laid off workers, etc. 
For Marx this little summary of the basic conditions of simple re- 
production is just the starting point. Marx establishes the fundamen- 
tal relationship of exchange between I(v+s) and IIc very early in his 
discussion, and then proceeds to give a detailed analysis of some of 
the essential problems and complications that this seemingly elementary 
relationship embodies. For our purposes we will deal with only a few 
of them. Suffice it to say that a proper account of Marx's analysis 
would have to be quite intricate and cover such matters as: The dis- 
tinctions between capital and revenue; the differentiation between pre- 
viously-created value transferred to the annual product versus the new- 
ly-created value of the current year's labor and how these are differ- 
ently reflected in the product of the individual capitals and that of 
the social capital; the role of money capital and the production of the 
money material; the breakdown of department II's product into articles 
of necessary consumption and articles of luxury; etc. 
11 Only then would 
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the full import of Marx's study become clear; and any notion that his 
analysis of the proportions and relations of reproduction was static 
"model-building" or even essentially quantitative, would be shown sim- 
ply untenable. We will touch upon this last point ourselves in a moment. 
Returning to the reproduction schemes, however, the first problem 
we see is that it would be a very easy matter if the two departments 
could merely swap their commodities, and distribute the products accord- 
ing to their use. If department I could give its exchangeable means 
of production to department II in return for the means of consumption 
it requires, it could then parcel them out to its workers and capital- 
ists in the appropriate proportions. This is impossible. The obstacle 
is not a technical one of efficiently organizing the distribution pro- 
cedure. This is not just simple reproduction--it is reproduction of 
a capitalist, market economy. As we demonstrated in the previous sec- 
tion, the elements of reproduction can only exchange through a process 
of circulation, a circuit which is described by money. 
In simple reproduction I(v+s) in means of production confronts IIc 
in means of consumption. Each must undergo a metamorphosis and change 
its form. And we have seen that Marx has already identified this as 
a problem of both the material elements of exchange and their value. 
The vehicle for this metamorphosis is monetary circulation. Money here 
no longer functions as a measure of value or means of payment; it be- 
comes money capital, which, as in the circuit M... M1, must itself be 
reproduced. If we look at I(v+s) we see that the v part of I's exchan- 
geable product remains a part of I's industrial capital at all times, 
though it frequently changes its external form. As money, however, it 
is simply part of I's variable capital-value (v remains part of its 
capital-value at all times, regardless of the functional form it takes 
on in the circuit). But in both the money and commodity form this 
capital-value is only potentially variable capital. In the case of 
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money its functioning as variable capital is conditional upon its being 
converted into labor power; in the case of commodity-capital it is con- 
ditional upon C' being converted back into M, and upon the reappearance 
of labor power on the market as a commodity. Only in the form of labor 
power actually functioning in the process of production is this vari- 
able capital-value functioning as variable capital--for only then is 
it part of the productive capital and capable of undergoing self-expan- 
sion. 
12 
It is with money, however, that the capitalist begins the acquisi- 
tion or renewal of his productive capital. This does not mean that 
M... MI has suddenly become the starting point of the reproduction pro- 
cess, as opposed to C'... C'. The capitalist must still begin with a 
commodity-product which has to be converted into money before produc- 
tion can take place. For department I, however, the commodity-product 
is simply not usable as variable capital. It is, as we have said, only 
potentially variable capital. Money, to be sure, is also only potential 
variable capital. But we have already established that there is a def- 
inite sequence in the process of circulation. The commodities that 
make up C' are not a universal embodiment of value. They are specific 
use values that possess value. Thus they must first be converted into 
money, which is a universal equivalent and which is one step further 
along the path of circulation so far as acquiring the elements of pro- 
ductive capital is concerned. It is the same with department II. It 
must replace IIc. For this it must still begin with a commodity-pro- 
duct, C', which must first be turned into money, and only then into 
productive capital, in this case means of production. 
Yet if both department II and department I must sell their product, 
C', in order to start the reproduction circuit, we would soon be in a 
dead end. Money must previously exist as a reserve in at least one of 
the departments so that it can be advanced and therefore initiate cir- 
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culation. This is not an unreasonable assumption to make. It is an 
historical assumption--its validity is the emrgence of money, merchant 
capital as the prius of capitalist production proper. 
13 
In the present case let us assume that it is department I that has 
such a reserve and makes the initial advance. The collective capital- 
ist of I advances to his workers their wages, which they reproduce as 
new value in the products that result from the application of their la- 
bor power to the means of production with which they work. These wages 
exist in the form of money. In exchange for this money the capitalist 
receives a commodity equivalent, i. e., the labor power of the workers 
he employs. The workers use the money they receive to purchase means 
of consumption produced by department II. The capitalists of I will 
only get back this money--their advanced variable capital-value--when 
II uses it to purchase means of production to the amount of Iv. What 
has taken place in this simple circuit? The capitalist of I has advan- 
ced money as wages. He receives a commodity, labor power. The labor 
power is expended, and the capitalist expropriates the product. So 
far it is an even exchange. He has given up Iv in money, and received 
Iv, first in labor power, and then, after the latter has altered its 
form and has been expended to create new values, in commodities in the 
shape of Iv in means of production. The worker now has money, for 
which he gave up a certain quantity of labor power. He can restore the 
latter, and thereby make himself fit for work in the next period, only 
if he then takes this money and exchanges it for means of consumption, 
which he finds in department II. He, too, then, has exchanged a value 
equivalent for a value equivalent. He has given up labor power that 
costs Iv to reproduce, and in return he has received Iv, first in money 
and then in useful objects which he consumes. 
14 
The circuit, however, is not yet complete. Although all the ex- 
changes have been equal, only the workers of department I have found 
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what they need in the form of use values. The capitalists of depart- 
ment I have means of production worth Iv which are of no use to them 
as they currently exist. They cannot advance these means of production 
in the next period as variable capital--the workers cannot consume them, 
productively or otherwise. The capitalists' variable capital must once 
again exist as money. What happened to the money they had advanced or- 
iginally? It is now in the hands of the capitalists of department II. 
Department II needs constant capital of the amount Iv. It has an equi- 
valent for this in money, which it received from the workers of I in 
exchange for means of consumption. What happens next is obvious. De- 
partment II then exchanges this money (which emanated from the capital- 
ists of I in the first place) for means of production worth Iv. De- 
partment I's capitalists now have back their original variable capital 
in its initial form, money, which they can advance again to their work- 
ers to begin production once more in the next period. 
15 Department II 
now has part of the constant capital it requires to go on as well--a 
part represented by Iv. The circuit is now complete, at least as re- 
gards the reproduction of the variable portion of I's exchange fund 
and the reproduction of an equivalent fraction of II's constant capital. 
Already we see that an important additional condition specific to 
capitalist reproduction has been established: The money originally ad- 
vanced to begin the circuit must eventually return to the department 
that advanced it. This, under capitalism, is every bit as much a con- 
dition of reproduction as the equality between I(v+s) and IIc. It is 
important to note it here, as it will play a crucial role later on. 
Even so, we have still only covered half the circuit. The same 
process must take place with regard to Is and the other half of IIc. 
Here let us suppose that it is the capitalists of II who advance the 
money. They will purchase the remainder of I's disposable means of pro- 
duction for money, and in return acquire in full the rest of their 
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constant capital. II still, however, has on its hands an equivalent 
of Is in means of consumption. This is easily corrected. The capital- 
ists of I have got rid of all their exchangeable commodities, and now 
have Is in the shape of money. They need means of consumption, and 
acquire these by purchasing them from department II. The capitalists 
of II now have back the money they initially advanced, and both depart- 
ments have what they need in material form: II has means of produc- 
tion; I has means of consumption. Neither one has given up anything 
more than they first had available for exchange, as the money advanced 
in turn by each department has returned to its source in both cases. 
In fact, the capitalists of department I have received somthing extra, 
the surplus value embodied in the products produced by the workers they 
employed . And without this surplus value--which Marx assumes is total- 
ly consumed as personal consumption in simple reproduction--department 
II could not restore the constant capital it had started production 
with, i. e., it could not achieve simple reproduction. 
As with our discussion of the metamorphoses of industrial capital, 
we are not concerned here so much with the mechanics of simple repro- 
duction, which are well explained elsewhere; nor have we exhausted 
Marx's own exposition of the subject. We have gone over certain basic 
aspects of Marx's analysis in order to highlight three important points. 
First. It is already clear from the above discussion that even 
under the most abstract conditions, unencumbered by the complications 
that Marx and later writers (including Preobrazhensky) subsequently 
introduced, the mere supposition of monetary exchange makes simple re- 
production a very complex process. The fact that reproduction must 
take place through the mediation of monetary circulation is an histor- 
ically-specific condition, the result of the development of the capi- 
talist economy. 
16 By extension we can expect to encounter the same dif- 
ficulties in any system of economy based on market exchange and a mature 
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monetary system. We will see this to be precisely the case when we dis- 
cuss expanded reproduction in the Soviet economy under NEP. Neither 
there, nor in the present example of simple reproduction under capital- 
ism, can we assume that the mere production of commodities by depart- 
ments I and II in the proper material and value proportions (and we 
still presume that goods exchange at their values) is sufficient to 
guarantee continued reproduction. These commodities must exchange for 
money, and any interruption of this circulation will halt the entire 
process. This, then, becomes a complicating factor in any analysis of 
reproduction in a commodity-socialist economy like the USSR in the 
1920's, at least to the extent that money, as a category of bourgeois 
economy, has not been totally superseded and transformed. 
Second. This permits us to clarify somewhat Preobrazhensky's use 
of the term "equilibrium. " Marx does not use the term when talking 
about the reproduction schemes (although he does use it in Volume III 
of Capital), but refers instead to those relationships which permit the 
conditions of simple or expanded reproduction to be satisfied and thus 
allow the continuation of the production process. Preobrazhensky's con- 
cept of equilibrium is practically inseparable from his overall pol- 
itical economy, so that a proper elaboration of it would take us into 
the realm of philosophy and politics. It must therefore be seen in the 
context of his method as a whole, which we discussed in our Introduc- 
tion. For the moment, however, we must point out the following: Any 
idea that reproduction implies a static "balance" of economic "factors" 
(such as the idea of a "steady state" or even the "balanced growth" of 
bourgeois economics) is foreign to both Marx and Preobrazhensky. The 
schemes of simple and expanded reproduction point out certain regular- 
ities and tendencies of development of modern capitalism (and in a con- 
ditional and limited sense, of post-capitalist society as well). In 
reality these conditions are never achieved. The system is constantly 
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in motion, engendering conflict and contradiction. Its moments of 
"stability" are only relative, never absolute. 
But inasmuch as only one-sided exchanges are made, a number of 
mere purchases on the one hand, a number of mere sales on the oth- 
er--and we have seen that the normal exchange of the annual product 
on the basis of capitalism necessitates such one-sided metamorpho- 
ses--the balance can be maintained only on the assumption that in 
amount the value of the one-sided purchases and that of the one- 
sided sales tally. The fact that the production of commodities 
is the general form of capitalist production implies the role which 
money is playing in it not only as a medium of circulation, but 
also as money capital, and engenders certain conditions of normal 
exchange peculiar to this mode of production and therefore of the 
normal course of reproduction, whether it be on a simple or on an 
extended scale--conditions which change into so many conditions 
of abnormal movement, into so many possibilities of crises, since 
a balance is itself an accident owing to the spontaneous nature 
of this production. 17 
The constant supply of labor power on the part of working class 
I, the reconversion of a portion of commodity capital I into the 
money form of variable capital, the replacement of a portion of 
commodity capital II by natural elements of constant capital Ilc 
--all these necessary premises demand one another, but they are 
brought about by a very complicated process, including three pro- 
cesses of circulation which occur independently of one another but 
intermingle. This process is so complicated that it offers ever 
so many occasions for running abnormally. 18 
Marx arrives at the same conclusion when he moves from his analy- 
sis of simple reproduction to that of reproduction on an expanded scale. 
Here he shows that simple reproduction, the analysis of which is cru- 
cial to revealing the basic tendencies of reproduction in general, is 
not just an analytical abstraction, is not only the starting point from 
which expanded reproduction proceeds, but is, aside from all these 
things, nothing other than a moment in the latter process-19 For ex- 
panded reproduction to proceed smoothly it must also satisfy the condi- 
tion that the consumption fund of department I equals IIc. But expand- 
ed reproduction means accumulation; and as soon as we introduce accumu- 
lation, which is the logic of capitalist production, and see that we 
are dealing with a system that is constantly in motion, we also see that 
this condition is a point around which capitalist production hovers, 
but can never reach. 
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The premise of simple reproduction, that I(v+s) is equal to IIc, 
is not only incompatible with capitalist production, although 
this does not exclude the possibility that in an industrial cycle 
of 10-11 years some year may show a smaller total production than 
the preceding year, so that not even simple reproduction takes 
place compared to the preceding year. Besides that, considering 
the natural annual increase in population simple reproduction 
could take place only to the extent that a correspondingly larger 
number of unproductive servants would partake of the 1500 represent- 
ing the aggregate surplus-value. But accumulation of capital, real 
capitalist production, would be impossible under such circumstances. 
The fact of capitalist accumulation therefore excludes the poss- 
ibility of IIc being equal to I(v+s). Nevertheless it might occur 
even with capitalist accumulation that in consequence of the course 
taken by the processes of accumulation during a preceding series 
of periods of production IIc might become not only equal but even 
bigger than I(v+s). This would mean an over-production in II and 
could not be adjusted in any other way than by a great crash, in 
consequence of which some capital of II would get transferred to I. 
20 
Preobrazhensky never departed from this idea of Marx, as will be 
more than clear when we discuss his own analysis of expanded reproduc- 
tion under concrete capitalism (VKA 17). There he derives the imbalance 
between the consumption fund of department I [I(v+s/x)] and IIc as a 
fundamental tendency of capitalist reproduction. It is important to 
get this clear before we launch into any _: xamination of Preobrazhensky's is 
writings on equilibrium. This/all the more necessary in the light of 
attempts by even sympathetic bourgeois economists to turn Preobrazhensky 
into a bourgeois "growth" theorist. 
21 
Third. In talking about Preobrazhensky's use of the term equilib- 
rium we must make a further point on method. Already in Volume I of 
Capital Marx explained that what lay behind the process of production 
and its reproduction was the reproduction of the particular social re- 
lationships appropriate to capitalist society. 
22 
As we have already 
stressed in both the Introduction and the previous section, we must 
not forget this when we look at the reproduction schemes of Volume II. 
It is true that there Marx discerns the fundamental regularities in the 
movement of the social capital and of its individual elements, primar- 
ily the exchange between I(v+s) and IIc. Yet in doing this Marx at the 
same time reveals that these regularities are those of the reproduction 
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of specific social relations. The circulation and reproduction of vari- 
able capital is not simply a matter of how the productive capital func- 
tions, or of how money is advanced to acquire labor power in the form 
of wage labor; it simultaneously shows how the working class is repro- 
duced as wage labor. When we see in the reproduction schemes that Iv 
exchanges against a portion of IIc we must always remember that behind 
the numerical and algebraic expressions is a very real social process. 
The working class functions within the process of reproduction as the 
sellers of a single commodity, its labor power; as the buyers of com- 
modities which they have themselves produced, but which they must pur- 
chase from the capitalists of department II; and as the agents for the 
creation of new values, as the producers of all past, present, and fu- 
ture social wealth. If the working class does not function in all of 
these capacities, reproduction cannot take place. There will be a rup- 
ture, either in the sphere of production or in that of circulation. 
23 
The same applies to the movement of the surplus value expropriated 
by the capitalist class. This movement details the reproduction both 
of a certain portion of the commodity-product of society and of the 
capitalists as a class. In simple reproduction the capitalists func- 
tion as the consumers of commodities and the agents of circulation. 
But they also function as the owners of capital; they are the other 
half of the social relation--capitalists and wage laborers--that cap- 
ital expresses. The reproduction of the one cannot take place without 
the reproduction of the other. Thus in expanded reproduction they re- 
present the agents of accumulation, the driving force of capitalist 
production. 
This explains why so much of Marx's discussion is devoted to relat- 
ing the circulation-reproduction process to the particular social rela- 
tions it involves. From his analysis of the fundamentals of simple-- 
and later, expanded--reproduction, he then is able to introduce more 
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and more complexities into the system and obtain certain derivative 
relations, for instance, the emergence of the modern credit system or 
the antecedent presence of merchant capital which precedes and makes 
possible capitalist production as the dominant form of economic and so- 
cial life. 
From this methodological standpoint it is quite key that we recog- 
nize the strictly formal character of the reproduction schemes. They 
are not "objective models" which portray all the complex realities of 
capitalist society. They are an analytical abstraction, analytical 
tools which facilitate Marx in his task of laying bare the regularities 
and laws of motion of capitalist production. 
24 
The very premise of 
the construction of the schemes is Marx's entire analysis of capitalist 
society, which he developed throughout his life. As Preobrazhensky 
emphasized in his own analysis of the categories of political economy, 
they are abstract concepts which are not natural objects in themselves, 
but the ideal expression of the real, concrete social relations that 
comprise capitalist society at a given historical moment. 
25 
If this is true of Marx, it is equally so of Preobrazhensky. Be- 
cause Soviet society, as the specific object of his analysis, is the 
resultant of conflicting tendencies of development, which are theoret- 
ically embodied in two antagonistic regulators of economic activity and 
the organization of human labor power (the law of value versus the law 
of socialist accumulation and planning), the problem of expanded repro- 
duction is not that of the reproduction of a given set of social rela- 
tions, but of their transformation. The tendencies that he reveals in 
his own use of the reproduction schemes and his application of them to 
the Soviet economy demonstrate certain obligatory conditions for the 
transition from one particular type of production relations (and one 
state of human consciousness) to another. And this, too, presupposes 
Preobrazhensky's entire analysis of Soviet society, with all of its 
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philosophical, social, and political implications. 
To summarize our discussion so far, we have looked at Marx's use 
of the reproduction schemes mainly to emphasize and clarify a few ideas 
that will prove important in our examination of Preobrazhensky's writ- 
ings on expanded reproduction under modern capitalism and in the USSR. 
We have first had to establish certain basic categories and relations 
crucial to further analysis. These include the inter-relations between 
reproduction as an exchange of values and as an exchange of the mater- 
ial elements of production; the role of monetary circulation as the in- 
dispensable condition of the continuation of the process of production 
in a market economy; the fluid, contradictory nature of reproduction 
and the fact that, under capitalism, crises are immanent to it; and the 
distinction between the schemes as objectively valid, algebraic repre- 
sentations of an outside world (which they are not), and as another, 
highly refined analytical device for revealing the real relations be- 
tween human beings that make up the substance of capitalist--and any 
other--society (which they are). Some of these ideas are introductory, 
and provide concepts upon which we will build our later argument. 
Others are cautionary, designed to dispel any misunderstandings that 
might arise from the use of the reproduction schemes or from the notion 
of "equilibrium. " 
We are not yet ready to leave Marx and move onto Preobrazhensky's 
articles of 1926-27. First, we must make a slight digression and go 
into Marx's treatment of the problem of fixed capital in some detail. 
As we have already intimated above, the relationships we will derive 
there will prove fundamental to almost all of our subsequent study. 
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working day, only part of which is needed to cover Iv. The rest, 
of course, goes to create surplus value, here represented by Is. 
From the point of view of the capitalist, however, the laborer 
only gives up Iv, or an amount of labor power equal to his wages, 
since the capitalist is virtually oblivious to the creation of 
surplus value. He thinks that the worker has labored all day sim- 
ply to reproduce his wages. What is correct to say is that the 
capitalist advances Iv and receives an equivalent for it in Iv in 
commodities, produced by the workers he employs. This represents 
only part of the day's product, however. In addition to this 
"equivalent" for Iv the capitalist also receives Is, which is 
realized separately from Iv and exchanges against a different 
portion of IIc (both in value and in use form; see Appendix to 
Part I, below). 
15. Of course, the other side of this is that the workers, after consum- 
ing their means of subsistence, return to the market as a commod- 
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within the reproduction process to further develop his analysis 
of the modern credit system. By the same token, the following 
passage from the chapter on simple reproduction gives us some 
idea of the real complexities monetary exchange introduces into an 
analysis of the reproduction schemes: 
"The fluxes and refluxes of money taking place spontaneously on 
the basis of capitalist production in the exchange of the annual 
products; the one-time advances of fixed capitals to the full ex- 
tent of their value and the successive extraction of this value 
from the circulation in the course of years, in other words, their 
gradual reconstitution in money-form by the annual formation of 
hoards, a hoarding which is essentially different from the paral- 
lel accumulation of hoards, based on the annual production of new 
gold; the different lengths of time for which, depending on the 
duration of the production period of the commodities, money must 
be advanced, and consequently always hoarded anew before it can 
be recovered from the circulation by the sale of the commodities; 
the different lengths of time for which money must be advanced, 
if only resulting from the different distances of the places of 
production from their markets; furthermore the differences in the 
magnitude and period of the reflux according to the condition of 
relative size of the productive supplies in the various lines of 
business and in the individual businesses of the same line, and 
hence the lengths of periods for which the elements of constant 
capital are bought, and all this during the year of reproduction-- 
all these different aspects of spontaneous movement had only to 
be noted, and made conspicuous, through experience, in order to 
give rise to a methodical use of the mechanical appliances of the 
credit system and to a real fishing out of available loanable 
capitals. " Capital, II, pp. 484-85. 
17. Capital, II, pp. 498-99. Our emphasis. 
18. Ibid, pp. 499-500. 
19. We will not deal separately with the mechanics of expanded repro- 
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duction. These will become clearer in discussing Preobrazhensky's 
analysis in VKA 17 (see also Luxemburg and Sweezy, cited in Note 
9, above). For the moment we need only mention that expanded 
reproduction also has the equality between the consumption fund 
of department I (v plus the consumed part of surplus value, s/x) 
and IIc; but here it is a point around which the process revolves 
--it is never attained. 
20. Capital, II, pp. 524-25. This extremely important passages raises 
a number of themes we will have particular cause to return to later 
on: First, when we see how Preobrazhensky derives the systematic 
"over-accumulation" of IIc as compared to the consumption fund of 
I as the basic disproportion inherent in capitalist expanded re- 
production; and second, when we deal with the role of non-produc- 
tive consumption in the Soviet system. 
21. See Introduction, pp. 15-17, above. 
22. Capital, I, Chapter XXIII. "But that which at first was but a 
starting point, becomes, by the mere continuity of the process, 
by simple reproduction, the peculiar result, constantly renewed 
and perpetuated, of capitalist production. On the one hand, the 
process of production incessantly converts material wealth into 
capital, into means of creating more wealth and means of enjoyment 
for the capitalist. On the other hand, the laborer, on quitting 
the process, is what he was on entering it, a source of wealth, 
but devoid of all means of making that wealth his own. Since, be- 
fore entering on the process, his own labor has already been alien- 
ated from himself by the sale of labor power, has been appropriated 
by the capitalist and incorporated with capital, it must, during 
the process, be realized in a product that does not belong to him. 
Since the process of production is also the process by which the 
capitalist consumes labor power, the product of the laborer is 
incessantly converted, not only into commodities, but into capi- 
tal, into value that sucks up the value-creating power, into means 
of subsistence that buy the person of the laborer, into means of 
production that command the producers. The laborer therefore con- 
stantly produces material, objective wealth, but in the form of 
capital, of an alien power that dominates and exploits him; and 
the capitalist as constantly produces labor power, but in the form 
of a subjective source of wealth, separated from the objects in 
and by which it can alone be realized; in short he produces the 
laborer, but as a wage laborer. This incessant reproduction, the 
perpetuation of the laborer is the sine qua non of capitalist pro- 
duction. " Capital, I, pp. 580-71. 
23. Capital, II, p. 420. 
24. Preobrazhensky unremittingly insisted on this point in VKA 17, 
when he repeatedly warned that Marx's analysis of the reproduction 
schemes established the basic abstract principles of simple and 
expanded reproduction, but that the need to study more concrete 
economies and societies demanded that this analysis be built upon 
and the abstractions successively removed. See in particular 
VKA 17, pp. 35-6,47. 
25. For Preobrazhensky's discussion of the categories of political eco- 
nomy see Introduction, pp. 27-35. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MARX ON THE REPRODUCTION OF FIXED CAPITAL 
In Marx's initial scheme of simple reproduction we saw that the 
portions of the commodity-product of departments I and II that had to 
be exchanged were as follows: 
1.4000c + 1000v + 1000s 
II. 2000c + 500v + 500s 
That is, 2000 I(v+s) had to exchange for 2000 IIc. Marx then notes a 
very serious problem. We have up till now assumed that if normal condi- 
tions of monetary circulation prevailed, this necessary exchange could 
take place, even though it required a fairly complex circuit in the 
movement of the individual classes of commodities. We presume, however, 
that this is capitalist production, which in turn presupposes a tech- 
nically advanced infrastructure to the economy. This being the case, 
large fractions of the fixed capital componentl of c are physically more 
durable than the one year production period we have taken as the basis 
of the schemes. We must remember what c stands for. It is not the 
total value of the means of production employed in production, but only 
that element which, through wear and tear, is transferred to the value 
of the commodities produced. If all of the constant capital, that is 
all of its circulating portion (raw materials, intermediate goods, 
fuel, etc. ) and all of the fixed capital which wear out or are produc- 
tively consumed in the course of one year's production, had to be re- 
placed in physical form at the end of this time, then our original re- 
lation between I(v+s) and IIc would hold. 
What happens if part of the plant and machinery which make up the 
fixed capital last longer than this time? This, after all, is the only 
realistic assumption we can make under capitalism, or any other form 
of modern economy. Then a machine worth, say, 100 may last for ten 
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years. Each year, assuming average and equal depreciation, it would 
transfer a value of 10 to the value of the commodities in whose produc- 
tion it is employed. When these commodities are sold on the market for 
money (say, arbitrarily, for a price of 20), 10 of this money will be 
immediately put back into circulation to replace the advanced circulat- 
ing capital (the circulating portion of constant capital plus the var- 
iable capital) and to realize the surplus value of the products. The 
other 10 will remain in the form of money. The capitalists will hoard 
this money, year after year, adding 10 in money each year to the hoard, 
until after 10 years they have accumulated 100 in money, on the one 
hand, and have completely worn out their machine, on the other. 
2 They 
can then replace it because of two conditions. One, it is used up, no 
longer capable of being productively consumed--it has to be replaced. 
Two, the capitalists have the money they need to buy a new machine 
(assuming, of course, that the price of this type of machine has not 
changed). This is no difficulty for the individual capitalist. It is 
a great difficulty for society as a whole. Why? 
Let us look again at the reproduction scheme. What is being ex- 
changed? There is 2000 I(v+s), which exists in the physical form of 
" means of production, and which must be metamorphosed through circulation 
into 2000 means of consumption. There is also 2000 IIc, which exists 
physically as so many means of consumption and must be transformed into 
an equal value of means of production, again through circulation. The 
one represents a value of newly added labor (v+s), which will function 
as a replacement for past embodied labor (i. e., as means of production). 
The other represents a value equivalent of past labor (c), which will 
function in the present in the form of newly added labor (i. e., as 
means of consumption). New values must exchange against old. Values 
to be completely consumed in the present (means of consumption) must 
exchange against those whose consumption (and hence replacement) will 
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only take lace over time 
3 p (means of production). 
Therefore, in the process of reproduction, department I will im- 
mediately purchase means of consumption from II, to the value of IIc, 
for money. Department II will then take this money and purchase means 
of production from I. But it will no longer buy the same value as it 
sold. It sold an equivalent of 2000 IIc because department I needed 
this much in means of consumption. It buys, however, only 1800 (Marx's 
illustration) in means of production. It only needs to replace this 
value of its used up constant capital (i. e., all of its circulating 
constant capital and part of its fixed capital) at the present time. 
A portion of its fixed capital depreciated by a value of 200 but does 
not physically require replacement. Department II will keep this left- 
over 200 in money as a hoard, saving it towards the day when it will 
have to replace another set of completely worn out machines. 
Two conditions of simple reproduction are violated here. Depart- 
ment I advanced money for the purchase of means of consumption, but 
not all of this money has returned to it--department II must keep part 
of it as a hoard. Secondly, the converse of this purchase-without-sale 
is that department I has 200 in means of production on its hands that 
II does not need. It may need them in the future, but that doesn't 
help us here--if I kept on producing at the same scale, the 200 in 
means of production would be available whenever II needed them, no mat- 
ter when the transaction took place. In this given year, however, de- 
partment I has a relative over-production of 200 in means of production. 
In addition, it has made department II a virtual gift of the 200 in 
money it advanced when it bought Ii's means of consumption. The result 
would have to be a crisis, with I cutting back production in the year 
of its over-production, and II suffering a shortage of means of produc- 
tion if it should need to replace its 200 in fixed capital before I had 
cause to return production to its previous level. How do we resolve 
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the problem? Perhaps I could keep on producing an extra 200 in means 
of production each year, storing them up without selling them, and un- 
til II had accumulated an equal amount in money and was ready to buy 
the whole lot. We will see later, when we discuss the function of re- 
serves under both advanced capitalism and socialism, that this is not 
as fantastic a solution as it seems--except that it is incompatible with 
capitalist production, where commodities produced must be realized (and 
under simple reproduction totally consumed, either productively or 
personally) and surplus value must be earned, and where the building 
up of such reserves brings with it an additional cause of capitalist 
crises. If, in the present example, I were to produce its surplus 200 
in means of production on faith, out of the goodness of its heart, 
while II kept up its part of the bargain and diligently accumulated its 
hoard of money until it was ready to get I off the hook with a massive 
purchase of fixed capital, we would wreak havoc with the whole logic 
of capitalist production. What is produced must be sold, and if it is 
not the individual capitals cannot complete their circulation and re- 
production comes to a halt. 
It is clear that we must find a solution within the premises of 
capitalist production and circulation. This is what Marx set out to do. 
Marx notes that in every year a certain portion of the capitalists 
in department II will be replacing their fixed capital in kind, using 
money they have hoarded in prior years. At the same time, another part 
of II's capitalists will not be retiring their fixed capital in full, 
but only accumulating a monetary equivalent of its wear and tear. Marx 
then divides department II into two sections: Those who must replace 
their fixed capital in toto, and those who only accumulate money for 
replacement in the future. How does our balance of exchange look after 
we account for: The exchange of Iv for an equal part of IIc, plus the 
exchange of part of Is for the additional portion of IIc that II is 
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prepared to exchange as a replacement for its circulating constant cap- 
ital and whatever fixed capital is ready for retirement? Following 
Marx's division of department II, we would have the following: 
I. 200s in commodities 
II. (1) 200c in money, plus (2) 200c in commodities 
In such a situation II-section (1) would exchange 200c in money for the 
200s of department I's means of production. With this money depart- 
ment I would then purchase the 200c in means of consumption from II- 
section (2). Everything is in order. Department I has acquired what 
it needs in means of consumption; II-section (1) has received the nec- 
essary means of production; and II-section (2) has 200 in money which 
it must set aside for the future purchase of fixed capital. In this 
case, unlike our first example, it was department II as a whole that 
advanced the money [it came from section (1)], and it is department II 
that gets it back [it returns to section (2)]. We could have obtained 
just as satisfactory a result from our first scheme. There we encoun- 
tered the difficulty that department I purchased means of consumption 
with money it had advanced, and could not receive it back in full. 
That the problem does not stem from the fact that department I advances 
the money, as opposed to department II, is easy to see. Department I 
could purchase 200s worth of commodities from II-section (2). It ad- 
vances money for this. It cannot in any way get this money back from 
II-section (2), because the latter has disposed of all its commodities 
and needs the money it received for its hoard--it requires no further 
purchases. But the circuit of exchange is not complete. II-section 
(1) still has 200c in money, with which it buys 200 in means of pro- 
duction from department I. It thereby receives what it needs in com- 
modities, that is, means of production, which it will productively con- 
sume; and department I has its original advance of money return to it. 
Marx's conclusion is tremendously significant. In any given period 
-122- 
of production, the portion of IIc's fixed capital which is retired and 
replaced in full must equal that portion which is accumulated in the 
form of a money equivalent. 
The condition precedent is here evidently that this fixed compon- 
ent part of constant capital II, which is reconverted into money 
to the full extent of its value and therefore must be renewed in 
kind each year (section 1), should be equal to the annual depreci- 
ation of the other fixed component part of constant capital II, 
which continues to function in its old bodily form and whose wear 
and tear, depreciation in value, which it transfers to the commod- 
ities in whose production it is engaged, is first to be compensated 
in money. Such a balance would seem to be a law of reproduction 
on the same scale. This is equivalent to saying that in class I, 
which puts out the means of production, the proportional division 
of labor must remain unchanged, since it produces on the one hand 
circulating and on the other fixed component parts of the constant 
capital of department 11.4 
We can illustrate the problem very simply. Imagine that total produc- 
tion within both I and II stays the same, and that, as with our original 
assumption, department I has 200 in unsold Is. But here imagine that 
the division within IIc between retirements and hoards is altered and 
that II must replace a greater value of fixed capital than it is simply 
accumulating in money form. Then the exchange balance would appear as: 
I. 200s in commodities 
II. (1) 300c in money, plus (2) 100c in commodities 
It is clear that I can only exchange 200 in means of production with 
II-section (1). I will obtain 200 in money and II-section (1) will re- 
ceive 200 in means of production. Yet I can only purchase 100 in means 
of consumption from II-section (2), because this is all that this sub- 
section of department II has for sale and 100 in money is all that it 
requires for its hoard. Thus I is left, on the one hand, with 100 in 
money which it cannot dispose of, and, on the other, a shortage of 100 
in commodities (means of consumption). By the same token, II-section 
(1) also has a surplus of 100 in money and--what is perhaps even more 
serious than the plight of department I--a shortage of a like amount 
of means of production. The division of labor within department I would 
have to radically alter to account for this new distribution between 
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retirements and hoards. Yet if this were only a one-time disproportion 
within department II (not unlike what occured in the Soviet Union after 
the Civil War), the system would be seized by a severe crisis, as it 
would suffer a shortage of fixed capital. The scale of production with- 
in department II would have to be reduced. 
Alternatively, the division between the two sections of department 
II might have been the reverse: 
1.200s in commodities 
II. (1) 100c in money, plus (2) 300c in commodities 
Here I would have unsold means of production, as II-section (1) would 
need only 100 from department I. But this would give department I only 
100 in money with which to try to purchase 200 in commodities from II- 
section (2). The latter suffers on two accounts. First, because de- 
partment I's demand for its means of consumption is less that what it 
must sell in any case, regardless of the amount of money I has for the 
purchase of commodities. And second, because I now has only 100 (not 
200) in money, as a result of the incomplete conversion of its commod- 
ity-product--200 Is--into money via exchange with II-section (1). So, 
I has unsold means of production and a shortage of means of consumption; 
II-section (2) has unsold commodities and a shortage of money for its 
hoard. Even more striking, I's shortage of means consumption coexists 
with an unsold stock of means of consumption within II-section (2)! 
Why? Because exchange must be mediated by money; what I has for ex- 
change, namely, means of production, is of no use to II-section (2), 
which needs hard cash. And this is precisely what department I does 
not have, due to the sudden imbalance in its exchange with II-section 
(1). Once again a crisis would ensue. Both I and II-section (2) would 
cut back their production, in order to eliminate the "over-production" 
they each suffer (an over-production that coexists with an actually un- 
filled demand on the part of department I). 
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In the first case, where IIc-(1) was greater than IIc-(2), I had 
a surplus of money on its hands, while II-section (1) had a shortage 
of means of production. They could have evened things out by importing 
commodities (means of production), through foreign trade. In the op- 
posite case, where IIc-(1) was less than IIc-(2), it was not money that 
I was left with, but unsold means of production alongside unsold means 
of consumption within II-section (2)--that is, a crisis of over-produc- 
tion "in spite of reproduction on an unchanging scale. "S This is Marx's 
first important general conclusion from this example. Even under the 
uncomplicated, asbstract assumptions of simple reproduction, we see 
that a crisis can result from an imbalance in the material composition 
of reproduction and the duration of the circulation period of these in- 
dividual parts. 
In the passage we quoted we emphasized part of the last sentence, 
where Marx stated how an imbalance within department II in terms of 
the rate of replacement of its fixed capital affected the division of 
labor within department I. A few pages later Marx makes this point 
again. 
In short, if under simple reproduction and other unchanged condi- 
tions--particularly under unchanged productive power, total volume 
and intensity of labor--no constant proportion is assumed between 
expiring fixed capital (to be renewed) and fixed capital still con- 
tinuing to function in its old bodily form (merely adding to the 
products value in compensation of its depreciation), then, in the 
one case the mass of circulating component parts to be reproduced 
would remain the same while the mass of fixed component parts to 
be reproduced would be increased. Therefore the total production 
I would have to grow or, even aside from money-relations, there 
would be a deficit in reproduction. 
In the other case, if the size of fixed capital II to be repro- 
duced in kind should proportionately decrease and hence the compon- 
ent part of fixed capital II, which must now be replaced only in 
money, should increase in the same ratio, then the quantity of the 
circulating component parts of constant capital II reproduced by I 
would remain unchanged, while that of the fixed component parts 
to be reproduced would decrease. Hence either decrease in aggre- 
gate production of I, or surplus (as previously deficit) and sur- 
plus that is not to be converted into money. 6 
If the total volume of production of I were to remain the same we would 
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have still another result. If under these circumstances the replaced 
part of IIc were to exceed the portion to be reproduced only in money 
form, then the volume of I's production of means of production for de- 
partment II remaining the same, the proportions between fixed and cir- 
culating means of production would have to change. The fixed part of 
IIc would go up, and the circulating portion would go down. "If one 
of these parts increases the other decreases, and vice versa. On the 
other hand the total production of class II also retains the same vol- 
ume. But how is this possible if its raw materials, semi-finished pro- 
ducts, and auxiliary materials (i. e., the circulating elements of con- 
stant capital II) decrease? "7 
We have now established two principle conclusions in our discussion 
of Marx's analysis of the replacement of fixed capital. The first is 
that, if the division of social labor within department I remains the 
same, a crisis can and will result if the technical structure of pro- 
duction in department Il--specifically, the division of IIc between fix- 
ed and circulating constant capital--alters, or if the rate of replace- 
ment of the fixed part of IIc changes. In either case department I will 
find itself alternatively with unsold means of production on its hands, 
or with a chronic deficit in its ability to supply means of production 
of the needed type. The second result is that the division of labor 
within I is itself affected by the proportion of fixed to circulating 
capital in II; and, once again, the implication of Marx's analysis is 
that if department I fails to adjust the material composition of its 
output between those means of production that make up fixed, and those 
that make up circulating constant capital, so as to keep pace with what- 
ever changes may take place in II's demand for the two types of constant 
capital, then a crisis will arise here as well. 
Marx's argument on fixed capital essentially stops here; and al- 
though his conclusions are indispensible to the discussion in the rest 
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of our thesis we cannot leave things as they stand. We must first go 
somewhat beyond what Marx has done in order to show just how much of 
Preobrazhensky's own analysis Marx had in fact anticipated. In doing 
so, the relevance of Marx's conclusions and their further ramifications 
will, we hope, emerge more clearly and will make the train of Preobra- 
zhensky's rather compact argument (especially in VKA 22) easier to 
follow. 
From what we have said so far it is clear that even under sim- 
ple reproduction the problem of the material composition of production 
and the different circulation paths of the individual components will 
complicate any but the most basic analysis. We must remove the initial 
assumption that the product of department I is totally homogeneous. 
Marx had already done the same with department II, when he showed how 
exchange would take place once we divided that department's product be- 
tween necessary articles of consumption and articles of luxury. 
8 We 
now must do the same with department I, and separate its production 
according to that part which produces fixed capital, and that which 
produces elements of circulating constant capital. Since we assume 
capitalist production of a mature technical development, let us take 
the division between fixed and circulating capital as three to one. 
Then, with the same organic composition of capital throughout our now 
subdivided department I, we get a new scheme for simple reproduction. 
[We have designated the two dubdivisions of department I by the let- 
ters F (fixed capital) and C (circulating constant capital), respec- 
tively. ] 
I-F, 3000c + 750v + 750s = 4500 means of production for fixed 
capital 
I-C. 1000c + 250v + 250s = 1500 means of production for circu- 
lating capital 
II. 2000c + 500v + 500s = 3000 means of consumption 
Total social production is the same as in Marx's scheme for simple 
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reproduction. We have merely divided production in department I accord- 
ing to the assumptions we stated, leaving both the organic composition 
of capital and the rate of exploitation the same throughout department 
I and in department II. Nothing else has changed. 
Now, suppose we add a qualifying condition, bringing our scheme 
somewhat closer into line with historical reality, and recognize that 
fixed capital will tend to be produced in urban areas, where there are 
large factories, and that the circulating portion of constant capital, 
e. g., raw materials, fuel, etc., will in large part come from rural, 
agricultural regions. We can still assume that capitalist production 
is universal, and that the organic composition of capital is the same 
in both subdivisions of department I. So far our difference is strict- 
ly geographical. If this is the case, we will have to break up depart- 
ment II as well. Most means of consumption will originate in the coun- 
tryside, even though they are capitalistically produced. The workers 
and capitalists of department I-C (means of production functioning as 
circulating constant capital) will obtain most of their means of con- 
sumption close by, from rural enterprises and farms. The latter, how- 
ever, will produce far more means of consumption than a rural market 
could absorb, and will have to trade with the cities. The urban areas, 
on the other hand, cannot produce very many means of consumption and 
will have to depend upon exchange with the countryside to feed their 
workers and capitalists whom, we have assumed, in order to simplify mat- 
ters, are engaged exclusively in the production of fixed capital (dep- 
artment I-F). We then find that we have two great sectors of produc- 
tion: The one urban-industrial; the other rural-agricultural. Each 
contains enterprises which produce means of production and means of 
consumption--that is, both will have their own department I and depart- 
ment II. The breakdown might look something like this: 
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I-F. 3000c + 750v + 750s = 4500 
II-F. 800c + 200v + 200s = 1200 
I-C. 1000c + 250v + 250s = 1500 
II-C. 1200c + 300v + 300s = 1800 
For convenience we have kept the same designations of F and C for 
departments II as well as I. More properly we might have renamed them 
I- and II-U (urban) and I- and II-R (rural), recognizing that some 
fixed capital will be produced rurally, and some circulating constant 
capital will come from the cities. This is not the important point. 
What is particularly interesting here is that if we take sector F by 
itself we see that it cannot satisfy conditions of simple reproduction. 
I-F has exchangeable means of production worth 1500(v+s), while II-F 
has only 800c in means of consumption, and requires only that much in 
means of production. I-F thus has a surplus of 700 in means of produc- 
tion and a deficit of 700 in means of consumption. 
Likewise with sector C. I-C has only 500(v+s) to offer in means 
of production, and needs only 500 in means of consumption; while II-C 
needs 1200 in means of production, and must dispose of the same amount 
of means of consumption in order to acquire them. II-C has a deficit 
of 700 in means of production, and a surplus of means of consumption 
of the same magnitude. 
It is fairly obvious that conditions of simple reproduction can 
be satisfied only if the rural and urban sectors engage in mutal ex- 
change. I-F can sell its surplus of means of production, worth 700, to 
II-C in exchange for 700 means of consumption. Then all departments 
in all sectors will have the material elements they require for produc- 
tion to begin again next year. This result should not really surprise 
us, since we took our figures for the respective sectors and depart- 
ments by disaggregating Marx's scheme, which had been in balance before 
we broke everything up. The relationship we have established, however, 
is an important one, since it in no way depends on the figures we 
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started with. We could have employed different figures and even changed 
the proportions of the total social product shared by the individual 
departments, the organic composition of capital, etc. No matter what 
illustration we chose, the same rules of proportionality would hold: 
Any imbalance, any surplus or deficit in the exchangeable commodity-pro- 
duct of one sector could only be redressed by calling the other sector 
into circulation--and then only if that other sector required the sur- 
plus commodities, and could supply the deficit commodities in the pro- 
per amount. In short, the conditions for simple reproduction no longer 
apply for any single sector alone, but only to the system as a whole. 
This is no abstract exercise in how much we can manipulate the 
schemes of simple reproduction. Historically production has seen this 
same "disaggregation" between urban and rural production. Not only 
that, they have, at particular, given historical moments been represent- 
ed by two different modes of production. Rural production at the dawn 
of capitalist development was predominantly of petty-commodity type. 
Urban production has been characterized by capitalist industry. Thus 
our two sectors are an abstraction of an historically real situation, 
and the interconnection we have just discerened between them has been 
an essential element of capitalist development. Any imbalance in the 
conditions of reproduction within the capitalist sector could in large 
part be rectified to the extent that the petty-commodity sector could 
be brought within the sphere of capitalist circulation. 
Within its process of circulation, in which industrial capital 
functions either as money or as commodities, the circuit of indus- 
trial capital, whether as money capital or as commodity capital, 
crosses the commodity circulation of the most diverse modes of pro- 
duction, so far as they produce commodities... The character of the 
process of production from which they originate is immaterial. 
They function as commodities in the market, and as commodities they 
enter into the circuit of industrial capital as well as into the 
circulation of the surplus value incorporated in it. It is there- 
fore the universal character of the origin of the commodities, the 
existence of the market as world market, which distinguishes the 
process of circulation of industrial capital... 
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... As soon as act M-MP is completed, the commodities (MP) cease 
to be such and become one of the modes of existence of industrial 
capital in its functional form of P, productive capital. Thereby 
however their origin is obliterated. They exist henceforth only 
as forms of existence of industrial capital, are embodied in it. 
However it still remains true that to replace them they must be 
reproduced, and to this extent the capitalist mode of production 
is conditional on modes of production lying outside of its own 
stage of development. But is the tendency of the capitalist mode 
of production to transform all production as much as possible in- 
to commodity production. The mainspring by which this is accomp- 
lished is precisely the involvement of all production into the 
capitalist circulation process. 9 
Marx, then, did in fact provide us with the framework for studying 
how capitalist and petty-commodity production will develop in mutual 
inter-relation. This is the first consequence of extending Marx's own 
breakdown of production according to its material, qualitative charac- 
teristics. We have derived, as a conclusion, what Preobrazhensky was 
to take as his starting point in his analysis of reproduction under con- 
crete capitalism and in the Soviet economy. We will, however, leave 
this point for the moment, as we will take it up in detail in Part II. 
This is not the only, or even the most important conclusion to be reach- 
ed, however. Although the two-sector scheme was no doubt a crucial 
analytical discovery for Preobrazhensky, its derivation in the way we 
have done here necessarily leads us to another problem, namely the ma- 
terial conditions of reproduction with regard to the different types 
of commodities produced and their separate functions within the process 
of production and circulation. 
At any given moment in a society's development its production will 
be characterized by a determinate technical structure. Reproduction, 
as we showed above, was not just a question of the material balance be- 
tween means of production and means of consumption in general, but also 
of the relation between the types of means of production (broadly speak- 
ing, those which function as the fixed part of constant capital versus 
those which function as its circulating portion) that society utilizes 
in the creation of its social wealth. Marx chose to demonstrate this 
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by looking at IIc in its exchange with I(v+s). But the argument neces- 
sarily extends to department I as well--it, too, has a given technical 
structure between its fixed and circulating components, and these must 
be reproduced in the proper proportions if reproduction is to continue. 
We can illustrate this by taking our two sector scheme and rearranging 
the figures according to the fixed and circulating portions of their 
constant capital. Again, we designate fixed capital by the letters F 
or f, and circulating capital by C or c. 
I-F. [22SOf+ 750c]c + 750v(f) + 750s(f) 
II-F. [ 600f+ 200 ]c + 200v + 200s 
I-C. [ 750f+ 250c]c + 250v(c) + 250s(c) 
II-C. [ 900f+ 300c]c + 300v + 300s 
In such a system as this the conditions of simple reproduction have 
become extraordinarily complex. Not only must means of production ex- 
change against means of consumption at their appropriate values--they 
must do so in the correct material form as well. It is no longer suf- 
ficient that the combined departments I(v+s) exchange against the com- 
bined IIc. The commodities of I-F(v+s) have the material form of means 
of production-qua-fixed capital, and must exchange in that form. The 
same with I-C(v+s), which has a value of 500, but a material shape of 
means of production that can only function within the circulating cap- 
ital. 
As the scheme is set up the conditions of simple reproduction are 
satisfied. We have assumed the same technical proportions between fixed 
and circulating constant capital in all departments, three to one, in 
addition to Marx's initial assumptions of a rate of exploitation of 
100% and an organic composition of capital of four to one. We must 
note that in the two departments I the subscripts f and c for Ic refer 
to the material form of the means of production these departments re- 
quire in their constant capital; the subscripts for Iv and Is represent 
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the material form of their own commodity-product. As the two depart- 
ments II produce no means of production, the subscripts there are only 
listed in their constant capital, and obviously refer to the material 
shape of the means of production they need to replace. 
In this scheme exchange would take place as follows: I-F has 
means of production of fixed capital to the value of 1500(v+s). Depart- 
ments II-F and II-C combined require means of production of fixed cap- 
ital to exactly this amount, and can provide I-F with means of consump- 
tion of the same value. Besides this exchange, I-C has an exchange 
fund of 500(v+s) which consists of means of production that will serve 
as circulating constant capital. It requires 500 in means of consump- 
tion in return. The combined departments II can satisfy this condition 
also. They need to replace their constant circulating capital with a 
combined total of 500; they have 500 in means of consumption to give 
in exchange to I-C. Simple reproduction is assured from this point of 
view. 
We see, however, that there is another condition to satisfy. There 
now has to take place an internal exchange between I-F and I-C. I-F 
has a constant capital of 3000, of which it can provide itself with 
2250 in fixed capital. It needs, however, 750 in circulating constant 
capital, because of the technical composition of its production process. 
It must obtain these 750 from I-C. Let us now look at I-C. It has a 
constant capital value of 1000, of which only 250 exists in a naturally- 
useful form, i. e., as circulating capital. It must have 750 fixed cap- 
ital for production to continue. It can acquire these only because it 
has 750 in means of production capable of functioning as circulating 
capital and which it can exchange with I-F; the latter in turn needs 
these 750 in means of production-qua-circulating capital that originate 
in I-C. So we see that this new, internal condition of simple reproduc- 
tion has been fulfilled as well as the others. Yet this in turn means 
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that there is a new possible point of dislocation in the entire process, 
a new point of disturbance. Even if the exchange between the combined 
I(v+s) were to take place in full with the combined IIc; and even if 
the necessary physical proportions between fixed and circulating capi- 
tal were satisfied; even then simple reproduction might still be impos- 
sible if the internal exchange between I-F and I-C were to break down 
or the technical structure of each department's constant capital were 
to alter. Such a disproportion might look like this: 
I-F. [2500f + 500c]c + 750v(f) + 750s(f) 
II-F. [ 600E + 200c]c + 200v + 200s 
I-C. [ 750E + 250c]c + 250v(c) + 250s(c) 
II-C. [ 900E + 300c]c + 300v + 300s 
Everything has remained the same in terms of how I-F and I-C ex- 
change their v plus s for needed means of consumption of both depart- 
ments II. Conversely, departments II are each still able to acquire 
what they need in both fixed and circulating capital. What is more, 
the value of the total commodity-product of each individual department 
and of the economy as a whole is the same. The only thing that is dif- 
ferent is that I-F now has a higher ratio of fixed to circulating cap- 
ital than before, while production within I-C has stayed exactly as it 
was. And this alone is enough to ensure that simple reproduction can- 
not go on. I-F requires only 500 in constant circulating capital. I-C 
on the other hand has 750 in circulating capital to exchange. It can 
exchange 500 of this with I-F easily enough. But then I-C will have a 
deficit of 250 in fixed constant capital, and a surplus of 250 in un- 
sold means of production which--since they can only serve as part of 
the circulating portion of some department's constant capital--have no 
purchaser. We have in effect a goods famine of means of production of 
industrial origin. 10 The result will be that I-C will have to cut back 
production all the way around. But this would mean that its variable 
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capital, and hence its surplus value would be reduced as soon as it ad- 
justed its total constant capital to the supply of fixed capital that 
it can obtain through exchange. Then either II-F or II-C, or possibly 
both would not be able to obtain the necessary amounts of circulating 
constant capital, in the shape of raw materials or semi-finished goods 
of agricultural origin. They, too, will have to cut production. The 
result is a general crisis, unemployment, destruction of values, etc., 
and all because of a change in the internal material requirements of 
department I-F. By simply changing the proportion of fixed to circulat- 
ing capital within its own constant capital it precipitated a drastic 
alteration in the entire division of labor of the economy as a whole. 
Every department was affected; a shortage of fixed capital for I-C meant 
the contraction of production in both departments II, even though the 
latter could still purchase whatever fixed capital they needed. 
Under the assumption of simple reproduction the only way out would 
be foreign trade, as Marx concluded in his discussion of the imbalance 
between the replaced and hoarded equivalents of fixed capital. Here the 
solution would be the same. Our economy could export its surplus of 
250 in raw materials, intermediary goods, etc., and import needed ma- 
chinery and other forms of means of production that could make up I-C's 
shortfall of fixed capital. 
ll We could also consider one other alter- 
native that Marx cites in his example, and which might prove suitable 
for ours: The intensification of the productivity of labor within I-F. 
This, however, engenders other serious problems. 
But such a change would not take place without a shifting of cap- 
ital and labor from one line of production of I to another, and 
every such shift would call forth momentary disturbances. Fur- 
thermore (in so far as extension and intensification of labor would 
mount), I [I-F in our example] would have for exchange more of its 
own value for less of II's [I-C's] value. Hence there would be 
a depreciation of the product of I [I-F]. 12 
Even foreign trade has it difficulties. Once we presume a world cap- 
italist economy, with its world market and mutual inter-relations 
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between all its parts, a disturbance in one will necessarily have re- 
percussions in others. Any attempt to solve the disproportion via for- 
eign trade would, as Marx argues, merely extend the disproportion, to 
the extent that it would require some change in the division of labor 
somewhere else in the world. The world market is not some idle ware- 
house, stocked with goods to fill up the holes in the economy of some 
closed national economy. The world market presumes world production, 
where every national productive unit has its own trauma, its own demands 
for proportionality, and its ensuing disturbances. Thus foreign trade, 
as Marx notes, "only transfers the contradictions to a wider sphere and 
gives them greater latitude,, '13 
There is, Marx concludes, only one durable solution to these dis- 
proportions and disturbances: The abolition of capitalist production. 
Once the capitalist form of reproduction is abolished, it is only 
a matter of the volume of the expiring portion--expiring and there- 
fore to be reproduced in kind--of fixed capital (the capital which 
in our illustration functions in the production of articles of con- 
sumption) varying in various successive years. If it is very large 
in a certain year (in excess of the average mortality, as is the 
case with human beings), then it is certainly so much smaller in 
the next year. The quantity of raw materials, semi-finished pro- 
ducts, and auxiliary materials required for the annual production 
of the articles of consumption--provided other things remain equal 
--does not decrease in consequence. 
Hence the aggregate production of means of production would have 
to increase in the one case and decrease in the other. This can 
be remedied only by a continuous relative over-production. There 
must be on the one hand a certain quantity of fixed capital pro- 
duced in excess of that which is directly required; on the other 
hand, and particularly, there must be a supply of raw materials, 
etc., in excess of the direct annual requirements (this applies 
especially to means of subsistence). This sort of over-production 
is tantamount to control by society over the material means of its 
reproduction. But within capitalist society it is an element of 
anarchy. 14 
These extrapolations, made from Marx's analysis of the reproduction 
of fixed capital, will prove immensely important to all of our subse- 
quent discussion. In the first place, they have allowed us to derive 
from Marx conclusions that anticipate a)the theoretical framework Preo- 
brazhensky was to use to analyze both the Soviet system and contemporary 
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capitalism, in particular the need to construct the reproduction schemes 
on the basis of two sectors in the economy; and b)the problems that arise 
when reproduction must take place within an economy where the necessary 
material elements of its existence are produced by sectors with differ- 
ent technical needs and differing productivities of labor, 
15 
and where 
reproduction must be mediated by market exchange. 
Secondly, Marx's own conclusion highlights the impasse in which 
the Soviet economy found itself in the 1920's, and which so preoccupied 
Preobrazhensky. Only a society with sufficient material wealth, and 
which had abolished the fetters that capitalist circulation (and ulti- 
mately, capitalist production) places upon reproduction could attain 
the flexibility needed to cope with these disproportions, which will 
occur more naturally the more developed and advanced a capitalist eco- 
nomy is, but which can be increasingly foreseen and coped with under 
socialism. 
We should also note that these disproportions arose in our examples 
strictly from an analysis of simple reproduction. Expanded reproduc- 
tion would increase the complexity of the process and provide even more 
loci of breakdown. Later, in Part III, we will show how such dispro- 
portion is inherent in the process of expanded reproduction itself. 
Even at the level of simple reproduction, however, we have managed to 
highlight the situation which confronted the Soviet Union in the twen- 
ties: The goods famine in a mixed commodity-socialist system of eco- 
nomy, which had to achieve expanded socialist reproduction via the 
medium of market exchange, and in the midst of a private economy even 
more technically backward than the state sector. It is no accident that 
Preobrazhensky, in his analysis of this dilemma, concluded that only a 
revolution in the advanced capitalist world could offer the Soviet Un- 
ion a way out. Only then could it overcome the political obstacle to 
her participation in an international division of labor which possessed 
_ , ýý 
16 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 
1. It is important here to clarify Marx's use of the categories "fixed" 
and "circulating capital (Capital, II, Chs. VIII, X, and XI). Cap- 
ital for Marx is not a thing, but a social relation; and so fixed 
and circulating capital have nothing to do with the material char- 
acteristics of commodities but with the way in which their value 
is transferred to the annual product. Thus fixed capital is that 
part of the productive capital whose value remains in a greater 
or lesser part fixed in the means of production, i. e., outside the 
value of the annual product--its value is transferred to that of 
the product only gradually, over several production periods. Cir- 
culating capital is capital whose value is transferred entirely 
to that of the product in the course of a single productive period. 
Several things follow from this distinction: First, the differen- 
tiation between fixed and circulating capital has nothing to do 
with that between machines and raw materials, or between means of 
production and means of subsistence, except insofar as certain 
types of means of production transfer their value more or less slow- 
ly as a function of their physical properties. But, notes Marx, 
fertilizer is fixed capital if its value is not wholly imparted 
to the crops it helps produce in one season; converesely, coal and 
other fuels, although not physically contained in any product are 
circulating capital, as they are wholly consumed and hence their 
value is completely transferred to that of the product within a 
single production period. Second, the distinction is not made 
strictly between different kinds of means of production. Variable 
capital, since it is a capital-value advanced in the course of 
production is also part of circulating capital. Here we must make 
a further distinction. Just as the circulating part of constant 
capital is not the same as the physical means of production invol- 
ved, but only a question of how their value is transferred, so 
the variable portion of circulating capital is not the same as the 
labor power of the worker or the means of subsistence that sustain 
the laborer. It is only the value of the variable capital as a 
capital-value advanced in the course of production. Third, the 
distinction between fixed and circulating capital is one entirely 
within the productive capital. This is important, as Marx attacks 
Smith for confusing circulation capital, i. e., money capital and 
commodity capital (which are the functional forms that industrial 
capital assumes in its path of circulation) with circulating cap- 
ital (i. e., capital which is distinguished by the manner in which 
it transfers its value to the product, something that can only be 
done in production, i. e., while the capital has the functional form 
of productive capital). 
is, 
2. This/ of course, an abstraction. The capitalists would not let this 
money lie idle, but would make it available, via the modern credit 
system, to the capitalist class as a whole. This, however, does 
not alter the nature of the problem in any way. Both the individ- 
ual and collective capitalist can only earn back the money needed 
to replace their machinery a little at a time, in increments; and 
the machinery itself will only wear out over time, but will require 
immediate replacement in toto at the end of its life span. For 
the possibilities and limits of employing this accumulating hoard 
--represented by the depreciation fund--for the purposes of accum- 
ulation, see Part III, Ch. 8, below. 
3. This relates to the somewhat difficult discussion in Volume II of 
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Capital (pp. 433-37), where Marx poses the problem of how to com- 
pare the value components of the social product with its material 
form. In any given production year the new value created is ob- 
viously resolved into what is created by the application of living 
labor, i. e., what appears in the value of commodities as v and s. 
Taken together for both departments these represent the aggregate 
consumption fund of the society, and so are materially represented 
as means of consumption. If we look at the reproduction schemes 
we see that, indeed, the sum of I(v+s) and II(v+s)--i. e., every- 
thing that is personally consumed--equals the total product of de- 
partment II, which produces these means of consumption. Yet the 
commodities that make up each department's product obviously con- 
tain a constant capital value component which is transferred to it; 
what is more, quite clearly new means of production are produced 
in each production year, and these contain new value created by 
the application of labor power. And here is the source of the con- 
fusion. All of the newly-created value in a year's social product 
is resolved into v+s. Yet all newly-created use values contain 
both a new value component and an old value component, i. e., a 
value that is simply transferred in the course of production. 
This duality is embodied directly in the exchange between I(v+s) 
and IIc. I(v+s) is new labor, whose value exchanges against a val- 
ue represented by the constant capital of II, i. e., by a value 
created (assuming that all of c turns over in one year) in the 
previous year. I(v+s) is a sum of values that represents the en- 
tire newly-added value of I's total product, even though each dis- 
creet product of I contains both c and (v+s). This is why we can 
refer to I(v+s) as new values. Conversely, IIc, although exist- 
ing as means of consumption, and hence in a social sense part of 
the newly-created values of society (which, as we noted, is equal 
to the total product of II), is really the old value component of 
II's product. What we have is newly-created value exchanging 
against old value, which exists in the annual product only because 
it has been transferred from values created in a previous year. 
And this is not surprising if we consider that in the year before 
II's constant capital wore out and was replaced by I(v+s) of that 
year, i. e., by new means of production that, in that year were new 
values. Thus I(v+s) in the present year is going to replace (and 
hence exchange against) I(v+s) of the preceding year. This year's 
newly-added labor exchanges against last year's. Although this 
may seem a rather scholastic distinction, it will prove exception- 
ally important once we take up the question of the accumulation 
of fixed capital under conditions where we no longer assume that 
the latter turns over solely in one year (see Part III, below). 
4. Capital, II, p. 469. Emphasis added. 
S. Ibid, p. 472. 
6. Ibid, p. 472. 
7. Ibid, p. 471. 
8. See Appendix to Part I, below. 
9. Capital, II, p. 113. Our emphasis. 
10. The Russian term tovarniy golod literally means "commodity famine, " 
Theoretically, this would be a more correct translation, because 
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it reflects the dual nature of the Soviet economy, which Preobra- 
zhensky characterized as commodity-socialist, since the category 
of commodity had not been transcended, not even in the state sec- 
tor. In these terms we could speak of a "goods" famine when the 
commodity no longer existed in the Soviet economy and we had only 
state products (see Preobrazhensky's discussion of this topic in 
the chapter, "The Law of Value in Soviet Economy, " in The New Eco- 
nomics, as well as our Introduction). Convention, however, has 
been to use the phrase "goods famine, " and we have retained the 
term only for this reason. 
11. We could solve the disproportion in another way. If the combined 
demand of departments II for means of production from I-F fell 
from 1500 to 1250, and their demand for means of production from 
I-C rose from 500 tO 750; and if I-F and I-C held their respective 
demands for means of consumption from both departments II constant; 
then the latter would have an exchange surplus of 250 in money from 
I-F, which they could then use to purchase their now greater amount 
of means of production from I-C. I-C would then have a money hoard 
of 250 with which it could purchase the means of production it 
needs from I-F. Then the system would be in equilibrium and the 
money I-F would have to advance would return to it. The figures 
might appear as follows: 
I-F. [2500f + 500c]c + 750v(f) + 750s(f) 
II-F. [ 500f + 300c]c + 200v + 200s 
I-C. [ 750f + 250c]c + 250v(c) + 250s(c) 
II-C. [ 750f + 450c]c + 300v + 300s 
Here departments II together purchase only 1250 in fixed capital 
from I-F. On the other hand they purchase 750 in means of produc- 
tion from I-C. Let I-F advance 1500 in money for its combined 
purchase of means of consumption. Departments II buy back only 
1250; so I-F has lost some of the advanced money (250) and has un- 
sold means of production (also 250). But departments II now ex- 
change 500 means of consumption directly with I-C for 500 means of 
production. I-C needs only 500 in means of consumption, but de- 
partments II have an extra 250 in money which they obtained from 
their unequal purchase and sale with I-F; and I-C has 250 unsold 
means of production available, since it has produced 750 for ex- 
change with I-F, but the latter bought only 500. So departments 
II obtain a full 750 in means of production from I-C, while the 
latter has sold everything it has to sell and has, in addition, 
250 in money that it did not have before. Finally, it takes this 
money and buys 250 in fixed capital from I-F, which in turn had 
these 250 lying idle due to the fact that it had produced 1500 
for exchange with departments II, but was able to sell only 1250. 
We can see that just on the basis of simple reproduction, equilib- 
rium can be attained only via a very complicated circuit of ex- 
change. We will meet this problem again in this exact form in our 
discussion of the Soviet Union's goods famine (see Part IV, below). 
12, capital, II, p. 472. The process Marx is describing here is that 
of non-equivalent exchange between the two departments. More of 
Its labor would exchange for less of II's. The only other alter- 
native would be a transfer of social capital from II to I, so that 
the two departments could then exchange equivalent values in the 
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necessary quantitative proportions. In the Soviet economy under 
NEP we also find non-equivalent exchange, but in the reverse dir- 
ection--values are transferred from the petty production sector 
into t he state sector, primarily into the state sector's depart- 
ment I. This is a vehicle for transferring values into the lat- 
ter and thereby redistributing the social capital towards an in- 
creased output of means of production. Without this the shortage 
of means of production of state heavy industry could only have 
been "liquidated" (abstracting from foreign trade) by abolishing 
non-equivalence (and this, as'we shall see below, only in the very 
short run). This would have made state-produced means of pro- 
duction relatively cheaper for the private sector and more acces- 
sible. Thus the state could have further accommodated to the pres- 
sures of the market and relieved some of the disproportions between 
its relations with the countryside, but only at the expense of its 
continued ability to accumulate and supply all of state industry 
with means of production. Under these conditions, which already 
presupposed that equilibrium was based on non-equivalent exchange, 
the Soviet economy would be tantamount to adopting the solution 
Marx described--i. e., a de facto transfer of values out of the 
state sector, or a relative subsidization of the petty-commodity 
sector. We should only note that when we refer to a transfer of 
values from one sector or department to another we are not talking 
about the moving of actual physical entities, but about values as 
a command over labor power and hence as a channel for reorganizing 
social labor and the total social capital. 
13. Ibid, pp. 472-73. 
14. Ibid, p. 473. 
15. See the passage from Capital, II, p. 113, quoted on pp. 129-30, 
above. 
16. It is this inability to recognize the political implications of 
the Soviet Union's relations with the world economy that charac- 
terizes the traditional economistic interpretations of the debates 
of the twenties, in particular the argument of Richard Day (see 
pp. 16-17 and Introduction, Note 5, pp. 75-76, above). Day treats 
foreign trade as a technological category, devoid of particular 
social and historical content. Thus he fails to see that the lim- 
its to the Soviet Union's relations with world capitalism were 
only partly determined by the levels of foreign trade the govern- 
ment was or was not willing to adopt or which the economy could 
support with its total output; the state in addition had to care- 
fully assess the fact that adaptations of the economy to produc- 
tion for the world market raised the serious question of what 
kinds of relations these were to be: Capitalist or tightly-con- 
trolled by the monopoly of foreign trade. Economic relations al- 
ways have a political character to them, as they form part of the 
process of reproduction of the specific economic systems that en- 
gage in them--hence they immediately become a question of the abil- 
ity of a given social system to reproduce particular types of soc- 
ial relations. The capitalist market could have been nothing more 
than a stop-gap measure for the Soviet economy; eventually assis- 
tance from other socialist countries would have been necessary, 
for only this could have safeguarded the socialist character of 
the Soviet economy. 
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APPENDIX TO PART I 
THE REPRODUCTION OF II(v+s): NECESSITIES AND LUXURIES 
Preobrazhensky did not work out his two-sector scheme from Marx's 
analysis of the reproduction of fixed capital. If the original inspira- 
tion came from Marx at all, it was certainly from the section of Volume 
II of Capital where Marx divides the consumption fund of department II 
into two categories, consumer necessities (which form the exclusive 
source of individual consumption of the working class, and comprise a 
substantial portion of that of the capitalists) and luxuries (which, 
understandably, are consumed only by the bourgeoisie). It is to this 
discussion that Preobrazhensky refers in VKA 17 when he emphasizes the 
need to go beyond a simple value analysis and take account of the mater- 
ial elements of reproduction and their exchange. 
' Marx's section on 
fixed capital, however, goes unmentioned throughout the VKA articles; 
it was only in 1931, when he was specifically taking up the question 
of capitalist crises and the accumulation of fixed capital, that Preo- 
brazhensky noted this part of Marx's analysis--and even then it was 
only a passing reference. 
2 
We deferred discussion of Marx's analysis of the reproduction of 
II(v+s) for two reasons. First, the question of the reproduction of 
fixed capital is thematically central to our entire argument, in partic- 
ular to any elaboration of the tendencies behind the goods famine in 
the USSR; by contrast, the analysis of II(v+s) is valuable for our pur- 
poses only to the extent that in it Marx came closer to actually deriv- 
ing the need for a two sector scheme than he did in his discussion of 
fixed capital, where the argument has to be drawn out by implication. 
Second, although the analysis of department II's consumption fund leads 
directly to the construction of a scheme for simple reproduction that 
combines both a material and a value analysis, the problems of circula- 
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tion are extremely complex--far more so than in the scheme we employed 
in our analysis of fixed capital. As a result the essence of the prob- 
lem would have been obscured if we had started out with an analysis of 
the reproduction of necessities and luxuries, whose explication in fact 
presupposes the prior elaboration of the circulation and reproduction 
of fixed capital. 
The actual problem that Marx began with is not especially abstruse 
or difficult to follow. The product of department II is necessarily go- 
ing to contain the two classes of commodities we referred to: Articles 
of necessity and luxury goods; and we can thus sub-divide department 
II into two groups. Group Ha produces necessities; group IIb produces 
luxuries. Marx divides their respective capitals as follows: 
Ha. 1600c + 400v + 400s 
IIb. 400c + 100v + 100s 
It is quite evident that the workers in IIa will obtain their means of 
consumption directly within that group--in the same way as the workers 
of department II as a whole receive their means of subsistence within 
II and do not have to exchange their wages outside that department. 
Similarly, the workers of IIb cannot obtain any of their needed means 
of subsistence within IIb itself. They must exchange their wages with 
Ha (the mechanics of which we will go into in a moment). So, the out- 
put of Ha must at least cover these 500 means of consumption-qua-nec- 
essities. The capitalists, of course, are a different story; they will 
consume both necessities and luxuries, Marx assumes that they each 
devote three-fifths of their surplus value to necessities and two. -fifths 
to luxuries. Thus the capitalists of group Ha will consume 240 in nec- 
essities and 160 in luxuries; those in Ilb will consume 60 in necessi- 
ties and 40 in luxuries. Therefore if we add up the total output of 
means of consumption produced in Ha that does not have to be exchanged 
with department I to replace constant capital, it amounts to 800, or 
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the sum of IIa(v+s). What is the demand for these necessary consumer 
items? It is 500 from the workers in both groups, plus 240 from capi- 
talists IIa and 60 from capitalists IIb, or 800 in all. As for luxury 
goods, group IIb will have 200 of these left over from its total out- 
put after it has restored its constant capital; and the demand for lux- 
uries equals 160 from capitalists Ila plus 40 from those in IIb, or 
200 all told. 
This is no artifact of our figures. We could, as Marx notes, 
have assumed a different proportion between necessities and luxuries 
consumed by the capitalists in IIa and IIb; or we could have assumed 
that the individual capitalists in each group have such varied tastes 
that the percentages do not average out and the overall consumption of 
necessities in Ha is, say, less than that in Ilb, or vice versa. None 
of this would change the proportionalities involved. Once we assume 
a given division between the gross consumption of necessities and lux- 
uries by the capitalists in department II, the division of II's output 
between Ha and IIb is fixed. This is for a simple reason. Given a 
particular size of IIv, which in our case equals 500, we know that the 
production of necessities must at least cover that amount. Therefore 
the division of capitalists' consumption between necessities and lux- 
uries will determine the relative weights of the two sub-departments. 
Any change, observes Marx, in the relative magnitude of a and b would 
alter the conditions of simple reproduction accordingly. 3 
The actual circuit of exchange is fairly straightforward. Break- 
ing down our initial scheme to reflect the consumption of the capital- 
ists in the two groups we have: 
Ha. 1600c + 400v + [240a + 160b]s 
IIb. 400c + 100v +[ 60a + 40b]s 
The most important feature of this scheme is this: The workers of IIb 
can only spend their wages in IIa. Hence the capitalists of IIb can 
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only realize their variable capital against the surplus value of the 
capitalists in IIa. This is identical to the problem that confronts 
departments I and II taken as a whole: I can only realize its variable 
capital and surplus value against II's constant capital, and vice ver- 
sa. In the present case the exchange presents little difficulty. The 
workers in IIb take their wages and purchase 100 articles of necessity 
from IIa. With the cash so-earned the capitalists in IIa purchase 100 
luxury items from IIb, which represent IIb's variable capital. This 
pair of transactions allows the capitalists in IIa to satisfy 100 of 
their total demand for 160 in luxuries. The last part of the circuit 
is completed when the capitalists in IIb purchase 60 in necessities 
from IIa, and the latter's capitalists in turn purchase 60 in luxuries 
from IIb. Thus the condition for simple reproduction here is that the 
portion of IIa's surplus value that is to be spent on luxuries must 
equal the variable capital in IIb plus the portion of IIb's surplus 
value that is to be spent on necessities. 
Marx then draws attention to an additional complication. The cap- 
italists in department I likewise will consume both necessities and 
luxuries, and so we must divide their sk; splus value accordingly. We 
know from our initial example that Iv = 1000, as does Is. So we then 
also know that the constant capital of Ha must equal that fraction of 
I's overall consumption fund that will go for necessities, while the 
constant capital of IIb must equal the part of I's consumption fund 
that will be exchanged for luxuries. In other words, IIa(c) must equal 
at least 1000, to cover Iv. But that in turn means that the division 
within Is between necessities and luxuries is also fixed--for produc- 
tion in Ha and IIb is already given by their organic compositions of 
capital and the consumption patterns of II's own capitalists, By nec- 
essity, then, the capitalists in I must consume 600 in necessities and 
400 in luxuries. Any other division would violate all the conditions 
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of simple reproduction and actually make it impossible for at least one 
group of capitalists in department II to realize their constant capital. 
This, however, is by no means the end of the matter. In reality 
we've different branches in department I: Those which produce means 
of production suitable for the production of articles of necessity and 
those which produce means of production for use in the production of 
luxuries. We know that the former group, which we may also designate 
as Ia, must provide 1600 in means of production for IIa; and the latter 
group, Ib, must provide 400 means of production for IIb. Yet the cap- 
italists in Ia and lb will themselves consume both necessities and lux- 
uries, and so we must break their consumption down into the relevant 
subdivisions. If Ia must produce 1600 means of production for exchange 
against IIa(c), then Ia(v) will equal 800, and so will la(s). If 
three-fifths of the 800 Ia(s) (which equals 480) are for necessities, 
Ia will purchase this many means of consumption from IIa. In addition 
we also know that the workers in Ia will already have purchased 800 
means of consumption from IIa, so the latter now has realized a total 
of 800 + 480 = 1280 of its 1600 IIa(c). Where does it obtain the other 
320 in constant capital replacement? Well, they must clearly come from 
Ib. Ib must necessarily have an exchange fund equal to 400, since that 
is what IIb requires to restore its used up constant capital. Thus 
Ib(v) will equal 200, and Ib(s) will equal 200 as well. The workers 
in Ib will immediately purchase 200 in means of consumption from IIa, 
as only that department can satisfy their demand for necessities. That 
leaves Ha still short 120 in means of production. These it obtains 
from the capitalists in Ib, who will, as do the other capitalists in 
this economy, devote 60% of their surplus value to necessities and 40% 
to luxuries. The capitalists in Ib will therefore buy 120 means of 
consumption from IIa and sell IIa a like quantity of means of production 
in return. Ha will then have recovered all of its constant capital; 
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conversely, the workers in la and Ib will together have purchased 1000 
in necessities from IIa, and the capitalists in Ia and Ib will have 
bought 480 and 120 respectively in necessities from Ha as well. 
This only leaves IIb. The capitalists in la will purchase 40% 
of their 800s = 320 from IIb in luxuries. Those in Ib will purchase 
40% of 200 = 80. The capitalists in I together purchase 400 in lux- 
uries from IIb; IIb can therefore restore its constant capital. 
Thus far Karl Marx. There is one crucial problem, however, that 
Marx did not tackle, at least not in his notes that Engels patched to- 
gether to make Volume II of Capital. This whole succession of exchanges 
assumes that Ha exchanges means of consumption directly with Ib for 
means of production. This it cannot do. Ib does not produce means of 
production that Ha can use. Ditto with Hb. We assumed that IIb could 
effect direct exchange of luxury items with Ia for means of production. 
This, too, is impossible. la does not produce means of production suit- 
able for use in IIb. How, then, do we solve this dilemma? Let us go 
back to the beginning and reconstruct what a reproduction scheme would 
look like on our assumptions. 
Ia. 3200c + 800v + [480a + 320b]s 
Ha. 1600c + 400v + 400s 
Ib. 800c + 200v + [120a + 80b]s 
Hb. 400c + 100v + 100s 
The subscripts a and b listed in Ia(s) and lb(s) refer to the quantity 
of necessities (a) and luxuries (b) that the capitalists in these 
groups will purchase with their surplus value. We have ignored the 
internal exchange between Ila and IIb, as this has already been solved, 
and does not affect the particular problem we are dealing with. How 
can exchange proceed? 
Ib advances money, in the form of wages to its workers. The latter 
can purchase their means of subsistence only in Ha. This they do, and 
they buy 200 of IIa's 1600c. This leaves Ha with 200 in money and 
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1400 unsold IIa(c). Next the workers in Ia purchase (with the money 
the capitalists in Ia advanced to them as wages) 800 in means of con- 
sumption from IIa. IIa now has 1000 in money and 600 in unsold commod- 
ities. It has not yet made any purchases to acquire replacement means 
of production for its constant capital. 
IIa now takes the 1000 in money and buys 1000 in means of produc- 
tion from Ia. With this transaction Ia gets back the 800 in money that 
it had originally advanced as Ia(v). But in addition to this Ia has 
also received 200 in money which it did not advance, but which origin- 
ated in Ib. The latter, we will remember, started off the entire cir- 
cuit by advancing 200 in money to its workers as wages. This money 
wound up in IIa, where the workers bought means of consumption. Ia got 
hold of it when it sold to IIa 200 of the means of production which 
were to realize its surplus value. As a result la has managed to sell 
an equivalent of 200 of its surplus value--but its capitalists have not 
yet made any purchases of either necessities or luxuries. This they 
proceed to do. la takes the 200 in money that have fallen into its 
hands by way of Ha, adds a further 280 of its own money, and purchases 
480 in articles of necessity from Ila. 
This means that IIa has sold 1480 out of the 1600 means of consump- 
tion that it must dispose of if it is to replace its constant capital. 
It sells the remaining 120 when lb advances a further 120 in money to 
buy necessities from IIa. IIa now has disposed of the entire commodity 
equivalent of its 1600 IIa(c) by selling 1000 to the workers of I and 
600 to its capitalists. Of the money it received by selling these com- 
modities it has already spent 1000 and purchased that much in means of 
production from Ia. By selling these further 600 in necessities to the 
capitalists of I it now has the money it needs to buy the rest of the 
means of production required to replace Ila(c). Thus IIa has realized 
its entire constant capital component and converted it into means of pro- 
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la likewise has now disposed of all of its 800s in natura and has 
320 in money which it did not advance. This money is the excess of what 
it received from Ha through sales over what it actually advanced to 
make its own purchases. This last point is of some note. Ignoring 
the 800v that Ia advanced to its workers, and which came back to it 
it 
straight away, Ia has advanced only 280 in money. Yet/ma. de 480 in pur- 
chases and, on top of that, has 320 in hand to do with as it pleases. 
200 of these 320 have circulated twice: Once from lb(v) to Ha and 
then back to Ia, and again from Ia to Ha (when it bought its 480 in 
necessities) and then back to la (when Ha bought the rest of its means 
of production). In addition another 120 in money advanced by lb have 
come Ia's way via IIa. So, while la has purchased 800v + 480 neces- 
sities = 1280 from IIa, it has sold 1600 means of production (its total 
v+ s). It has, as we noted, 320 in money which it did not have before. 
Ia takes this 320 and buys 320 in luxuries from IIb. This makes 
the entire circuit complete from la's point of view. It has sold all 
of its commodity-product; it has received back the ; Honey it advanced 
as variable capital; and it has acquired all the means of consumption 
its capitalists need to consume, and in the correct proportion between 
luxuries and necessities. In the process of acquiring these means of 
consumption it had to advance 280 in money, which returned to it with- 
out any complications. 
This leaves IIb with 320 in money which it did not advance either. 
At the same time IIb has sold 320 of the means of consumption that it 
has to get rid of to replace its IIb(c). It still has to buy these 
means of production, however, and it does this now, at least in part, 
by taking the 320 in money it just received from la and buying means 
of production from Ib. Ib in turn had these means of production on 
hand when it made 320 in purchases (200 through its workers and 120 
through its capitalists) from IIa without any compensating sales. And 
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by selling these means of production, lb at long last gets back all of 
the money it had advanced. 
This leaves IIb with 80 luxury items still unsold and a shortage 
of 80 in means of production which it needs from Ib; and Ib with 80 
means of production still unsold and a need for 80 luxuries which it 
is 
can only buy from Hb. This/done through direct exchange, with one of 
these two sub-departments advancing the money needed for the purchase. 
The circuit is now complete, all the money has returned to those who 
advanced it, etc. The conditions of simple reproduction have been sat- 
isfied, both in terms of exchanges of values and of the restoration of 
all the individual elements of the separate commodity-products in their 
proper material form. 
We see from this that, once we assume the material interdependence 
of each department upon the products of all the others, the conditions 
for simple reproduction are much narrower than it first appeared. By 
merely assuming a given organic composition of capital in each depart- 
ment and a given division of the surplus value of the capitalists in 
department II between necessities and luxuries, the division of labor 
for the system as a whole was determined. The breakdown between Ha 
and IIb--seemingly the least important feature of the entire economy-- 
necessitated a particular division in the material production of depart- 
ment I, which had to meet the needs of Ha and IIb for specific types 
of means of production, and in the correct quantitative proportions. 
At the same time, once this social division of labor was fixed, 
exchange between the departments and the realization of each sub-depart- 
ment's commodity-product could only take place via an extraordinarily 
complex circuit, where the purchases-without-sales had to exactly match 
the sales-without-purchases. And all this under simple reproduction! 
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NOTES TO APPENDIX TO PART I 
1. VKA 17, pp. 44-45. 
2. Zakat Kapitalizma, p. 81; p. 83, fn 1. 
3. Capital, II, pp. 413-14. 
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PART II 
SIMPLE AND EXPANDED REPRODUCTION UNDER CONCRETE CAPITALISM 
CHAPTER 3 
SIMPLE REPRODUCTION 
In Part I we showed how, starting from Marx, we could construct 
a scheme for simple reproduction in an economy of more than one sector. 
From this we derived that a basic condition of simple reproduction was 
that I(v+s) = IIc for the economy as a whole; any balance between I(v+s) 
and Ilc within each particular sector would be strictly accidental--and 
any imbalance could be overcome only by drawing the other sector into 
exchange. Beyond this we also showed how a goods famine of industrial- 
ly-produced means of production could take place even under simple re- 
production, and what it would mean for the entire system. We saw this 
as soon as we removed the simplifying assumption that reproduction in- 
volved merely an analysis of the exchange of values, and introduced the 
problem of the reproduction of the material components of constant cap- 
ital within both departments of both sectors, as well as within the 
industrial (or capitalist) sector alone. 
Needless to say, Preobrazhensky arrived at the need to modify Marx's 
schemes from a different angle. For him the essential question was how 
to analyze an historically-given society, where modern industry coexist- 
ed with peasant agriculture as an historical and economic-political 
fact. So it should not surprise us that, when he came to analyze the 
conditions of expanded reproduction of such an economy, he would intro- 
duce a new sector to represent petty-commodity production. This fol- 
lowed from the premises of his theory of two regulators, which said that 
the concrete Soviet economy was the result of a conflict between two 
different and antagonistic systems of production: The law of value and 
the law of primitive socialist accumulation. 
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Already in 1923, in Ekonomicheskie Krizisi Pri NEP'e (Economic 
Crises Under NEP) he stated that in order to properly analyze the Soviet 
economy and to understand the sources of its crises and disproportions 
it would be necessary to add a third department to the two Marx had 
used in his study of simple and expanded reproduction. 
In general, for us to carry out the necessary analysis of all the 
conditions of the exchange of goods in our commodity-socialist 
system of economy, we will need not two schemes, with which Marx 
operated, but three. It is necessary to introduce a third scheme, 
which will characterize the exchange of goods and the numerical 
regularities and proportions of this exchange between state indus- 
try and the peasant economy. ' 
Only then would it be possible to understand and regulate the entire 
economy in. the NEP period. Preobrazhensky, as always, was concerned 
with the practical significance of even the most seemingly abstract 
theoretical endeavors. 
Preobrazhensky must have soon realized that just an additional 
"third scheme, " or third department would not do. The problem was a 
whole other system of economy, as he had already pointed out. Thus an 
analysis of expanded reproduction would necessitate the introduction 
of a new sector, which itself produced both means of production and 
means of consumption. This is what Preobrazhensky did, and this is 
where we will pick up his analysis. 
Preobrazhensky treated all economic categories as historically 
specific, and we have previously argued that this was an essential part 
of his method. We see this as soon as we compare his scheme of simple 
reproduction in a mixed capitalist-petty production system with the one 
we drew out on page 128. The departments of the capitalist sector are 
labelled K, those of the pre-capitalist sector are labelled P. The 
small letter p represents the values which K obtains from P via exchange; 
and k represents those which P obtains from K. 
2 
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KI. 4000c[3750k + 250p] + 1000v + 1000s = 6000 [KI(v+s) = 1000p 
+1000s] 
KII. 1500c[l000k + 500p] + 375v + 375s = 2250 
Total production in K= 8250 
Pl. 750c[ 500 
p+ 
250 k] + 1500 consumption fund [1000p+ 500k] = 2250 
PII. 2000c[1000p + 1000k] + 4000 consumption fund = 6000 
Total production in P= 8250 
The sector of petty-commodity production does not divide up the 
articles of consumption it produces into v and s. The structure of pet- 
ty production is such that the category of variable capital is simply 
inapplicable; there is only the income the petty producers consume dir- 
ectly from their annual product. As a result, the related categories 
of Marxian political economy, such as surplus value, s, and the organic 
composition of capital, c/v, either have no counterpart in the peasant 
economy, or can be used only in a conditional sense. This circumstance, 
according to Preobrazhensky, makes our analysis of the mechanics of 
simple reproduction much easier. We have only the two divisions of 
constant capital (used up means of production) and the fund of consump- 
tion to take into account. Conversely, it makes the question of expand- 
ed reproduction that much more complicated, as "one cannot in this case 
assume any constant value of labor power, because the surplus product 
of petty production can go not only to expand production but also to 
expand consumption by the independent producers themselves on a scale 
that is only indirectly regulated by the law of value of labor power ... "3 
What sort of regularities emerge from an economy of this type? 
Preobrazhensky's first conclusion is identical to what we saw for own 
scheme on page 128. Although we will not have equilibrium between 
I(v+s) and IIc within a single sector (except under the most accidental 
of circumstances), equilibrium is possible if we exchange the total 
constant capital equivalent of the combined departments II against the 
total consumption fund of the combined departments I. This much we have 
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already shown. A corollary relationship Preobrazhensky derives from 
this first one is that the value of the commodities that pass from K 
into P must equal the value of those that go from P into K. This is 
not surprising, since Preobrazhensky assumes that all goods exchange 
at their values, and that, in spite of the obviously more primitive 
technical structure of the peasant economy (compare the ratios of c to 
the consumption fund in both departments of P against c/v of both depart- 
ments in K), no non-equivalent exchange takes place--one hour of petty- 
production labor is worth one hour of capitalist labor. 
5 With this 
assumption there must be an equal exchange of values between the two 
sectors. (If this condition is not satisfied we will have a dispro- 
portion similar to the one that arose in our example on page 133--but 
more on this below). Socially, what is really taking place is that 
the capitalist sector has found itself with a critical imbalance and 
cannot achieve simple reproduction. It rectifies this by drawing petty 
production into exchange and bringing it into the capitalist orbit. In 
the scheme we have taken from Preobrazhensky, the surplus means of pro- 
duction of KI, worth 500, are sold to PII, which has a deficit of means 
of production of this amount; conversely, PII, which has a 500 surplus 
of means of consumption, sells these to KI, whose consumption fund is 
short by these same 500. 
A closer look, however, shows us that this is not what really hap- 
pens. Preobrazhensky has given us a far more complex scheme than 
our own. It is, in fact, very close to the one we later composed to 
show the proportionality in the exchange of the fixed and circulating 
components of constant capital. First of all, KI does not exchange 
with PI merely that part of its (v+s) which KII does not purchase. It 
actually buys more from PH (1000) than its deficit with KII (which is 
only 500). It buys the rest of its needed means of consumption from 
KII (= 1000), well enough. But this comes to only 1000, and KII has 
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to replace constant capital to the amount of 1500. Now it is KII which 
has the unsold commodities, while at first glance it looked like the 
surplus belonged to KI. Clearly something more is needed. KII must 
sell this 500 in means of consumption somewhere. It sells them to PI, 
which has an overall need of 1500 to replenish its consumption fund. 
So far so good. KI has sold all of its exchangeable means of production 
(half to KII and half to PII). It has obtained all of the means of 
consumption it requires. KII has disposed of all its exchangeable means 
of consumption--1000 to KI and S00 to PI. In return it has acquired 
all the means of production it needs, two thirds of which are of capi- 
talist origin, one third from peasant agriculture. What remains of the 
total social product to be exchanged is 1000 in peasant means of produc- 
tion in PI for 1000 in peasant means of consumption in PII. This is 
a simple transaction within the peasant sector. Thus we see that for 
the combined KI(v+s) plus PI's fund of consumption to exchange for the 
combined KIIc plus PIIc, a fairly complicated circuit is called for. 
This complexity is dictated by the technical structure of production 
in each of the two departments that produce means of consumption: They 
need means of production from both the industrial-capitalist and the 
agricultural-peasant sectors, which are of a qualitatively different 
type. 
But this means that we haven't finished accounting for all of the 
exchanges of commodities needed for simple reproduction. The depart- 
ments in both sectors that produce means of production each have to re- 
place their constant capital, part of which will consist of machines 
(produced in KI) and part of which will consist of raw materials and 
other articles of agricultural production. We thus have internal ex- 
change between KI and PI. This works out all right in Preobrazhensky's 
scheme because KI has to replace 250 of its constant capital in raw ma- 
terials, etc., and PI has to restore 250 of its constant capital which 
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had previously existed as machines. We have an exchange of 250 KIc 
for 250 PIc. The cycle of reproduction is now complete. 
It would be a very simple thing for us to juggle Preobrazhensky's 
figures around so that there was a goods famine of means of production 
produced in KI. We did this above (p. 133) and saw what type of crisis 
would ensue. What is all the more amazing is that Preobrazhensky says 
absolutely nothing about this. He presents this first scheme of simple 
reproduction in a mixed economy, traces out the general movement of the 
exchange between the combined consumption fund of departments I and the 
combined constant capital of departments II, and leaves the matter at 
that. He never refers to the figures in brackets, which show the actual 
route through which circulation travels, even though this would have 
been central to his later argument about the goods famine in the article 
"Economic Equilibrium in the System of the USSR" (VKA 22). At no time 
in any of the articles on economic equilibrium does he ever refer back 
to this first scheme. We will leave this question at this point. We 
should keep in mind what this reproduction scheme shows, because it 
will be important later on. 
6 
Preobrazhensky was obviously concerned with showing the reglarities 
inherent in a strictly value analysis of reproduction, and even cautions 
that the question of the material composition of exchange would alter 
his results, and must be taken up at a later stage of concrete study 
of a given economy.? Even so, Preobrazhensky has presented this scheme 
only to lay the groundwork for the more sophisticated analysis he wants 
to construct. He first laid out conditions of proportionality for a 
mixed system of economy, and these conditions are valid for any economy 
based on market exchange, be it capitalist or commodity-socialist. What 
he now does is reveal the conditions of interdependence between the two 
sectors and show how if a disproportion arises in the system it can 
be overcome by adjusting production within the sector that had been 
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unaffected. This is somewhat different from our first conclusion. 
There we saw that disproportion within the capitalist sector could be 
alleviated by drawing the peasant sector into exchange. Now Preobra- 
zhensky takes this fact as his starting point, in order to show how both 
sectors will adjust to any new disproportion within the system as a whole. 
To this end he presents a new scheme, in which the production of means 
of production within the capitalist sector has fallen, and the produc- 
tion of means of consumption has grown. What will be the response of 
the petty-commodity sector to such a rearrangement of the capitalist 
sector's social capital? 
New Scheme 
KI. 3500c + 875v + 875s = 5250 Total production = 8250 KII. 2000c + 500v + 500s = 3000 
PI. 1000c + 2000 consumption fund = 3000 
PII. 1750c + 3500 consumption fund = 5250 
Total production = 8250 
Old Scheme 
KI. 4000c + 1000v + 1000s = 6000 
KII. 1500c + 375v + 375s = 2250 
Total production = 8250 
PI. 750c + 1500 consumption fund = 2250 Total production = 8250 PII. 2000c + 4000 consumption fund = 6000 
When we compare the two schemes we see that total social production 
has not changed; nor has total production within each sector. What has 
altered is that the division of social labor within the capitalist sec- 
tor is now such that the formerly self-sufficient capitalist production 
of means of production is now in deficit and the previously inadequate 
production of means of consumption now shows a surplus. Everything is 
the reverse of what it was before. The only way that equilibrium could 
be maintained in this situation would be if the petty-commodity sector 
also rearranges its social division of labor. It will have to produce 
more means of production and fewer means of consumption than it used to. 
In the present example there is now a shortfall of means of production 
within K of 250; production in PI, however, has risen, while PIIC has 
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has fallen, making 2S0 in PI available for exchange against KIIc. In 
this way the peasant economy provides capitalist production with nec- 
essary means of production, and serves as an adequate market for cap- 
italist-produced means of consumption. If any other arrangement within 
the petty production sector prevailed, simple reproduction would be 
impossible. 
8 
From this Preobrazhensky has established an important relation- 
ship. If production within one department of the capitalist sector 
falls, equilibrium within the system as a whole can only be maintained 
if the corresponding department of the petty bourgeois sector raises 
its level of production by the same amount. There is, therefore, a 
clear, inverse relation between the movement of KI-PI, on the one hand, 
and KII-PII, on the other. 
9 This, of course, applies only to simple 
reproduction and takes only the exchange of values into account. It goes 
without saying that the technical composition of production in each de- 
partment of each sector is such that the physical means of production 
from the peasant sector are not interchangeable with those of capital- 
ist production, except to a very limited extent. Preobrazhensky takes 
this up further in VKA 22, and we will deal with it more properly then. 
Right now he has provided us with two constituents of our analysis that 
are indispensible to our study of concrete capitalism and commodity- 
socialist economy. First, capitalism exists in constant inter-relation 
with petty production, and depends upon its exchange with this sector 
to maintain equilibrium. Second, certain disproportions that crop up 
in the capitalist sector can be overcome by a redistribution of the 
social labor in the petty-commodity sector. We have seen as well, al- 
though Preobrazhensky did not draw the appropriate conclusions from 
his own analysis, that because of the material composition of exchange, 
this new, more complex process of commodity circulation between two 
different types of economy brings additional sources of disproportion- 
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ality and crises along with it. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 
1. Ekonomicheskie Krizisi Pri NEP'e (Economic Crises Under NEP, Moscow, 
1923), p. 16. 
2. VKA 17, p. 40. There is an error in the text; KIc reads 4000c 
[3725k + 250p] instead of 4000c[3750k + 250p]. We have changed 
Preobrazhensky's designation for the petty-commodity sector from 
D (for the Russian dokapitalistichesky) to P (for its English 
translation, pre-capitalist). 
3. This as we know, became translated into an historical fact during 
the goods famine, when the peasantry, rather than market its crops 
on terms it considered unfavorable, simply went over to increased 
in natura consumption of its own product, along with handicraft 
production of goods which could substitute for those products of 
urban industry which were in short supply. 
4. It might seem that this is an artifact of Preobrazhensky's figures, 
since he has set KI(v+s) equal to PIIc and PI consumption fund e- 
qual to KIIc, and obviously the system as a whole will then bal- 
ance. This latter set of equalities, however, is itself an arti- 
fact of the symmetry he has established between production in the 
two sectors. Total output in K equals that in P; output in KI 
equals that in PH and that in PI equals that in KII. We could 
easily set up a different scheme where the volume of production 
differs between K and P and where the above accidental relations 
do not occur: 
KI. 6000c + 1500v + 1500s = 9000 Total production = 11,250 KII. 1500c + 375v + 375s = 2250 
PI. 2000c + 4000 consumption fund = 6000 
PII. 5500c + 11,000 consumption fund = 16,500 
Total production = 22,500 
Here we have simple reproduction for the system as a whole, while 
equilibrium does not exist in any one sector on its own. 
S. When we speak of non-equivalent exchange we are dealing with the 
problem of what constitutes socially-necessary labor. Obviously 
one hour spent on production is the same in either sector. But 
this one hour will yield more products in the capitalist sector, 
it will see more use values produced. As such, exchange relations 
will be dominated by those of the more efficient capitalist econo- 
my. This also raises the more complicated theoretical question 
of how we evaluate exchange between two sectors which are not gov- 
erned by the same economic laws. Petty production conforms to the 
law of value only to a limited degree. Yet its exchange with the 
capitalist economy will be subject to the law of value, and eval- 
uated on those terms. It is precisely here that non-equivalence 
becomes an historical fact which reflects the differing productiv- 
ities of labor of the two economies. 
6. See Part IV, below, where we take up Preobrazhensky's analysis of 
the circulation process in the Soviet economy. Even here Preobra- 
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zhensky confined himself to a merely verbal argument and failed 
to work out all of the implications of his analysis, which the 
application of the reproduction schemes--even one as basic as that 
on page 1S3--would have shown. 
7. VKA 17, p. 45. Throughout the VKA 17 article Preobrazhensky refers 
to the complications that would arise if we introduced the ques- 
tion of internal exchange, i. e., exchange between the same depart- 
ments of different sectors, but cautions that this can really only 
be taken up at a more advanced stage of analysis. 
8. VKA 17, p. 46. Preobrazhensky notes that historically capitalism 
did not develop in this way. Both KI and KII advanced simultan- 
eously, though in different proportions (due to their differing 
organic compositions of capital, as we deal with in the next chap- 
ter). As he shows in the final section of this article, petty 
production plays an instrumental role in assisting capitalism to 
overcome this disproportion between KI and KII. 
9. The text actually states that there is a direct, proportional rela- 
tionship between KI-PI, on the one hand, and KII-PII, on the other. 
Both the argument on the preceding pages and the reproduction 
schemes make it perfectly clear, however, that the relationship 
is one of inverse proportionality. 
We should also note that when we speak of a fall in the production 
of one of the capitalist departments and the role of petty production 
in overcoming this imbalance, this drop can be either absolute (as 
in a crisis) or relative (as when one department accumulates at 
a faster pace than the other). In either case, the petty-commodity 
sector plays a vital part in affording capitalism much-needed flex- 
ibility in its ability to adjust to such momentary disturbances. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPANDED REPRODUCTION UNDER PURE CAPITALISM 
Before Preobrazhensky could extend the analysis of concrete cap- 
italism and study the capitalist-commodity production system under con- 
ditions of expanded reproduction he first had to further amend and con- 
cretize Marx's analysis of pure capitalism. If the only drawback of 
Marx's investigation was that it did not work out the tendencies and 
inter-relations of a two sector economy, we could move straight on from 
simple reproduction to study such an economy when there is accumulation. 
But Volume II of Capital, as we have already stressed, was terribly 
incomplete. Marx had laid out the regularities of pure capitalism under 
simple reproduction in great detail; there our extrapolations consisted 
of moving from pure capitalism to concrete capitalism, both in terms 
of studying what occurs when circulation must take account of the mater- 
ial composition of each department's production, and the mutual inter- 
connections in a capitalist economy that coexists with pre-capitalist 
formations. 
When it came to expanded reproduction under even pure capitalism, 
however, Marx had done little more than undertake the barest beginnings 
of an analysis, and had examined it under the most simplifying assump- 
tions. Some of these now had to be stripped away if Preobrazhensky was 
to be able to go further and establish an analysis that could actually 
apply to the concrete economy of the USSR. What Preobrazhensky then 
did, in the second part of VKA 17, was question Marx's basic premise 
about the organic composition of capital. In his original scheme Marx 
had assumed that the ratio, c/v, would remain constant in both depart- 
ments; he was therefore abstracting from even his own detailed discus- 
sion in Part III of Volume III of Capital, where he showed what tenden- 
cies would emerge as society augments and improves its technological 
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base and machines take over increasingly larger portions of the labor 
process previously performed by living labor. 
In addition, when he studied expanded reproduction, Marx made the 
realistic assumption that the organic composition of capital was lower 
in department II than in department I. The production of means of pro- 
duction will, in fact, have a higher organic composition of capital than 
the production of means of consumption. He did not, however, demon- 
strate all the possibilities of crisis and development that this assump- 
tion presents. Marx made accumulation within department I the axis of 
expanded reproduction, and adjusted accumulation in department II to 
satisfy the necessary exchange of I's consumption fund [I(v+s/x)] with 
IIc. Consequently, he did not bring out the fact that departments I 
and II, if left to grow independently and to accumulate on the basis 
of equal rates of exploitation and equal divisions of their surplus 
value between accumulation and consumption (as is the only valid assump- 
tion in a concrete analysis) would grow at different rates. 
Preobrazhensky's analysis of expanded reproduction under pure cap- 
italism centers around these two points. He discovers that if we assume 
an increase in the organic composition of capital; or, given a lower 
organic composition of capital in department II than in department I, 
if we allow department I and department II to accumulate the same per- 
centage of their annual surplus value, then either or both of these con- 
ditions will produce a relative over-production of means of consumption 
and a deficiency of means of production destined to replace IIc. The 
disproportion is systematic, and can only be overcome by rearranging 
the total social capital each year so as to transfer capital from de- 
partment II to department I. This will assure the absolute growth of 
I(v+s/x) and allow it to keep pace with the natural rise in IIc that 
department II's accumulation brings about. 
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I. The Tentative Nature of Marx's Analysis of Expanded Reproduction 
Just what were the inadequacies of Marx's schemes for expanded 
reproduction that led Preobrazhensky to modify them? Well, let us be- 
gin with Marx's initial scheme for expanded reproduction: 
I. 4000c + 1000v + 1000s = 6000 Total production = 9000 II. 1500c + 750v + 750s = 3000 
Compare this with the scheme for simple reproduction at the beginning 
of Chapter I. Production in department I is exactly the same. So is 
the total social product, which still equals 9000. The difference is 
in department II. We now assume that one half of s in department I is 
accumulated, whereas before, with simple reproduction, it was totally 
consumed. This in turn means that S00 out of 2000 I(v+s) goes to ex- 
pand the functioning constant and variable capital in that department. 
The consumption fund of I is, therefore, only equal to 1500 (1000v plus 
500s/x--the consumed part of I's surplus value). Since we also assume 
that the system starts off in equilibrium, Marx sets IIc equal to 1500 
as well. Finally, because total production in II is presumed still 
equal to 3000, its v, and therefore its s, have risen from 500v and 
500s to 750v and 750s. This is already an important difference from 
the earlier scheme. The technical structure of the economy which the 
present scheme describes shows differeing organic compositions of cap- 
ital within the two departments. Department I has a c/v of four to 
one, as before. Department II, however, has a much lower organic com- 
position of capital, only two to one, whereas under simple reproduction 
it had been four to one, the same as in department I. 
This fact has little immediate significance if we only look at the 
way Marx described expanded reproduction. Department I accumulates 
one half its surplus value, or 500. This must be distributed between 
expanding the constant capital and employing new labor power to work 
with the new means of production. The organic composition of capital 
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in I is four to one: So 400 of the 500 must go to augment c and 100 
to increase v. At the beginning of the new production year department 
I's capital will look like this: 
I. 4400c + 1100v + 500 consumption fund = 6000 
The total exchangeable product of department I is equal to 1600 I(v+s/x). 
In order for department II to satisfy I's demand for means of consump- 
tion it must increase its own IIc by 100. But an increase of 100 IIc 
also means that we must add 50 to IIv, which makes the total which II 
accumulates equal to 150. II's consumption fund then equals 800v plus 
600s/x, or 1400. So, at the end of the first year, production in both 
departments stands as follows (remembering that Marx retains his as- 
sumption that the rate of exploitation equals 100% in both departments): 
I. 4400c + 1100v + 1100s = 6600 Total production = 9800 II. 1600c + 800v + 800s = 3200 
What is interesting about this scheme is that, while department 
I accumulated one half of its surplus value, department II could only 
accumulate 150/750, or one fifth. If it had accumulated more, IIc 
would have outstripped I's capacity to provide it with means of pro- 
duction. There would have been a relative over-production in department 
II. We need only look at what would happen in the next year to see that 
this is not an arithmetical artifact. After accumulation, dividing it 
up between c and v in the proper proportions, department I's capital 
will be: 
I. 4840c + 1210v + 550 consumption fund 
Department II will have to add 160 to its constant capital and 80 to its 
variable capital, making accumulation there equal to 240. After the 
year's production, both departments together will appear as follows: 
I. 4840c + 1210v + 1210s = 7260 Total production = 10,780 II. 1760c + 880v + 880s = 3520 
Here department I accumulates 50% and department II 30% of their res- 
pective surplus values. If we work out the process of accumulation 
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over a number of years, we find this always to be the case--accumulation 
in department II is 30% of its surplus value as compared to department 
Its 50%. This must be so as long as department I is our axis, and de- 
partment II grows only enough to maintain the relation I(v+s/x) = IIc. 
But this leaves us with the highly unrealistic result that the capital- 
ists of department II consume considerably more--and accumulate much 
less--of their surplus value than their counterparts in department I. 
Nevertheless, as Preobrazhensky notes, it was essential for Marx to be- 
gin his analysis of expanded reproduction in this way, in order to de- 
monstrate the basic regularities of the process. Marx's discussion of 
the problem breaks off abruptly and the last chapter of Volume II of 
Capital remains incomplete. We are left with Marx's invaluable intro- 
duction to the problem, plus a whole range of questions that he left 
unexplored. 
This discussion of Marx, which is drawn from observations and ex- 
amples scattered throughout the first parts of VKA 17, takes us up to 
the point where Preobrazhensky's main argument properly begins. As we 
stated at the start of this chapter, he raises two questions: 1)What 
happens if the organic composition of capital rises in one or both de- 
partments?; and 2)what happens if we assume equal rates of accumulation 
in both departments I and II when their organic compositions of capital 
differ? 
Here we come up against certain difficulties. Preobrazhensky is 
clearly talking about two distinct tendencies within capitalist devel- 
opment, each of which seem to lead to the same result. Yet as distinct 
tendencies it is crucial that we abstract them out from each other and 
examine them each in their turn. That way, when we look at the final 
result we can discern what is the product of the rise in the organic 
composition of capital and what results from the fact that the organic 
compositions in the two departments are unequal. Preobrazhenskyt un- 
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fortunately, while being absolutely clear in his own mind what he was 
driving at, did not sharply distinguish between these two quite separ- 
ate aspects of capitalist development. Nor is it unambiguous how he 
arrived at and used his arithmetic examples--although we will show that 
they are, in fact, well, and quite systematically chosen to demonstrate 
the particular theoretical points in question. What we propose to do, 
then, in the remainder of this chapter is to deal with each of these 
tendencies individually, illustrating them with our own examples. Then, 
when we take up the question of the transfer of capital from department 
II to department I, we will look at both of them together so as to show 
their combined effect. We will do this with Preobrazhensky's own il- 
lustration, while showing the algebraic regularity behind the arithmetic. 
II. Unequal Organic Compositions of Capital 
Let us begin with the question of unequal organic compositions of 
capital. When we presented Marx's scheme in the last section we point- 
ed out that the organic composition of capital was lower in department 
II than in department I, and said that this fact had no immediate sig- 
nificance so long as we continued to adjust accumulation within depart- 
ment II to satisfy the demands of equilibrium, which were themselves 
dictated by accumulation within department I. As soon as we alter this 
condition, this is no longer true. The deviation in the two organic 
compositions of capital becomes a critical source of instability. And 
certainly we must now drop this assumption that only department I ac- 
cumulates according to the internal logic of its own production of sur- 
plus value. In reality there is nothing to make capitalists II behave 
any differently than those in I and to consume more and accumulate 
less. 
If we work out expanded reproduction over the course of a couple 
of production years we see this disproportionality quite plainly. We 
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already know the figures for department I's accumulation in the first 
year from our example in the preceding section. If department II also 
accumulates fifty per cent of its surplus value, the arrangement of the 
social capital will be: 
I. 4400c + 1100v + 500 consumption fund = 6000 
II. 1750c + 875v + 37S consumption fund = 3000 
After this first year's production we will have (also assuming a rate 
of exploitation = 100%): 
I. 4400c + 1100v + 1100s = 6600 Total production = 10,100 II. 1750c + 875v + 875s = 3500 
Whereas before department II accumulated only 150 (100c plus 50v), it 
now accumulates 375, or more than twice as much. This 375 goes to ex- 
pand IIc by 250, and IIv by 125. Already in this first year we have 
a massive deficit of means of production. After accumulation, but 
before the year's production is carried out, it equals 150; that is, 
II cannot convert 150 in accumulated money capital into means of produc- 
tion representing part of its new productive capital. Even at the end 
of the year, when all production has been carried out and no further 
accumulation has yet taken place, the deficit is still equal to 100. 
And in the second year it will become even worse. If both departments 
accumulate 50% of their surplus value we have: 
I. 4840c + 1210v + 550 consumption fund = 6600 
II. 2041.7c + 1020.8v + 437.5 consumption fund = 3500 
IIc is now greater than the consumption fund by 281.7. The dispropor- 
tion has grown. In terms of the circuits of industrial capital that 
we examined in Part I, department II has some 281 in commodity capital 
that it cannot convert into money capital; or, somehow assuming that 
II, perhaps via foreign trade (from which we are actually abstracting), 
could carry out this first metamorphosis, and convert this portion of 
C' into M, there is simply no way that the circuit can carry on to the 
next stage and see M converted into means of production, which are el- 
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ements of additional productive capital, P. Even at the end of the year, 
when I's productive capital has given rise to a greater surplus value, 
as a result of the accumulation of new variable capital, the situation 
is little better: 
1.4840c + 1210v + 1210s = 7260 Total production = 11,343.3 II. 2041.7c + 1020.8v + 1020.8s = 4083.3 
The deficit still equals 226.7, or considerably more than the 100 def- 
icit of the year before. 
If we were to carry out accumulation for a number of years, we 
would find that the disparity would increase each time. Why is this 
happening? Well, to find an answer we should first ask, what is the 
nature of accumulation? Any society can accumulate only off of its 
surplus product. Under capitalism, surplus product only takes the form 
of surplus value, which the capitalist class appropriates. Surplus 
value is a function of the living labor employed in the production pro- 
cess, for this is the only element that can add new value to the social 
product--the value of the worn out constant capital being merely trans- 
ferred and saved up towards future replacement. Thus the larger the 
v component of capital, the greater s will be (productivity of labor 
and intensity of exploitation remaining constant). Now, what is the 
situation where one department has a lower organic composition of cap- 
ital than the other? For every quantum of surplus value out of which 
it accumulates it devotes more of it to increase v, and less to increase 
c than the department with a higher ratio of c/v. Thus the new surplus 
value in the next year will be greater. If we look at our present 
scheme, the new surplus value added in department I from our starting 
point to the end of the second production year equals 1210 - 1000 = 210. 
In department II it equals 1020.8 - 750 = 270.8. 
As a result department II adds in each new year an increment to 
IIc that is far greater than what department I adds to I(v+s/x). This 
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is because the new surplus value, out of which this accumulation comes, 
is so much larger in II than in I. Accumulation as a whole proceeds 
far faster in department II than in I. In fact, it would not take too 
many years before IIc was greater than the total v plus s in department 
I, not just its fund of consumption. If we reversed the relationship, 
and set IIc/v higher than Ic/v, we would obtain the opposite result. 
At first the disparity between IIc and I(v+s/x) would actually increase, 
because a larger part of II's accumulation was now going to augment 
IIc. Soon, however, accumulation within II would slow down radically, 
so that the mass of new surplus value out of which it could take this 
(relatively) larger share of IIc would decrease in comparison with what 
department I had available to raise I(v+s/x). In this case, after a 
while we would have a sharp deficit of means of consumption. Econom- 
ically, this would mean that II's production could not keep pace with 
what society needed to sustain itself. Either production in department 
I would have to be cut back, meaning declining reproduction and perpet- 
ual crisis and stagnation, or, as we shall see later on, capital would 
have to move from department I to department II. And in our present 
example, where the over-accumulation is in department II, just the re- 
verse conclusion holds. Either department II must cut back production, 
also leading to crisis and loss of values, or capital must be transfer- 
red from department II to department I. 
We can demonstrate this very simply algebraically. At the end of 
a new production year, the new level of (v+s/x), that is, (v+s/x)', will 
equal the previous level [(v+s/x)], plus the addition to the consumption 
fund, d(v+s/x). How is this addition to the consumption fund formed? 
First, the new v is a function of the rate of accumulation--the greater 
the share of s going to accumulation, the greater the addition to v. 
Secondly, with a given rate of accumulation out of s, it is a function 
of the share going to v, as opposed to that which goes to increase c-- 
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in other words, it is directly proportional to the fraction v/(c+v). 
Now, let us adopt the following notation: 
x= rate of accumulation out of s 
y= v/(c+v) 
z= the proportion of s going to individual consumption =1-x 
Then dv = xy(s/v)v 
= xyv, where s/v (the rate of exploitation) =1 
So, (v+s/x) '= (v + zv) + (dv + zdv) 
= (v + zv) + (xyv + xyzv) 
= (v + zv) + xy(v + zv) 
= (1 + xy) (v + zv) 
= (1 + xy) (v + s/x), where s/v =1 
In other words, the growth of (v+s/x) is directly related to the size 
of the rate of accumulation and to the share of v in the total produc- 
tive capital. It is therefore inversely related to the organic composi- 
tion of capital, c/v. This, however, tells only about the growth of 
(v+s/x). What about the growth of c, with which it must be compared? 
Logically we know that c must grow at the same rate as v and as 
(v+s/x), since the equation for accumulation is a linear one. We can 
show this easily as well. If the new level of constant capital is des- 
ignated by c', then 
Cl =c+ dc 
If q= the share of c in the total capital = c/(c+v) =1-y, then 
dc = xqs 
and assuming that s/v = 1, 
dc = xqv. 
But v is a constant fraction of c, i. e., (v/c) "c 
Therefore, c' =c+ dc 
=c+ xqv 
=c+ xq(v/c"c) 
=c+ (xq"v/c)c 
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= (1 + xq. v/c)c 
Now, if c/v is contsant throughout a production year, 
xq"v/c = x[c/(c+v)]"v/c 
= x[v/(c+v)] 
= xy 
Thus, c' _ (1 + xq"v/c)c 
_ (1 + xy)c 
That is, c, v, and (v+s/x) all grow--as expected and as they must--at 
the same rate. We do not consider this result especially troublesome 
to interpret. Both (v+s/x) and c grow in direct proportion to the rate 
of accumulation and in inverse proportion to the organic composition 
of capital, c/v. Therefore, if, starting out from a position of equal- 
ity between IIc and I(v+s/x), IIc/v is less than Ic/v, then Ilc will 
quite clearly grow faster than I(v+s/x), and so the absolute divergence 
between the two will obviously grow with each passing year. This is pre- 
cisely the result we obtain by working out the pattern of accumulation 
year by year. The reason is equally clear from the algebraic exposition: 
The dynamic factor in those equations is v, the value of the variable 
capital, It is v that gives rise to s; and so the coefficients of v 
will determine the entire pattern of accumulation. 
III. A Rise in the Organic Composition of Capital 
The question of a rise in the organic composition of capital is 
quite a different matter from the fact that departments I and II have 
unequal organic compositions. To avoid any possible confusion, we will 
select a numerical example where--unlike in Preobrazhensky's scheme in 
VKA 17--c/v is the same in the two departments. 
I. 4000c + 1000v + 1000s = 6000 Total production = 8250 II. 1500c + 375v + 375s = 2250 
In this scheme total production is lower, since we have had to scale 
down department II in order to bring its technical structure into line 
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with that of department I. The organic composition of capital is four 
to one in both departments. 
Preobrazhensky's argument on the effects of a rise in the organic 
composition of capital is fairly straightforward. If c/v in department 
I were to alter, so that, say, Ic = 4050 and Iv (and hence Is) = 950, 
then--department II staying the same--department I's consumption fund 
would only equal 1425 and there would be a deficit of means of produc- 
tion in IIc of 75. By the same token, if IIc/v were also to rise, giv- 
ing, for example, IIc = 1550 and IIv and Its = 325, then, if I(v+s/x) 
remained at 1500 (i. e., before any change in Ic/v), there would still 
be a deficit of means of production for IIc equal to 50. And if we took 
our two illustrations together the shortage would come from both ends 
at the same time: The deficit would equal 1550 - 1425 = 125. 
Nor is it difficult to see why this is so. A rise in the organic 
composition of capital in department I means that its exchange fund, 
relative to what it was in conditions of equilibrium, has fallen. I 
needs to replace a smaller quantity of advanced variable capital and 
to realize a smaller capitalists' consumption fund. II, on the other 
hand, sees its demand for means of production stay the same, so that 
while we started out from a position of equality of exchangeable com- 
modity-products, we now see IIc greater than I(v+s/x). In the case of 
a rise in IIc/v, the worn out constant capital component in II's product 
grows, thus heightening II's demand for means of production. Depart- 
ment I, on the other hand, has not changed at all; its exchange fund is 
now inadequate to meet II's increased need for means of production. 
When c/v changes in both departments at once we have the worst of both 
worlds. Department I has a smaller exchange fund--it offers fewer com- 
modities for exchange and needs fewer in return--while department II has 
a larger one--it must realize a larger quantity of commodities and re- 
ceive more means of production back. 
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It might be asked, however, if this isn't an artifact of the static 
way in which we've approached the problem. After all, if the organic 
compositions were to rise uniformly (in percentage terms) in both de- 
partments, they would still be equal. So, providing we also have 
equal rates of accumulation, shouldn't equilibrium be maintained under 
conditions of accumulation? To answer this question, we need only to 
work out accumulation for a couple of years, but now introducing the 
condition that the organic composition of capital rises in each depart- 
ment by one per cent (the example Preobrazhensky chose in his later il- 
lustration of the transfer of capital from department II to department 
I, which we will deal with below). A growth in the organic composition 
by one per cent means that in each department it will move from 4: 1 to 
4.04: 1. 
This means that the newly accumulated surplus value is divided 
between new c and new v in such a way that the total capital in each 
department has the relation of 4.04c to lv. So that there is no mys- 
tery about this, we can solve this with simple simultaneous equations. 
If x equals the share of the newly accumulated s that goes to augment 
c, and if y equals the portion that goes to raise v, and if the final 
arrangement must give c/v = 4.04: 1, then we will have these equations: 
For department I: 
4000 +x=4.04(1000 + y) 
x+y= 500 
Solving for x and y, we obtain x= 408.7 and y= 91.3. That is, the 
new division between c and v is actually 408.4/91.3 = 4.48: 1. 
For department II: 
1500 +x=4.04(375 + y) 
x+y= 187.5 
x= 153.3 and y= 34.2, which is also a division between newly added 
c and newly added v of 4.48: 1. Translating these figures into a new 
arrangement of the social capital for the year's production we get: 
-174- 
I. 4408.7c + 1091.3v + 1091.3s = 6591.3 Total production = 9063 II. 1653.3c + 409.2v + 409.2s = 2471.7 
I(v+s/x) = 1636.95; IIc = 1653.3. There is a deficit of means of pro- 
duction = 16.35. 
If we allow c/v to rise in both departments by another 1% in the 
following year, i. e., to 4.08: 1, the disproportion worsens. 
For department I: 
4408.7 +x=4.08(1091.3 + y) 
x+y= 545.6 
x= 446.9; y= 98.8 [new c/new v=4.52] 
For department II: 
1653.3 +x=4.08(409.2 + y) 
x+y= 204.6 
x= 167.5; y= 37.1 [new c/new v=4.51]. This gives for the year's 
production: 
I. 4855.6c + 1190.1v + 1190.1s 
II. 1820.8c + 446.3v + 446.3s 
I(v+s/x) = 1785.15; IIc = 1820.8. The deficit has increased to 35.65. 
The way we have worked out the problem here, that is, by adjusting 
only the division between the new accumulated surplus value, so as to 
affect the total productive capital, comes fairly near to what we would 
observe in a real economy. For example, suppose new labor-saving ma- 
chines are introduced and these require an amount of labor power to 
operate them such that the value of the constant capital used up in re- 
lation to the value of this new labor power equals 4.48: 1 (which is 
what we have in our first year). The old machinery, whose replacement 
component stands to the value of the labor power needed to work it in 
the ratio of 4: 1, isn't scrapped. It continues to operate alongside 
the new machinery, so that the average c/v of the entire productive cap- 
ital turns out to have risen by 1%, i. e., to 4.04: 1. Similarly in year 
two, the new machinery requires new labor power to set it into motion 
such that dc/dv equals about 4.51: 1. Again, the new machinery functions 
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along with the machinery that was added in the year before (which, al- 
though technically more advanced than the initial stock in year one, 
is not as efficient as the machinery that has been most recently added), 
as well as the machinery still functioning from the very beginning. 
This newest addition of means of production causes the average c/v to 
rise by another 1%, to around 4.08: 1. 
To show why there is no contradiction between this argument and 
our algebraic formulation in the previous section, let us suppose, for 
purely theoretical purposes, that the change in c/v all took place prior 
to accumulation. In other words, out of the productive capital of 5000 
in department I, we rearranged it so that c/v = 4.04. Then c would come 
to around 4008 and v to 992. In department II, where we would have to 
make the same sort of adjustment, the original 1875 in productive capi- 
tal would see c equal to 1503 and v equal to 372. The total social pro- 
duct would look like this: 
1.4008c + 992v + 992s 
II. 1503c + 372v + 372s 
Accumulation would then take place by apportioning the accumulation 
fund of each department according to the already-established organic 
composition of capital of 4.04: 1. 
I. 4405.6c + 1090.4v + 496s/x 
II. 1652.1c + 408.9v + 186s/x 
which gives for the final product 
I. 4405.6c + 1090.4v + 1090.4s 
II. 1652.1c + 408.9v + 408.9s 
IIc - I(v+s/x) = 16.5, which is very close to the first year deficit 
we obtained by calculating accumulation with our first method. 
If we look more closely at the arrangement of the productive capi- 
tal, we see that by altering the organic composition of capital, by 
letting it rise by one per cent, we disrupted the entire equilibrium 
before any accumulation even took place. Thus, even though accumula- 
tion subsequently was carried out on the basis of equal organic composi- 
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tions of capital and equal rates of accumulation and exploitation, 
there was still a sizable disproportion. This arose from the initial 
inequality between the exchange funds of the two departments. 
In fact, we could only have overcome this disproportion if, once 
a new c/v had been established, the absolute size of the productive 
capital in I grew by an amount necessary to allow I(v+s/x) to equal 
IIc. Such an arrangement would be: 
I. 4048.1c + 1002v + 1002s 
II. 1503c + 372v + 372s 
Here the organic composition of capital is still 4.04: 1, but the total 
capital in I has grown to allow I(v+s/x) to equal IIc, or 1503. Then, 
obviously, accumulation would retain proportionality, so long as the 
organic composition of capital did not change in either department. 
The problem is that additional capital does not fall from the sky. 
We cannot simply presume that department I will grow out of nowhere and 
thereby re-establish proportionality. 
More to the point, since with a constantly rising c/v the dispro- 
portion would re-arise every year, in spite of any initial equilibrium, 
we would have to presume that department I had perpetual access to this 
magical warehouse of instant capital, so that it could grow every year 
by an amount necessary to sustain proportional exchange between itself 
and department II. 
So, once again we are confronted with the conclusion that only a 
rearrangement of the social capital as a whole can allow this dispropor- 
tion to be erased. The mechanism for this rearrangement under capital- 
ism must be the transfer of capital from department II to department I, 
a transfer that would have to take place each and every year. 
IV. The Transfer of Capital Between Departments 
As we have already indicated, Preobrazhensky concluded that there 
was only one way out of this impasse: The systematic redistribution of 
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the total social product in each period, which would ensure that I(v+s/x) 
would grow absolutely so as to keep up with the absolute growth of IIc. 
The historical tendency for the organic composition of capital to rise 
creates a tendency for IIc to outgrow I(v+s/x); such a tendency can on- 
ly be mitigated by a constant redistribution of the social capital. 
Historically this would mean that the relative weight of society's pro- 
duction devoted to the production of means of production will increase. 
This argument is quite in line with that of Marx in Volume III of Cap- 
ital (Part III), where he dealt with the tendency for the rate of profit 
to fall. A rise in the organic composition of capital, Marx noted, 
will logically lead, along with a fall in the rate of profit, to a fall 
in the mass of profit as well. Historically, however, the latter is 
not observed. It is offset because the mass of surplus value produced 
increases as a result of an absolute increase in the amount of variable 
capital employed in production--in spite of the fact that the relative 
share of v in the productive capital drops. This in turn happens be- 
cause the total capital grows absolutely, and faster than the growth 
in the organic composition of capital. 
1 
We have shown that the same process is expressed in the reproduc- 
tion schemes once we add the condition of a rising c/v. If department 
I accumulates off of its own resources this will be insufficient to 
cover the demand for means of production in department II. In addition 
to the internal accumulation within department Ia portion of the sur- 
plus product of department II must go to augment production in I as well. 
There will be a transfer of capital from II to I, so that the relative 
growth in I proceeds faster than that of social production as a whole. 
This relative growth of I is a condition for the absolute growth of 
I(v+s/x) increasing in line with the absolute growth of IIc. 
Consequently, we are obliged to try to solve the problem by estab- 
lishing, for each new year, new proportions that will ensure equi- 
librium. For if we take one department as a base and adjust the 
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distribution of capital within the other department to it, as the 
pivotal point, that could not give us any sort of long-term solu- 
tion to the problem. Therefore, at the end of each year we have 
first of all to set aside from the surplus value of both depart- 
ments an amount necessary to maintain the level of production of 
the preceding year, and then to distribute the remaining surplus 
value of both departments, taken together, on the basis of the 
conditions of proportionality of the new year. Under the actual 
conditions of capitalist development (excluding, of course, per- 
iods of crisis) things proceed something like this. Allowing for 
"normal" bankruptcies in both departments, the general outlines 
of the preceding period's distribution of capital are retained; 
new capital accumulated in the preceding year through new stock 
and bond issues is then distributed hit or miss, spontaneously, 
between the various branches by taking into account the interplay 
of market forces in each given case between departments I and II; 
and finally this new distribution of capital readjusts itself 
through the market mechanism that regulates the whole system. 
2 
To illustrate this process, Preobrazhensky takes the following 
example: 
I. 4000c + 1000v + 1000s 
II. 1500c + 750v + 750s 
We already know how accumulation would proceed in department I. We 
would get: 
I. 4400c + 1100v + 500 consumption fund 
First, says Preobrazhensky, department II must take, out of its accumu- 
lation fund of 375,100 to add to IIc, in order to match the increased 
demand of department I for means of consumption. To do this, however, 
it must also increase its own variable capital by S0. This leaves 225 
not yet distributed. We cannot return to Marx's solution and assume 
that this whole 225 is consumed by the capitalists in department II. 
It must, therefore, be redistributed between both departments together, 
so the equilibrium as a whole is maintained. Preobrazhensky does this and 
winds up with this result: 
I. 4558.4c + 1129.6v + 500 consumption fund = 6188 
II. 1629.6c + 807.3v + 375 consumption fund = 2811.93 
Preobrazhensky resolved this in the following way: First of all, he 
retained his condition of a growth in the organic composition of capi- 
tal, which he set at 1%. This meant that first off, Ic would grow by 
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40, to 4440, and IIc by 15, to 1615. To cover this increase in IIc by 
15, however, Iv would also have to grow by that amount, so that the 
means of production for IIc would actually be available, and there would 
be a market for II's additional commodity-product. Yet for Iv to grow 
by 15 means that Ic must then increase by a further 60, to 4500.4 Thus 
the mere rise in the organic composition of capital by 1% is enough 
to set in motion a chain of events that accounts for 130 of the 225 of 
II's undistributed accumulation fund. The rest Preobrazhensky distrib- 
utes in this fashion: 7.3 to augment IIv. In line with this, IIc must 
then rise by 14.6, as must Iv. And the latter then causes Ic to swell 
by 58.4. This puts everything in order. The actual sum that passed 
from II to I was 188.5 The value of Preobrazhensky's exposition here 
is that it carefully shows how this process of redistribution obeys 
very tight rules of proportionality between the individual elements of 
the productive capital of both departments. Mathematically, however, 
the problem lends itself very neatly to solution by simultaneous equa- 
tions. 
We know that there is 225 total capital to be distributed. We also 
know that the organic composition of capital in department I is to rise 
from 4: 1 to 4.04: 1, and that the organic composition of capital in de- 
partment II is to go from 2: 1 to 2.02: 1. The appropriate equations 
would be: 
4400 +x=4.04(1100 + y) 
1600 +y=2.02(800 + z) 
x+ 2y +z= 225 
x is the addition to Ic; y is what is added to Iv. But the essential 
condition to be satisfied here is that whatever is added to Iv is also 
added to IIc, and vice versa, since this is the condition of exchange 
we must satisfy. Therefore y is also what is added to IIc, and hence 
the appearance of the term 2y, instead of just y, in the last equation. 
Finally, z is the addition to IIv. Solving these equations for the 
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three variables, we have x= 160.6; y= 28.86; z=6.4. So the final 
arrangement looks like: 
I. 4560.6c + 1128.9v + 500s/x 
II. 1628.9c + 806.4v + 375s/x 
giving production at the end of the year as 
I. 4560.6c + 1128.9v + 1128.9s = 6818.4 Total production = 10,060.1 II. 1628.9c + 806.4v + 806.4s = 3241.7 
The conditions of equilibrium, where I(v+s/x) = IIc, are satisfied. The 
slight discrepancies between this scheme and that of Preobrazhensky are 
due to the fact that, after making an initial boost in the organic com- 
position of capital by 1%, he did not maintain that ratio when adding 
subsequent increments to Iv, IIc, and Ic. As a result his figure for 
Ic is somewhat understated, while his figures for Iv and IIc are slight- 
ly too high. 
An arithemtical example is not a proof. The fact that we can dem- 
onstrate the algebraic feasibility of the transfer of capital from de- 
partment II to department I says nothing about how the process would 
take place in practice. Preobrazhensky takes up this point and notes 
the obvious objection that the physical elements of production cannot 
be so easily transferred from one department to another. Not all ma- 
chines are suitable for production of both means of production and 
means of consumption, nor will these different kinds of commodities util- 
ize the same raw materials. Yet, Preobrazhensky notes, the same is 
true of the separate branches of production within each department; yet 
this does not stop capital from readily shifting from one line of pro- 
duction to another in real life. In a very detailed and interesting 
argument, he points out that under capitalism the mechanism for this 
mobility is the modern credit system. Money capital can easily flow 
from one branch of production to another, calling forth a different di- 
vision of social labor. In understanding this process, we must at all 
times keep in mind that capital is a social relation, and that when we 
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speak of transfers of capital we are really talking about shifts in the 
command over labor power and changes in the social division of labor. 
This is perhaps easier to understand if we again recall the circuits 
of industrial capital and the process by which money capital, M, is 
converted to means of production and labor power. The historical im- 
portance of the modern credit system is that it places the total social 
surplus value at the effective disposal of the entire capitalist class, 
and not just an individual capitalist. It is for this reason that Pre- 
obrazhensky can speak of it as the historical condition for the mobil- 
ity of capital. 
What makes this entire process possible, however, is the prior ex- 
istence of substantial reserves of both fixed and circulating capital 
(both its constant and variable components). If society suddenly in- 
creases its output of means of production, the prior "over-production" 
of means of consumption will act as reserves which can now be tapped to 
sustain the new workers now to be employed in department I. What allows 
department I to expand is that it already possesses reserves of raw ma- 
terials and unused, idle plant and equipment. We should not be sur- 
prised by this conclusion- -Marx had arrived at it in his own analysis 
of fixed capital, and it was to play an increasingly important role in 
Preobrazhensky's own theory of capitalist crisis. 
6 
The only difficulty is that if values are transferred from II to 
I, these have the physical form of means of consumption which are far 
more perishable than stored up means of production, and hence more dif- 
ficult to hold in reserve for protracted periods. Therefore, from the 
point of view of the material composition of production, it is far eas- 
ier to transfer capital the other way around, i. e., from department I 
to II. This, however, would imply that society had undertaken the rel- 
ative "over-production" of means of production--just the opposite of 
the tendency Preobrazhensky arrived at. Preobrazhensky concludes that 
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this indeed is the outward form that capitalist crises take, but that 
this is itself a product of the need to transfer capital to department 
I, in order to compensate for the deficit in that department's produc- 
tion that would otherwise result. 
7 
It would appear that Preobrazhensky's argument is seriously flawed. 
As he himself admits, this is not the only mechanism by which the cap- 
italist economy maintains an equilibrium of proportions. He also, for 
instance, mentions the deviation of prices from values that takes place 
in normal economic activity. We can even go beyond that and point out 
that as soon as we apply prices of production, whereby the rate of prof- 
it is determined on the basis of the total capital employed in produc- 
tion and this, rather than the rate of surplus value, s/v, determines 
the distribution of social capital via the mechanism of the average rate 
of profit, we have just such a deviation. Yet this would completely 
reverse Preobrazhensky's conclusion. Only if goods exchanged at their 
value and accumulation took place strictly in terms of the rate of ex- 
ploitation (that is, off of the surplus value produced by v), would the 
natural tendency of the economy be towards over-production in department 
II and a consequent need to increase the relative weight of department 
I through the transfer of capital. Prices of production, on the other 
hand, would mean that department I would accumulate faster than depart- 
ment II, due to the sheer fact of its larger total capital. We will 
see in Part III that this appearance is itself deceptive. As soon as 
we account for the extended depreciation of fixed capital and the fact 
that its turnover period is longer than that of circulating capital, 
even the application of prices of production cannot erase the inherent 
tendency towards over-production in department II. It is important to 
mention the effect of prices of production upon Preobrazhensky's schemes, 
however, because they would seem to raise a rather obvious objection to 
his conclusions. We have included the mathematical presentation of the 
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problem as an appendix to this chapter. 
At another level, even if the application of prices of production 
did reverse the tendency Preobrazhensky had uncoverd, this would not 
make it any less significant. It shows what the natural tendency of 
capitalist development is, without which it would be impossible to ex- 
plain how and why observable phenomena may deviate from it. Its sta- 
tus in this regard is similar to Marx'a analysis of prices of production 
and the deviation of prices from values. That analysis did not negate 
Marx's theory, but in fact presupposed it. Prices of production and 
the deviation of prices from values are a further concretization of 
Marx's theory of capitalist production; yet they can only be understood 
if we first accept the validity of the theory of value, which forms the 
starting point from which prices of production are derived. 
8 
The application of prices of production to the reproduction schemes 
would, if they genuinely did demonstrate a reversal of the tendencies 
we have shown, reveal themselves as one of the key ways by which the 
necessary transfer of capital from department II to department I takes 
place. Our value analysis had shown that such a transfer and rearrange- 
ment of the social capital was essential to the equilibrium of the sys- 
tem; prices of production would be one particular vehicle through which 
the process occurred. 
In either case we will find that expanded reproduction constantly 
demands the rearrangement of each year's surplus product and the trans- 
fer of productive forces from one department to another. As Preobra- 
zhensky observed it is only the relative wealth of capitalist produc- 
tion that allows this to happen, through the creation of ample reserves 
of both means of production and means of consumption. Otherwise society 
would not have the necessary elasticity to constantly adjust. This, of 
course, was Marx's conclusion. The technical complexity of production 
in a society with an advanced division of labor is so great that dis- 
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equilibrium rather than equilibrium will be the rule, unless such re- 
serves exist. They represent society's allowance in the present for 
what it will require in the future, its conscious control, to recall 
Marx's phrase, "over the material means of its own reproduction. " Pre- 
obrazhensky detailed how capitalism acquires some of this essential 
flexibility, but can never avoid periodically resolving the dispropor- 
tions it engenders in another, more "natural" way: Crisis, destruction 
of values, and the resumption of expanded reproduction on a new econom- 
ic footing. 
In conclusion, Preobrazhensky has established one more fundamental 
constituent of his analysis. Under pure capitalism, where the organic 
composition of capital grows, and where, as a result of the development 
of the social division of labor, it is higher in department I than in 
department II, the resulting disproportion can only be overcome by the 
systematic transfer of capital to the production of means of production. 
This means that the volume of capital and of society's production em- 
ployed in department I must grow not only absolutely but relatively. 
9 
Historically, this is tantamount to saying that a society's potential 
wealth is dependent upon its ability to free an ever-larger portion of 
its population from the need to produce basic necessities. Whether 
this increased production of material goods by machines leads to an in- 
crease in the creative leisure of its population and their greater ma- 
terial wealth, or whether it results in crisis is, however, a question 
of social organization. Though capitalism can create the possibility 
and the pre-conditions for the former, only socialism can make it a 
reality. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 
1. Capital, III, p. 223. This argument will become increasingly im- 
portant when we deal with the accumulation of fixed capital. 
2. VKA 17, p. 55. 
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3. Ibid, p. 61. 
4. Ic should, in reality, grow by 60.6, in line with the 1% increase 
in the organic composition of capital. 
S. VKA 17, p. 61. 
6. See above, pp. 134-35, and Part III, below. 
7. VKA 17, pp. 55-58. In zakat Kapitalizma Preobrazhensky did not spe- 
cifically identify this tendency towards over-production in depart- 
ment II as a cause of crises. Instead he dwelt upon the discon- 
tinuity between the time when the demand for new means of produc- 
tion first arises and that when the production of these new means 
of production is actually completed. This led him to treat the 
existence of ample reserves, especially of fixed capital, and the 
prolonged turnover period of fixed capital as essential parts of 
his analysis. We will deal with all of these points in much greater 
detail in Part III. 
8. For a concise and stimulating discussion of this topic see the 
chapter "Value and Production Price, " in I. I. Rubin, op cit. 
9. VKA 17, p. 63. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
THE APPLICATION OF PRICES OF PRODUCTION 
In Part II of Volume III of Capital, Marx addresses the need the 
resolve a seemingly basic contradiction in his theory of value. Differ- 
ent capitals will have different rates of profit, depending on their 
organic compositions. Suppose the aggregate capital in one branch of 
production, say, light industry, breaks down as 1000c + 500v + 500s, 
while that in another branch, say, heavy industry, is composed of 4000c 
+ 1000v + 1000s. The two capitals will have identical rates of exploi- 
tation, 100%. Their rates of profit, however, will differ radically. 
Our first capital will have a rate of profit, p' = [SOOs/(1000c + 500v)] 
= 331. Our second capital will have a rate of profit = [1000s/(4000c 3 
+ 1000v) ]= 20%. 
In the same way, we see that equal capitals will also earn differ- 
ent rates of profit. If one capital is made up of 1500c + 500v + 500s, 
and another is comprised of 1000c + 1000v + 1000s, then again their 
rates of profit will differ quite a bit. The first will have p' = 
500/2000 = 25%; the second, p' = 1000/2000 = 50%. In fact, the only 
way these individual capitals, both in our first illustration and in 
our second, would have equal rates of profit (given equal rates of ex- 
ploitation) would be if their organic compositions were the same. The 
result, said Marx, was so fundamental that it seemed to threaten to 
overthrow his entire theory of capitalist production. 
We have thus demonstrated that different lines of industry have 
different rates of profit, which correspond to differences in the 
organic composition of their capitals and, within indicated limits, 
also to their different periods of turnover; given the same time 
of turnover, the law (as a general tendency) that profits are re- 
lated to one another as the magnitudes of their capitals, and that, 
consequently, capitals of equal magnitude yield equal profits in 
equal periods, applies only to capitals of the same organic com- 
position, even with the same rate of surplus value. These state- 
ments hold good on the assumption which has been the basis of all 
our analyses so far, namely that the commodities are sold at their 
values. There is no doubt, on the other hand, that aside from 
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unessential, incidental and mutually compensating distinctions, 
differences in the average rate of profit in the various branches 
of industry do not exist in reality, and could not exist without 
abolishing the entire system of capitalist production. It would 
seem, therefore, that here the theory of value is incompatible 
with the actual process, incompatible with the real phenomena of 
production, and that for this reason any attempt to understand 
these phenomena should be given up. l 
Marx was not really prepared to abandon the theory of value. He 
was pointing out that a purely value analysis has its limitations. It 
is adequate to trace out the most basic tendencies and regularities of 
the capitalist system, but it is still an analysis at a very high level 
of abstraction. A critical modification was needed in his assumptions 
if Marx was to extend his analysis and be able to explain the fact that 
an average rate of profit exists throughout capitalist industry and that 
equal capitals earn equal profits, regardless of their organic composi- 
tions. 
Marx resolved the contradiction in his theory of prices of produc- 
tion. The theory of prices of production does not abrogate or super- 
sede the theory of value. It uses the theory of value to explain how 
prices deviate from values. The theory of value is its necessary start- 
ing point; thus the theory of value and the theory of production price 
are part of the same theory of capitalist production, but they operate 
at different levels of abstraction. 
2 
We will not go into the detailed explication of the formation of 
prices of production that Marx does, but will use a very simple example, 
since this will be most in line with our application of prices of pro- 
duction to the reproduction schemes. Take two capitals that are of 
equal size, but have unequal organic compositions of capital. 
A. 700c + 300v + 300s--total capital = 1000, total s= 300; p' = 30% 
B. 800c + 200v + 200s--total capital = 1000, total s= 200; p' = 20% 
Yet we know that equal capitals must earn equal profits; and what is 
more, different capitals, regardless of their size, must have equal 
rates of profit. How, then, is the average rate of profit formed? The 
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total surplus value produced is 500. The 
general rate of profit, i. e., the average 
therefore, 25%. We must then apply this 
of these capitals in turn to see how much 
of society they will appropriate as their 
If we do this, we see that they will 
total capital is 2000. The 
for the two capitals, is, 
average rate of profit to each 
of the total surplus value 
profit. 
each earn 250 in profit. Cap- 
ital A will be 700c + 300v + 250p, and its total product will be 1250, 
rather than 1300, as it was in purely value terms. Capital B will be 
800c + 200v + 250p, and its total product will come to 1250 as well, 
instead of the 1200 we had when we calculated it on the basis of values. 
As a result of this redistribution Capital A sells its product at 50 
under its value, and Capital B sells its product at 50 over its value. 
The two compensate each other; the total product of the two capitals 
must be the same in price terms as it is in terms of values. This is 
quite logical, since prices are formed by redistributing the already 
created surplus value between the two capitals on the basis of their 
total size. 
Clearly this same process will be at work with capitals of unequal 
size. If Capital A had equalled 1500c + 300v + 300s = 2100, while Cap- 
ital B remained the same, the total surplus value would then equal 500, 
as before. But the total capital will have risen from 2000 to 2800. 
The rate of profit is now 17.86% and so the final products will be: 
A. 1500c + 300v + 321.4p = 2121.4 
B. 800c + 200v + 178.6p = 1178.6 
Now, in fact, it is Capital A that sells above its value (21.4 above) 
and Capital B that sells below (also 21.4). The total product in price 
terms equals 3300, just what it equalled in values. Thus we see that 
the average rate of profit causes values to be transferred from capi- 
tals with a low organic composition of capital to those with a high or- 
ganic composition. Capitals with high organic compositions will have a 
rate of profit lower than the average; those with low organic composi- 
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tions will have a rate of profit higher than the average. Hence any pro- 
cess of equalization of rates of profits must by necessity shift values 
from those whose surplus is too high in relation to the total capital 
to those whose surplus value is too low. 
What effect will this have on the reproduction schemes we were an- 
alyzing before? To demonstrate what happens we will use the following 
figures: 
I. 10,000c + 2000v + 2000s 
II. 3000c + 2500v + 2500s 
The figures we used in this chapter would have served just as well, and 
would have had the additional advantage of being fairly neat and simple 
to work with. They have the peculiarity, however, that the organic com- 
position of capital in department I is exactly double that in department 
II, and we want to show that the tendency we are describing has nothing 
whatsoever to do with the figures we select. So we have chosen a scheme 
where Ic/v is considerably greater than IIc/v, but where there is no 
chance of our results being attributed to any artificial symmetry. 
To start off, the total surplus value comes to 4500; the total cap- 
ital equals 17,500. The rate of profit equals 25.71. %. The first 
thing then, is to redistribute the surplus value accordingly. 
I. 10,000c + 2000v + 3085.7p 
II. 3000c + 2500v + 1414.3p 
Assuming that each department accumulates one half its profit, and dis- 
tributes it in line with the organic composition of capital, we have: 
I. 11,285c + 2257.1v + 1542.8p/x 
II. 3385.8c + 2821.5v + 707,2p/x 
I(v+p/x) equals just about 3800, while IIc = 3385.8. There is a deficit 
of means of consumption and a stock of unsold means of production equal 
to approximately 414. If we proceed over two more years we will see 
the disproportion actually worsen. 
3 
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Year Two: 
I. 11,285c + 2257.1v + 2257.1s 
II. 3385c + 2821.5v + 2121.5s 
Total s= 5078.6 
Total capital = 19.748.6 
p' = 25.72% 
After redistributing the surplus value 
I. 11,285c + 2257.1v + 3483p 
II. 3385c + 2821. Sv + 1596.3p 
which, after accumulation, gives: 
I. 12,736.3c + 2547.3v + 1741.5p/x 
II. 3820.4c + 3184.3v + 798.2p/x 
I(v+p/x) = 4288.8, giving a deficit of means of consumption = 468.4. 
Year Three: 
I. 12,736.3c + 2547.3v + 2547.3s Total s= 5731.6 
II. 3820.4c + 3184.3v + 3184.3s Total capital = 22,288.3 
p' = 25.72% 
After redistributing the surplus value we have: 
I. 12,736.3c + 2547.3v+ 3930.9p 
II. 3820.4c + 3184.3v+ 1801.6p 
so that, after accumulation we get: 
I. 14,374.2c + 2874.9v + 1965.5p/x 
II. 4311.8c + 3593.3v + 900.8p/x 
I(v+p/x) = 4840.4, yielding a deficit in means of consumption and a sur- 
plus of means of production = 528.6. 
What is interesting about this result is that after redistributing 
the surplus value in line with the average rate of profit, accumulation 
produces a large and growing over-production in department I. But once 
production is carried out on the basis of this accumulation, and sur- 
plus value is created by the labor power employed in production, then 
IIc = I(v+s/x). In other words, distributing the profit out of which 
accumulation takes place according to the average rate of profit equal- 
izes the amounts of labor power employed in production such that in 
value terms the exchange funds of the two departments would be in bal- 
ance if exchange took place immediately following production. Once we 
then distribute this new surplus value, however, in accord with the 
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average rate of profit, this equality evaporates, and we have an over- 
production in department I in price terms (and it is in price terms that 
exchange must take place). Yet this over-production when commodities 
are evaluated in terms of their prices hides an initial equality in terms 
of their values. It would seem, then, that the existence of an average 
rate of profit is a vehicle for transferring capital from department II 
to department I such that the values of their exchangeable products are 
equalized. But this equality is only ephemeral. In reality there is 
no time sequence according to which production is carried out first in 
value terms and then converted into prices. All production bears the 
nominal appearapce of being transacted in prices. The value relation- 
ships are the link which holds these mutual connections between the 
various capitalists in separate departments together. What the repro- 
duction schemes show, however, is that equilibrium in value terms is 
only a moment in the reproduction process, whose external form is un- 
mistakably that of an over-production in department I, a phenomenon that 
would indicate a constant source of crises. Preobrazhensky's original 
conclusion would seem to hold. A transfer of capital must then take 
place in the reverse direction, from department I to department II. 
As we stated in the main text of this chapter, this result is a 
product of the still-over-simplified assumptions we are making. We have 
continued to assume that fixed capital turns over in one year, along 
with the circulating capital. Once we remove that assumption, as we 
will demonstrate in Part III, the over-production in department I van- 
ishes, and the previous tendency towards over-production in department 
II re-emerges, even with the application of prices of production. 
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NOTES TO APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
1. Capital, III, p. 153. 
2. See I. I. Rubin, "Value and Production Price, " op cit. 
3. We assume, as did Marx, that the product of the previous year, to 
the extent that it consists of commodities that re-enter into the 
productive capital, is treated as a value element by the capital- 
ists in the ensuing year. The debate over how these commodities 
should be re-evaluated, to reflect their own deviation of prices 
from values, is a complex one, and does not affect the argument 
we are putting forward here. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPANDED REPRODUCTION UNDER CONCRETE CAPITALISM 
So far we have followed Preobrazhensky's attempt to show two 
and 
things. First, that the existence of production/exchange relations with 
the pre-capitalist sector provides capitalism with an essential outlet 
for achieving and maintaining proportionality in the course of its 
development. Second, that the tendency of pure capitalism is towards 
chronic disequilibrium in the growth of its two component departments 
of production. What then, is the role of petty production in capital- 
ism's attempt to sustain expanded reproduction? In the final part of 
VKA 17 Preobrazhensky set out to answer this question, and thereby to 
complete the groundwork for his main analysis of expanded reproduction 
in the mixed commodity-socialist economy of the USSR. 
how, 
Here we have two tasks. One is to show/ given disproportionality 
within the capitalist sector under conditions of expanded reproduction, 
the system as a whole attains equilibrium not only via exchange with 
the petty bourgeois sector, but by necessitating a rearrangement of 
the productive forces within that sector as well. The transfer of cap- 
ital that we saw as an essential condition of equilibrium in pure cap- 
italism, and which brought with it the danger of crisis and stagnation, 
is now shifted onto petty production, which is more elastic. The sec- 
ond task is to show how even when the entire system of social economy 
is in equilibrium and when there is an initial over-production of means 
of production, the original disproportion, i. e., the deficit of means 
of production, will re-emerge as a result of expanded reproduction. 
This is perhaps the most difficult part of Preobrazhensky's argument in 
VKA 17 and, as with the previous two chapters, we will by necessity have 
to telescope and reshape it. 
We begin with a scheme similar in structure to that for our mixed 
economy under simple reproduction: 
-194- 
KI. 2000c + 500v + 500s = 3000 Total production = 5000 KII. 1200c + 400v + 400s = 2000 
PI. 1500c + 1500 consumption fund = 3000 Total production = 6150 PII. 1O50c + 2100 consumption fund = 3150 
Right off we see some interesting characteristics of this scheme. Pro- 
duction in the petty-commodity sector is greater than in K. 
1 Within 
the two sectors, we see that the organic composition of capital in KI 
is greater than in KII. The same is true of P--the ratio of means of 
production to the consumption fund in PI (the "organic composition of 
capital" in the conditional sense of the term) is far higher than in 
PII. Finally, the volume of production in PI is almost, but not yet 
equal to production in PII. 
What we want to do, says Preobrazhensky, is see what happens when 
the scheme is in motion. We have three possible cases. Production in 
K expands, while that in P falls. This case will most dramatically show 
the inter-relation between K and P under expanded reproduction. Case 
two would be when K expands and P remains constant--this is not partic- 
ularly interesting at this point of our analysis, as all of the dispro- 
portions in the system would originate within K and we would be large- 
ly covering old ground. This case would have an interest later on, 
if and when we took up the question of the rearrangement of productive 
forces within P while its total production stayed stable; for this would 
necessarily compel changes in the structure of material exchange between 
P and K, a problem which Preobrazhensky by and large ignored but which 
will become central to our argument when dealing with the Soviet goods 
famine (although we do this within the context of changes in the over- 
all volume of P's production). The last case is when both K and P ex- 
pand simultaneously; and we shall see that though this case may be his- 
torically more realistic, especially as regards the Soviet economy, 
its mechanics are but a variation of those revealed by case one. 
Before proceeding we must make one cautionary remark. Preobra- 
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zhensky makes it quite clear that we are still operating within the 
bounds of a value analysis. Thus when examining exchange between the 
departments of both sectors we merely need account for the balances, 
what is left over after all internal exchange between KI and KII, and 
between PI and PII, has taken place. In reality this is obviously too 
much of a simplification. Above, in Chapters 2 and 3, we saw that de- 
partment I of the capitalist sector and department I of the agricultural 
or petty production sector enter into exchange with each other, and that 
any imbalance between them will disrupt the process of reproduction. 
Preobrazhensky points out that the same is true of exchange between 
KII and PH (a case we will take up in Chapter 11). For the moment, 
we cannot overstep the limits we have set for our analysis, because our 
immediate concern is to lay out the more abstract tendencies in a mixed 
economy, upon which we can build when we come to analyze the concrete 
2 
situation in the USSR in the 1920's. 
Let us go back to our scheme. We want to make a few assumptions: 
1)K accumulates half its surplus value in both departments; 2)c/v grows 
by 1% in both KI and KII; 3)P as a whole experiences declining repro- 
duction at a rate of 2% each year. With this in mind, our capital at 
the start of the production year will be: 
KI. 2204c + 546v + 250 consumption fund 
KII. 1353c + 447v + 200 consumption fund 
PI. 1470c + 1470 consumption fund 
PII. 1029c + 2058 consumption fund3 
If we compare this scheme with the one on page 194 we see that, first 
of all, the deficit of means of production within the capitalist sector 
has grown. Initially it equalled 1200 IIc - 750 I(v+s/x) = 450. This 
was exactly balanced by the surplus of means of production of peasant 
origin we had in P. There PI required means of consumption of 1500, 
for which it had to exchange the same quantity of peasant-produced means 
of production. PII, on the other hand, could provide only 1050 for PI's 
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consumption and could purchase only 1050 of its exch 
In this instance the solution is easy. PI exchanges 
means of production to KII for its surplus of 450 in 
tion. Socially, this means that KII requires 450 in 
iliary goods, etc., which come from the countryside, 
an identical quantity of industrially-produced means 
such as textiles or processed foods. 
angeable commodities. 
its surplus of 450 
means of consump- 
raw materials, aux- 
and that PI needs 
of consumption, 
Now, however, we have problems. The deficit within K has jumped 
from 450 to 557. The surplus of means of production within P has shrunk 
to 441. The disproportion can no longer be made up by mutual exchange 
between the two sectors. We have a deficit for the economy as a whole 
of 116 in means of production. Before, for pure capitalism, such a def- 
icit would require a rearrangement of capital between KI and KII, shift- 
ing it from the latter to the former. Certainly this is a possible 
solution here. It is not, however, desirable, since capitalism would 
then run the risk of massive loss of values, if not an actual crisis. 
It would be much better if the rearrangement of productive forces took 
place entirely within P. This is possible because P is much more flex- 
ible from the technical standpoint, with each peasant farm producing 
some means of production and some means of consumption, and with con- 
sumption itself having great elasticity--the peasantry can simply con- 
sume more or less of its physical product as expansion or contraction 
of various spheres of production demands. It is also a realistic sup- 
position, since history shows us that capitalism ousts and subordinates 
petty-commodity production as a more or less constant process. 
Suppose we tried to do this by simply making PH absorb the entire 
drop in P's production. Then P as a whole would fall by 2%, or 123, 
but this would all take place in PII, while PI stayed the same. P would 
then look like this: 
PI. 1SOOc + 1500 consumption fund = 3000 
PII. 1009c + 2018 consumption fund = 3027 
Total production = 6027 
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Even this would not do. PI would still only have 491 in means of pro- 
duction to exchange with KII. The overall shortfall of means of produc- 
tion in K, and its surplus of means of consumption would be less severe, 
but it would still be large, equal to S57 - 491 = 66. The only way out 
will be to rearrange the capital within P. To show how this works, 
Preobrazhensky first supposes that the first year's disproportion is 
overcome by foreign trade--the surplus of KII's means of consumption 
is exported and means of production imported for the same amount. In 
the second year, with K accumulating half its surplus value, and its 
organic composition of capital growing by 1% in both departments, its 
product would look like this: 
KI. 2204c + 546v + 546s = 3296 Total production = 5533 KII. 1353c + 447v + 447s = 2247 
Its capital for the next year would be (rounding off fractions for sim- 
plification): 
KI. 2426c + 596v + 273 consumption fund 
KII. 1524c + 499.5v + 223.5 consumption fund 
This time, however, when we cut P's production by 2% we let the entire 
decline in that sector fall on PII; PI continues to produce at the old 
level. We then have: 
PI. 1470c + 1470 consumption fund = 2940 Total = 5907 PII. 989c + 1978 consumption fund = 2967 
As before, when we tried making PIT absorb all of the first year's fall, 
the disproportion is not as bad as it would have been had we distributed 
the decline in P evenly over the two departments. Yet on the whole 
matters are still getting worse. K's internal deficit has climbed from 
557 to 655. PI's ability to make it up has grown to only 481 (from a 
previous 441--it has actually declined compared to the case in the first 
year when we let the entire fall in P rest on PII). The overall defi- 
cit for society is 655 - 481 = 174.4 Even if we modified these condi- 
tions and made PIT shoulder the decline for both years, keeping PI 
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stable throughout, PI would still have a disposable commodity-product 
of only 581.5 The social deficit of means of production would be 74, 
worse than the case in the first year where PII shouldered the entire 
fall in P (though not as bad as when the first year decline in P was 
shared evenly by both PI and PII). 
No matter how we approach the problem we cannot escape from the 
need to actually rearrange production within P. Preobrazhensky does 
this by increasing total production within PI by 210 and cutting PH 
by the same magnitude. If we distribute this new arrangement according 
to the ratios of constant capital to the consumption fund in the two 
departments we get: 
6 
PI. 1575c + 1575 consumption fund = 3150 Total production = 5907 PII. 919c + 1838 consumption fund = 2757 
Total production in P has fallen by 2% for this production year, as be- 
fore. Only now production has been restructured so that PI has a mar- 
ketable commodity-product of 656 in means of production. KII's deficit 
of means of production has, or course, remained at 655. Now, however, 
the social economy as a whole can attain equilibrium. PI can sell 655 
in means of production for the 655 of capitalist-produced means of con- 
sumption it requires from KII; the latter can dispose of its marketable 
surplus and obtain what it needs in means of production of peasant or- 
igin. In real terms, this helps reveal the historical process whereby 
peasant production of means of consumption was ousted by capitalist ag- 
riculture. At the same time the whole of the capitalist sector, but 
primarily KIl, had to secure its base of raw materials and other inter- 
mediate goods produced in the countryside. Thus the actual rearrange- 
ment of production within P, towards an increase of just such kinds of 
means of production, allows us to see both the absolute encroachment of 
capitalism upon petty production, and a shift in the relative weight of 
petty production in favor of its production of those goods capitalism 
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required for its expansion. Not only does this reflect the actual his- 
torical movement of capitalist development, but--as we shall see in Part 
IV--mirrors the necessary future course of the Soviet economy of the 
twenties. We should add, however, that this description of the process 
of equilibrium has assumed throughout that what exchanged in value terms 
also satisfied the material needs of production in the various depart- 
ments of the two sectors. Had this not been the case, then at least 
some rearrangement of capital would have been necessary in the capital- 
ist sector. 
8 We have already examined this problem in its basic out- 
lines and will deal with it extensively in Part IV as well. 
We will not spend much time with the variant of this example, where 
both K and P expand their production simultaneously. In that case the 
deficit of KII for means of production is somewhat less. PI has a 
slightly larger amount of exchangeable means of production than before, 
which ameliorates the disproportion in the economy as a whole. As Preo- 
brazhensky notes, equilibrium is still achieved in the same manner-- 
through the rearrangement of capital within P (thereby increasing pro- 
duction in PI), either alone, or in combination with the more difficult 
process of transferring capital from KII to KI. 
9 
This takes us to the second problem Preobrazhensky examines. If 
instead of "over-production" of means of consumption we have "over-pro- 
duction" of means of production in the capitalist sector, will expanded 
reproduction automatically lead us back to the initial disproportion, 
a deficit in means of production? 
For this we would either have to construct a scheme of expanded 
reproduction where, keeping total production in the capitalist sector 
the same, we reversed the relative weights of departments I and II (that 
is, reduced the volume of capital employed in II, and increased produc- 
tion in I by the same amount); or we could keep the volume of capital 
employed in the capitalist sector the same as before for both depart- 
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ments, but would sharply raise the organic composition of capital in 
department H. We can dispense with this last possibility quite easily. 
We have already mentioned it above (page 169). What would happen is 
that IIc would outdistance I(v+s/x) by an even greater amount in the 
beginning, because it was adding to an absolutely larger IIc; but be- 
cause it would be devoting a smaller share of its surplus value to in- 
crease v, the rate of growth of this surplus value would slow down mark- 
edly. In the future IIc would in fact fail to keep pace with I(v+s/x), 
and there would bean over-production of means of production in KI. Cap- 
ital would then have to move in the reverse direction, from KI to KII, 
or, as we saw from our preceding example, the shift could take place 
within P, calling forth a reduction of production in PI and an increase 
in PII. Preobrazhensky does not pursue this example any further, for 
even though it is theoretically conceivable, it is of little practical 
importance. The higher organic composition of capital in department I 
as opposed to department II is one of the historical features of capi- 
talist development. 10 
We are left with the first alternative, reversing the relative 
weights of the social capital invested in departments I and II. Preo- 
brazhensky illustrates this with the following scheme: 
KI. 2400c + 600v + 600s = 3600 
KII. 840c + 280v + 280s = 1400 
Total production = 5000 
Total production in the capitalist sector is the same as in the first 
example on page 194, as are the organic compositions of capital in both 
departments (i. e., Ic/v is still greater than IIc/v). All that has 
changed is that the volume of capital employed in KI has increased at 
the expense of KII, adding 600 to KI and taking that much from KII. 
This in turn calls for a redistribution within P, with PI falling and 
PIT rising--here, too, the total production in P is kept at around the 
previous level, 6100. P will now look like the following: 
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PI. 1184c + 1184 consumption fund = 2368 Total production = 6100 PII. 1244c + 2488 consumption fund = 3732 
Here we have over-production of means of production in K of 60, since 
KI(v+s/x) exceeds KIIc by this amount (900 - 840 = 60). This made up 
by the petty bourgeois sector, where PIIc is greater than PI's consump- 
tion fund by just this amount, and therefore can provide a necessary 
market for KI's surplus commodities and a source for its shortage of 
means of consumption. The equilibrium of this scheme is disturbed as 
soon as we introduce accumulation in both sectors. In K we accumulate 
half the surplus value of both departments and increase the organic 
composition of capital by 1% in each. Distributing the accumulated s 
accordingly, we get: 
KI. 2644.8c + 655.2v + 300 consumption fund 
KII. 947.1c + 312.9v + 140 consumption fund 
The first thing we notice is that the surplus 
KI(v+s/x) over KIIc is now equal to only 655.2 
we increase production in P by 2% (PI rises by 
tribute the new product according to the ratio 
consumption fund in each department, P will be 
PI. 1207c + 1207 consumption fund 
PII. 1269c + 2538 consumption fund 
of means of production, 
+ 300 - 947 = 8.2. If 
47, PH by 74) and dis- 
of constant capital to 
as follows: 
The deficit of means of production in P has now risen from 60 to 62, be- 
cause PIIc is slightly larger than the consumption fund of PI, and so a 
uniform rise in both will yield a somewhat higher absolute increase in 
PIIc. What is significant is that KI can no longer make up the deficit 
of means of production in PII. It has only 8.2 to offer. Nor can it 
serve as a market for PII's excess means of consumption. 
Thus we end up with the case where the expansion of department II 
of the capitalist sector has replaced department II of the petty 
bourgeois sector both as a market for the sale of II's production 
and as a supplier of consumer goods to KI. As a result of this 
situation, PIT cannot restore 62 - 8.2, or 53.8, of its constant 
capital. On the one hand, it lacks a martket for that amount of 
its own goods, and, on the other hand, it suffers a corresponding 
shortage of means of production in their material form. 
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Equilibrium can be achieved either by cutting back production 
throughout PII, or byltransferring productive forces from PII to 
PI in the next year. l 
This condition emerges even more starkly if we assume that the dis- 
proportion is somehow overcome in the present year and reproduction goes 
on. This year's product in K will be: 
KI. 2644.8c + 655.2v + 655.2s 
KII. 947.1c + 312.9v + 312.9s 
And arranging the capital in K for the next year, plus allowing P to 
grow by 2%, we have the following picture for the economy as a whole: 
KI. 2912.2c + 715v + 327.6 consumption fund 
KII. 1066.7c + 349.5v + 154.4 consumption fund 
PI. 1231c + 1231 consumption fund 
PII. 1294c + 2588 consumption fund 
In the petty-commodity sector, the disproportion between PIIc and the 
consumption fund of PI has grown once more, to 63. What is more strik- 
ing is that not only can KI not make up any of this deficit in means of 
production for PII, but it can't even cover the internal needs of depart- 
ment II of the capitalist sector. KII now exceeds KI(v+s/x) by 24.1-- 
there is a deficit of means of production in the capitalist sector as 
well. Whereas before the disproportion existed for the system as a 
whole, it was attenuated by the fact that K could make up some of P's 
deficit for means of production. But now this deficit exists all the 
way around, and emanates from both K and P. "We thus have throughout 
the whole social production a goods famine in means of production to 
the amount of 63 + 24.1 = 87.1. "12 The cause, Preobrazhensky concludes, 
is: 
... firstly... the rise in the organic composition of capital 
in both 
departments of the capitalist sector, and second... the more rapid 
rate of accumulation in KII, which was due to the lower organic 
composition of capital in this department as compared to KI. Thus, 
here, as the process of expanded reproduction develops mechanical- 
ly, the tendency of a capitalist economy that we pointed out above 
forces its way to the fore--the tendency towards systematic over- 
accumulation in branches with a low organic composition of capital, 
that is, in the present case in the branch of capitalist production 
of means of consumption. And that in turn compels society-whether 
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more or less elastically or through a crisis--to redistribute its 
productive forces by increasing the capital invested in branches 
of the production of means of production. 
This last example, which is characteristic of capitalist economy 
during its period of development, is of special interest to us for 
the additional reason that it also reproduces in part (although 
in an overly general and abstract form) the processes that we, 
mutatis mutandis, can currently observe in the economy of the USSR, 
insofar as we study that economy from the standpoint of economic 
equilibrium in the system as a whole. 
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We have now finished our reconstruction of Preobrazhensky's anal- 
ysis of concrete capitalism, of a capitalism constantly interacting 
with the petty-commodity economy. In the end we arrive at a picture 
that seems fairly unspectacular--although we can see with what meticu- 
lousness Preobrazhensky constructed it. The natural course of capi- 
talist development is towards the over-production of means of consump- 
tion. This signifies the ousting of petty-commodity agriculture by cap- 
italist farming; and this in turn necessitates the expansion of petty 
production of means of production--both to provide a market for the 
growth of department II of the capitalist sector, and to ensure the 
latter an adequate base of raw materials. In addition, this fundamental 
tendency will be modified to the extent that the material composition 
of production does not permit the peasant sector to absorb all of the 
disproportionalities that arise within capitalist production. We have, 
after all, been dealing so far strictly with a value analysis, as we 
have emphasized many times. 
Conclusion 
Before we move on to Preobrazhensky's analysis of expanded repro- 
duction in the economy of the Soviet Union under NEP--which is the main 
focus of our study--a few comments are in order on what we have estab- 
lished so far. 
Preobrazhesnky conducted his analysis in VKA 17 solely on the pre- 
be 
mise that equilibrium conditions can/satisfied on the basis of exchange 
of values between departments and between sectors in the correct pro- 
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portions. He goes to great pains to caution us that this is a necessary 
simplifying assumption, and will have to be modified as soon as we be- 
is 
gin to analyze a concrete economy. This/a question we should say more 
about. Although Preobrazhensky worked out certain patterns inherent 
in capitalist development in general, the contradictions they involve 
have all more or less been resolved historically, at least to the ex- 
tent that capitalism has systematically undermined petty production. 
Thus any analysis of the concrete economy of modern capitalism must be- 
gin from the tendencies Preobrazhensky detailed, and study how the con- 
crete, particular structures of capitalist production and exchange mod- 
ify them or allow the system to partially ameliorate its immanent con- 
flicts. In doing this we can introduce complicating factors: How, for 
example, the modern credit system helps affect transfers of capital 
that are essential to the system; the effect of analyzing the material 
composition of production and exchange; and disproportions that arise 
strictly from breakdowns in the process of circulation. 
We said at the outset of this part of our discussion that, although 
Preobrazhensky's argument in both VKA 17 and VKA 18 are important con- 
tributions to the Marxist theory of contemporary capitalism, our main 
interest, at least as far as VKA 17 was concerned, was to establish an 
analytical framework for studying the Soviet economy, In this regard 
we should note that the capitalism Preobrazhensky describes is not only 
capitalism in general, but the specifically Russian capitalism of be- 
fore the Revolution. It is important that we know what the developmen- 
tal tendencies of this particular capitalism are, so that we can better 
understand the economic legacy the Bolsheviks inherited. We can only 
fully appreciate the pathbreaking quality of Preobrazhensky's analysis 
of the Soviet economy if we can first define the pure tendencies from 
which that economy, with all of its contradictions, was deviating. Only 
then can we ask the most important question, why these deviations take 
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place and how they can be overcome. 
Furthermore, such deviations show the particular ways in which the 
analysis will have to be further concretized and developed. The schemes 
of expanded reproduction will be much more complex than even those for 
concrete capitalism. They will have to allow for the material composi- 
tion of production in each department in each sector, the complex nature 
of exchange (whose basic outlines we drew out above in Chapter 3) and 
the disproportions brought about by the destruction of the industrial 
infrastructure during the civil war. 
This brings us, finally, to the question of non-equivalent exchange, 
which Preobrazhensky only touched on briefly at the close of VKA 17. 
There he points out that he had not considered the transfer of elements 
of production from one sector to another as a means of rearranging cap- 
ital within the capitalist sector. In The New Economics Preobrazhensky 
detailed a whole series of mechanisms for the alienation of values from 
the private sector by the state sector. In the light of the ensuing 
argument built up around the reproduction schemes, we should return to 
this subject briefly. In VKA 17 Preobrazhensky notes that a key source 
of captialist expansion has been monetary accumulation in the pre-cap- 
italist sector. In many cases, when there has been an over-production 
in one department of petty production capitalism would purchase these 
commodities out of monetary reserves, or out of the resources of its 
advanced credit system, without making any subsequent sales. P would 
thus accumulate money holdings, which it would then deposit in the bour- 
geois banking system. That is, the capitalist class would both obtain 
the commodities it might desire or require from P and utilize the money 
it pays out--and which returns to it, via its domination over the credit 
system--for further expansion. By definition, this would become a ve- 
hicle for the redistribution of society's capital according to the needs 
of proportionality of the system--at least as best as the spontaneous 
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and anarchic production of capitalism would allow. 
For the Soviet economy this means of alienating values from the 
petty-commodity sector is especially important. First of all, Preobra- 
zhensky had always argued that such monetary accumulation within the 
peasant economy would be a vehicle for primitive socialist accumulation. 
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This is turn accented the critical importance of Gosbank and its need 
to have total control over the country's financial affairs. Second, 
non-equivalent exchange between the state and non-socialist sectors is 
itself the primary means of carrying out the "purchases without sales" 
through which the state could transfer values from petty production to 
state industry. To the extent that the state economy of the USSR dis- 
plays the regularities--and the subsequent disproportions--detailed in 
VKA 17, non-equivalent exchange is the basic precondition for overcom- 
ing them by drawing petty production into exchange with the state sec- 
tor. 
Throughout his analysis Preobrazhensky made the historically jus- 
tifiable assumption that the petty-commodity sector was subordinate to 
that of capitalist production. As a result, in the reproduction schemes 
it was P which adapted to the imbalances within K, and not vice versa. 
This process of subordination was the period of primitive accumulation 
which both Marx and Preobrazhensky describe so well, and continued well 
into the age of imperialism. Non-equivalent exchange is but a specific 
instance of the general fact that in the USSR this subordination of the 
peasant economy to the state sector is not given, is not already his- 
torically achieved, as under capitalism, but is only contingent. If 
it is true, and the entire body of Preobrazhensky's work points to this 
conclusion, that the state economy cannot develop except on the basis 
of the progressive subordination of petty production to the needs of 
Soviet industry, this becomes not just an economic but a political ques- 
tion, whose outcome depends on the conscious intervention of the Soviet 
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state. What is more, although this is a necessary condition for the 
continued survival of the USSR and the construction of a socialist soci- 
ety, it is not sufficient. Preobrazhensky's analysis of the Soviet eco- 
nomy, with its regularities and, above all, its contradictions, points 
to the inexorable conclusion that an end to the Soviet Union's social- 
ist isolation, through revolution in the advanced countries of the cap- 
italist West, must take place. Otherwise these contradictions may be 
modified, but never resolved. 
The argument Preobrazhensky put forward in VKA 17 leads directly 
to that in "Economic Equilibrium in the System of the USSR" (VKA 22), 
where, a year later, he applied it to the concrete study of the Soviet 
economy under the conditions of the mid-twenties. There are a number 
of questions implicit in his analysis both of concrete capitalism and 
the Soviet Union that he did not touch upon but which must be answered 
if the economic impasse of the Soviet Union during this period is to 
be properly understood. Paramount among them is that of the reproduc- 
tion of fixed capital; for by analyzing the proportions in which fixed 
and circulating must be reproduced during expanded reproduction, given 
the fact that they have different turnover periods and represent qual- 
itatively different kinds of means of production, we will determine both 
the quantitative and material dictates of equilibrium in far greater 
detail than Preobrazhensky was able to do. Our most important conclu- 
sion will be that there existed an unresolvable contradiction between 
the conditions of accumulation and circulation of the material elements 
of reproduction under expanded reproduction in a mixed commodity-soci- 
alist economy, on the one hand, and the expansion and degree of propor- 
tionality the Soviet Union could achieve given its weak industrial base 
and a chronic goods famine, on the other. So, before passing on to 
Preobrazhensky's theory of expanded reproduction in the Soviet economy 
we will first deal extensively with the question of the accumulation of 
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fixed capital under pure capitalism; for it is upon the latter that the 
study of expanded reproduction of fixed capital under concrete capital- 
ism and in the Soviet Union must build--a study without which Preobra- 
zhensky's own theory of the goods famine is provocative but incomplete. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 
1. This would certainly be a realistic assumption for Russian capital- 
ism prior to the Revolution, which, as we will note later in this 
chapter, is the particular capitalism Preobrazhensky is describing 
--a fact that helps strengthen the continuity between the arguments 
in VKA 17 and VKA 22. 
2. VKA 17, pp. 65-66,70. 
3. Ibid, p. 67. For the method of calculating accumulation allowing 
for a growth in the organic composition of capital, see Ch. 4, pp. 
173-76, above. We should also note that in his examples through- 
out VKA 17 Preobrazhensky takes the exchange fund of department I 
as equal to the variable capital after accumulation plus the con- 
sumed part of surplus value. This is clearly a lower sum than if 
we took I(v+s/x) after the year's production has already taken 
place. Although it is true that the capitalists in II must find 
their additional means of production already available in the mar- 
ket at the start of the year, we will show in Part III that a part 
of these means of production are only produced by department I dur- 
ign the production year that is carried out on the basis of accumu- 
lation at the year's beginning--that is, they are embodied in the 
new surplus value that is produced by the accumulated variable cap- 
ital. As a result, the deficits Preobrazhensky measures in his 
examples are somewhat lower than those he would have obtained had 
he carried production through to the end of the year and then cal- 
culated the exchange fund of department I. This does not change 
the argument, as he is describing tendencies at work over time, 
and not absolute figures. If the sums involved are large enough 
that deficits would be transformed into surpluses of means of pro- 
duction, these surpluses would disappear in the course of one or 
two year's further production under the same prevailing conditions. 
4. There is an error in the figures in the text (VKA 17, p. 68), which 
reads 655 - 483 = 173, instead of 655 - 481 = 174, which is correct. 
S. If we did this P would be: 
PI. 1500c + 1500 consumption fund = 3000 
PII. 969c + 1938 consumption fund = 2907 
Total = 5907 
6. We can calculate this rearrangement by using simultaneous equations. 
If x= total production in PI, and y= total production in PII, 
then-. 
x+y= 5907 
1/2x + 1/3y = 655 
This gives production in P as: 
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PI. 1574.4c + 1574.4 consumption fund = 3148.8 Total = 5907 PII. 919.4c + 1838.8 consumption fund = 2858.2 
Here production within P has remained the same, while PI now has 
655 available for exchange with K. 
7. VKA 17, p. 69. Preobrazhensky makes the somewhat obscure comment 
that, because this result demonstrates that total social produc- 
tion can grow while petty production declines, it disproves Rosa 
Luxemburg's theory of the role of petty production in capitalist 
development. It seems to us that this is simply wrong, and does 
much to obscure the real differences between the two thinkers. 
In the first place, Luxemburg was well aware of the inadequacy of 
Marx's schemes and of the fact that if, given the lower organic 
composition of capital in department II, you allowed for equal 
rates of accumulation of surplus value, over-production in depart- 
ment II would result. Likewise with the rise in the organic com- 
position of capital: Luxemburg notes that to be consistent with 
Marx's analysis we must allow it to rise, and then over-production 
in II would again manifest itself. And, like Preobrazhensky, she 
concluded that this could only be resolved--and was resolved in 
real life--by the transfer of capital from department II to depart- 
ment I. It was here that she emphasized that the limits of Marx's 
schemes--which stressed that commodities must exchange in rather 
precise material form--would seem to contradict the dictates of 
capitalist development as it really took place. The transfer of 
capital would seem to be impossible, yet it constantly takes place. 
Nevertheless, this for Luxemburg was not the main contradiction 
within the schemes; for her the latter resided in the apparent in- 
ability for the accumulation of money to keep pace with, and act 
as the motive force for the accumulation of commodities. This, 
along with the other contradictions we have just mentioned led her 
to conclude that capitalism could not develop as a closed system, 
but must do so in perpetual inter-relation with the petty produc- 
tion sectors of the world economy. Here, too, it would appear that 
in the case we are dealing with here she and Preobrazhensky were 
saying much the same thing: Even while capitalism will increas- 
ingly encroach upon the pre-capitalist economy, it requires the 
latter to increase the share of its production that enters into 
exchange with capitalism. This is true in Preobrazhensky's current 
example, where P must make up the deficit in K (which is growing) 
by rearranging its production so as to increase the share avail- 
able for exchange with the capitalist sector. 
Preobrazhensky's real difference with Luxemburg is more profound, 
for it calls into question her entire method of exposition. Pre- 
obrazhensky analyzed the inter-relation between the capitalist and 
pre-capitalist modes of production by starting from the historical 
genesis of the problem, where the two systems of economy constantly 
interact, and where one subordinates the other precisely through 
this process of interconnection. Preobrazhensky can in this way 
show how capitalism's exchange with, and eventual subordination 
of the pre-capitalist economy ameliorates some of its disproportions 
and heightens others. Luxemburg, on the other hand, posits, it 
seems to us, an abstract model of "pure" capitalism which, despite 
her protests about the formal, and hence conditional nature of the 
schemes, fails to transcend them and in the end treats them in the 
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rigid, almost naturalistic manner we have argued against through- 
out this study. As a result, Luxemburg's analysis is too static 
to actually infer conclusions of the dynamic character she wants. 
Because she deals only with a closed capitalist system and an equal- 
ly closed system of petty production she sees little more than a 
reciprocal relationship between them--something that inevitably 
leads towards a breakdown theory: Capitalism will eventually use 
up its petty bourgeois buffer, and then cataclysm must result. In 
Zakat Kapitalizma (pp. 14-15,77) Preobrazhensky again criticized 
Luxemburg's theory of the role of petty production in capitalist 
development, but this time, it seems to us, in a manner that was 
much more to the point. The significance of the petty producer 
sector as a market for capitalist production does not lie in its 
absolute size (which is relatively small), but in the fact that 
this sector gives capitalism a crucual margin of elasticity, both 
in terms of supplying it with commodities it requires for expanded 
reproduction and as a market for capitalist products. This elas- 
ticity permits capitalism to smooth out and overcome a number of 
disproportions that would acquire critical dimensions if it were 
indeed a closed system. 
We will also show, in Part IV, that Luxemburg was wrong to assume 
that the reproduction schemes cannot reflect--and cannot lead to 
a solution of--the problem of the material composition of the soc- 
ial product when dealing with the transfer of capital between de- 
partments and between sectors. For her discussion of the inherent 
contradictions within Marx's schemes see The Accumulation of Cap- 
ital, Ch. XXV, especially pp. 336-46. 
8. VKA 17, p. 70. 
9. Ibid, p. 71. Preobrazhensky takes expanded reproduction in the cap- 
italist sector to be the same as before, but now he expands produc- 
tion in P by 2%. We then have the following: 
KI. 2204c + 546v + 250 consumption fund 
KII. 1353c + 447v + 200 consumption fund 
Pl. 1530c + 1530 consumption fund 
PII. 1071c + 2142 consumption fund 
KII's overall shortage of means of production is 98, which is a 
bit less than when production in P fell (then it was 116). A re- 
arrangement of society's productive forces is necessary, whether 
it takes place exclusively within P, or within both sectors togeth- 
er. We get the same result even if we allow all of the rise in P 
to accrue to PI. Then total production in P still goes up to 6273, 
but PH remains constant, at 3150. 
PI. 1561.5c + 1561.5 consumption fund 
PH. 1050c + 2100 consumption fund 
PI then has 511.5 available for exchange with K, which still leaves 
a deficit of 45.5. 
We should also note that when we expand P by 2% this is not accumu- 
lation in the strict sense that we speak of it under capitalism. 
The value of labor power is not regulated by the law of value, and 
hence the category of surplus value has no meaning for petty pro- 
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duction. We cannot, then, say that P accumulates a certain portion 
of its surplus value, or even its surplus product. It has a sur- 
plus product over and above the necessary consumption fund, but this 
can go to augment either future production or present consumption 
in any number of percentage divisions. This no doubt explains why 
Preobrazhensky sets growth in P in percentage terms, not just for 
total production, but for each of the categories, e. g., the con- 
stant capital and the consumption fund. As a result PIIc grows by 
2%, since at the present level of analysis this growth is indepen- 
dent of the mass of "variable capital" in PII, and depends only on 
the total product of the department. This also explains why when 
P expands and when the "organic composition of capital" is lower 
in PH than in PI, we do not get over-production in PII. 
10. Even in the Soviet economy of the period of primitive socialist 
accumulation, where the organic composition of capital was higher 
in the department of state production of means of consumption (de- 
partment II), this was a legacy of Russia's backwardness and the 
destruction of her industrial base. The whole tendency of devel- 
opment was towards reversing this relationship. See below, Ch. 10. 
11. VKA 17, pp. 73-74. 
12. Ibid, p. 74. 
13. Ibid, pp. 74-5. Emphasis added. In "Ekonomicheskie Zametki III" 
Preobrazhensky detailed a series of conditions of equilibrium in 
the Soviet system which closely parallel those he discussed in great 
detail in VKA 22. He noted that the growth of constant capital 
can only keep pace with that of means of consumption if department 
I of the state sector grows relatively faster than department II, 
and that this is the result of its higher organic composition of 
capital. He then poses the rhetorical question to the effect that 
this should be obvious to every serious student of the Soviet eco- 
nomy. Quite frankly we find this a little peculiar, given the 
rather original and sophisticated analysis with which Preobrazhen- 
sky derived this relationship in VKA 17. See "Ekonomicheskie Za- 
metki III, " op cit, pp. 78-9. 
14. See From NEP To Socialism, pp. 56-7 for this specific reference, and 
Lectures Six and Nine (chapters two and five) for Preobrazhensky's 
quite interesting discussion of how the state could use the credit 
and banking system to influence the development of agriculture in 
particular, desired directions. 
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PART III 
THE EXPANDED REPRODUCTION OF FIXED CAPITAL 
CHAPTER 6 
RESERVES UNDER EXPANDED REPRODUCTION 
We have reached a point in our analysis where we must break some 
new ground. We have, on the one hand, examined the constraints that 
the material composition of production places upon the laws of simple 
reproduction. Further, we have studied the means by which expanded re- 
production takes place in an economy of capitalist and petty bourgeois 
producers, confining ourselves in the latter instance to a purely value 
analysis. We now must drop this condition. We must try and discover 
how, in addition to the values of the various components of society's 
productive capital, their material proportions are reproduced under ex- 
panded reproduction. For this we will have to modify both tracks of our 
analysis up to now. First, we must apply our analysis of the material 
bases of reproduction to the capitalist economy as it really exists, 
i. e., as an economy that accumulates surplus value for the purpose of 
creating more surplus value. Second, we will have to complicate our 
analysis of concrete capitalism by abandoning the assumption that equil- 
ibrium can be satisfied simply by the exchange of commodities on the 
basis of their values. Exchange must also satisfy the particular mater- 
ial needs of each department, both in terms of the means of production 
they require and the various types of means of consumption consumed by 
capitalists and workers. 
So far as we know, neither Preobrazhensky nor anyone else undertook 
or has undertaken this further concretization of the reproduction schemes. 
Fortunately, however, Preobrazhensky, in his book Zakat Kapitalizma, 
made a first step in this direction, when he modified the reproduction 
schemes to allow for the fact that fixed capital is not replaced in a 
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single year, but is amortized over a series of years. We have already 
dealt with this phenomenon under simple reproduction in Chapter 2. Pre- 
obrazhensky took up this question of fixed capital in a different con- 
text from what we will do. Although he was well aware that he was fol- 
lowing the immanent logic of his previous studies of the reproduction 
schemes in VKA 17,18, and 22,1 in Zakat Kapitalizma he was trying to 
explain the world capitalist crisis of that period, and so did not ex- 
tend his analysis either to the Soviet economy or to the regularities 
of expanded reproduction once we take its material composition into 
account. 
In this and the next three chapters we will start from Preobrazhen- 
sky's basic schemes in Zakat Kapitalizma and will show that, as soon as 
we make the further concretization that fixed capital is not replaced 
in one year, capitalism has a systematic under-accumulation of both the 
fixed and circulating portions of its constant capital. From there we 
will discuss how Marx treated this same problem, primarily in Volume II 
of Capital and in Theories of surplus value, and what solutions he sug- 
gested. 
2 We will see that Marx's solution is not adequate to solve an 
under-accumulation of constant capital that is chronic and recurring. 
Preobrazhensky had worked out the method for solving this problem in 
VKA 17, namely the systematic transfer of capital from department II to 
department I, form the branches of social production that produce means 
of consumption to those which produce means of production. We will con- 
clude Part III by showing how such a transfer takes place under so-cal- 
led "pure capitalism. " Later, in Part IV, when we analyze the goods 
famine in the Soviet Union, we will have cause to return to this analy- 
sis of fixed capital in order to see how it applies to the concrete cap- 
italism of capitalist and petty producers and the commodity-socialist 
economy of the Soviet Union during NEP. 
In the present chapter we will begin by taking another look at ex- 
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panded reproduction from the point of view of a simple value analysis; 
and we will see that even here, once we move from simple reproduction, 
the process of accumulation presupposes the existence of commodity re- 
serves, while accumulation itself has quite specific material prerequi- 
sites. We will conclude by taking up Preobrazhensky's treatment of the 
function of reserves under capitalism and their indispensable role in 
allowing the ongoing accumulation of fixed capital. 
I. The Material Bases of Expanded Reproduction 
Let us start with a scheme for expanded reproduction similar to 
that used by Marx and Preobrazhensky. 
I. 4000c + 1000v + 500s/x + 500s(a) = 6000 Total = 8250 II. 1500c + 375v + 187.5s/x + 187.5s(a) = 2250 
Here s/x equals the portion of surplus value that goes for capitalist 
consumption, and s(a) equals that part that goes towards accumulation. 
We note that the organic composition of capital is the same (four to 
one) in both departments, so that proportionality between IIc and I(v+s/x) 
will be maintained with expanded reproduction. 
With this scheme accumulation should proceed as follows: Depart- 
ment I will take 400 of its 500 accumulation fund for additional con- 
stant capital. These 400 already exist in their correct material form 
within the department. Department I will take the other 100 of its 
500s(a) for additional variable capital, either to hire more workers to 
set this new constant capital into motion or to raise the wages of those 
already employed to support an increase in the intensity of their labor. 
3 
As we know, these 100 exist as part of I's commodity-capital and, as 
means of production, are physically unsuitable for the personal consump- 
tion of the workers. I must therefore exchange them with department II 
for means of consumption. Likewise, department II will take 150 of its 
187.5s(a) for new constant capital; and it must exchange these with de- 
partment I, since they exist in the wrong natural form. This leaves 
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37.5 to increase II's variable capital, which it obtains in natura from 
its own product. The arrangement of the social capital for the begin- 
ning of the next production year is thus: 
I. 4400c + 1100v + 500s/x 
II. 1650c + 412. Sv + 187.5s/x 
Now, we notice immediately that department I has only 100 additional 
means of production to exchange with department II, while the latter 
requires new constant capital equal to 150. There is a deficit of 50 
in means of production throughout the economy. In order to make up this 
deficit we would have to wait until the end of the production year, when 
the new labor power department I had purchased would have created a sur- 
plus product, half of which the capitalists in department I would put 
towards their personal consumption. Then the social product would be: 
I. 4400c + 1100v + 550s/x + 550s(a) = 6600 Total = 9075 II. 1650c + 412.5v + 206.25s/x + 206.25s(a) = 2475 
Thus it is only at the end of the year's production, and after all ex- 
changes are made, that I(v+s/x) = IIc. This, however, creates a real 
problem. Department I has 100 in means of production which it can offer 
immediately to department II at the start of the production year. The 
other 50 are available only gradually, as they are produced. The new 
laborers in department I are constantly turning out products during the 
course of the year, of which an aliquot part, equal in value to 100, rep- 
resents a surplus product which the capitalists in part consume and in 
part devote to extending their production. Even if we assume that the 
production time of these means of production is relatively short, and 
that they appear on the market in a more or less steady flow, say, every 
month, department II will not have them when it needs them, i. e., at the 
start of the production year. It will not have all of them until right 
at the end of the year, when the last means of production produced by 
department I are finished and ready for sale. 
This difficulty arises from the different material needs of depart- 
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ments I and II and the fact that the production of the commodities the 
separate departments require does not temporally correspond. Depart- 
ment I requires an equivalent of its worn out or additional constant 
capital, i. e., a replacement for that part of its product that repre- 
sents past, embodied labor. These values, as use-values must already 
exist as the products of labor already expended. Department I, on the 
other hand, exchanges an equivalent of its revenue, of the part of its 
product that represents labor which is newly added in the course of the 
production year, and, therefore, at the beginning of the year has not 
yet been expended. Department I can exchange 100 in new variable capi- 
tal with department II because these come from already-produced surplus 
value, created during the year just ended. They are an advanced capi- 
tal-value whose equivalent will return to the capitalist in its original 
money form at the year's end and whose equivalent, as value, never leaves 
the capitalist's hands. But department I cannot offer the remaining 50 
to department II because the latter have still to be created. They rep- 
resent surplus value, the result of the labor process, the product of 
the self-expansion of this additional labor power that department I has 
just set into motion. And this self-expansion is a function of the lab- 
or currently employed, and will not exist as a use-value or as a commod- 
ity ready for exchange until that labor process is completed at the end 
of the year. Like the variable capital-equivalent the surplus value 
shows up in the commodity as value that is newly added. But it is not 
newly added value that replaces an advanced capital. The surplus value 
is not an equivalent for anything. It is value over and above what 
society possessed before, and as such it must be produced in the course 
of the current production year. 
It is clear that department II will need a reserve of at least 50 
in means of production to tide production over until I has produced the 
commodities it requires. This result was to be expected, when we recall 
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that Marx, in Chapter XV of Volume II of Capital, observed that any cap- 
italist must have an additional, reserve capital on hand to keep pro- 
duction going during the time his product is circulating. The circula- 
tion process includes not only the time it takes for the commodity-pro- 
duct of a particular capital to be realized on the market and converted 
into money, the stage C'-M', but it contains also the time it takes to 
convert this money back into the elements of productive capital, the 
stage M-C... P (means of production and labor power). If the commodities 
demanded are not available on the market circulation cannot be completed. 4 
This is precisely the case in our present scheme. Department II 
must expand its productive capital by 150, but can find only 100 of these 
on the market. On the one hand there must exist a reserve of constant 
capital in the economy, either as a supply that department II had al- 
ready acquired to maintain production while a portion of its commodity 
capital finishes its more protracted period of circulation; or as a 
commodity supply available on the market due to "excess" past production 
in department I. In either case a reserve or supply of means of produc- 
tion must exist over and above what department I has immediately on 
hand for exchange at the start of the year. 
On the other hand department II will have an unsold stock of means 
of consumption worth 50, which it must keep on hand until the capital- 
ists of department I have produced a surplus product equal to 50s/x and 
converted it into money. Once again, the material form of these commod- 
ities of department II is important. As means of consumption, they must 
be capable of being stored without damage or loss until department I 
can purchase them (we ignore credit here). They need not sit in stor- 
age an entire year, but will enter the market gradually, as department 
I's additional product, ds/x, is produced and sold. 
The specific size of this reserve of means of production will vary, 
depending upon how we assume wages are paid and how complex we presume 
-218- 
the circulation of I(v+s/x) in its exchange with an equivalent portion 
of IIc. We must not forget that the schemes are abstractions and can- 
not reveal the myriad of complexities of capitalist production and ex- 
change. The way we have currently constructed the scheme supposes that 
wages are paid in advance and that the initial value of the capitalists' 
consumption fund in department I is immediately spent for their person- 
al consumption. In reality we must keep in mind what Marx said in his 
discussion of circulation in Volume II of Capital: Portions of an in- 
dustrial capital will exist simultaneously in all spheres of the circuit 
--some as money capital (or as revenue), some as productive capital, 
some as commodity capital (products waiting on the market to be sold). 
Thus it is not wages that are advanced, but labor power; and it is not 
advanced for a year before it is paid, but for very short periods, one 
or two weeks. Taking our scheme as a whole, and not just the addition- 
al capital, the workers in I are paid their 1100 in wages gradually, 
over the course of the year. Similarly, the capitalists in department 
I will not consume all their revenue, their consumption fund at once, 
but will do so as they require this or that article of consumption. 
But this does not alter the problem in any way. At the start of the 
new production year department I will have means of production, already 
produced and available for exchange, worth 1600 and no more. We could 
assume that department II advances the money to purchase this 1600, 
which it will have on hand as a result of having sold all of last year's 
product to sustain the capitalists and workers of I in that year. Or 
we could even assume that department II purchases these 1600 on credit, 
although it is in no way necessary to complicate our analysis to that 
extent. In either case, the capitalists in I would have 1600 in money 
which they will pay out in wages (1100) or use for their personal con- 
sumption (500) during the year. Eventually they will have a capital- 
value of another 50, equal to part of the additional surplus value I's 
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new workers will create during this year (the part that will go for cap- 
italist consumption). Conversely, department II will throughout the 
year have a capital-value of 1650 Ilc. Part of it may exist as newly 
produced means of consumption that II's capitalists are holding as com- 
modities to be exchanged gradually for new means of production, as they 
need them; another part (perhaps the larger part, depending on the tech- 
nical structure of II's productive capital) will exist as means of pro- 
duction that II purchased at the beginning of the year, and whose value 
is perpetually being transferred to the commodities department II is 
currently producing. But a final part, equal to 50, must necessarily 
exist as an unsold stock of commodities, as commodity capital, whose 
realization is essential if department II is to accumulate its entire 
increment of 150 new constant capital. These last 50 department II will 
exchange against the newly produced s/x of department I, as it appears 
on the market. 
We see that no matter how we assume exchange takes place, a reserve 
of constant capital equal to at least 50 must exist. The reserve stock 
may be larger, depending on how slowly or rapidly II's commodity capi- 
tal circulates, or how large or small department I's purchases are and 
. 
how often it makes them. But the initial problem remains. No matter 
how we construct these transactions, they cannot provide department II 
with the 50 means of production which department I has not yet produced. 
These must exist as a reserve, either in the possession of department 
II due to a previous purchase, or available on the market as a result 
of prior "over-production" in department I. 
In Chapter 2 we saw how Marx concluded that reserves of both fix- 
ed and circulating constant capital and of means of subsistence for 
additional labor power were necessary even under simple reproduction, 
once we take the gradual depreciation and replacement of fixed capital 
into account. What we have shown is that even ignoring this condition, 
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and assuming that the entire constant capital turns over in one year, 
these reserves are a necessary precondition of accumulation and expand- 
ed reproduction. This arises from the distinct use forms of the pro- 
ducts of departments I and II which must exchange against each other, 
and the fact that they are reproduced differently in time. This in 
turn comes from the different manner in which value is transferred or 
added to the particular commodities. The product in which lie is em- 
bodied exists in a use form of means of consumption. In this form it 
can function as revenue, as the material form of the newly added labor 
expended in department I. But its value is that of II's constant cap- 
ital, a replacement for labor performed sometime in the past. The pro- 
duct containing I(v+s/x) has the use form of means of production that 
will go to replace constant capital used up in department II; but in 
value terms it exists as newly added labor, part of which (100) will 
go not to restore labor power already incorporated in the labor process, 
but to purchase new labor power which has not yet been expended and 
has not produced a surplus product. As Marx says, "it is an exchange 
of... this year's working day for... a working day spent before this 
year, an exchange of this year's labor-time for last year's. "5 In our 
, example we 
have values that must be replaced (a part of II's addition- 
al c) to be exchanged against those that must still be created (a por- 
tion of next year's Is/x). And by the very nature of accumulation and 
the self-expansion of capital-value the values of this year's labor and 
last year's are not equal. They cannot be equally exchanged. For one 
of them does not yet represent labor materialized as use values. 
Thus the different material form of the social product and the 
fact that the reproduction of its various components does not corres- 
pond in time, create a potential barrier to expanded reproduction even 
under the simplest of assumptions. The very act of accumulation brings 
with it a shortage of means of production, which stifles the reproduc- 
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tion process unless adequate reserves of means of production already 
exist as the result of past production. As we will take up in the next 
section, when we discuss Preobrazhensky's theory of capitalist crisis 
and the reproduction of fixed capital, it is the existence of these re- 
serves that gives capitalism, or any advanced system of social produc- 
tion, much of the flexibility it requires to avoid disproportionalities, 
crises, and economic stagnation. 
II. Preobrazhensky's Treatment of the Problem 
Zakat Kapitalizma was Preobrazhensky's attempt to set down a theory 
of the capitalist crisis of 1929. Written in 1931, it is very much a 
"Third Period" piece, especially in the sections dealing with the USSR 
and the class struggle in Europe. Nevertheless, it is still an impor- 
tant work--we might say even remarkable, given the time and circumstan- 
ces under which it was written. For the most important thing about 
the book is the fact that it continues the theoretical lines of the 
VKA articles written at the high point of the intra-party struggles of 
the twenties. Preobrazhensky makes no bones about this. He cites 
these articles as background material for his argument and makes it 
otherwise clear that he considers VKA 17 and 18 and zakat Kapitalizma 
as part of a unified work. It is a sign of the times that he does not 
refer to the article "Economic Equilibrium in the System of the USSR, " 
published in VKA 22, or to any of his previous writings on the Soviet 
Union per se. Yet all of the VKA articles were written as part of The 
New Economics, and Preobrazhensky had expressly stated that VKA 17 and 
18 were to serve as part of the theoretical foundation of VKA 22 and 
subsequent studies on the USSR. Preobrazhensky must have known what 
he was doing when he published the book. It should not surprise us 
that the Party hacks attacked it almost immediately. 
6 
Preobrazhensky employed the reproduction schemes to illustrate how 
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the longer turnover period of fixed, as opposed to circulating capital, 
combined with the relatively long gestation period of investments in 
means of production that tend to serve as fixed capital, would affect 
the process of expanded reproduction and could serve as a partial ex- 
planation of crises. The main thrust of this argument lies outside the 
scope of our study, and so our interest in his use of the reproduction 
schemes is somewhat different. Our question is this: How will the 
material proportionality of simple reproduction reproduce itself under 
expanding reproduction? If the material components of expanding repro- 
duction exist in the right proportions at any one time in the economy, 
will this proportionality be maintained during the process of accumula- 
tion? Or will each new production period bring with it an imbalance, 
either in the overall exchange between I(v+s/x) and IIc, or in the ma- 
terial composition of the social product (e. g., between the necessary 
proportions of fixed and circulating capital)? 
To answer this question we need first of all to find the appropri- 
ate way to express it in the reproduction schemes. If we were to 
plunge straight into the analysis of concrete capitalism, or the com- 
modity-socialist economy of the Soviet Union we would have to begin 
with the fact that the various elements of material production are re- 
produced in different ways. Production in K and P (to take our schemes 
from Part II) is carried out by different modes of production, with 
their own characteristic technical structures and their own specific 
means of applying labor power to their social stock of implements of 
labor. Within the capitalist sector alone, fixed capital, the circula- 
ting portion of constant capital, means of subsistence, luxury articles, 
etc., all vary in the technique used to produce them, in their time of 
production, and in their time of circulation. Any reproduction schemes 
we might construct would have to embody all of these additional factors. 
As we know Preobrazhensky was concerned with very much the same 
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problem. In all of the VKA articles he cautioned that his analysis up 
to that point was conditional, being based largely on a value analysis 
of reproduction, and could only form the basis of a more concrete anal- 
ysis later on, when the material composition of the elements of repro- 
duction would be taken into account. He began to carry out that study 
in VKA 22, but never completed it. He took it up again in zakat Kapi- 
talizma. There, as we have mentioned, his starting point was the fact 
that fixed capital is not reproduced and renewed only in one year, but 
a)takes several years to produce and b)when added to the stock of fix- 
ed capital, does not wear out in one year, but over a period of years. 
The schemes he constructed to demonstrate this characteristic of expand- 
ed reproduction contain within them the basis for solving our own prob- 
lem. Preobrazhensky did not use them as we will, because he was con- 
ducting a different type of investigation. We want to develop a scheme 
that will eventually permit us to go beyond Preobrazhensky's analysis 
of the Soviet economy as he was compelled to leave it in 1928. By 1931 
this subject was obviously taboo. It was enough that he should attempt 
to continue the work he had begun as a member of the Left Opposition 
and to apply it to such a seemingly non-controversial matter as the na- 
ture of the capitalist crisis, for the ruling bureaucracy to go on the 
attack once more. We have no way to know if Preobrazhensky was aware 
of the implications of what he did in Zakat Kapitalizma, and we see no 
value in speculating one way or the other. By way of anticipation we 
will only say here that our own analysis, which utilizes Preobrazhen- 
sky's schemes in a rather different way than he did himself, leads us 
to conclusions that validate both the method he employed in the 1926- 
27 articles and the specific arguments he put forward at that time.? 
There are several passages in Zakat Kapitalizma where Preobrazhen- 
sky detailed the successive concretizations he wanted to make in Marx's 
original schemes of expanded reproduction. We could cite any one of 
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them, but perhaps the most concise is the following: 
As a consequence of the incompleteness of his work, Marx's theory 
of crises and of reproduction must be developed and elaborated as 
regards approximating the analysis to the conditions of real cap- 
italism. First of all, this approximation must denote the estab- 
lishment of the characteristic features of the reproduction pro- 
cess in the epoch of classical capitalism and in the epoch of mon- 
opoly. A further concretization must consist of elucidating the 
problem of fixed capital, of reserves of fixed and circulating 
capital, changes in the organic composition of capital, in bring- 
ing the periphery of petty, pre-capitalist production into the in- 
vestigation, of changes in the conditions under which labor power 
is sold, etc. The premise of the investigation must be world, 
and not national economy. The investigation must proceed from an 
account of the working of the law of uneven capitalist development 
and, consequently, of uneven capitalist decay. From there it is 
necessary to elaborate not only a theory of simple and expanded 
reproduction, but also a theory of declining reproduction, which 
must elucidate the conditions of reproduction in countries in eco- 
nomic decline. The investigation must proceed from the deforma- 
tion of the law of value, of the intertwining of monopolist ten- 
dencies with those of free competition, and must trace out the in- 
fluence of these important changes on the general conditions of 
expanded reproduction and of crises in the epoch of imperialism. 
The investigation cannot proceed from the silent premise of capi- 
talism's internal tendencies towards expansion and its ability for 
that expansion, but must analyze the causes of the progressive 
slowing down of economic development, thus inevitably abandoning 
the region of pure economic analysis. Finally, the investigation 
must trace out the influence that the existence of the USSR exerts 
on the process of capitalist reproduction. 8 
Of this list, the only one that Preobrazhensky had not already written 
about and incorporated into his work in one fashion or another, is the 
problem of fixed and circulating capital. Virtually every other aspect 
of the concrete analysis of capitalism he proposes in this passage he 
had already anticipated or dealt with extensiviely in the 1920's. Fur- 
thermore, in our own analysis of the problem we will see that to solve 
it we must retain nearly all of these concretizations. 
Preobrazhensky starts off with the following scheme: 
Department I: 10,000 stock of fixed capital (2000 in reserve) 
4000(1000f + 3000c)c + 1000v + 500s/x + 500s(a) 
Department II: 3750 stock of fixed capital (750 in reserve) 
1500(375f + 1125c)c + 375v + 187.5s/x + 187.5s(a) 
Production in I= 6000; production in II = 2250; total = 8250 
This scheme shows the following: Department I has a supply of fixed 
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capital equal to 10,000, of which 2000 is a reserve fund. Of this 
stock, the average depreciation of the total stock is 10% per year. 
9 
The circulating portion of the constant capital is 3000, and this--by 
the nature of circulating capital--is reproduced in the annual product 
each year. We have designated the portion of the fixed capital whose 
value enters as wear and tear into that of the annual product by the 
subscript, f [or, alternatively, by c(f)], and the value of the circula- 
ting portion of constant capital by the subscript, c [or by c(c)]. 
In exactly the same way department II has a fixed capital supply 
of 3750, of which one fifth (20%) is held in reserve. The rate of de- 
preciation on its fixed capital is the same as in department I, 10 per 
cent per year. II's circulating constant capital equals 1125. 
So far there is nothing in this scheme that we have not already 
encountered. The overall proportions in and between the two departments 
are ones we have used before. Total production in department I is two 
and two-thirds that of department II. They have the same organic com- 
position of capital (four to one), so that expanded reproduction would 
proceed smoothly and without revealing any disproportionalities. This 
much is identical to the scheme we presented in the first section of 
this chapter. Its mechanics involve nothing new. Nor is there any- 
thing exceptional about the breakdown of the constant capital in each 
department between its fixed and circulating components. This, too, we 
have seen before in Chapter 2. What is more, the technical structure 
of both departments is identical in this regard: They have the same 
rate of depreciation of their fixed capital, and the proportion between 
the total stock of fixed to circulating constant capital is 10: 3 in 
both cases. In terms of the values of the fixed and circulating parts 
of the constant capital that show up in the annual product, these, too, 
are equal in the two departments, the ratio of used up fixed capital to 
circulating constant capital being three to one. Therefore, both in 
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terms of the basic exchange of values between the two departments and 
in terms of their technical proportions of production, there is nothing 
in this scheme to suggest any basic sources of disproportionality. 
The one crucial difference is that the 4000c in department I and 
the 1500c in department II no longer represent the total value of means 
of production in the two departments. Ic and IIc each contain a fixed 
capital component whose value is equal to that of one years wear and 
tear, 10 per cent, of their total stocks of fixed capital. 
The problem Preobrazhensky is concerned with is this. Suppose 
society somehow increases its orders for fixed capital by 1500. How 
will department I, which is the only department that produces means of 
production, fill this new demand? The answer, Preobrazhensky wants to 
show, will be different depending upon whether we are looking at capi- 
talism during the period of free competition or in the epoch of imper- 
ialism and monopoly capitalism. Dealing first with classical capital- 
ism, where free competition dominates, Preobrazhensky notes that this 
new demand for 1500 in fixed capital is greater than the combined re- 
placement fund for fixed capital in the two departments. The fixed 
part of Ic is 1000, that of IIc is 375, making a total of 1375. Sup- 
pose we devoted all of the accumulation fund in both departments to 
increasing constant capital. This would not even make a dent; it would 
be insignificant in comparison to what is needed. In department I, 
s(a) equals 500. If all of this went to augment Ic, given the techni- 
cal proportions between fixed and circulating capital, only 125 would 
represent fixed capital; the other 375 would have to go to increase the 
circulating portion of Ic. In department II, s(a) equals 187.5, of 
which (presuming all of it is devoted to increasing IIc) only 25%, or 
about 46.9, could go towards new fixed capital. At this rate, it would 
take an inordinately long time, somewhere in the vicinity of eight or 
nine years, for society to increase its stock of fixed capital by the 
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required amount. But this type of "solution" goes against the very 
premise of the problem. These new orders for fixed capital arose be- 
cause the state of the market and the material bases of past accumula- 
tion gave the capitalists who made these orders reason to believe they 
were necessary to their continued production. They will have geared 
all other production plans to the assumption that these orders could 
be filled. If not, we will have a period of stagnation, or even a deep 
crisis. 
But there is another aspect to the problem that Preobrazhensky 
does not mention, and that is the use form of the products of depart- 
ments I and II. If we look at our original scheme, which we took almost 
directly from Preobrazhensky, we see that we broke down the constant 
capital in each department according to its fixed and circulating por- 
tions. If we then examine the material form of department I's exchange 
fund, I(v+s/x), it will consist of 375 means of production that will 
function as fixed capital and 1125 means of production that will func- 
tion as circulating constant capital. The ratio of fixed to circulat- 
ing capital in the final product is the same as that in the value of 
the original constant capital that was used to create it. This is not 
because of the value composition of I's constant capital. The use form 
of I's product in no way depends upon the value of the various instru- 
ments of labor, raw materials, intermediate products, etc., that went 
into its production. If a particular capitalist makes heavy machinery, 
the bulk of the value of his product might consist of the value of the 
iron ore that some other capitalist had used to make the steel he had 
used in building his machines. In that case the greater part of the 
value of the machines would be made up of the value of a raw material 
that (in the form of an intermediary good) our capitalist had incorpor- 
ated into his commodity-product. This capitalist's entire output will 
consist of machines that will serve as fixed capital, either for other 
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capitalists in the same department or for capitalists in department II. 
Yet the largest single value component will be that added by raw mater- 
ials, i. e., circulating constant capital. The depreciation of his own 
machinery, or even the wages and surplus value that show up in the val- 
ue of the final product may well prove insignificant by comparison. 
The reason I(v+s/x) exists in the material form of one quarter 
fixed capital the three quarters circulating constant capital is be- 
cause this and only this combination meets the technical needs of de- 
partment II. It is a coincidence, or rather an artifact of the figures 
Preobrazhensky chose for his scheme, that the ratio of fixed to circu- 
lating capital in the value of Ic is the same as the respective values 
of the means of production that make up the commodity-product I(v+s/x) 
and which will function as fixed and circulating capital once they are 
sold and enter into some individual capitalist's productive capital. 
Given this fact, Is(a) must also exist materially as 25% fixed and 
75% circulating constant capital. Only this would meet the technical 
demands of both departments, who each require use values from this part 
of the commodity-product. If we accumulated the 500 Is(a), 400 would 
go to increase Ic. Of this, one fourth would have to consist of fixed 
capital and three fourths of circulating capital. Similarly, in order 
for the 100 that went to increase Iv to be exchanged with department II 
for means of subsistence for I's new workers, it would have to meet the 
precise technical requirements of department II, i. e., 25% fixed capi- 
tal, and 75% circulating constant capital, 
10 
As for department II, its accumulated part of surplus value repre- 
sents no net increase to the social stock of fixed capital whatsoever. 
If 25% of this accumulation fund went to increase the supply of fixed 
capital, this would not be in natura. This would only represent a com- 
modity supply of 46.9 in means of consumption that could be exchanged 
against means of production that department I had already produced. 
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From this we conclude that the only addition to the supply of fixed 
capital possible under these conditions is the 125 taken by devoting 
the entire accumulation fund of department I to increase Ic. These 125 
are the only means of production capable of functioning in a future pro- 
cess of production as fixed capital. Society has produced no others. 
The best that could occur would be if department II were to "loan" this 
46.9 in means of consumption to department I so that the latter could 
take on the new workers it needs to set the additional Ic in motion and 
thereby produce an increased quantity of fixed capital in the future. 
There is simply no way, however, that department II could exchange this 
46.9 in additional IIc(f) for elements of fixed capital at the present 
time. So long as we assume (as we did above) that, in order to meet 
the new demand for fixed capital, department I devotes its entire fund 
of accumulation to increase its own constant capital, no new means of 
production will be on hand for exchange with department II. 
Once we examine the material form of the surplus product of both 
departments we see that the available additions to fixed capital do not 
amount to the 125 coming from Is(a) plus the 46.9 coming from IIs(a), 
but simply to the 125 in department I. The 46.9 in department II can 
only help I obtain the new labor power it would need if it added 500 
to its constant capital. The amount of time it would take to boost I's 
output of fixed capital via such slow accretions to its productive cap- 
ital would be even longer than we first believed. 
The only way society can overcome this obstacle is to employ its 
existing reserves of fixed and circulating capital (including both the 
constant and variable parts of the latter). Presuming free competition 
this will eventually call forth the new construction of enterprises that 
produce fixed capital and, following this, the new construction of 
those that produce circulating capital as well. This way all of Is(a) 
can go to increase Iv. We only have to suppose that these reserves do 
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not exist to see how essential they are to solving the problem. First, 
if Iv goes up by 500, then I(v+s/x) rises by the same amount (we assume 
that production has not yet been carried out, i. e., that this addition- 
al 500 Iv has not yet produced any surplus value). Department I can 
only acquire these extra 500 wage goods by exchanging means of produc- 
tion for 500 newly-created means of consumption in IIc. Here is the 
first impediment. IIc's entire accumulation fund equals only 187.5. 
Department I will be short of some 312.5 in means of subsistence for 
its workers. 
The second problem is more basic. If all the technical propor- 
tions of production remain unchanged in our economy, any increase in 
Iv by 500 will necessarily call forth a 50% rise in Ic, from 4000 to 
6000. The only way this would not be true would be if the productivity 
of labor were to fall, which is unrealistic unless we assume a crisis 
or a period immediately leading up to one. If the productivity of lab- 
or stays the same (as we have presumed) or rises (which is its natural 
historical tendency), Ic will have to go up by at least 50%. Now, 
if we also assume--and we have no reason not to--that the ratio of fix- 
ed to circulating constant capital does not change, Ic(f) and Ic(c) 
will each have to rise by 50%. The new Ic of 6000 will consist of 1500 
Ic(f) and 4500 Ic(c). 
We must remember, however, that a rise in Ic(f) by 500 does not 
represent the total addition to fixed capital that is needed. This 500 
is nothing more than the value that is transferred to the product of 
department I, that is, it is the depreciated part of a larger stock of 
fixed capital. Here, too, we are bound by the technical composition we 
assumed at the start. For 500 additional Ic(f) to enter into the value 
of I's product, I must add ten times that, or 5000, to its total stock 
of fixed capital. Hence, this stock must also rise by 50%, from 10,000 
to 15,000. 
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We started out from society's need for 1500 additional fixed capi- 
tal, an amount equal to its total initial output of these types of 
means of production. Once we drop the simplifying assumption that all 
of the fixed capital is turned over in one year and is totally replaced 
in that time, any addition to society's output of fixed capital requires 
the prior construction of those means of production that will create 
it, and whose value is many times that of the final product. Simply to 
add 500 to the fixed capital replacement fund of department I necessi- 
tates the previous construction of 5000 fixed capital which will go to 
produce it. This is economically impossible. In real terms this would 
mean withdrawing huge resources from society to build the plant and 
equipment that would eventually produce this new fixed capital as part 
of its annual product. And this plant and equipment themselves need 
labor power and circulating constant capital with which to produce 
their fixed capital product. This is a one-way withdrawal of values 
from society, a withdrawal that will give no new values back to the 
economy for the entire period of construction of this new plant and 
equipment. 
ll 
What would such an expansion in department I mean for department 
II? Hypothetically, at least, I would look like this: 
1.15,000 fixed capital: 
6000(1500f + 4500c)c + 1500v + 750s/x + 750s(a) = 900012 
I(v+s/x) equals 2250. Therefore IIc must rise by the same amount, from 
1500 to 2250. This would break down into 562.5 fixed capital and 1687.5 
circulating constant capital, or a 50% increase throughout IIc. Such 
a rise in IIc(f), as in department I, can only take place if II Is stock 
of fixed capital grows in the same proportion, from 3750 to 5625, which 
is again economically impossible. 13 
Preobrazhensky's general conclusion--following Marx--is that soci- 
ety can only meet such demands for rapid expansion of its industrial 
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base if the system possesses ample reserves of all forms of productive 
capital: Unused plant and equipment, stocks of raw materials and sec- 
condary products, supplies of means of consumption, and a surplus popu- 
lation to satisfy the increased demand for labor power. 
14 If we look 
once more at our original scheme on p. 224, we will recall that each 
department held one fifth of its stock of fixed capital in reserve. 
It is these reserves that will now be tapped by society in order to 
meet its new need for fixed capital. If this happens, our scheme will 
be: 
I. 10,000 fixed capital: 
6000(1500f + 4500c)c + 1500v + 750s/x + 750s(a) = 9000 
II. 3750 fixed capital: 
2250(562.5f + 1687.5c)c + 562.5v + 562.5s = 3375 
Total production = 12,375 
The portion of department I's output that will exist in natura as means 
of production suitable for functioning as fixed capital will equal 1500 
Ic(f) + 375 Iv(f) + 375 Is(f) = 2250. Previously the aliquot of I's 
product that represented fixed capital was 1000 Ic(f) + 250 Iv(f) + 250 
Is(f) = 1500. Half of the new demand for fixed capital has been satis- 
fied. Preobrazhensky states that by devoting a substantial part of the 
new accumulation fund of department I to increase Iv, and by further re- 
lying on reserves of fixed capital to augment Ic on the appropriate 
scale, society can fulfill its original order of 1500 additional fixed 
capital during the second year of this "boom. " 
This, however, does not exhaust the problem. We note that the 
quantity of circulating constant capital also had to increase by one 
half in both departments. Similarly, II's reserves of fixed capital 
cannot materially satisfy I's demand for additional means of consump- 
tion (the latter equalled 500, while the most II could have provided 
would have been its whole accumulation fund, or 187.5). Thus society 
must also have on hand commodity supplies of raw materials and means of 
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consumption of sufficient size that they can enter into production 
along with the reserves of fixed capital. 
One source of these reserves would be for department II to issue a 
"loan" of fixed capital to department I out of its amortization fund. 
Here department II would accumulate the share of its s(a) that goes to 
constant capital only as a money hoard. That is, it would sell means 
of consumption to department I, but would make no corresponding purchas- 
es of fixed and circulating constýat capital except for what it abso- 
lutely needed to replace unserviceable machines and to restore depleted 
stocks of raw materials, so as to keep production going at the old lev- 
el. In this way department I could take the means of production in- 
tended for sale to department II and use them to expand its own produc- 
tion. In short, it would add to its own accumulation fund an equival- 
ent of that of department II (excluding what II would have to add to 
IIv), and these would now exist in the appropriate material form. This 
constitutes just such a de facto "loan" of fixed capital from depart- 
ment II to department I as we mentioned on p. 229. 
For the moment let us proceed with Preobrazhensky's analysis of 
how monopoly capitalism will satisfy this same demand for new fixed 
capital. He has altered the reproduction scheme to reflect the differ- 
ent technical makeup of an advanced capitalist economy: It has a great- 
er share of its total capital existing as fixed capital, and a larger 
portion of these lying idle as reserves. 
1.20,000 fixed capital (35% in reserve): 
6000(2000f + 4000c)c + 1200v + 1200s = 8400 
II. 6000 fixed capital (35% in reserve): 
1800(600f + 1200c)c + 360v + 360s = 2520 
Total production = 10,920 
Preobrazhensky has also changed the relationship between fixed and cir- 
culating capital (one to two) and the organic composition of capital 
(five to one) in line with the historical tendency for society to in- 
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crease the specific weight of fixed capital in its total product. We 
will see that this makes it far easier for society to meet any extra- 
ordinary demand for new fixed capital with its already existing resour- 
ces and without calling for the new construction of plant and equip- 
ment. Although we will not deal with it in this context, Preobrazehsky 
uses this to subsequently demonstrate how monopoly capitalism is prone 
to prolonged periods of economic stagnation. 1S 
As before, let us suppose that society increases its demand for 
fixed capital by 1500. Instead of devoting all of Is(a) to raising 
Iv, we need now put only one half of it, or 300, to that purpose. Iv 
will now equal 1500, as in our first example. Only now this calls for 
a 25% rise in Ic, and not the 50% of before. Ic will equal 7500, of 
which 2500 is fix, i1 and 5000 circulating capital. Of the 1000 increase 
in Ic(c), we can cover 300 of it with the remaining 300 Is(a). This 
leaves only 700 to be covered from I's reserves of circulating constant 
capital. The 500 additional fixed capital, lc(f) comes from the in- 
creased amortization of fixed capital. This gives department I as: 
1.20,000 fixed capital: 
7500(2500f + 5000c)c + 1500v + 750s/x + 750s(a) = 10,500 
The new exchange fund, I(v+s/x) now equals 2250. 
This will, as before, necessitate a corresponding increase in IIc 
of 450, from 1800 to 2250, i. e., 25%. Thus, department II will expand 
its productive capital by 25% all the way around: 
II. 6000 fixed capital: 
2250(750f + 1500c)c + 450v + 450s = 3150 
Of II's accumulation fund of 180 only half, or 90, need go to increase 
IIv. The other 90 can go to help cover II's increased demand for 300 
IIc(c). Only 210 have to come out of previous reserves; the increase 
in fixed capital of 150, as in department I, can come from accelerated 
amortization of the existing fixed capital stock. 
How much of the social demand for 1500 new fixed capital do we 
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satisfy in this way? Before, the part of department l's product that 
consisted in natura as fixed capital was 2000 Ic(f) + 400 Iv(f) + 400 
Is(f) = 2800. Now it is 2500 Ic(f) + 500 Iv(f) + 500 Is(f) = 3500. 
Department I has covered 700 of the 1500, not quite as much as under 
free competition. But this difference is insignificant compared to the 
relative ease with which society accomplished this expansion of its 
fixed capital output. First, only half of the accumulation fund had to 
go to increase the variable capital in both departments. This left part 
of the accumulated surplus value available to increase the supply of cir- 
culating constant capital., Second, as a result of this, society had to 
tap a smaller quantity of its reserves of raw materials, auxiliary pro- 
ducts, and other forms of circulating constant capital. Third, the 
relatively smaller increase in v meant that the technical proportions 
of production could be maintained with a much smaller boost in the 
plant and equipment needed to produce the desired quantity of fixed 
capital. As this would still have been an unmanageable burden for 
society if this construction had to take place all at once, it filled 
this demand for fixed capital by increasing the amortization of its 
current stock of fixed capital. In addition, this "loan" from the am- 
ortization fund constituted a relatively smaller portion of the exist- 
ing stock, and placed a far lighter strain upon the economy's productive 
resources, than it did under free competition. 
a 
For all these reasons, we see that/more highly developed capital- 
ist economy, which possesses greater reserves of all forms of produc- 
tive capital can more easily satisfy any momentary increase in its de- 
mand for fixed capital, that this demand will mean a smaller withdrawal 
of means of production and labor power for the construction of new en- 
terprises, and that a lower share of existing reserves need be brought 
into production in the interim. In our present example, the new enter- 
prises will not so much boost society's output of additional fixed cap- 
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ital, as they will pay back the loans from the amortization funds of 
departments I and II. 
From the preceding example we see that reserves of fixed and cir- 
culating capital are absolutely necessary for the capitalist sys- 
tem; they give the capitalist economy the elasticity it needs in 
periods of rapid cyclical expansion of production. Without these 
reserves the existence of mass production for the market is impos- 
sible, as would be any sort of rapid expansion of the productive 
apparatus of the system. Unfortunately, in the Marxist literature 
that deals with the theory of capitalist reproduction, necessary 
attention is not given to this question. If Marx abstracted from 
this circumstance in the first stage of his analysis of the pro- 
cess of expanded reproduction, understanding full well its impor- 
tance for a theory of crisis, it in no way follows from this that 
Marxist thought must stop at that point where Marx's investigation 
was interrupted by his illness and death. Here is why, on the 
basis of schemes which ignore these reserves, the fact that fixed 
capital does not depreciate in the course of one year, the uneven 
renewal and increase of fixed capital, and finally, the influence 
that the unevenness of capitalist development exerts on reproduc- 
tion--here is why given schemes at such a level of abstraction and 
such a level of scholastic timidity and inability to go beyond 
Marx's interrupted investigation, it is impossible to understand 
the development either of a single capitalist cycle or of a single 
capitalist crisis. 16 
In reality such operations [the use of the amortization fund] take 
place all the time. Marx called this process the release of cap- 
ital. 17 In the given instance, it is a question of the release of 
a part of the fixed capital, which takes on the form of money cap- 
ital and again takes on a fixed material form, when the amortiza- 
tion fund is employed for orders of new fixed capital. The abil- 
ity to manoeuver the amortization fund of fixed capital is in gen- 
eral a very important spring in the system of capitalist reproduc- 
tion, increasing its elasticity in periods of cyclical boom-18 
Preobrazhensky argues in Zakat Kapitalizma that the existence and use 
of the reserve fund becomes, under capitalism, a source of crises and 
stagnation. Under free competition the rush to build new enterprises 
that will turn out an increased volume of fixed capital when the latter 
is in short supply turns into its opposite. The shortage is covered 
out of existing reserves, and the construction of new plant and equip- 
ment leads to an eventual over-production of means of production. 
Prices fall and crisis ensues. But each crisis, as Marx had already 
noted, 19 brought with it not a return to the old level of production 
but a process of recovery on a higher and broader technical plain than 
before. The tendency was towards greater extension and improvement of 
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the social stock of means of production, especially of fixed capital. 
20 
With the growth and expansion of the productive forces, and with 
the advent of the age of imperialism, such cycles of boom and crisis no 
longer act as a stimulous to further economic growth. The great capi- 
talist trusts will, Preobrazhensky argues, meet any cutback in demand 
not by cutting prices and engaging in competitive wars of the strong 
capitals against the weak, but by cutting production. The technical 
basis for this is precisely those reserves that capitalism built up 
during previous cycles. We have seen that the larger these reserves 
the easier it is for capitalism to meet any new demand for increased 
output without constructing new enterprises or expanding its productive 
capacity. Excess capacity is brought into operation, unemployed 
workers are called back into production, existing stocks of fixed and 
circulating capital necessitate smaller increases in new investment. 
And when this new investment does eventually lead to over-production 
the crisis will be one of economic stagnation and not the cycle of 
crash, restoration, and boom that characterized capitalism during the 
period of free competition. 
21 
This contradiction between the expanding technical foundations of 
capitalist production and the striving for surplus value formed the 
basis of Marx's theory of the falling rate of profit in Volume III of 
Capital. We have, on a number of occasions, referred to the contradic- 
tion between the need for adequate capital reserves in order to main- 
tain material proportionality, and the existence of these reserves as 
a source of crises of over-production. 22 In zakat Kapitalizma Preobra- 
zhensky began to examine the regularities and the logic behind this pro- 
cess and to adapt his analysis to the specific historical characteris- 
tics of capitalism. But in attempting to answer one set of questions 
he posed another, which for us is the most essential of all. In his 
use of the reproduction schemes his starting point is a one-time in- 
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crease in the demand for fixed capital. We must ask, however, where 
does this increased demand come from? 
23 Is it really momentary, or is 
it systematic, inherent in the process of accumulation? Behind this 
is the even more basic question: How is fixed capital accumulated? 
In trying to answer these questions we will find that Preobrazhen- 
sky had already worked out most of the basic analytical tools we need. 
This should not surprise us, for the fundamental dilemma facing the 
Soviet economy under NEP was how the country could accumulate fixed 
capital under the specific conditions of its backwardness and isolation. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 
1. For Preobrazhensky's account of how Zakat Kapitalizma formed part 
of the overall study he had undertaken of the Soviet and world 
capitalist economies and the book's particular relation to the ar- 
ticles published in the VKA, see Zakat Kapitalizma, pp. 53-56. 
2. Capital, II, pp. 175,181; Theories of Surplus Value, Part II 
(Moscow, 1968), pp. 470-91. 
3. We assume here, as throughout, that the rate of exploitation re- 
mains unchanged. 
4. Capital, II, Ch. VI, pp. 140-41; Ch. XIV, pp. 257-60; Ch. XV, pp. 
263, passim. 
S. ibid, p. 432. See above, Ch. 2, pp. 118-19 and pp. 137-38, Note 3. 
6. We have already noted the relation between the VKA articles and 
Zakat Kapitalizma, as well as Preobrazhensky's general plan for 
subsequent volumes of The New Economics (see above, pp. 2-3). For 
the attack upon the book, see Grigorii Konstinovich Roginsky, ed., 
Zakat Kapitalizma v Trotskistkom Zerkale: 0 Knige E. Preobrazhen- 
skogo Zakat Kapitalizma (The Decline of Capitalism in the Trotsky- 
ist mirror: On E. Preobrazhensky's Book, The Decline of Capital- 
ism), op cit. 
7. We do know of the draft of the article, "0 Metodologii Sostavleniya 
Genplana i Vtoroi Pyatiletki" ("On the Methodology of Drawing Up 
the General Plan and the Second Five-Year Plan"), submitted to 
Problemy Ekonomiki, but never published (see Introduction, Note 4). 
It seems inconceivable to us that Zakat Kapitalizma, with its ar- 
gument about the conditions of proportionality and the need for 
ample reserves in the accumulation of fixed capital, was not also 
an indirect statement about the plight of the Soviet economy and 
the industrialization drive being undertaken at the time. Certain- 
ly the bureaucracy understood the connection, for the draft of this 
article was attacked as being the explicit line behind the veiled 
argument in Zakat Kapitalizma (see Roginsky, op cit, pp. 52-58). 
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8. Zakat Kapitalizma, pp. 61-62. For similar passages see pp. 54, pas- 
sim, pp. 70-71, and 82-83. 
9. Marx, for instance, notes (Capital, II, pp. 245-46) that the active 
life of fixed capital includes the entire time in which it func- 
tions in the process of production, including waiting time and 
other periods when it may lie idle, and not just those periods 
when it is in motion. Thus it continues to depreciate, though 
perhaps less rapidly, even when it is not being specifically used 
(it is, of course, subject to moral depreciation, unavoidable ef- 
fects of age, rust, etc., as well as the wear and tear from dir- 
ect use), so that its life span is averaged over the whole produc- 
tion period (which, Marx stresses, is longer than the working 
period proper). 
10. In the next chapter we will see how it is necessary to modify this 
method of calculating accumulation in line with the assumption 
that fixed capital takes longer than one year to complete its 
turnover. 
11. Preobrazhensky only mentions this in passing (Zakat Kapitalizma, 
p. 68). It is a problem more immediately relevant to the Soviet 
economy, where the need for massive renewals of depleted fixed 
capital would have meant a sharp fall in current output, given the 
long gestation period of investments in heavy industry. Preobra- 
zhensky discussed this in some detail in VKA 22, and we will take 
this question up in Part IV, when dealing with his theory of ex- 
panded reproduction in the USSR. See also Capital, II, pp. 318-20. 
12. We should note that this only raises the supply of fixed capital 
by 750 [500 Ic(f) + 25% of the overall growth of I(v+s/x), or 250] 
--i. e., by only half of what is required. 
13. Zakat Kapitalizma, pp. 69-70. Preobrazhensky states that it is 
even more difficult for department II to meet this demand for new 
constant capital, due to the material composition of its product. 
While it is easier for II to put IIs(a) towards increasing IIv, 
given its material form of means of consumption, expansion of con- 
stant capital is thus harder: Not just because it lacks the sup- 
ply of fixed capital, but because its circulating capital is large- 
ly tied to agriculture, which in turn has certain definite natural 
limits to its expansion. 
14. Theories of Surplus Value, II, p. 477. 
15. For Marx's discussion of the historical tendency to increase the 
share of fixed capital in the total productive capital, see Capi- 
tal, III, pp. 260-62. 
16. Zakat Kapitalizma, pp. 70-71. 
17. Preobrazhensky's use of the term "release of capital" is incorrect. 
Marx used the term "released capital" to refer to the additional 
part of an industrial capital that is advanced during the period 
of circulation to tide production over while the initial commodity 
capital is circulating. He shows that if an initial capital is 
advanced for the production period extending, say, nine months, 
then an additional capital will be necessary to keep production 
going for the time of circulation (in Marx's example, three months). 
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This does not mean that a new capital is needed every year to main- 
tain the level of production; for once the first circulation per- 
iod is complete the original capital returns, only part of which 
is now needed to complete the nine-month production period (which 
had been initiated with the supplemental capital). Thus at the 
end of the second nine months there is an increment of the origi- 
nal capital left over, equal in magnitude to the supplemental cap- 
ital, and which can now be used to keep production going during the 
next period of circulation. The result is that with the end of 
every working period there is always left over, or "released" an 
amount of capital equal to the supplemental capital advanced in 
the first year. See Capital, II, Ch. XV). The fund to which Pre- 
obrazhensky refers was called by Marx the sinking fund. 
18. Zakat Kapitalizrna, p. 90. 
19. Capital, II, p. 174, pp. 188-89; Capital, III, p. 119. 
20. Zakat Kapitalizma, p. 20. 
21. ibid, pp. 62-65. 
22. Capital, II, p. 472. See also Chapter 2, above. 
23. Although the 1500 increased demand in fixed capital Preobrazhen- 
sky posited may seem arbitrary, it would not have been if we were 
talking about the Soviet Union. There vast quantities of fixed 
capital, destroyed during the war and Civil War, had to be res- 
tored all at once; in addition, the need for rapid industrializa- 
tion would have made this demand for new fixed capital even larger. 
In the unpublished article we have already mentioned (Note 7, 
above) it would appear that Preobrazhensky addressed exactly this 
point, and tried to show, as he had done in VKA 22, that such rap- 
id and massive accumulation of fixed capital was impossible in a 
country as backward as the Soviet Union. For further discussion 
of this point, see Part IV, below. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE ACCUMULATION OF FIXED CAPITAL 
I. The Accumulation of Fixed Capital and the Tendency Towards Under- 
Production of Means of Production 
In his analysis of the replacement of fixed capital Marx conclud- 
ed that the value of fixed capital replaced during any one year must 
equal that which is simply transferred to the annual product and whose 
equivalent is accumulated as a money hoard. In Preobrazhensky's scheme 
department II has a fixed capital stock of 3750. Each year ten per 
cent of its value, or 375, passes into that of the commodities it helps 
produce. This 375 circulates, along with the rest of the commodity 
capital, and returns to the capitalist with the sale of his commodities. 
In the circuit C'-M', 375 of the money the capitalist gets back with 
the sale of his commodities represents the annual wear and tear of his 
fixed capital. Now, all or part of this 375 may have been transferred 
by fixed capital (machines, buildings, etc. ) which do not need replace- 
ment at this time. In that case the capitalist will take this 375 and 
use it to replace that part of his fixed capital whose life span has 
ended in that particular year. But this is conditioned not only on 
his having enough money to replace his worn out machinery, etc., but 
upon fixed capital of the same value actually needing renewal. With 
simple reproduction our capitalists in department II will receive each 
year 375 in money as an equivalent for the ten per cent depreciation 
of their fixed capital. Conversely, ten per cent of their total stock 
of fixed capital will wear out and require replacement at the same 
time. If these two conditions do not balance one another, we will have 
either over-production in department I (where fewer than 375 need re- 
placement), or under-production (where more than 375 must be renewed). 
Marx derived this relationship--important enough in its own right 
--strictly on the basis of simple reproduction. In fact, to him this 
-242- 
constituted its great significance. 
This illustration of fixed capital, on the basis of an unchanged 
scale of reproduction, is striking. A disproportion of the produc- 
tion of fixed and circulating capital is one of the favorite ar- 
guments of the economists in explaining crises. That such a dis- 
proportion can and must arise even when the fixed capital is mere- 
ly preserved, that it can and must do so on the assumption of ideal 
normal production on the basis of simple reproduction of the al- 
ready functioning social capital is something new to them. ' 
This relationship cannot possibly hold true under expanded repro- 
duction. There department I must produce enough means of production 
not only to replace the worn out portion of society's fixed capital, 
but an additional increment, equivalent to the amount of new fixed cap- 
ital that is to be added to the social stock. It would seem even at 
first glance that this is bound to create a problem. The money depart- 
ment II receives as an equivalent for the depreciated part of its fix- 
ed capital whose value enters the annual product will quite obviously 
fall short of the amount of fixed capital it must purchase. It might 
be answered that this additional money comes from the sale of part of 
IIs(a) during the process of accumulation. This will be true only un- 
der the assumption that the entire fixed capital turns over and is re- 
newed in the course of one year. As soon as we drop this assumption, 
as Preobrazhensky did in zakat Kapitalizma, matters become much more 
complex. Each year a given quantity, f, is added to the stock of fix- 
ed capital. In the following year, however, not all of the value of 
f enters into the product, but only f/n, where n is the life span of 
fixed capital in years. In department I, on the other hand, all of 
(v+s/x) is reproduced every year. Under these circumstances, will not 
I(v+s/x) constantly outstrip IIc, since only a fraction of the accumu- 
lated part of surplus value that goes to augment His fixed capital 
will show up in next year's value of IIc? And if so, what will guar- 
antee that each year's new accumulation of fixed capital in department 
II will absorb this difference between I(v+s/x) and IIc and thereby 
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avert a tendency towards chronic over-accumulation in department I? 
To illustrate the problem, let us take Preobrazhensky's original 
scheme from zakat Kapitalizma and break it down into its material com- 
ponents. 
I. 10,000 fixed capital: 
4000(1000f + 3000c)c + 1000(250f + 750c)v + 
+ 500(125f + 37Sc)s/x + 500(125f + 37Sc)s(a) 
II. 3750 fixed capital: 
1500(375f + 1125c)c + 375v + 187.5s/x + 
+ 187. S(37.5f + 112.5 + 37.5v)s(a) c 
[We have not broken down IIv and IIs/x into (f) and (c), as they only 
exist as means of consumption and do not exchange with department I 
against any form of means of production. IIs(a) "breaks down" into 
(f) and (c) components only by way of designating what aliquots will go 
towards the various elements of productive capital when accumulated. ] 
If we add up all of the fixed capital components of I(v+s/x) we 
get 375, which balances the fixed capital part of IIc. The same with 
circulating constant capital, which equals 1125 in both the consumption 
fund of I and in IIc. 
If we ignore the fact that the fixed capital does not fully deprec- 
fate in one year accumulation would proceed in the following manner. 
In department I, 125 of its accumulated surplus value exists in the 
physical form of potential fixed capital. Of this, four-fifths, or 
100, go to increase the fixed capital portion of Ic. The other 25 go 
to increase Iv, although they naturally must be sold so that the capi- 
talists in I can reconvert these commodities into variable capital. 
As to the 375 which exist physically as circulating constant capital, 
four-fifths of this, or 300, go to augment Ic(c), and the other 75 go 
to increase Iv. Thus, after accumulation we have: 
I. 4400(1000f +3300c)c + 1100(275f + 825c)v + 500(125f + 375c)s/x 
And after the year's production: 
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I. 4400(1100f + 3300c)c + 1100(27Sf + 825ý)v + 
+ 550(137.5f + 412.5c)s/x + 550s(a) 
In department II accumulation proceeds in the very same way. If we 
view IIs(a) as existing as a value equivalent of a certain quantity of 
means of production and a sum of means of subsistence for the acquisition 
of new labor power, then, of the four-fifths of the total commodity- 
product that will go to purchase means of production, one quarter, or 
37.5, goes to increase IIc(f) and three quarters, or 112.5, will go to 
buy additional elements of IIc(c). The other one fifth of the product 
goes to increase IIv. 
II. 1650(412. Sf + 1237. Sc)c + 412. Sv + 187. Ss/x 
And after the year's production: 
II. 1650(412.5f + 1237.5c)c + 412.5v + 206.25s/x + 206.25s(a) 
We see that overall, I(v+s/x) = IIc. In addition, the internal 
proportions between fixed and circulating capital balance as well. De- 
partment I has 412.5 in means of production that will function as fixed 
capital to offer for sale to department II. Department II in turn 
needs precisely this amount of new fixed capital. To purchase it de- 
partment II has means of consumption worth 412.5 to exchange with de- 
partment I. As for the circulating constant capital, department I has 
means of production of this type worth 1237.5, which is exactly what 
department II requires. The latter also has this amount of means of 
consumption to exchange with department I. Everything is in order. 
Department I has obtained the right quantity of means of consumption 
needed to advance its variable capital for another year and for the 
personal consumption of its capitalists; and department II has received 
means of production in just the right physical proportions between 
fixed and circulating capital. 
We should be perfectly clear that, given the figures we have as- 
sumed, we were to able to maintain proportionality between all of the 
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material elements of expanded reproduction in the two departments for 
only one reason. They both have identical technical structures. The 
physical composition of I(v+s/x), as we have already noted, is deter- 
mined by department II's respective demand for fixed and circulating 
constant capital. If, say, department I had a ratio of fixed to cir- 
culating capital not of one to three, but of one to one, then of the 
400 Is(a) that went to increase Ic, not 100, but 200 would have had to 
go for fixed capital. But the technical proportions we have assumed 
would not allow this. Only 125 of Is(a) physically exist as fixed cap- 
ital. Quite clearly we would have to assume a different material com- 
position of I's commodity-product in order for accumulation to proceed 
smoothly in both departments. Is(a) would have to break down into 225 
fixed capital and 275 circulating capital. Otherwise it could not pro- 
vide both itself and department II (which must acquire some of its con- 
the 
stant capital in exchange against Iv) with/different types of means of 
production they each need. 
In reality this symmetry is just an accident of the figures we 
used for our scheme. There is no reason why the physical composition 
of I's product should in any way reflect the value composition of the 
means of production used to produce it. The only point to keep in mind 
is that the use form of I's product must reflect the combined demand 
of both departments for the two kinds of constant capital they require. 
We will have reason to return to this point later on. 
As soon as we abandon the simplifying assumption that all fixed 
capital turns over in one year this scheme is no longer valid. Depart- 
ment I took 400 of its accumulation fund to add to its constant capi- 
tal. Of this, 100 was for fixed capital. If fixed capital has an av- 
erage life of 10 years, as we have assumed in our example, then the 
entire 100 does not reappear in the value of the product in the follow- 
ing year, but only one tenth, or 10. To calculate the figures for 
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accumulation we would have to add the 100 to the total stock of fixed 
capital in department I. and recalculate the value of the constant cap- 
ital on that basis. In department II the 37.5 additional fixed capital 
will also go to increase II's stock of fixed capital, and only a value 
equivalent of 10 per cent, or 3.75, will pass into the value of IIc in 
the course of next year's production. If we alter our scheme accord- 
ingly we obtain this result (for the sake of simplicity we show only 
the final product, after both accumulation and production have been 
carried out): 
1.10,100 fixed capital: 
4310(1010f + 3300c)c + 1100(275f + 825c)v + 
+ SSO(137. Sf + 412.5c)s/x + 550s(a) 
II, 3787.5 fixed capital: 
1616.25(378.75f + 1237.5c)c + 412.5v + 206.25s. x + 206.25s(a) 
There is an apparent over-production in department I of 33.75, an over- 
production entirely of fixed capital. We say apparent, because it does 
not really exist. In terms of the value of the final product, I(v+s/x) 
exceeds IIc by this amount. But in terms of exchange between the two 
departments, there is no discrepancy at all. II still had to purchase 
37.5 in fixed capital from department I, and to do this it had to pro- 
duce and sell this amount of means of consumption. In the next year 
II will add 165 of its accumulation to its constant capital, of which 
41.25 will be for fixed capital, It will add this 41.25 to its stock 
of fixed capital, and only a value of 10 per cent (4.125) will enter 
into the value of II's product. Department I, whose accumulation fund 
equals 550, will put 110 of this to new variable capital. This 110 
will eventually give rise to a surplus value of the same amount, of 
which half, or 55, will be taken by Its capitalists for their individ- 
ual consumption. The increment, dI(v+s/x), will be 165, and a quarter 
of this (41.25) will exist in the material form appropriate to their 
use as fixed capital. 
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What we have is a new condition for expanded reproduction, which 
arises as soon as we allow for the fact that fixed capital is accumu- 
lated, but not fully replaced every year. I(v+s/x) will no longer 
equal IIc. It will equal IIc of the previous year plus the total addi- 
tion to II's means of production. Or, what is the same thing, it will 
equal IIc of the current year plus the value of the newly added fixed 
capital which still remains fixed outside the value of the individual 
commodities it was used to produce. In our example this will be 
1616.25 plus 90% of 37.5 = 1616.25 + 33.75 = 1650 = I(v+s/x). 
If we look closer at our scheme we see that in solving one prob- 
lem we have created another, more serious one. Production and exchange 
between the two departments balance each other, well enough. But now 
the technical structure of the economy has altered and, what is more, 
it has taken on a more backward character. In both departments the re- 
lation between fixed and circulating constant capital has fallen. Be- 
fore, the ratio of the stock of fixed capital to the circulating con- 
stant capital was equal to 3.33: 1 in both departments. Now it has de- 
clined to 3.06: 1. In terms of the value composition of Ic and IIc, the 
proportion of its value made up by the wear and tear of fixed capital 
has dropped from 25 per cent to 23.4 per cent. The same holds true of 
the organic composition of capital: It has fallen from four to one in 
both departments to 3.9 to one. What is even more telling is that both 
the ratio of total means of production employed to variable capital and 
the ratio of total stock of fixed capital to variable capital have fal- 
len--that is, there has been a decline in the productivity of labor 
(conversely, the share of variable capital in the total value of the 
annual product has risen, from 16.67% to 16.89%). All of these phenom- 
ena show that the relative weight of fixed capital, of those means of 
production that give society a more advanced technical foundation and 
tend to raise the productivity of labor, has fallen. Clearly this is 
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neither historically nor logically warranted. 
2 
It is obvious that we must start out on a new basis. Accumulation 
must proceed in such a way that the breakdown of the accumulated sur- 
plus value between fixed capital, circulating constant capital, and 
variable capital leaves the relationships between c(f) and c(c), c/v, 
and total employed means of production to variable capital, unchanged. 
Just a glance at our original scheme (p, 243) would suggest that accum- 
ulation will then have to preserve the existing shares of fixed, circu- 
lating-constant, and variable capital in the total capital: Namely 
10,000/14,000 (71.43%) for fixed capital, 3000/14,000 (21.43%) for cir- 
culating constant capital, and 1000/14,000 (7.14%) for variable capital. 
We can confirm this by setting up the following simultaneous equations: 
Let x= the value of the newly added fixed capital 
y= the value of the additional circulating constant capital 
z= the value of the additional variable capital 
Then we have: 
(1) x+y+ z= s(a) 
(2) . lx +y 4z =0 (3) . 3x - y= 0 
Equation (1) is a definitional equation, and expresses the fact that 
s(a) must equal the sum of its constituent parts. Equation (2) is the 
equation for the organic composition of capital; given our present as- 
sumptions that the stock of fixed capital depreciates by 10 per cent 
per year and that c/v = 4, we will have (. lx + y)/z = 4. Equation (3) 
is the equation for the ratio of used up fixed capital to circulating 
capital in the c component of each department, i. e., lx: y = 1: 3. Sol- 
ving these equations for x, y, and z respectively we have: 
x= 71.43% of s(a) 
y= 21.42% of s(a) 
z=7.15% of s(a) 
Which is identical to what we estimated. 
Returning to our original scheme on p. 243, department I has 500 
surplus value to be accumulated. Out of this 500,357.14 is added to 
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the fixed capital stock. A further 107.14 goes to increase the cir- 
culating part of constant capital. Finally, 35.71 goes towards addi- 
tional variable capital. After accumulation the arrangement of depart- 
ment Its capital (rounding off decimal places where appropriate) is: 
I, 10,357.1 fixed capital: 
4142.8(1035,7f + 3107.1c)c + 1035,7v + 500s/x 
In department II, whose accumulation fund is 187.5,133.9 goes for 
fixed capital, 40.2 for circulating constant capital, and 13.4 for 
variable capital, giving an arrangement of: 
II. 3883.9 fixed capital: 
1553.6(388.4f + 1165.2c)c + 388.4v + 187.5s/x 
At the end of the year's production we will have: 
I. 4142.8(1035.7f + 3107.1c)c + 1035.7v + 517,85s/x + 517.85s(a) 
II. 1553.6( 388.4E + 1165.2c)c + 388.4v + 194.2s/x + 194.2s(a) 
This scheme retains all of the original value relationships bet- 
ween the different material elements of the productive capital within 
each department. If we add up the portions of each department's pro- 
duct that has to be exchanged we find that I(v+s/x) = 1553.55. IIc = 
1553.6. The two magnitudes are, for all practical purposes, equal. 
Department I has produced enough means of production to replace II's 
used up constant capital, But this means that the conditions of ex- 
panded reproduction are not satisfied. As we demonstrated above, the 
longer turnover period of fixed capital requires not that I(v+s/x) = 
IIc, but that it equals IIc plus the remaining value of the newly added 
fixed capital, in this case IIc plus 90% of the value of the portion of 
Hs(s) that went to fixed capital. This figure equals 1553.6 + 90% of 
133.9 = 1553.6 + 120.5 = 1674.1. There is a shortage of means of pro- 
duction of 120.55. Department I has 53,55 newly produced means of pro- 
duction for exchange, while department II needs a total of 174,1 (133.9 
in new fixed capital plus 40.2 in new circulating constant capital). 
We see the problem even more strikingly if we work out accumulation 
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for the next year. IIs(a) equals 194.2, of which 180.3 must go to in- 
crease its supply of means of production (138.7 for addition to the 
fixed capital stock, 41.6 for new circulating constant capital). De- 
partment I will devote 37.03 to increase its variable capital. The 
extra labor power set in motion will produce 37.03 in surplus value, 
out of which department I will take half, or about 18.5, for the indi- 
vidual consumption of its capitalists. Thus, of the 180,3 means of 
production required by department II, department I can provide only 
55.5. Even if we assume that department II, either through the utili- 
zation of reserves, or through recourse to foreign trade, had somehow 
been able to cover its first-year deficit of means of production, in 
the next year this shortage would have grown in magnitude, and by a 
considerable amount. We see, therefore, that this under-production of 
means of production is not a momentary occurrence (as Preobrazhensky 
treated it in Zakat Kapitalizma), but is systematic and arises out of 
the very process of accumulation. 
What is the source of the disproportion? The general condition 
of expanded reproduction is that department I's consumption fund grows 
by the same absolute quantity and at the same rate as II's constant 
capital. In social terms this means that department I each year must 
produce enough new means of production to exchange with department II 
in order to meet its own increased demand for means of consumption; and 
the latter magnitude must equal department His demand for additional 
means of production. The relative sizes of the two departments and 
their technical makeups must be such that the value of the labor power 
department I employs plus the value of the consumed part of the surplus 
value this labor power creates is always equal to the value of the con- 
stant capital department II requires to produce these means of consump- 
tion. We have already seen that for expanded reproduction to proceed 
smoothly, and without any transfer of social capital from one depart- 
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went to another--something that can never happen in a technologically 
advanced economy, and especially under the anarchy of capitalist pro- 
duction, where such transfers cannot be anticipated and planned in ad- 
vance--their organic compositions of capital must be equal and remain 
constant (should it rise, the absolute size of department I must grow, 
in order to re-establish proportionality). This alone, however, is not 
enough. Given a particular organic composition their relative sizes 
are rigidly dictated, otherwise there would be an automatic imbalance 
between their respective demands for each other's products (as when the 
organic composition of capital rises). Now, starting off from a posi- 
tion of equilibrium, when we introduce the complicating condition that 
fixed capital is not amortized solely in the course of a single year, 
we do two things. One, we increase the share of I's accumulated sur- 
plus value that must go to increase its own constant capital. This in 
turn means a sharp reduction both in the relative quantity of labor 
power employed by I and the surplus value it produces. Two, we simul- 
taneously raise the portion of II's accumulation fund that goes to pur- 
chase new means of production, thus sharply increasing its demand for 
fixed capital. From any given point of equilibrium between the two de- 
partments next year's accumulation will automatically bring with it a 
greater need for means of production on the part of department II and 
a reduced ability on the part of department I to satisfy it. The only 
way society could get around this difficulty would be if the absolute 
size of department I gave it enough exchangeable output to meet Ills 
requirements for constant capital. With each year department I would 
have to augment its total scale of production such that there was an 
absolute rise in I(v+s/x) sufficient to cover department H's increased 
demand for means of production. 3 
This result is virtually identical to what we found when the or- 
ganic composition of capital, despite being equal in both departments, 
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rises, What is more, the processes operate in the same way, Each dis- 
rupts proportionality by simultaneously raising II's need for means of 
production and reducing the share of I's consumption fund in its total 
commodity-product. Capitalism solves this problem by perpetually trans- 
ferring capital from department II to department I, thereby increasing 
the relative weight of the production of means of production in the en- 
tire social product. We will see below that the problem we have just 
uncovered has the same solution: The systematic transfer of capital 
into those sectors of industry that produce means of production. In 
the course of this process capitalism establishes a growing interdepen- 
dence between its own production and that of other modes of production, 
an interconnection that leads to the inevitable subordination of these 
more backward economic systems to the more advanced. 
II. Variations Arising From Unequal Organic Compositions of Capital, 
Unequal Proportions of Fixed and Circulating Capital in the 
Two Departments, and From the Application of Prices of Production 
The schemes we have used in our discussion so far, including those 
taken from Preobrazhensky, make no complicating assumptions, other than 
the longer turnover period of fixed capital. The organic composition 
of capital is the same in both departments, which is strikingly unreal- 
istic for an economy with a high level of technique and a well develop- 
ed division of labor. Nevertheless, we have assumed it, because with 
equal organic compositions expanded reproduction presents no difficul- 
ties and raises no exceptionally disturbing questions. This allowed 
us to show (as with the case of a rising c/v) that the disproportions 
we found when we increased the depreciation period of fixed capital 
were solely attributable to that factor and to no other. 
We know, however, that even when all the constant capital turns 
over in one year disproportions arise from other sources, namely the 
unequal organic compositions of capital in departments I and II, and 
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that these disturbances are systematic under expanded reproduction. We 
must now reintroduce this qualification, first, in order to make our 
analysis more concrete so that it more closely approximates the con- 
ditions of a real capitalist economy, and second, to see if this in any 
way affects our original results and conclusions. 
In addition, we also assumed that both departments had the same 
level of technique, in terms of the relationship between fixed and cir- 
culating constant capital. Like positing equal organic compositions 
of capital, this condition is not realistic, and does not express the 
fact that department II, which produces means of consumption, uses re- 
latively less fixed capital in its production than does department I. 
Again, allowing for unequal ratios of c(f) to c(c) in departments I and 
II is both a concretization that we must make in order to bring our an- 
alysis increasingly in line with real conditions, and a factor we must 
take into account to see if it in any way mitigates the basic tendency 
towards under-accumulation in department I that we have uncovered. 
Finally, we saw in our discussion of VKA 17 that the application 
of prices of production reversed the direction of the disproportion 
between the two departments, and led to a persistent over-accumulation 
in the production of means of production. This was a predictable re- 
sult, because the assumption of a general rate of profit meant that the 
surplus value is redistributed throughout the economy not according to 
the relative size of the variable capital each department employs, but 
to its total capital. The higher organic composition of capital in de- 
partment I led to it attracting a greater share of this surplus value 
than did department II, and hence to an over-production of means of 
production, Therefore, it is extremely important that we apply prices 
of production to our present problem and assume an average, general rate 
of profit as the basis of accumulation, in order to see if once again 
the actual movement of social capital is the reverse of what we arrive 
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at in a purely value analysis. 
When we have introduced all of these modifications in turn we will 
see that they do not fundamentally alter the problem, and that there 
is still a chronic under-production of means of production. This is 
quite surprising in the case of prices of production, for it shows that 
the original tendency Preobrazhensky discerned when he assumed that com- 
modities exchange at their values is, in fact, still valid once we in- 
troduce more complicating factors. What is more, it makes our own at- 
tempts to solve the problem analytically "neater, " Since the essence 
of the problem does not change, we can employ reproduction schemes that 
are relatively unencumbered by complications. 
We should state, finally, that since the problem we are examining 
is in fact of the same nature as a rise in the organic composition of 
capital, it would make no sense to introduce that modification into our 
schemes. Clearly it could in no way counteract the tendency towards 
under-production of means of production, but could only reinforce it. 
II-a. Unequal Organic Compositions of Capital 
We start with the following scheme: 
1.10,000 fixed capital: 
4000(1000f + 3000c)c + 1000v + 500s/x + 500s(a) 
II. 3750 fixed capital: 
1500(375f + 1125c)c + 500v + 250s/x + 250s(a) 
Our scheme for department I is unchanged, so its accumulation fund will 
divide up into the same percentages of fixed, circulating-constant, and 
variable capital as before. Department II, however, now has a lower 
organic composition of capital, three to one, and so its accumulated 
surplus value will divide differently, according to these equations: 
(1) x+y+z= IIs(a) 
(2) 
, lx +y- 3z =0 (3) 
. 3x -y=0 
Solving for x, y, and z, we get 69.77% of IIs(a) going for new fixed 
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capital, 20.93% for additional circulating constant capital, and 9.3% 
to increase IIv. In the first year, out of the 250(s), II will add 
174.42 to its stock of fixed capital, 52.33 to IIc(c), and 23.25 to IIv. 
The arrangements of the total social capital will therefore be: 
1.10,357.1 fixed capital: 
4142.8(1035.7f + 3107.1c)c + 1035.7v + 500s/x 
II. 3924.4 fixed capital: 
1569.7 (392.4f + 1177.3c)c + 523.25v + 250s/x 
At the end of the year's production: 
I. 4142.8(103S. 7f + 3107.1c)c + 1035.7v + 517.85s/x + 517.85s(a) 
II. 1569.7( 392.4f + 1177.3c)c + 523.25v + 261.63s/x + 261.63s(a) 
When the organic composition of capital was the same in both depart- 
ments, we saw that in the first year I(v+s/x) equalled IIc, and the 
deficit of means of production showed up in II's inability to accumulate 
additional needed fixed capital. Now, with IIc/v lower than Ic/v, de- 
partment I cannot even replace all of those means of production depart- 
ment II productively consumes simply in the course of one year. I(v+s/x) 
is less than IIc by about 16.2. Not only will department II be unable 
to accumulate the fixed capital necessary to expand its production in 
the ensuing year, it will be unable to restore 16.2 of the constant 
capital immediately used up. 
The overall deficit of means of production is 1726.75 (1500 IIc 
from the start of the first year plus the additional fixed capital = 
174.42, plus the additional circulating capital = 52.33) minus 1553.55 
= 173.2. As in our original example, let us assume that department II 
somehow is able to cover this deficit. What will happen in the second 
year? Department I [s(a) = 517.85] will add 369.9 to its fixed capital 
stock, 110.9 to the circulating portion of tis constant capital, and 
37 to its variable capital. Department II will add 182.5 to its fixed 
capital, 54.8 to IIc(c), and 24.3 to its variable capital. After re- 
arranging the social capital and carrying out production for the year 
we have: 
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I. 10,727 fixed capital: 
4290.7(1072.7f + 3218c)c + 1072.7v + 536.3s/x + 536.3s(a) 
II. 4106.9 fixed capital: 
1642.8(410.7f + 1232.1c)c + 547.6v + 273.8s/x + 273.8s(a) 
IIc exceeds I(v+s/x) by 33.8. The total deficit of means of production 
equals 198. Both the deficit in the replacement fund of lie and that 
of the accumulation fund for fixed capital have worsened. The total 
shortage of means of production has gone from 173.2 to 198, an increase 
of 24.8. The shortage of means of production destined simply to replace 
II's used up constant capital has gone from 16.2 to 33.8, a rise of 
17.6. This means that the shortfall of fixed capital also increased 
by 7.2. 
As we would have expected, the lower organic composition of cap- 
ital in department II reinforces the tendency towards under-production 
of means of production brought about by the lengthened turnover period 
of fixed capital. When we lowered IIc/v from four to one, to three to 
one, this caused the share of accumulated surplus value going to new 
fixed capital to fall by some 1.5%. This in and of itself would have 
acted to ease the disproportion somewhat--not absolutely, but by slight- 
ly slowing its rate of growth. Counteracting this, however, is the fact 
that the fall in IIc/v raises the part of surplus value that goes to 
increase II's variable capital--by better than two per cent. We need 
not repeat what effect this will have on proportionality between the 
two departments. The increase in the rate of growth of IIv will aug- 
ment its production of surplus value, and its total accumulation fund 
will grow (including the part going to new fixed capital) faster than 
department I's capacity to satisfy II's demand. Thus we see that, when 
we 
. 
take account of the fact that the department producing means of pro- 
duction has a higher organic composition than that producing means of 
consumption, the tendency is towards an even more chronic shortage of 
means of production than we first found. Not only is department II 
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unable to accumulate new fixed capital, it can no longer even replace 
all of the constant capital it would use up in a single year of expand- 
ed reproduction. 
II-b. Unequal Proportions of Fixed and Circulating Constant Capital 
This case is virtually identical to the previous one, where we 
had unequal organic compositions of capital, and we can cover it quite 
quickly. Take the following scheme for the social capital: 
1.10,000 fixed capital: 
4000(1000f + 3000c)c + 1000v + 500s/x + 500s(a) 
II. 2500 fixed capital: 
1500(250f + 1250c)c + 375v + 187.5s/x + 187.5s(a) 
Here the organic compositions of capital are the same, but department 
II uses much less fixed capital to produce a given value of commodities 
than does department I. The ratio, IIc(f)/c(c) is now one to five, in- 
stead of one to three. Quite clearly this will mean that II will de- 
mand relatively less fixed capital than before, and so we would expect 
this to alleviate the burden on department I for new fixed capital. If 
we solve a new set of simultaneous equations for distributing IIs(a), 
however, we find just the opposite result. 
(1) x+y+z= IIs(a) 
(2) 
. lx+y-4z=0 (3) 
. 5x-y= 0 
Here x= 60.6% of s(a); y= 30,3% of s(a); and z=9.1% of s(a). Even 
though II's demand for fixed capital will fall, the general division 
of IIs(a) between means of production and variable capital is practic- 
ally identical with what we found by varying the organic composition of 
capital. In any given year II will devote a greater share of its ac- 
cumulated surplus value to increase its variable capital than will de- 
partment I. Consequently, II's rate of accumulation will outpace that 
of I, and there will be a worsening shortage of means of production. 
We can illustrate this by working out the pattern of accumulation for 
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a two-year period. We already know what department I will look like 
after the first year's accumulation and production. As for department 
II, it will add 113.6 to its fixed capital, 56.8 to IIc(c), and 17.1 
to IIv. At the end of the production year we will have: 
1.10,357.1 fixed capital: 
4142.8(1035.7f + 3107.1c)c + 1035.7v + 517.85s/x + 517.8Ss(a) 
II. 2613.6 fixed capital: 
1568.2(261.4f + 1306.8c)c + 392.1v + 196s/x + 196s(a) 
IIc exceeds I(v+s/x) by 14.65. II's total demand for means of produc- 
tion, equal to 1670.4, exceeds I's exchangeable supply by 116.9. 
In year two I will, of course, have the same accumulation and pro- 
duction as in our example on p. 256. For department II, accumulation 
will proceed as follows: 118.8 to increase fixed capital, 59.4 to Ilc(c), 
17.8 to IIv, giving at the end of the year: 
1.10,727 fixed capital: 
4291(1072.7f + 3218c)c + 1072.7v + 536.3s/x + 536.3s(a) 
II. 2732.4 fixed capital: 
1639.4(273.2f+1366.2c)c + 409.9v + 205s/x + 205s(a) 
lie is greater than I(v+s/x) by 30.4, and II's overall deficit of means 
of production equals 137.4. The shortage of means of production has 
jumped by 20.3: The deficit within IIc by 15.65, and that of fixed 
capital by 4.65. So, once again we see the disproportion coming from 
both ends at the same time. 
This, too, was a predictable result. Lowering the share of fixed 
capital in the total means of production employed in II has the same 
effect as lowering its organic composition of capital. To counter the 
tendency towards under-accumulation in department I, it would have to 
be the latter, and not department II, that lowered its ratio of c(f) 
to c(c). In that case I's accumulation and production of surplus value 
would tend to outgrow that of department II, raise its supply of means 
of production, and thus partially offset II's deficit, But this is an 
arithmetical possibility and nothing more. It contradicts the real 
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historical movement of capitalist development, which says that the grow- 
ing productivity of social labor reflects itself first and foremost in 
the absolute increase of the share of means of production, and espec- 
ially fixed capital, in the total annual product. 
II-c. The Application of Prices of Production 
Of all the variations we have introduced into our reproduction 
schemes, the application of prices of production is the one that gives 
a truly surprising result. When we modified the schemes to incorporate 
the observable historical trends for department II to have a lower pro- 
ductivity of labor and to require less fixed capital to produce its an- 
nual output, expanded reproduction proceeded as we would have expected. 
The basic tendency towards under-production of means of production was 
reinforced. 
When we examined Preobrazhensky's analysis of expanded reproduction 
under pure capitalism we noted that if we applied prices of production 
and assumed a general rate of profit, it was department I, and not de- 
partment II, that experienced over-production. This did not in any way 
invalidate Preobrazhensky's argument, since it left his essential point 
unchanged: That capitalism has an inherent tendency towards disequil- 
ibrium which it overcomes through the periodic transfer of capital from 
one department to another (often as a result of crises) and a growing 
interconnection between capitalism and other modes of production. Nor 
did it affect his application of this analysis to the Soviet economy 
under NEP, where: as we will discuss in Part IV, the erosion of the 
law of value and the deviation of prices from values is already assumed. 
It would seem to follow that the most important question our analysis 
of the accumulation of fixed capital raises is whether or not the ex- 
istence of a general rate of profit and the systematic deviation of 
prices from values will change the tendency towards under-production 
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of means of production that we find in a value analysis of capitalist 
expanded reproduction. 
When we apply prices of production to our schemes we see that they 
do not alter our results. The deficit of means of production is less 
than when we assumed commodities sold at their values, but it is still 
systematic and it grows with each year of accumulation. A result that 
appeared to contradict our first conclusion, because our initial assump- 
tions were too simplified, now itself turns out to be the product of 
an analysis that was too abstract. 
To illustrate the problem we will use the schemes from section 
II-a, i. e., where Ic/v is greater than IIc/v. If the organic composi- 
tions of capital were equal the annual rate of profit would, like the 
annual rate of surplus value, be the same in the two departments, and 
prices of production would effect no change in the distribution of the 
total surplus value. We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the 
technical coefficients of production, c(f) and c(c) are the same in de- 
partments I and II, as this does not affect the nature of the problem. 
1.10,000 fixed capital: 
4000(1000f + 3000c)c + 1000v + 500s/x + 500s(a) 
II. 3750 fixed capital: 
1500(375f + 1125c)c + 500v + 250s/x + 250s(a) 
As before, we calculate the general rate of profit for each separate 
year, as the ratio of the total surplus value produced to the total 
capital advanced. Like Marx, we take the result of any year's produc- 
tion as a given datum for the next year. Though the prices of commod- 
ities produced in one year will deviate from their values, these devi- 
ations will even out for the great mass of commodities and will influ- 
ence neither the distribution of the social capital nor the value of 
labor power, insofar as they pass into the prices of succeeding gener- 
ations of commodities. They form part of the cost-price, upon which 
any capitalist must calculate his profit. With this in mind, we can 
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proceed. We will work out accumulation and expanded reproduction for 
a series of four years. 
In the first year, the total capital is equal to the sum of the 
stocks of fixed capital, plus the circulating constant capital, plus 
the variable capital for the two departments taken together. This 
comes to 19,375. The total surplus value, Is + Its is 1500, giving a 
general rate of profit of 7.74%. Department I, with a total capital 
of 14,000, will earn a profit, p, of 1083.6. Department II, whose to- 
tal capital is 5375, has a profit of 416 (the discrepancy between total 
profit and total surplus value comes from having rounded off the figure 
for the rate pf profit to workable decimal places). The new arrange- 
ment of capital will be: 
I. 4000(1000f + 3000c)c + 1000v + 541.8p/x + 541.8p(a) 
II. 1500( 375f + 1125c)c + 500v + 208p/x + 208p(a) 
We recall from p. 248 that in department I: 
x= addition to fixed capital stock = 71.43% of Is(a) 
y= addition to circulating part of constant capital = 21.42% of 
Is (a) 
z= addition to variable capital = 7. IS% of Is(a) 
and from pp. 254-55 that in department II: 
x= 69.77% of I Is (a) 
y= 20.93% of IIs(a) 
z=9.3% of I Is (a) 
We will take the scheme immediately above as the result of production 
from the year prior to the one we will start with. After the total mass 
of surplus value has been distributed between the two departments on 
the basis of the general rate of profit, it forms the starting point 
for accumulation and production in year one. Here department I, out 
of its fund of accumulation, will add 387 to its stock of fixed capital, 
116.1 to its circulating constant capital, and 38.7 to its variable 
capital. Department II will distribute the accumulated share of its 
profits this way: 145.1 for new fixed capital, 43.5 for additional 
circualting constant capital, and 19.3 for new variable capital. After 
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the year's production on the basis of this accumulation we will have: 
1.10,387 fixed capital: 
4154.8(1038.7f + 3116.1c)c + 1038.7v + 1038.7s 
II. 3895.1 fixed capital: 
1558(389. Sf + 1168. Sc)c + 519.3v + 519.3s 
In value terms, we see that I(v+s/x) is equal to IIc. In this regard 
we have obtained the same result as when we first examined the question 
of prices of production. The existence of the general rate of profit 
acts as a vehicle for redistributing the entire surplus value in 
such a way that, if exchange were then to take place according to val- 
ues, department I would be able to meet department II's demand for new 
means of production and exchange between the two departments would bal- 
ance. The existence of a general rate of profit, however, means that 
exchange does not occur on a value basis, but on that of the deviation 
of prices from values. It was when we distributed the mass of society's 
surplus value in line with the total capital of each department--which 
forms the real basis of exchange--that we saw a growing tendency to- 
wards over-production in department I. Here we saw one of the contra- 
dictions embodied in the general rate of profit. If somehow exchange 
could take place between these unequal price magnitudes it would effect 
an actual equal exchange of values; yet exchange cannot take place on 
this basis precisely because in price terms the two magnitudes, I(v+p/x) 
and IIc, are unequal. And so there is the phenomenon of over-produc- 
tion in department I. 
Taken at this level, we have merely reproduced the same problem 
we uncovered in section I, when we examined the accumulation of fixed 
capital under the most simplified conditions. Thus even though the 
general rate of profit causes I(v+s/x) to equal IIc, in spite of the 
lower organic composition of capital in department II, we have still 
violated the new conditions of expanded reproduction. II requires 
means of production not equal to IIc, but to 1500 plus 188.6, or 1688.6. 
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This is an overall deficit of means of production of 130.6, even on the 
assumption that commodities would exchange at their values. 
The question we must answer is this: When we assumed that the en- 
tire constant capital turned over in one year, and when the organic 
composition of capital was lower in department I than in department II, 
the application of prices of production restored equilibrium conditions 
in terms of a value-exchange between the two departments. It then fol- 
lowed that when we redistributed the total surplus value according to 
the relative sizes of the departments, department I actually showed an 
over-production of means of production as compared to what department 
II could, or needed to purchase. Now, however, we see that even where 
accumulation takes place on the basis of a general rate of profit, 
there is under-production in I. Will the redistribution of the surplus 
value in accordance with this general rate of profit--which would other- 
wise lead to a sizeable increase of I's exchangeable product--counter- 
balance this under-production, lead to the expected over-production in 
department I, or merely reduce the deficit, but not overcome it? 
The surplus value produced during this first year has still to be 
distributed between the two departments. The total capital has grown 
to 20,125. The total surplus value is 1558. The rate of profit, p', 
is again 7.74%. Department I, whose capital is 14,541.8, earns a pro- 
fit of 1125.5; department II, with an advanced capital of 5583, receives 
a profit of 432.1. We then have for the final product: 
I. 4154.8(1038.7f + 3116.1c)c + 1038.7v + 562.8p/x + 562.8p(a) 
II, 1558( 389f + 1168.5c)c + 519.3v + 216p/x + 216p(a) 
I(v+p/x) = 1601.5, which is greater than IIc by 43.5. II's total de- 
mand for means of production is, however, far greater than this "sur- 
, plus" that 
department I can sell to II for the latter's accumulation 
fund of fixed capital. II requires means of production equal in price 
to 1688.6, leaving it with a substantial shortage of 87.1. The redis- 
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tribution of the surplus value according to the general rate of profit 
allows I to reduce its deficit of means of production, but not by near- 
ly enough to eliminate it. To demonstrate that this is not an artifi- 
cial result of either our figures or the initial year of the schemes, 
we will work out the process of accumulation for a further three years. 
Year Two : 
Ip(a) = 562.8, so x= 402, y= 120.6, z= 40.2 
IIp(a) = 216, x= 150.7, y= 45.2, z= 20.1 
Arranging the capital in I and II accordingly: 
I. 10,789 fixed capital: 
4315.6(1078.9f + 3236.7c)c + 1078.9v + 1078.9s 
II. 4045.8 fixed capital: 
1618.3(404.6f + 1213.7c)c + 539.4v + 539.4s 
Here, too, I(v+s/x) = IIc. There is a deficit in the overall exchange 
of 135.5, an increase of 4.9 over the previous deficit, when calculated 
on the assumption that exchange would take place between values, and 
not prices of production. Converting into the latter, the total capi- 
tal is 20,903.8, total surplus value is 1618.4, the rate of profit, 
7.74%. In department I, capital = 15,104.6, Ip = 1169.1. In depart- 
ment II, capital = 5799, Hp = 448.8. The final product is: 
I. 4315.6(1078.9f + 3236.7c)c + 1078.9v + 584.6p/x + 584.6p(a) 
II. 1618.3( 404.6E + 1213.7c)c + 539.4v + 224.4p/x + 224.4p(a) 
II's demand for means of production = 1752.9. I's exchangeable supply 
--I(v+p/x)--= 1663.5. Deficit of means of production = 90.4, an in- 
crease of 3.3 over Year One. 
Year Three: 
Ip(a) = 584.6: x= 417.6, y= 125.2, z= 41.8 
IIp(a) = 224.4; x= 156.6, y= 47, z= 20.9 
The new arrangement of the capital in both departments after the year's 
production is; 
I. 11,206,6 fixed capital: 
4482.9(112lf + 3361.9c)c + 1121v + 1121s 
II. 4202.4 fixed capital: 
1680.7(420.2f +1260.7c)c + 560.3v + 560.3s 
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I(v+s/x) = IIc (the slight difference is due to rounding off decimal 
places). The deficit of means of production, on the basis of an ex- 
change of values, is 1821.9 - 1681.5 = 140.4, an increase of 4.9 over 
Year Two. 
Converting into prices of production, the total capital = 21,712.8, 
total surplus value = 1681.3, the rate of profit = 7.74%. Capital in 
department I= 15,689.2, and Ip = 1214.3. Capital in department II = 
6023.4, and lip = 466.2. The final product is: 
I. 4482.9( 1121E + 3361.9c)c + 1121v + 607.2p. x + 607.2p(a) 
II. 1680.7(420.2f + 1260.7c)c + 560.3v + 233. lp/x + 233.1p(a) 
II Is demand for means of production = 1821.9, while I's supply now = 
1782.2. The deficit of means of production = 93.7, once again an in- 
crease over the preceding year of 3.3. 
Year Four: 
Ip(a) = 607.2: x= 433.7, y= 130.1, z= 43.4 
IIp(a) = 233.1: x= 162.6, y= 48.8, z= 21.7 
Arranging the capital in both departments: 
I. 11,640.3 fixed capital: 
4656(1164f + 3492c)c + 1164.4v + 1164.4s 
II. 4365 fixed capital: 
1746(436.5f + 1309.5c)c + 582v + 582s 
I(v+s/x) = IIc. The overall deficit of means of production based on a 
value exchange = 145.5, a rise of 5.1 over Year Three (the difference 
is once more due to rounding off to significant figures). 
Converting into prices of production, the total capital = 22,553.1, 
total surplus value = 1746.4, the rate of profit = 7.74%. Capital in 
department 1= 16,296.4, and Ip = 1261.3. Capital in department II = 
6256.5, and lip = 484.3. This gives a final product of: 
I. 4656( 1164E + 3492c)c + 1164.4v + 630.7p/x + 630.7p(a) 
II. 1746(436. Sf + 1309.5c)c + 582v + 242.2p/x + 242.2p(a) 
II's demand for means of production = 1892.1, while I's supply now = 
1795.1. The deficit of means of production = 97, an increase over the 
last year of 3.3. 
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These calculations indicate that the existence of an average rate 
of profit cannot reverse the inherent tendency for capitalism to suffer 
from under-production of means of production, Yet we must not underes- 
timate the extent to which these results are completely conditional on 
the assumptions we made in setting up the reproduction schemes, There 
are two factors in particular that would have seriously altered the 
outcome of this part of our investigation. 
The first of these, and by far the least significant of the two, 
has to do with the particular figures we chose for the organic compo- 
sition of capital in each of the departments. The deviation of prices 
from values will be the greater the larger is the differential between 
Ic/v and IIc/v. It should be possible, at least arithmetically, to 
construct a scheme where the under-production of means of production was 
arrested and converted into a surplus. If we were to take the follow- 
ing scheme for department I: 
1.20,000 fixed capital: 
10,000(2000f + 8000c)c + 1000v + 1000s 
and substitute it for the one we used in this section, we would find 
that (assuming department II remained the same) we had an initial sur- 
plus of means of production of approximately 47.4 with the application 
of prices of production. What is more, this surplus would grow margin- 
ally from year to year--by about 0.6-0.7. Although mathematically feas- 
ible, such a scheme is not especially realistic. In the first place, it 
requires that the organic composition of capital in department I rises 
to 10: 1, while that in department II stays as before--that is, that the 
organic composition of capital climbs to better than three times that 
in department II (any ratio less than that would not erase the under- 
production in department I). This would be presuming that, over a per- 
iod of years, the productivity of labor had grown astronomically in de- 
partment I while in department II it remained unaffected by this devel- 
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opment of technology. This is simply an unrealistic assumption. The 
reversal of the tendency towards under-production of means of produc- 
tion was not due to the absolute figure for the organic composition in 
department I, but to the disparity beetween Ic/v and IIc/v. While it 
is true that the productivity of labor rises sharply with modern tech- 
nology, and that it will be higher in department I than in department 
II (which will tend to be more labor intensive), the production of means 
of consumption has become greatly mechanized along with that of means 
of production. Production indeed takes place in large, well-equipped 
units of production; and while the ratio of means of production employ- 
ed to labor power employed will be higher in department I, it will not 
be so many times greater as we have had to posit it here in order to 
overcome the tendency for department II to outstrip department I. 
By the same token, the new scheme for department I also must 
change the ratio of fixed to circulating constant capital, so that more 
circulating capital is absorbed in the course of a production year per 
unit of fixed capital. This is possible only by again positing a sharp 
increase in the efficiency of new fixed capital that does not extend 
to department II, and does not itself lower the value of raw materials, 
intermediate goods, etc., that make up the circulating part of constant 
capital--an assumption that is no more realistic than that of the rise 
in the organic composition of capital being limited to one department. 
6 
Far more important, however, is the second factor, which pertains 
to the volume of production we assumed in department I and the initial 
levels of exchange between I(v+s/x) and IIc. It should be noted that 
in all of the schemes we used in this chapter we began with an equality 
between I(v+s/x) and IIc. Yet the new conditions for expanded reproduc- 
tion we derived dictate that I(v+s/x) equal II's total demand for means 
of production, and not just IIc. We will show in Chapter 9 that this 
makes no difference to our result, so long as we are dealing with a 
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purely value analysis. There we will demonstrate that, even with an 
initial proportionality between the exchange funds of the two depart- 
ments, the over-production of means of consumption will recur every year 
and that this will in turn necessitate a transfer of capital from de- 
partment II to department I. 
This is not true when we are dealing with the average rate of pro- 
fit, however, since the volume of production in each department will 
determine its share of the total social surplus value. The advantage 
of retaining the equality between I(v+s/x) and IIc in our value schemes 
was that it showed the analytical continuity between this new problem 
and the original schemes that Marx and Preobrazhensky both worked with. 
Its simplicity of exposition was an additional advantage. Conversely, 
it is this same simplicity that makes the result so deceptive when 
dealing with the average rate of profit. Let us go back to the scheme 
presented on p. 255 above. There the organic composition of capital 
is lower in department II than in department I. But instead of assum- 
ing a deficit between the exchange funds of the two departments, let 
us adjust the capital in department I such that I(v+s/x) equals II's 
total demand for means of production, which was 1726,75, If I(v+s/x) 
equals this figure, Iv will be 1151.2. We would in turn have to adjust 
the total capital in I, in order to retain the organic composition of 
capital equal to four to one and the existing ratios of fixed to cir- 
culating capital and total means of production to variable capital. 
The entire scheme would then look like this: 
I. 11,510 fixed capital: 
4604(llSlf + 3453c)c + 1151v + 576s/x + 576s(a) 
II. 3924 fixed capital: 
1570(392.5f + 1177.5c)c + 523.3v + 261.6s/x + 261.6s(a) 
We have rounded all of the figures for the sake of clarity. Now, if we 
were to take this scheme, and apply prices of production to it, we would 
find that in the first year there was an over-production of means of 
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production of about 73.5. What is more, it would grow by about 2.5 per 
year. Thus there would be a reversal of the tendency we have outlined 
in this chapter, similar to what we found when we dealt with the gen- 
eral rate of profit under pure capitalism. There would have to be a 
systematic transfer of capital out of department I and towards depart- 
ment II, a factor that helps explain the phenomenal form that capital- 
ist crises usually take (i. e., over-production of means of production). 
(Here we must repeat our constant warning that the schemes are such 
highly abstract analytical tools that to seek in them a "holistic" ex- 
planation of the immediate causes of crises--as opposed to developmen- 
tal tendencies that might, in combination with other factors, illumin- 
ate certain conditions under which crises might break out--is, we think, 
a highly dangerous objectification of them. ) 
Nevertheless, there is good reason for having constructed the an- 
alysis the way we did. In the first place, the problem Preobrazhensky 
was trying to solve was how society, given an initial demand for addi- 
tional fixed capital, could meet such a demand and still maintian pro- 
portionality. We have shown that if, for whatever reasons, there is 
either a temporary or structural shortage of the production of means 
of production, then, given the conditions under which fixed capital is 
accumulated, this deficit will worsen over time and society will not 
be able to provide sufficient quantities of means of production without 
a transfer of productive forces into department I. What is more, in 
value terms this shortage of means of production--whose obverse is just 
that "one-time" demand for new means of production Preobrazhensky pos- 
ited as his starting point--arises directly out of the accumulation 
process, and is explained by the fact that to construct means of pro- 
duction other means of production of even greater value are required. 
Even more important, however, is that by proceeding with our anal- 
ysis in this way we have duplicated, albeit in general form, the situa- 
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tion that existed in the Soviet Union in the 1920's, that is, where 
there was just such a structural shortage of means of production, pri- 
marily of fixed capital. 
Here our findings are extremely important, for they show that re- 
gardless of whatever modifications we make in our schemes the basic di- 
lemma facing an economy of the Soviet type still remains. In any in- 
dustrial economy the production of means of production takes on an ever- 
increasing importance. It is the fact that this growth is not only 
one of quantity, but brings with it a constant improvement in technique, 
that makes it the main vehicle for increasing the productivity of social 
labor. Likewise, it is their respective abilities to anticipate and 
effect this growth that constitutes one of the great differences be- 
tween capitalism and socialism--and this was precisely the impasse in 
which the Soviet Union found itself during its period of primitive 
socialist accumulation. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 
1. Capital, II. P. 473. 
2. To the extent that some commodities that comprise circulating con- 
stant capital enter wholly into the use values they help produce, 
and thus the value of the circulating portion of c is related to 
the number of use values produced in the course of the year, the 
introduction of more efficient machinery could cause the ratio of 
fixed to circulating components of c to fall. But this can only 
take place if we assume that accumulation brings with it an auto- 
matic rise in the productivity of labor, i. e., that the additional 
fixed capital always turns out a greater number of commodities 
during the year, an assumption that is not, in our example, war- 
ranted. In addition, it ignores what effects a rise in the pro- 
ductivity of labor has on the value of circulating capital: For 
as soon as it became generalized throughout the economy, the value 
of the individual commodities forming the circulating portion of c 
would also fall, though not necessarily in the same proportion as 
the rise in the productivity of labor (that is, not in the same 
proportion as the increased quantity of them demanded for the 
greater mass of commodities produced during the year). Also, it 
is important not to confuse the case of the individual commodity 
with that of the annual social product. If the productivity of 
labor rises as the result of a new, more efficient generation of 
machines being introduced, then the value of the circulating com- 
ponent of c could well rise; but this says nothing about the value 
of the annual product, which contains the entire value of the worn 
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out means of production and all of the value of 
expended. The only "absolute" law we can speak 
ery case, that of the individual commodity as 
product, the share of living labor will tend to 
For an additional discussion of this point, see 
260-62. 
the labor power 
of is that in ev- 
Nell as the annual 
fall over time. 
Capital, III, pp. 
3. Once again, this is similar to Marx's discussion of how the mass 
of surplus value can rise while the share of variable capital in 
the total productive capital falls. See Capital, III, p. 223, 
and p. 177, above. 
4. Capital, III, p. 161. 
5. Wg can obtain a very general idea of the validity of this argument 
from statistics on the share of wages and salaries in gross out- 
put in British industry. This is in no way an accurate reflection 
of the "organic composition of capital, " but it will not be far 
off in showing us the relative proportions of wages in the pro- 
ductive capital employed in industries devoted to producing means 
of production and means of consumption, respectively. In 1973 
the "Census of Production" showed that wages-as-a-proportion-of 
gross-output was approximately 1.5 times higher in those indus- 
tries we would classify as department II than in those we would 
count as department I. "Fact Service, " (Labour Research Depart- 
ment Publications, London), Vol. 38, Issue 11,13 March 1976, p. 
44. 
6. Capital, III, pp. 260-62. 
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CHAPTER 8 
MARX ON THE USE OF THE AMORTIZATION FUND 
The problem we are dealing with is certainly not new. Marx was 
well aware of it, and devoted a fairly lengthy discussion to it in Part 
II of Theories of Surplus value. Preobrazhensky, as we have seen, re- 
where 
fers to similar passages, probably from Volume II of Capital, /Marx an- 
alyzes the use of the amortization fund as a source of actual accumula- 
tion. Preobrazhensky, following Marx, treated the amortization fund 
as a temporary source of reserves of productive capital which society 
could use to help extend production and thereby meet extraordinary new 
demands for fixed capital. 
Marx asks, what are the material preconditions of accumulation and 
expanded reproduction? First, new labor power must be available on the 
market. This requires both a constant reserve army of labor and a regu- 
lar increase of the population. Second, the capitalist who wants to 
expand his operations must find additional means of production ready for 
purchase on the market. He needs additional machines, raw materials, 
intermediate goods (e. g., steel for the machine builder, concrete for 
the construction contractor, cloth for the textile manufacurer, etc. ) 
over and above what he used in past years. Where are these extra means 
of production (or means of subsistence for laborers) to come from? All 
the other capitalists, upon whom our present capitalist depends for his 
supplies, have geared their own production to the average needs of pre- 
ceding years. If our capitalist wants more machines, or feul, etc. he 
must order them, and wait for them to be produced and delivered before 
he can use them. But this would cause a real interruption in the pro- 
cess of production, on the one hand, and would only push off the prob- 
lem to these other capitalists, on the other. For the machine builder 
also will need new machines, raw materials, etc., if he is to extend 
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his production in order to meet the demands of our first capitalist. 
He, too, would have to order these new elements of his productive cap- 
ital, wait for them to be produced, etc., and so the whole process 
would be delayed right down the line. It is obvious that expanded re- 
production is only possible if all capitalists simultaneously extend 
their production. 
Just as the production and reproduction of existing capital in one 
sphere presupposes parallel production and reproduction in other 
spheres, so accumulation or the formation of additional capital in 
one branch of production presupposes simultaneous or parallel cre- 
ation of additional products in other branches of production. 
Thus the scale of production in all spheres which supply constant 
capital must grow simultaneously (in accordance with the average 
participation--determined by the demand--of each particular sphere 
in the general growth of production) and all spheres which do not 
produce finished products for individual consumption, supply con- 
stant capital. Of the greatest importance, is the increase in ma- 
chinery (tools), raw material, and auxiliary material, for, if 
these preconditions are present, all other industries into which 
they enter, whether they produce semi-finished or finished goods, 
only need to set in motion more labor. 
It seems therefore, that for accumulation to take place, continu- 
ous surplus production in all spheres is necessary, 1 
Marx maintains that there is one element of productive capital where 
at least part of the new supply is constantly on hand in the market- 
namely fixed capital. As we know, when fixed capital is bought, the 
money for its purchase, which we assume is equivalent to its value, is 
laid out all in one go, but it need not be repurchased for some years 
afterwards. Every year the capitalist will receive in money an equiv- 
alent for that year's depreciation. If his fixed capital lasts 10 
years, he will get back one tenth each year, which he will retain as 
a hoard, until it is time to buy more fixed capital to replace that 
which has just worn out. This means that in every year but the last 
one, the capitalist has a monetary fund, the sinking, or amortization 
fund, from which he can "borrow" in order to extend production. In 
reality this is one of the central functions of the credit system, For 
the specific size of the amortization fund may not be sufficient to 
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allow that particular capitalist to increase production in any given 
year, especially as capitalism develops and thereby necessitates an 
ever-larger initial investment of machines and constant and variable 
circulating capital. Through the credit system, however, the amortiza- 
tion funds of a number of capitalists together can be pooled and made 
available to others. "With the development of the credit system, 
which necessarily runs parallel with the development of modern indus- 
try and capitalist production, this money no longer serves as a hoard 
but as capital; however not in the hands of its owner but of other cap- 
italists at whose disposal it has been placed. "2 
This is one side of the matter, that of the means of purchasing 
this new fixed capital. But our problem, as we have elaborated it so 
far, is that of the supply. How is this capital to be produced in the 
necessary quantity to meet society's expanding needs, and at the ap- 
propriate points in time? Marx's answer is that while the purchasers 
of fixed capital may only replace their stock once in 10 years, as an 
intermittent series of one-time acquisitions, the producers of fixed 
capital are constantly engaged in production. If a machine builder 
produces and sells fixed capital worth, say, 10,000,3 and if its aver- 
age durability is 10 years, then he would in theory only have to pro- 
duce 1000, the equivalent of this average wear and tear, in each year 
after that as a replacement supply for his original customers. In real- 
ity he does not even do that, since if the 10,000 fixed capital is pur- 
chased all at one time, no fixed capital need be bought again for an- 
other 10 years. Obviously the machine builder is not going to cut his 
yearly production by nine-tenths after he has produced the initial fix- 
ed capital. Nor is he going to discontinue production for nine years, 
waiting to take it up again and produce another 10,000 in replacement 
fixed capital in year ten. He will produce 10,000 fixed capital every 
year, even under conditions of simple reproduction, i. e., presuming no 
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accumulation. This means that on average he will have, each year fol- 
lowing the first, some 9000 in fixed capital produced and ready for 
sale to all other capitalists who need to accumulate and expand their 
own scale of production. What is more, this is a necessary condition 
of his even staying in business. Simply by maintaining his old level 
he must find new purchasers to buy this 9000 "superfluous" product 
each and every year. 
Thus even the mere reproduction of the capital invested in this 
sphere requires continuous accumulation in the remaining spheres 
of production. But because of this, one of the elements of con- 
tinuous accumulation is always available on the market. Here, in 
one sphere of production--even if only the existing capital is re- 
produced in this sphere--exists a continuous supply of commodities 
for accumulation, for new, additional industrial consumption in 
other spheres. 
4 
We must ask, to what extent does Marx's solution for the individual 
capitalist apply to society as a whole? There we have different capi- 
talists investing, replacing, or simply accumulating a monetary equiv- 
alent of their fixed capital at all times. This is the basis of Marx's 
own analysis of the replacement of fixed capital under simple reproduc- 
tion, which we have already examined. There we saw that the amount of 
fixed capital physically replaced at any one time must equal that value 
equivalent of still-functioning fixed capital which is accumulated as 
a hoard, as money. Thus if we take our current capitalist who builds 
machines as representing the total social production of fixed capital, 
for each year that he sells fixed capital worth 10,000 he is selling an 
equivalent of one tenth of society's fixed capital stock which has been 
used up in that year, Each year one tenth of society's users of fixed 
capital replace their stock in kind, while nine-tenths continue to func- 
tion with the 10,000 each of them has purchased in turn in one of the 
last nine years. 
Suppose, however, that our machine builder has started a new enter- 
prise and that his output is over and above that which society previ- 
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ously consumed. Then, in addition to the normal balance of replace- 
ments and hoards, there is an extra supply of 10,000 in fixed capital 
every year. Presuming that he actually finds buyers for his product, 
society is actually increasing its productive consumption of fixed cap- 
ital by 10,000 a year for the next 10 years. After that time, if no 
other new producers come onto the scene, his yearly production will 
simply go to replace the worn out machinery his old customers had bought 
from him 10 years before. In the interim, however, society will have 
added 100,000 to its fixed capital stock. If we also recall that our 
machine builder, as someone who was creating a real addition to soci- 
ety's supply of means of production, himself required instruments of 
labor, raw materials, etc., to first begin and then carry on production, 
the actual increase to the social stock of constant capital will be 
quite a bit larger. 
The question is to what extent this perpetual supply of new fixed 
capital that arises out of the unequal rate of replacement of fixed 
versus circulating constant capital, is adequate to meet the ever-in- 
creasing demand for new fixed capital we have come up against in our 
prior discussion. On the other side of the question, to what extent 
is the amortization fund a sufficient source of funds to allow for reg- 
ular accumulation? We can answer both of these questions by referring 
to the table on the following page. 
We have assumed that society adds 100 to its fixed capital stock 
in the first year, and that, given expanded reproduction, augments this 
addition by 10 each year. We have also assumed that the average life 
of this fixc: i capital is five years, so that it depreciates by 20% each 
year. In addition, we presume that somehow, either through credit or 
past monetary reserves, society had the money to pay for these additions 
to fixed capital for the first five years, but thereafter had to rely 
on the amortization fund to finance all subsequent accumulation. 
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Let us first look at the question of supply. Because no replace- 
ment of fixed capital is necessary for the first five years, we see 
that production grows considerably before any replacement takes place. 
Let us assume that this increased production of fixed capital comes 
from our machine builder. In the first year he produces 100 in machines 
which are just enough to satisfy society's increased demand for fixed 
capital (Column 2). Now, he, too, accumulates, and expands his own out- 
put to 110 in year two, again just enough to cover the total social 
need. And so on all the way through year five. At that point, however, 
he ups his yearly output to 150 (the start of year six in our table), 
but the economy as a whole needs not only 150 in new fixed capital, but 
now has to replace the first 100 he produced in year 1 (Column 6). If 
he satisfies this demand for replacement-fixed capital the machine 
builder will have only 50 left over to cover the new demand for fixed 
capital. And so we would have to find a new machine builder to launch 
an enterprise in addition to our first capitalist. The production of 
the latter, which was quite adequate to allow ongoing accumulation of 
fixed capital for the first five years, is no longer enough, Society 
must invest in a new enterprise that will produce fixed capital. This 
second producer will start off with a yearly output of 100, as did our 
first, and add 10 to his yearly output in each successive year--this 
would then serve to cover the yearly replacement of all the fixed capi- 
tal that was purchased in these first five years. Meanwhile our first 
capitalist will continue expanding his own production by 10 per year, 
thereby continuing to cover the overall needs for new fixed capital. 
This will work well enough until the end of year 10. At that time, how- 
ever, the same problem will reappear. Machine builder number one will 
be able to offer 200 in machinery (the start of year 11 in Column 2). 
Machine builder number two will have 150. These 150 will be just enough 
to cover the replacement of the 150 purchased from machiiic builder num- 
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ber one at the start of year six. If each machine builder keeps on 
producing as before, society will be able to continue to expand (via 
machine builder number one) and to replace the fixed capital produced 
from year six onwards (via machine builder number two). But now the 
very first machines, purchased in year one, and which have already been 
replaced once, will need a second renewal. Society will again be short 
by 100 in fixed capital, unless it invests the capital to build a third 
machine building factory, whose output could cover this replacement for 
the next five years. 
In fact, every five year period would necessitate the investment 
in a new enterprise that built fixed capital. We see from this that 
what Marx said about the individual capitalist is true for society as 
a whole only up to a certain point. For any new enterprise that pro- 
duces fixed capital merely simple reproduction does in fact require 
the constant expansion of social demand for such means of production. 
But this increase in demand is not perpetual, but lasts only as long 
as the life time of the first generation of means of production that 
were purchased. After that all of the new enterprise's output goes to 
simply replacing its original product. 
is 
As to the amortization fund, this/somewhat more complicated. 
Looking first at years one to five in our table, we see that each year 
the aggregate owners of fixed capital receive a money equivalent of 20% 
of the value of their fixed capital. This they place in what we have 
called the cumulative depreciation fund, where it will sit until it is 
needed for future purchases. Up through the end of year five things 
would appear to stand all right. The fund has grown to 340, and there 
is a fixed capital stock of 600. Here, however, we begin to run into 
difficulty, Although the fund stands at 340, our capitalists must make 
a deduction of 100 in order to replace the 100 in fixed capital they 
purchased in the first year. These have now worn out and, at the end 
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of the production year in year five, must be scrapped and new fixed 
capital, worth 100, must take their place. This leaves a balance at 
the close of year five of 240 (Column 8). 
At the start of year six the cumulative fund actually grows. We 
had a balance of 240 at the close of the preceding year, to which we 
must add the depreciation for that year, equal to 150. So in money 
terms the capitalists have a cumulative amortization fund of 390. 
This, of course, would be more than enough to cover the replacement 
needs for that year, equal to 110. But in addition to that we now want 
to see if the amortization fund can sustain accumulation, and so out 
of the fund also must come the money to buy 150 in new fixed capital, 
or 260 in all. So the monetary balance at the close of year six stands 
at only 130. 
In year seven we have a money-equivalent of 182 in depreciation 
of the existing fixed capital stock. This is added to the balance from 
the close of year six, so the cumulative monetary hoard rises to 312. 
Once again, however, the demands upon this fund exceed its growth. We 
must replace 120 in old fixed capital (that purchased in year three) 
and add another 160. The total purchase of fixed capital comes to 280, 
leaving a monetary balance of just 32 at year's end. 
In year eight we actually move into the red. The balance of 32 
is augmented by the depreciation that accrues in year eight, making a 
total of 248. But this has to support fixed capital purchases of 300 
(130 to replace year four's worn out stock plus 170 new fixed capital). 
The money balance at the end of year eight thus shows a deficit of 52. 
The only reason things don't collapse completely at this point is be- 
cause of the depreciation fund of the following year. In year nine 272 
in money equivalent for the depreciation of the fixed capital stock 
comes in, which makes up the deficit and leaves 220 in the cumulative 
depreciation fund. Here again, however, the requirements on this fund 
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are too great. Total purchases now come to 320, and the deficit in the 
monetary balance at the end of the year grows to 100. The same process 
fund 
repeats itself in year 10. The addition to the amortization/wipes out 
the deficit well enough, but leaves only 210 in the cumulative fund. 
Only now the demands upon this fund have mushroomed. Not only must the 
fixed capital added at the start of year six be restored at the close 
of year 10, but the fixed capital from year one, which was already rep- 
laced at the end of year five, has gone through another five year cycle 
and must be replaced again. Thus the cumulative fund must finance the 
purchase of: a)At the beginning of year ten, 190 in new fixed capital; 
b)at the end of year ten, 100 in fixed capital to replace that added 
in year one and which has now worn out a second time; c)plus 150 in 
fixed capital which was newly added in year six, and whose first five 
year life time has now ended. This all comes to 440, leaving a deficit 
balance of 230. 
Still, some purchases of fixed capital can carry on, If we assume 
that our capitalists are able to obtain credit to carry this growing 
deficit, we see that they can manage a positive accumulation fund for 
three years more. Even though the balance at the close of year 10 is 
230 in the red, next year's depreciation covers it and leaves 120 in the 
cumulative fund. This, as before is totally eaten up--it can cover 
none of the purchases of new fixed capital (200), and less than half 
of the replacements (270). The deficit is 350 at the end of year 11. 
Year 12 shows the same pattern; finally the deficit is so great (458) 
year 
that not even the depreciation fund in/13 can erase it. The cumulative 
depreciation fund disappears altogether. 
This little exercise shows that the amortization fund can only 
partially solve the problem of a growing demand for fixed capital. It 
is true that in any given year the additions to the fund from the year- 
ly depreciation of the existing stock of fixed capital will always be 
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greater than society's need for the replacement of old stock. With the 
assumption of expanded reproduction, the addition to the fund from the 
fixed capital added in year five is by necessity greater than the value 
of that added in year one, which is now coming up for replacement. The 
point is that the amortization fund cannot possibly cover both the re- 
quirements of renewal and additions to the fixed capital stock. 
This may not seem like a very spectacular discovery, but it does 
show that the employment of the amortization fund can be no more than 
a partial solution to our problem. The problem itself, however, still 
remains. It is not enough to say that accumulation is provided for via 
the simultaneous, parallel production of a surplus product in each 
branch of production. First, because production takes place on the 
basis of a definite technical structure, e. g., a given ratio of fixed 
to circulating constant capital and a given organic composition of cap- 
ital, this surplus product must be of a certain size and represent the 
right kinds of use values. It must also anticipate, as Preobrazhensky 
noted in The New Economics, the future needs for means of production, 
particularly given the fact that in an advanced society the production 
of commodities of a certain value requires the prior production of the 
means of production that will produce those commodities, and whose val- 
ue will be many times that of the commodities themselves. 
5 Second, un- 
der capitalism we have the contradictory constraint that this surplus 
product is limited in size by virtue of the fact that it is production 
for the market, for sale, for the realization of surplus value. It is 
interesting that Preobrazhensky, from a different vantage point than 
Marx, draws the same conclusion: Capitalism must expand its production 
of means of production if it is to have on hand the reserves it will 
need to meet the future demands of accumulation; yet this expansion 
brings with it the persistent threat of crises of over-production. And 
so production is either held back, as under monopoly capitalism, or 
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leads to purely spasmodic bursts of new construction which cannot sus- 
tain themselves given production for profit. This explains why Preob- 
razhensky held that the tendency towards under-production of means of 
production would lead to crises of over-production. Society must "over- 
produce" if it is to avoid chronic shortages; yet this kind of over- 
production is a "luxury" capitalism cannot afford. 
Marx, both in Theories of Surplus Value and in Capital, defined 
the problem of accumulation and its inherent endemic nature: The ac- 
cumulation of capital constantly pushes capitalism beyond the bounds 
of its given structure and level of technique, while the surplus produc- 
tion this calls for is itself limited by the need to realize it as sur- 
plus value. The very act of accumulation raises this problem anew, 
with each and every period of reproduction. 
6 The use of the amortiza- 
tion fund can never eliminate this difficulty--it can at best act as a 
temporary, equilibrating lever, which makes the economy more adaptable 
to momentary disturbances. Marx never claimed it was more than that; 
he simply demonstrated some of its potentialities. Nevertheless, we 
are no nearer a genuine solution to our problem than when we first 
uncovered it. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 
1. Theories of Surplus Value, Part II, p. 485. Original emphasis. 
2. Capital, II, p. 185. 
3. We have altered Marx's example here. 
4. Theories of Surplus Value, II, p. 481. 
5. The New Economics, pp. 66-67. 
6. "The real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself. It 
is that capital and its self-expansion appear as the starting and 
the closing point, the motive and the purpose of production; that 
production is only production for capital and not vice versa, the 
means of production are not mere means for a constant expansion of 
the living process of the society of producers. The limits within 
which the preservation and self-expansion of the value of capital 
resting on the expropriation and pauperization of the great mass 
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of producers can alone move--these limits come continually into 
conflict with the methods of production employed by capital for 
its purposes, which drive towards unlimited extension of produc- 
tion, towards production as an end in itself, towards uncondition- 
al development of the social productivity of labor. The means-- 
unconditional development of the productive forces of society-- 
comes continually into conflict with the limited purpose, the self- 
expansion of the existing capital. The capitalist mode of produc- 
tion is, for this reason, a historical means of developing the 
material forces of production and creating an appropriate world- 
market and is, at the same time, a continual conflict between this 
its historical task and its own corresponding relations of social 
production, " Capital, III, p. 250. Original emphasis. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE ACCUMULATION OF FIXED CAPITAL UNDER "PURE" CAPITALISM 
If anything, the chronic under-production we have found in depart- 
ment I is even more fundamental than that which Preobrazhensky describ- 
ed in VKA 17. No matter whether we assume that commodities exchange 
at their values or according to their prices of production, this under- 
accumulation still exists, except under the most narrowly-defined of cir- 
cumstances. Nevertheless, at root the problems are the same. The ten- 
dency for capitalist development to increase the social productivity of 
labor, to replace the living labor of men with the past labor embodied 
in machines, itself stifles the further development of this productivi- 
ty. This, as we see, is the tendency of capitalist accumulation. Yet 
we also know that capitalism does overcome the problem, that it con- 
tinues to exist, in spite of the myriad of economic and social contra- 
dictions it engenders. The answer to this is of course political and 
is to be found in the concrete history of the class struggle. When cap- 
italism departs from the historical stage it will not be because the 
reproduction schemes "proved" that it could not accumulate fixed capi- 
tal. It will be because the constant adjustments and readjustments it 
must make (some of whose outlines the reproduction schemes permit us to 
define) do not entail the simple manipulation of c's and v's, but the 
organization of human labor. There is not a single "solution" to any 
of capitalism's so-called economic problems that does not bring with it 
intense social conflict, and there is no problem it cannot solve if the 
proletariat is not sufficiently prepared to resist. The reproduction 
schemes, or any similarly abstract form of analysis cannot possibly 
reflect the complexities of real history. They can enlighten us as to 
certain inherent tendencies or directions of development, but nothing 
more. To take them literally, and to draw implications from them that 
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their abstract nature does not warrant--as, for instance, Luxemburg at- 
tempted to do--is to become a prisoner of their essentially formal 
structure. We can use the schemes to uncover a whole range of contra- 
dictions that, if left at that level of analysis, would imply the inev- 
itable end of capitalism, its final breakdown. And when the breakdown 
does not occur, or is too preposterous a conclusion to accept, we must 
invoke "outside" factors to explain why. 
1 If a breakdown theory is un- 
acceptable from both a philosophical and political point of view, and 
if the reproduction schemes are to retain more than a heuristic value-- 
and one which, moreover, becomes extremely limited as soon as we con- 
cretize our analysis--we must be able to use them to explain why, in 
fact, a breakdown does not take place. At least from a purely economic 
point of view, we must adapt them to reflect the real flexibility and 
elasticity capitalism does possess to potentially extricate itself from 
some of its most basic economic contradictions. 
This, as we have argued, is one of the great contributions Preo- 
brazhensky made to Marxist thought. While never exceeding the bounds 
of what they really do tell us, he continually tried to modify the 
schemes to reveal some of the fundamental tendencies, not only of cap- 
italism, but, as we shall see, of the historically unprecedented econo- 
my of the Soviet Union during the 1920's and its period of primitive 
socialist accumulation. He did not abandon Marx's analysis of expand- 
ed reproduction when the tools Marx bequeathed proved inadequate to ex- 
plain the concrete phenomena of capitalist development, any more than 
Marx himself took the schemes as literal statements about capitalist 
reality. We must, as Preobrazhensky understood perfectly well, adapt 
the reproduction schemes to our total analysis of the capitalist and 
post-capitalist world, and not our analysis to the formalisms of the 
schemes. This does not mean that the problem of under-accumulation we 
have found is a mere artifact. If so this would call into question 
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Marx's entire analysis of capitalist reproduction. We must recognize 
that given the premises on which they are constructed the schemes point 
to a real tendency within capitalism. Yet premises change. What we 
discover as an essential characteristic of the system at an abstract 
level of analysis, may not appear on the surface of events, due to 
other complexities that modify or mask the inherent tendencies at work. 
This is the case with the law of value, that analytical abstraction 
without which it would be impossible to "make sense" of capitalist pro- 
duction and exchange. Yet the law of value is at the same time a soc- 
ial abstraction, without which capitalist society could not sustain it- 
self from one generation to the next. The situation is similar with 
the reproduction schemes. If capitalist accumulation and exchange took 
place simply on the basis of the law of value, then we would indeed ex- 
pect to see persistent under-production of means of production, leading 
the system into a dead end. This, however, is too abstract an analy- 
sis. The premises upon which it is founded may demonstrate the inherent 
tendencies of the system, but they do not explain its phenomenal form 
and external movements. For this we must allow for other conditions, 
some of which, e. g., speculation and the vagaries of the modern credit 
system, can never be expressed in the schemes, others, such as a rise 
in the organic composition of capital, the extended amortization period 
of fixed capital, and the application of prices of production, can be. 
But they may alter our results. If, on the other hand, these modifica- 
tions are still inadequate to account for what we observe we must look 
around to see what further concretizations must be made, before aban- 
doning the schemes altogether. 
This was the method Preobrazhensky adopted, and it is the one we 
must use to try and find a solution to the problem of the accumulation 
of fixed capital. In this chapter, the concluding one of our discus- 
sion of the accumulation of fixed capital under the assumptions of an 
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abstract and pure capitalism, we will examine how capitalism, through 
the transfer of capital from department II to department I, can and does 
mollify the problem of under-accumulation. We will defer the continua- 
tion of this discussion and its application to the system of concrete 
capitalism until Part IV, where we will treat it as an introduction to 
our analysis of the Soviet goods famine. This will prove a complicated 
explication and requires the prior analysis of the material foundations 
of circulation in a mixed commodity-capitalist or commodity-socialist 
economy. 
I. The Use of Reserves Under Pure Capitalism 
In the discussion that follows we will use the schemes we first 
presented in Chapter 7. We have already shown that the modifications 
we might make in them do not change the problem in its essentials, and 
these schemes are simpler and easier to work with. 
Take our scheme from p. 249, that is, after accumulation and pro- 
duction in the first year: 
1.10,357.1 fixed capital: 
4142.8(1035.7f + 3107.1c)c + 1035.7v + 517.85s/x, + 517.85s(a) 
II. 3883.9 fixed capital: 
1553.6(388.4f + 1165.2c)c + 388.4v + 194.2s/x + 194.2s(a) 
Out of its accumulation fund of 194.2, department II must take 138.7 to 
augment its stock of fixed capital, and 41.6 to increase IIc(c). We 
know that prior to this year I's exchange fund consisted in a material 
form of one quarter fixed capital and three quarters circulating con- 
stant capital. Otherwise it could not have supplied II with fixed and 
circulating capital in the proper proportions. If this division stays 
the same, then, for I to meet II's demand for 138.7 in fixed capital, 
I(v+s/x) as a whole must grow to 554.8, of which two thirds is the 
equivalent of the variable capital, or 369.9. Given an unchanged or- 
ganic composition of capital, this in turn calls for a rise in Ic by 
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1419.5, which will break down into 369.9 as the value equivalent of the 
wear and tear of new fixed capital and 1109.6 as the additional circu- 
lating portion of Ic. Finally, presuming that the rate of depreciation 
remains unchaged as well, this growth of Ic(f) by 369.9 implies a prior 
increase in I's total fixed capital by 3699. Adding all these figures 
up, we would need a total growth in I's output of means of production 
of 3699 in additional fixed capital, plus 1109.6 in new circulating 
constant capital, plus an equivalent of 369.9, which will exchange a- 
gainst means of subsistence for the new workers employed through the 
increase in Iv--a total of some 5178.5 in means of production, a growth 
better than 83% of the previous year's output. To say that this would 
be beyond the means of this or any other economy is to beg the question. 
The result becomes even more bizarre when we note that the actual in- 
crease in Iv of 369.9 will mean an equal rise in Is, half of which will 
enter the exchange fund, making the latter--as we already noted--equal 
to 554.8. Now, II only has 180.3 for exchange, and so we would actual- 
ly have over-production in department I. The reason for this rather 
peculiar result is that we assumed that the division of I's output be- 
tween those means of production which serve as fixed, and those which 
serve as circulating capital was the same as before. Yet II's accumula- 
tion of means of production will consist of 71.43% fixed capital, and 
21.42% circulating constant capital, and not 25% and 75%, as we had be- 
fore accumulation took place. This over-production would be entirely 
of circulating constant capital, which would have increased by 3/4 x 
554.8 = 416.1,10 times what II required. 
It is clear that we must start from the other end. II's exchange 
fund will increase by 180.3. If 138.7 of this goes for fixed capital, 
this leaves 41.6 to increase IIc(c). This will call forth a corres- 
ponding rise in I(v+s/x) of 180.3, of which two thirds is variable cap- 
ital, or 120.2. This will cause: a)Ic to rise by 480.8 [120.2 Ic(f) 
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and 360.6 Ic(c)], and b)the total stock of fixed capital in I to go up 
by 1292. Now, department I only has 517.85 in its accumulation fund. 
How could it raise its production by such a large amount, i. e., by a- 
bout 1680? (We ignore for the moment the problem of the material com- 
position of I's product. ) 
One way would be for I to accelerate the amortization of its fixed 
capital. If we let the entire increase in circulating capital, Ic(c) + 
Iv = 480.8, come from the accumulation fund, this leaves 37 to be added 
to I's fixed capital, bringing it up to 10,394. If the rate of deprec- 
iation of I's fixed capital went up from 10% per year to around 11%, 
i. e., if it was replaced not in 10 years, but in just under nine, then 
Ic(f) would go up by the requisite 120.2. 
A second method would be if I had existing reserves of fixed ca, - 
ital which it could tap in order to raise Ic(f) by the necessary amount. 
This case is exactly as that in Zakat Kapitalizma and we need not dwell 
on it here. 
Neither of these solutions is very satisfactory in the long run. 
The second implies a fairly rapid depletion of reserves. This is not, 
after all, a one-time rise in II's demand for fixed capital, but will 
recur every year. If reserves are employed it can only be until new 
enterprises are built which can place I's output of means of produc- 
tion, primarily fixed capital, on a new, higher level. 
The first solution, meaning as it does an increasingly rapid turn- 
over of fixed capital, also has material limits. First, the rate of 
amortization would have to increase every year, so that the number of 
years for which we could solve the problem this way is quite finite. 
2 
Second, this acceleration in the rate of depreciation must be real--it 
cannot be caused by moral depreciation, speculation, or any number of 
other methods of capitalist book-keeping which cause fixed capital to 
be written off before its natural lifetime is up. In our case the more 
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rapid rate of depreciation of fixed capital must mean that the same or 
more use values are produced in a shorter period of time. This, too, 
has limits. The length of the working day, or the time during which 
the means of production function, can be increased only so much; the 
same is true of the intensity with which these means of production can 
be used. 
Any increase in the rate of depreciation brings with it certain 
complications which make this type of solution more difficult. If the 
fixed capital functions at an increased intensity, or for a greater 
number of hours per day, this raises the demand for circulating con- 
stant capital (raw materials, fuel, etc. ) on the part of department I. 
In terms of the circulation of values, the entire circulating capital 
would 
would in fact have to turn over more quickly. To some extent this/ac- 
tually help alleviate our problem, in that more surplus value would be 
produced in the course of a year and a greater quantity of means of pro- 
duction could be offered for sale to department 11.3 The reproduction 
of Ic(c), however, is not simply a question of the circulation of val- 
ues. It is a matter of production. To the extent that Ic(c) exists 
as raw materials which come from agriculture, or depends upon such raw 
materials to produce intermediate goods, its increased supply has real 
technical limits, Some of these are natural, e. g., industrial crops 
have only certain growing seasons, or are dependent on climatic condi- 
tions, etc. Others are a function of technology and the state of agri- 
cultural production. 
4 If these agricultural products originate from 
pre-capitalist petty production, as we have mentioned in Chapter 2, 
then these technical limits are even narrower. 
5 For the present, how- 
ever, we assume that all production is capitalist, though we will take 
this point up again in our discussion of the Soviet goods famine. 
Changes in the rate of depreciation may not be possible unless 
there is a simultaneous rise in the intensity of the exploitation of 
-291- 
labor power, If the working day is lengthened or if the same means of 
production are consumed more intensively, then each of these may neces- 
sitate the expenditure of more labor, either in quantity or in quality, 
by the same number of workers. This rise in the rate of exploitation 
would represent at the same time a very real means for capitalism to 
extract the extra values that it cannot produce with the current rela- 
tions between constant and variable capital and the existing degree of 
exploitation--i. e., without a fundamental change in the relationship 
between capital and wage labor. This is a "method" that capitalism 
can and does use. It is the reason that any analysis of an economic 
crisis must at the same time be political. 
6 
No matter whether capitalism meets this shortage of fixed capital 
by relying on reserves or by accelerating the amortization of its fixed 
capital, there is a third problem that results. The value of the 
year's product would be as follows: 
I. 4623.6(1155.9f + 3467.7c)c + 1155.9v + 578s/x + 578s(a) 
II. 1609.1( 402.3f + 1206.8c)c + 402.2v + 402.2s 
I(v+s/x) equals Ills demand for means of production, which comes to 
1733.9. If I(v+s/x) meets the actual material requirements of depart- 
ment II, then Iv will consist of 2/3(1733.9 - 1206.8) = 351.4 fixed 
capital, and 2/3(1206.8) = 804,5 circulating constant capital. Is/x 
will be half that, or 175.7 fixed, and 402.3 circulating constant capi- 
tal, The proportion of those means of production that will function 
as fixed capital for department II to those that will enter its cones 
stant capital as circulating capital has risen over the ratio we start- 
ed with. Whereas before accumulation took place it was 25% fixed and 
75% circulating constant capital, now it is 30.4% and 69.6% respective- 
ly. With each year's accumulation, in which 71.43% of the accumulated 
surplus value must be put towards increasing the stock of fixed capi- 
tal in each department, and 21.42% towards acquiring the raw materials, 
-292- 
etc., for these implements to work up, the overall share of fixed cap- 
ital in the part of society's productive capital that represents means 
of production rises. This merely reflects the phenomenon we have re- 
ferred to many times before, that is, the changing technical base of 
social production, which, once again, we will analyze in more detail 
in Part IV. 
In sum, this last difficulty, the need to constantly gear produc- 
tion not towards the replacement of the existing stock of means of pro- 
duction but towards the anticipation of what that stock must look like 
in the future, is certainly not an obstacle to capitalism overcoming 
the problem of underproduction of means of production. It is, as we 
have stated, the reflection of an historical tendency, which for capi- 
talism becomes a deep contradiction and conflicts with the inherent 
anarchy of that mode of production--but it is a tendency to which cap- 
italism adapts, nonetheless. The basic problem is still with us, how- 
ever, and neither the reliance upon reserves of constant capital nor 
the accelerated amortization of fixed capital offer capitalism a way 
out. 
II. The Transfer of Capital From Department II to Department I 
When Marx moved from his analysis of simple reproduction to ex- 
panded reproduction he had to make a major adjustment in his schemes. 
Once accumulation was assumed I(v+s) would no longer equal IIc. Marx 
could either have boosted total production in department I, bringing 
the absolute value of I(v+s/x) up to that of IIc, while leaving all of 
the technical dimensions between c and v the same in the two depart- 
ments, or conversely, he could have reduced production in department 
II, again preserving the original values for c/v. Yet Marx chose neith- 
er of these. In order to demonstrate the continuity, as well as the 
distinctions between simple and expanded reproduction, he chose to keep 
the total volume of production in the separate departments just as they 
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had been under simple reproduction. Simple reproduction is a moment in 
the process of expanded reproduction, and there is no particular reason 
to assume that the movement from simple to expanded reproduction would 
actually involve two separate stages in the development of a real cap- 
italist economy, whereby it underwent some form of transition from a 
lower volume of production to a higher in order to effect accumulation. 
As a result Marx elected to rearrange production within one of the 
departments, so that, while its overall volume of production remained 
as it had been, its exchange fund would balance that of the other de- 
partment, which would be left unaffected. This inevitably meant alter- 
ing the organic composition of capital. It was perfectly logical for 
Marx to have carried out this adjustment within department II, rather 
than department I, since historically it is the former that has a small- 
er amount of constant capital in its productive capital. But in doing 
this Marx introduced a new point of disequilibrium in the system, al- 
though he himself did not work out, at least not as far as we have dis- 
covered, how this disproportionality would arise, simply from the fact 
that the two departments of social production had different technical 
structures, 
In our analysis of the accumulation of fixed capital we were faced 
with a very similar problem. We started out with a scheme which showed 
equilibrium in the exchange between IIc and I(v+s/x). Yet the new con- 
ditions of proportionality were that I(v+s/x) equal not only IIc, but 
II's total demand for means of production, which, given the assumption 
that fixed capital does not turn over in one year, would be appreciably 
larger. Thus there was a built-in disproportion before we even began 
our investigation. Here, too, we could have got around this in one of 
two ways. We could, as we noted in our discussion of prices of produc- 
tion, have boosted the volume of production in department I and assumed 
that its exchange fund could cover that of department II. The problem 
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with this solution is that it would have totally obscured the real his- 
torical process whereby capitalism developed and increased the volume 
of fixed capital in its total productive capital and, in so doing, had 
to make precisely the adjustments in the patterns of accumulation and 
exchange we have outlined here. The continuity between the process of 
the accumulation of fixed capital and the process of expanded reproduc- 
tion as outlined by Marx and subsequent Marxists, would have been lost. 
Nor, however, could we have followed Marx and rearranged produc- 
tion within one of the departments. For this would have meant lowering 
the organic composition of capital in department II (to do so in depart- 
ment I would have been unrealistic) and this would, as we know, have 
brought with it an automatic tendency towards under-accumulation in de- 
partment I, a tendency which would have obscured that other tendency 
towards under-production of means of production associated with the 
accumulation of fixed capital. The sources and special characteris- 
tics of the latter would have been inextricably confused with those of 
the former. 
We wanted to show how the tendencies for an under-production of 
means of production grew out of the reproduction schemes premised upon 
expanded reproduction, but with all of the constant capital turning over 
in a single year. On the one hand, as we will demonstrate in this sec- 
tion, even setting up the schemes so that I(v+s/x) initially is in bal- 
ance with the total exchange fund of department II will not eliminate 
the tendency towards under-production in department I. On the other, 
using the schemes we have presented here allows us to show three things: 
1)It mirrors the real historical process whereby capitalism moved from 
a stage of manufacturies to genuine modern industry, with large-scale 
production based on heavy machinery and increasing quantities of fixed 
capital. This fixed capital had to be accumulated, and the process we 
have described here reflects that stage of developing capitalism quite 
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accurately. 2)It allows us to show with full clarity the way that cap- 
italism carries out its accumulation of fixed capital, namely the trans- 
fer of capital from department II to department I. This is the mechan- 
ism by which capitalism ensures the absolute growth of department I, 
which we would have otherwise had to posit. One way, as we have seen, 
that capitalism effects this transfer of capital is via the deviation 
of prices from values, i. e., through the allocation of the social sur- 
plus value according to the average rate of profit. 3)These schemes 
further reflect, although only in their broadest outlines, the actual 
situation in the Soviet Union following the October Revolution, that 
is, an economy where department I could barely replace existing stocks 
of means of production, much less embark on a path of positive accumu- 
lation. And when accumulation proper did begin, it had to do so on a 
basis of restoring not simply the average depreciation of fixed capi- 
tal, but massive quantities of fixed capital all at once. 
We have, in addition, tested out various possible solutions to this 
tendency towards under-production of means of production. All of them 
so far have pointed to the need to invest in new enterprises that can 
produce fixed capital. This was impossible so long as we stuck to our 
assumptions that each department a)accumulated solely out of its own 
surplus value, and b)fully utilized its accumulation fund. In that sit- 
uation department II would produce on too large a scale, while depart- 
ment I would have insufficient capital to expand production. We have 
already seen how Preobrazhensky approached this problem in VKA 17. 
When new investment is needed it is not department I or department II 
alone that makes capital available, but society in general. Capital is 
constantly transferred from branches of production where there is ex- 
cess production to those where it is insufficient. In Chapter 4 we de- 
tailed how this is done. In our case, where there is under-production 
in department I, the capitalists in department II will invest in plants 
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that produce means of production, primarily fixed capital. Such ready 
transfers of capital would not be possible were it not for ample re- 
serves of implements of labor, raw materials, and means of subsistence, 
on the one hand, and a highly developed credit system on the other. 
Capital, after all, takes the legal form of titles to property, and its 
fluidity derives from the very act of realizing the result of production, 
commodity capital, as money, which is the universal equivalent and the 
only form that allows production to begin again in the following period. 
The modern credit system centralizes this money capital and, effective- 
ly, disposes of it where it can be most profitably invested. 
How would such a transfer of capital work? Again, take our ini- 
tial scheme, after production and exchange in the first year; 
I. 10,357.1 fixed capital: 
4142.8(1035.7f+3107.1c)c + 1035.7v + 517.85s/x + 517.85s(a) 
II. 3883.9 fixed capital: 
1553.6(388.4f + 1165.2c)c + 388.4v + 194.2s/x + 194.2s(a) 
Department I will have to accumulate all of its available surplus val- 
ue, Is(a). Out of this 517.85,369.9 will go to new fixed capital, 
110.92 for the circulating part of Ic, and 37.03 to increase Iv. This 
gives: 
I. 10,727 fixed capital: 
4290.7(1072.7f + 3218c)c + 1072.7v + 517.85s/x 
This increase of Iv by 37.03 means that II can add the same amount to 
its means of production, and so this much is withdrawn from IIs(a). To 
figure out how this will divide up between new fixed capital and addi- 
tions to IIc(c), we solve for the following two equations: 
(1) x+y= 37.03 
(2) 
, 3x -y=0 
x, the addition to fixed capital, equals 28.5 and y, the additional 
IIc(c), is 8.5. Given an annual rate of depreciation of fixed capital 
of 10% and an organic composition of capital of four to one, we must 
also subtract 2.85 from the 194.2 IIs(a) to add to IIv. We have for 
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department II: 
II. 3926.6 fixed capital: 
1570.7(392.7f + 1178c)c + 392.7v + 194.2s/x 
Out of the 194.2 IIs(a) we have taken a total of 37.03 to increase 11 's 
supply of means of production and 2.85 to increase Ilv, or 39.9 in all. 
This leaves 154.3 to be distributed between the two departments. We 
solve this the same way Preobrazhensky did in VKA 17. We know that the 
increment to Iv must equal II's entire addition of means of production, 
i. e., its new fixed capital plus IIc(c). This gives us the following 
equations: 
(3) h+ 2i +j= 154.3 
(4) h- 12.99i =0 
(5) i- 12.99j =0 
Where: h= the increment to I's total means of production [fixed cap- 
ital + Ic(c)] 
i= the increment to Iv = the increment to II's total means of 
production 
j= the increment to IIv 
We obtain equations (4) and (5) from our original simultaneous equa- 
tions (p. 248, above). The ratio of the total additional means of pro- 
duction to the additional variable capital is (71.43 + 21.42)/7.15 = 
12.99. Solving these equations we get h= 133, i= 10.2, and j=0.79. 
Using equations (1) and (2), out of h we take 102.3 to add to I's 
stock of fixed capital and 30.7 to add to Ic(c). The new variable cap- 
ital in I we already have from equation (4). It equals 10.2. For de- 
partment II, where i= the total addition to constant capital, we take 
7.88 for the stock of fixed capital and 2.36 for IIc(c). Again, we have 
the figure for the increase in IIv from equation (5)-. -it comes to 0.79. 
Arranging all of the capital accordingly we have: 
I. 10,820.3 fixed capital: 
4331.6(1082.9f + 3248.7c)c + 1082.9v + 517.85s/x 
II. 3920.3 fixed capital: 
1568(392f + 1176c)c + 392v + 194.2s/x 
I(v+s/x) = 1600.75. II's aggregate accumulation of means of production 
(the initial IIc plus the total additions of fixed and circulating con- 
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stant capital) = 1600.8. The net transfer of capital from department 
II to department I is 143.2. 
In this way, by apportioning the total surplus value produced in 
a given year according to the material needs of both departments, we 
obtain an overall arrangement that satisfies all the demands of ex- 
change between the two departments. In addition, we should note that 
we solve an additional problem. Previously we had to carry out produc- 
tion to the end of the year in order for department I to produce all 
of its consumption fund equivalent available for exchange with depart- 
ment II. It was only after the variable capital added by accumulation 
had produced surplus value that I would have all of the commodities II 
needed. The other side of this condition, however, was that II had to 
have a certain quantity of means of production in reserve, to tide pro- 
duction over until the close of the year. By arranging the entire so- 
cial surplus value we have not only overcome the under-production in 
department I brought about by the immanent tendencies of accumulation 
in the two departments, but have also eliminated the initial imbalance 
between I(v+s/x) and II's demand for means of production caused by the 
temporal discontinuity in their respective process of production and 
accumulation. 
7 
The question we must ask is whether, having established equilibri- 
um between the two departments, it will sustain itself in coming years 
through "normal" accumulation, without requiring any further transfer 
of capital between departments. The arrangement of capital we have 
just arrived at will yield the following product at the end of the year: 
I. 4331.6(1082.9f + 3248.7c)c + 1082.9v + 541.5s/x + 541.5s(a) 
II. 1568( 392f + 1176c)c + 392v + 196s/x + 196s(a) 
Is(a) = 541.5, of which 386.8 will go to the stock of fixed capital, 
116 to Ic(c), and 38.7 to Iv. IIs(a) = 196, of which 140 goes to fixed 
capital, 42 to IIc(c), and 14 to IIv. If we arrange the cappital ac- 
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cording to these figures and carry out production to the end of the 
year [thus giving us the maximum level of I(v+s/x)], we will have: 
1.11,216 fixed capital: 
4486.3(1121.6f + 3364.7c)c + 1121.6v + 560.8s/x + 560.8s(a) 
II. 4060 fixed capital: 
1624(406f + 1218c)c + 406v + 203s/x + 203s(a) 
Although I(v+s/x) exceeds lie by 58.4, II's total demand for means of 
production is greater than I(v+s/x) by about 67.55. 
We see, then, that equilibrium can only be maintained by rearrang- 
ing the total surplus value each and every year, i. e., by transferring 
capital from II to I. There is no one-time reallocation of capital that 
will guarantee a balance between I(v+s/x) and II's demand for means of 
production in subsequent years, As soon as we allow accumulation to 
proceed on the basis of the resources already within each department 
our old disproportion will automatically return. 
This, of course, is the same conclusion Preobrazhensky arrived at 
in VKA 17 when dealing with the disproportionalities that arise when 
departments I and II have unequal organic compositions of capital and 
when the organic composition rises. What he said about the viability 
of this type of solution, which takes place solely within the bounds of 
pure capitalism, applies here, as well. These transfers can only occur 
at the potential cost of masses of values. The need to constantly re- 
distribute the social capital between branches of production introduces 
countless points disturbance in the process of capitalist production and 
exchange, precisely because this production is only geared to the real- 
ization of surplus value. It is production for the moment, and not in 
accordance with any sort of social plan. What is characteristic of 
capitalism is not just that this process of transferring capital--which 
goes on all the time, and for which the general rate of profit is a 
prime vehicle--is attended by crises; crises are themselves one of the 
main mechanisms for effecting these rearrangements and restoring the 
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two departments to a position of proportionality. But we already know 
that this is not the whole story by any means. Capitalism does not 
carry out accumulation and production strictly within its own economic 
borders. It constantly breaks out of them and draws other modes of pro- 
duction into its orbit, where they produce for capitalist production 
and purchase as part of its market. These other forms of economic or- 
ganization give capitalism a powerful mechanism for regulating the dis- 
proportions that would otherwise arise from the accumulation process. 
So, once more following Preobrazhensky, we will investigate the problem 
of expanded reproduction of fixed capital not under pure, abstract cap- 
italism, but as it exists concretely, in constant inter-connection with 
pre-capitalist, or developing-capitalist and subordinate modes of pro- 
duction. The analysis Preobrazhensky developed in VKA 17 established 
theoretical principles necessary for a concrete study of the Soviet 
economy during NEP. We cannot simply proceed in that same order, and 
move on to apply what we discovered under pure capitalism to the con- 
ditions of concrete capitalism. This is because the solution to the 
question of the expanded reproduction of fixed capital turns out to be 
inseparable from that of the reproduction and circulation of the mater- 
ial elements of the social capital. For that we must first trace out, 
in some detail, the basic process of circulation of these material el- 
ements and their reproduction in a mixed economy of petty and indus. - 
trial production. The groundwork for that task was laid out not in the 
last two parts of this thesis, but in Part I, where we derived the rud- 
iments of a two-sector reproduction scheme. The Soviet economy was 
more complex, in that, as we have stressed many times, the two sectors 
represented two modes of production with different techniques and dif- 
ferent principles of organizing labor power. We must therefore move on 
directly to our analysis of the Soviet goods famine: First in its gen- 
eral outlines, then in terms of the circulation and reproduction of the 
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individual elements of reproduction in the two sectors, and then in terms 
of expanded reproduction of these elements, with particular attention 
to the reproduction of fixed capital. It is there, in that latter 
discussion, that we will take up the question of the accumulation of 
fixed capital under concrete capitalism. We will use it to establish 
the basic conditions of proportionality in the accumulation of fixed 
and circulating capital in a mixed economy, and as the touchstone for 
analyzing the chronic shortage of productive capital in the Soviet 
Union. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 
1. For a good example of this see the last chapter of Luxemburg's 
Accumulation of Capital, where she allows that capitalism will not 
actually reach the point of imminent breakdown, and the revolution- 
ary action of the proletariat will intercede and establish social- 
ism long before. She does not, however, abandon the breakdown 
theory, in spite of its determinist implications. 
2. Carrying out accumulation and production for an additional year, 
we have: 
I. 10,394.1 fixed capital: 
4623.6(1155.9f + 3467.7c)c + 1155.9v + 580s/x + 580s(a) 
II. 4022.6 fixed capital: 
1609.1(402.26f + 1206.8c)c + 402.2v + 201. ls/x + 201.1s(a) 
II will increase its fixed capital by 143.6, its circulating con- 
stant capital by 43, and IIv by 14.4. Thus I(v+s/x) will have to 
rise by 186.6, meaning a rise in Iv by 124,4 (which will increase 
Is/x by 62.2 at the end of the year), This increase in Iv will, 
if we maintain proportionality throughout I's productive capital, 
mean that Ic goes up by 497.6: 124.4 Ic(f) and 373.2 Ic(c), The 
total increase in Iv and Ic(c) taken together is thus equal to 
497.6. If we let all of this come out of Is(a), this leave 82.4 
to go to increase the stock of fixed capital, bringing it to 
10,476.5. We also know that Ic(f) must rise to 124.4, to 1280.3. 
Dividing the stock of fixed capital through by this figure, we 
get an amortization period of just under 8.2 years, or about 12.2% 
per year, which is quite a substantial increase. 
3. This is true only if, as in our example, the reduction in the turn- 
over period results from a fall in the production period or from 
a rise in both the intensity of labor and the intensity with which 
fixed capital is employed. If the reduction in turnover time comes 
only from a drop in the time of circulation, this has no effect 
on the mass-of surplus value, and hence the mass of use values, 
produced during the year; it simply lowers the amount of variable 
capital (and circulating capital in general) that must be advanced. 
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This would raise the annual rate of surplus value and the annual 
rate of profit, but would have no effect on production. See Cap- 
ital, II, Chs. XV-XVII. 
4. See Capital, III, pp. 118-19. 
5. See above, Chapter 2, pp. 129-30 and p. 138, Note 9. 
6. This was one of the main themes of Preobrazhensky's writings about 
capitalist crises. In the last instance, argues Preobrazhensky, 
economic crises posed the need for the bourgeoisie to attempt to 
redefine the conditions under which labor power is bought and sold, 
for a crisis always posed the essential problem of how the capi- 
talist class could extract more surplus value out of the proletar- 
iat, and thus restore profitability, Quite obviously this proved 
central to Preobrazhensky's analysis of fascism, which he viewed 
as the form of the bourgeois state most appropriate to enforcing 
this new relationship between capital and wage labor. At the same 
time, crises provide the capitalist class with the opportunity to 
scrap outmoded fixed capital and restore it with new, modern plant 
and equipment--at the same moment that it is attempting to purchase 
labor power at bargain basement prices. See in particular "Eco- 
nomic Equilibrium Under Concrete Capitalism and in the System of 
the USSR, " VKA 18, and Teoriya Padaiushchei Valiuty, Ch. 7. 
7. This still says nothing about the material composition of I's pro- 
duction and its ability to satisfy II's demand for various kinds 
of means of production in the right proportions. We will defer 
this analysis, however, until Part IV, concentrating here upon its 
solution in value terms. 
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PART IV 
EXPANDED REPRODUCTION IN THE USSR DURING 
THE PERIOD OF PRIMITIVE SOCIALIST ACCUMULATION 
CHAPTER 10 
GENERAL OUTLINES OF THE GOODS FAMINE 
I. Preobrazhensky's Scheme For Expanded Reproduction in the USSR 
Preobrazhensky never carried out his proposed study of the con- 
crete conditions of expanded reproduction in the Soviet economy, in 
which he would have used the kind of detailed statistical analysis he 
thought necessary. If the two articles of 1926 (VKA 17 and 18) were 
preliminary to his last one of 1927 (VKA 22), the latter in turn was 
still theoretical in nature. It is concrete in the philosophical sense 
used by Marx, in that it introduces further complexities and details 
which Preobrazhensky synthesized into a more sophisticated and "com- 
plete" picture of reality. Yet it is still abstract, in the sense that 
it only presents the analytical framework Preobrazhensky thought to be 
essential for further work. The analysis of "Economic Equilibrium in 
the System of the USSR" (VKA 22) differs from that of the two earlier 
articles precisely in the fact that it deals with an historically-given, 
specific economy. To study it properly, we must first fill in those 
particulars and unique characteristics that make this society what it 
is. Preobrazhensky had, of course, done this throughout his other 
works, from The New Economics to the writings on financial policy. We 
have already described in a number of places his theory of two regula- 
tors and his analysis of the conflict between the law of value and the 
law of primitive socialist accumulation. This, as we noted at the op- 
ening of Part II, was what led him to start his analysis of the repro- 
duction schemes from the standpoint of two sectors, each representing 
a different mode of production. In the Soviet system, however, not 
even these schemes were adequate. We already came upon this difficulty 
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ourselves, in our examination of the accumulation of fixed capital. 
There we saw that any solution to the problem in value terms could on- 
ly be conditional, and constantly demanded to go beyond a pure value 
analysis to take account of the reproduction of the individual compon- 
ents of productive capital in terms of their distinct use values and 
functions within the process of production. Following our analysis 
both of expanded reproduction under concrete capitalism and of the ac- 
cumulation of fixed capital, we might, as Preobrazhensky observed, 
choose the following scheme for studying the Soviet economy: 
State Sector; 
I. c+v+ surplus product 
II. c+v+ surplus product 
plus the surplus product alienated 
from other sectors 
Capitalist Sector: 
I. c+v+s 
II. c+v+s 
Petty Production Sector 
1. c+ consumption fund + surplus product 
II. c+ consumption fund + surplus product 
Here we would note immediately that the categories of this scheme ref- 
lect the different modes of production that coexist in the Soviet eco- 
nomy. Neither the state sector nor the peasant sector produces "sur- 
plus value" in the proper sense of the term. In the state sector this 
category has been in large part eroded by the transformation of the 
market, the modifications in the category of commodity (without which 
the production of surplus product cannot take place), and the changes 
that have occurred in the other categories of capitalist political eco- 
nomy, whose whithering away and nascent transformation Preobrazhensky 
analyzed in Chapter 3 of The New Economics. We have already described 
why surplus value does not exist in the petty-commodity sector: The 
value of labor power is not regulated by the law of value, and hence 
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the category of "variable capital" does not apply to this sector. I 
Nevertheless, this scheme cannot convey all the information we 
need. "The above scheme, " says Preobrazhensky, "is inadequate for our 
purposes, because it gives no idea as to how the individual magnitudes 
break down from the point of view of their exchange with the different 
departments of the different sectors. "2 Preobrazhensky proposes that 
we adopt the more detailed scheme which we have reproduced on the next 
page. 
This scheme is extraordinarily complex, and it would be useful for 
us to briefly summarize Preobrazhensky's explication of it. 
3 Let us 
first examine the constant and variable capital components within each 
department of each sector. None are completely reproduced within any 
is 
one department or any one sector alone. This/first of all due to the 
physical composition of production. For instance, department I of the 
state sector, no matter how relatively self-sufficient it might be in 
the production of machines and other forms of fixed capital, still needs 
certain means of production from the peasant sector. Likewise with de- 
partment II of the state sector. It will purchase means of consumption 
from petty bourgeois agriculture, i. e., its workers will spend part of 
their wages on commodities of peasant origin. In addition, we should 
note the introduction of imports into the scheme. We shall see below 
that planned imports and exports play a large role in helping the sys- 
tem achieve equilibrium, As Marx observed in Volume II of Capital, 
foreign trade would be necessary to relieve any imbalance in reproduc- 
tion, particularly when we considered the elements of reproduction in 
their material form, Imports play precisely this role in both the 
state and peasant sectors. That they do not do so in the capitalist 
sector reflects the fact that capitalism in the Soviet economy has a 
relatively small role in production per se, and is generally confined 
to trading and merchant undertakings. In addition, department II of 
STATE SECTOR 
All of the The part of the constant Wage fund: Surplus product: 
fixed capital annually 
capital reproduced on an 
c expanding scale: (1) For ex andin p g 
(a) via reproduction (a) the part that is re- 
existing (a) accumulation 
within the placed by means of 
enterprises fund 
department exchange with //c of (2) For constructing 
q) m the state sector new factories 
Q (b) by means of (b) by means of ex- (b) the fund of non-productive consump- 
exchange with change with Ilc of tion of the Soviet system, which 
other departments / other departments passes into //c of all sectors and into 
c of military industry 
(c) via imports 
c The part of the constant 
i l ll 
Wage fund: Surplus product: 
annua cap ta y 
reproduced on an 
expanding scale: 
(a) by means of exchange (a) the part replaced (a) accumulation fund in the depart- 
with department / of within the ment itself (additional v, additonal 
the state sector department itself increase to its own c) 
(b) by means of exchange (b) the part replaced by (b) the fund of non-productive consump- 
with the consump- means of exchange tion of the Soviet system 
tion funds of the with the consumption E 
departments / of funds of other 
n other sectors departments 
(c) by means of exchange 
with part of fund of 
non-productive con- 
sumption of 
department / 
(d) via imports 
a, The movement of the material composition of the fund of socialist accumulation is clear 
from the entire scheme of reproduction. More detail about this will be given in the numerical 
analysis of the Control Figures of Gosplan. 
CAPITALIST SECTOR 
c c +v +s 
Same as in the state Same as in the state (a) accumulation fund 
4) sector, except for sector (b) fund of capitalist consumption imports 
t! 
CO (c) fund of nonproductive consumption 
of the Soviet system 
D (d) expropriation for the fund of so- 
cialist accumulation 
ZI 
Same as in the state Same as in the state Same as in department / of the 
CF1 sector sector capitalist sector 
C 
O 
Co 
7 
E 
O 
U 
CO 
N 
. 
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PETTY BOURGEOIS SECTOR 
c Means of production Consumption fund Surplus product 
for the production of 
means of production (1) the part that re- 
which are annually mains within the 
reproduced on an department 
expanding scale (2) the part exchanged 
for addition to the (a) reproduced within (a) reproduced by means (a) accumulation consumption fund 
the department of exchange with fund (3) for additional //c of the state 
sector means of produc- 
tion from other 
sectors 
(b) by means of ex- (b) by means of exchange (b) fund of nonproductive consumption 
change with Ic of with I/c of the capital of the Soviet system 
the state and ist sector 
capitalist sectors 
(c) via imports (c) by means of exchange (c) expropriation into the fund of social- 
with //c of its own ist accumulation 
sector 
c Means of production Consumption fund Surplus product 
for the production of 
means of consumtion (1) fund of additional 
annually reproduced on consumption pro- 
an expanding scale duced internally 
(2) exchange for 
(a) created within (a) produced internally (a) accumulation of produc iionans o the department (predominant part) fund from other depart- from epart- 
ments of other ments 
sectors 
(3) own additional 
means of produc- 
tion 
(b) reproduced by means (b) by means of exchange (b) fund of nonproductive consumption 
of exchange with the with a part of IN of of Soviet society, in natural form 
consumption fund the state sector, and 
and a part of the fund IN of the capitalist m E of nonproductive sector 
consumption of its 
$1 own sector 
(c) by means of exchange (c) expropriation into the fund of social- 
with v and a part of ist accumulation 
the fund of nonprod- 
uctive consumption 
of department / of 
the state sector 
(d) by means of ex- 
change with a part of 
v and s of department 
/ of the capitalist 
sector 
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the petty-commodity sector is able to reproduce part of its own con- 
stant capital, in the form of seeds manure, livestock for breeding, etc. 
We should also look at the function that the state sector's non- 
productive consumption plays in reproducing the constant capital of all 
three departments II. It must be remembered that IIc of each sector 
exists in the physical form of means of consumption, while non-produc- 
tive consumption of the Soviet state is a category that corresponds to 
the personal consumption of the capitalist class in capitalist simple 
and expanded reproduction. SII can produce the equivalent of this share 
of its surplus product in kind, but this is not true of SI, where the 
fund of non-productive consumption exists physically only as means of 
production which must be exchanged against all three IIc's. The three 
departments II, in turn, require means of production which they obtain 
in large part from SI. Thus we see the crucial role that the non-pro- 
ductive consumption fund of SI plays in allowing for the renewal and 
expansion of the constant capital in all departments II, 
4 
Therefore, the reproduction of the c and v parts of the productive 
capital of each sector (remembering that "v" exists only in a condi- 
tional sense in the sphere of petty production) shows the high degree 
of interconnection that exists between them all. No part of this pro- 
ductive capital can be reproduced without mutual exchange involving 
all departments of all sectors, 
The reproduction of the surplus product in each sector tells us 
a great deal about the nature of the Soviet economy in the period of 
primitive socialist accumulation. In department I of the state sector 
it consists of two basic parts. One goes to accumulation within the 
state economy, and breaks down into the categories of new constant and 
variable capital. These go to expand existing enterprises and to build 
new ones. The second part is for non-productive consumption of the 
state sector. It corresponds, as we said, to capitalist personal con- 
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sumption under capitalist reproduction, in that it forms the state's 
consumption fund, which either exists in natura or is exchanged against 
all three IIc's. In social terms, the part of this fund that exists 
as means of production (SIs/x) is exchanged for means of consumption 
which go to sustain those working in Soviet administration and trade, 
workers in defense plants, the military, leakages into the private 
trading network, etc. The only exception is that part of the non-pro- 
ductive consumption fund which goes in natura to form the constant cap- 
ital of military-related industries. 
For the state's department II, the part of the surplus product that 
goes for accumulation is fairly straightforward: A portion goes to new 
constant capital, and must exchange aginst means of production from all 
the sectors; the remainder goes to increase v, and is produced either 
in natura within SII, or is exchanged for goods produced by PII. Phys- 
ically, the non-productive consumption fund of SII is reproduced the 
same as SIIv--it either goes directly for the consumption of the "non- 
productive" workers of the Soviet state, or must be exchanged for com- 
modities of PIT which can fulfill this function. 
The surplus product of the capitalist and petty-commodity sectors 
is quite interesting. Part of it goes towards accumulation within the 
respective sectors: Some goes for the personal consumption of new 
workers, the rest to augment means of production. Both obviously re- 
quire exchange with other sectors to achieve reproduction. Another 
portion of the surplus product is consumed by the capitalists (or, 
where applicable, by those peasants--predominantly kulaks--who can ex- 
pand their personal consumption as a direct result of accumulation, 
that is, over and above the portion we would normally terms as "v") 
The remainder of the surplus product directly reflects the subordinate 
role that both K and P play in relation to the state economy. This 
portion goes first of all into the fund of primitive socialist accumu- 
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lation. The state directly expropriates it through taxes, by means of 
non-equivalent exchange, through interest on agricultural credits, etc. 
The other part is for the fund of non-productive consumption of the 
state apparatus, the military, etc. Of course, the shares of private 
production that go to non-productive consumption or to socialist accumu- 
lation are physically indistinguishable in most cases (except, perhaps, 
where the peasantry makes such payments directly by means of labor ser- 
vices). They must be distinguished conceptually, however, because 
they represent different applications of social labor, and in fact have 
a reciprocal relationship: The fund of non-productive consumption, no 
matter how necessary it may be, is a direct block to more rapid accumu- 
lation in the state sector. 
These, then, are the essential outlines of Preobrazhensky's scheme 
for expanded reproduction in the USSR. 6 We will go into all of the 
categories we have described here and the way in which they are repro- 
duced in much more detail in the next chapter. Even now it should be 
clear that only such a complex scheme would have allowed Preobrazhensky 
to carry his analysis of the Soviet economy to the depths he wished, 
which meant not only revealing the quality and origins of the quantita- 
tive disproportions within the economy, but the imbalances in the ma- 
terial composition of each sector's productive "capital" as well. This 
is, perhaps, the crucial point. We are no longer dealing with only 
those parts of each department's product that exchange with different 
departments of the same or other sectors (as is adequate with a strict- 
ly value analysis). We now must go further and consider exchange be- 
tween the same departments of different sectors, such as that between 
department I of the state sector, which produces agricultural machinery, 
and department I of the petty bourgeois sector, which produces raw ma- 
terials, It is only then that the full implications of the Soviet goods 
famine and the country's backwardness emerge. Before moving on to that 
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analysis, it is necessary to first examine Preobrazhensky's theory of 
the general morphology of the goods famine, so that we can discern the 
basic tendencies at work under expanded reproduction and from there 
draw out more complex inter-relationships. 
II. Non-equivalent Exchange as the Basis of the Reproduction Schemes 
One of the central arguments of The New Economics is the need for 
the state sector to accumulate off of the private sector via non-equiv- 
alent exchange. We must be quite careful about what is meant by this. 
Preobrazhensky was not, as Day ludicrously asserts, advocating an ever- 
widening gap between state and peasant prices.? The productivity of 
labor of Soviet industry was far lower than that of Western capitalism; 
yet it was quite a bit higher than that of petty production. On the one 
hand, the Soviet economy could not hope to compete with capitalist in- 
dustry if the latter were allowed access to the domestic private market. 
Thus the relatively high prices of Soviet industry were reinforced and 
protected politically by the monopoly of foreign trade. At the same 
time, peasant prices were kept low, also by economic-political measures. 
This was not the result of a policy of "milking" the peasantry. If, as 
Preobrazhensky repeatedly argued, one hour of peasant labor exchanged 
equally for one hour of labor expended in state industry, there would 
be a de facto subsidy of the private sector by the state, since the 
latter, in exchanging one hour's product for one hour's product, would 
in effect be exchanging one hour of skilled labor for one hour of aver- 
age or socially necessary labor. The state would actually be exchang- 
ing more of its own values for fewer values of peasant production. 
Non-equivalent exchange, of course, takes place regularly under capi- 
talism, wherever the latter intersects with and subordinates pre-cap- 
italist forms of production. It is no less a reality in the Soviet 
economy; only here, given the lower productivity of labor in Soviet 
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industry as compared to the world market, this non-equivalence must be 
enforced. It is, then, what Preobrazhensky calls an obligatory condi- 
tion of primitive socialist accumulation. 
Preobrazhensky viewed non-equivalent exchange, like he did every 
other means of primitive socialist accumulation, as a weapon of social 
conflict. Although expanded reproduction of socialist production re- 
lations could not proceed without it, by the same token it must be tran- 
scended as soon as possible. This could only happen if Soviet industry 
could attain the same productivity of labor as the capitalist West. 
Eventually the conditions of labor and exchange between the city and 
the countryside would have to be equalized. If they were not, the pol- 
itical instability engendered by those social forces who constantly 
pressed for an end to the constraints the Soviet state placed on their 
economic activity would threaten to rock the system to its foundations. 
In The New Economics Preobrazhensky argued that state prices must fall, 
but only in line with rises in labor productivity. Non-equivalence 
would persist, but only because the drop in state industrial prices 
would not reflect the full saving in production costs brought about by 
increased efficiency, The bedrock of this process was obviously the 
industrialization of the country, the re-equipping of its industry, the 
collection of the rural unemployed around collective state industrial 
production as the new proletariat, and the increased leisure and stan- 
dard of living, the sine qua non of socialism, which such industrial- 
ization would, for the first time, make possible. 
8 
Preobrazhensky therefore cites non-equivalent exchange and its 
supersession as the two dominant characteristics of equilibrium in the 
period of primitive socialist accumulation. What would be the effect 
of a realxation of this "first condition of equilibrium, " as Preobra- 
zhensky termed it in VKA 22? Suppose, Preobrazhensky says, that the 
gross output of both departments of the state sector combined is 12 
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billion chervontsi, divided up as follows; 
8c + 2v +2 surplus product 
Of this 12 billion, it exchanges 3 billion in means of production, 
means of consumption, and state-provided services, such as transport, 
with the peasant sector9 for an equal amount of peasant-produced raw 
materials and other means of production, means 
cultural products for the export fund. This e 
far as the inter-relations between S and P are 
of expanded reproduction are satisfied. It is 
is based on non-equivalent exchange. 
What if it weren't? Suppose instead that 
its products at world market prices, which are 
of consumption, and agri- 
Kchange shows that as 
concerned the conditions 
clear that this balance 
state industry evaluated 
much lower due to the 
technological superiority of Western capitalism over the more backward 
Soviet economy. State prices would fall, let's say, by half. This 
would not change anything for internal exchange within S. There money 
and price no longer function as they do under capitalism; within the 
state sector prices are more units of accounting, means of measuring 
plant or trust "profitability" (khozraschet) and a means of distribut- 
ing resources within the state sector than anything else. Any uniform 
drop in prices would affect all enterprises in both departments to the 
same degree and goods would exchange in the same proportions as before. 
Where this would make a difference, according to Preobrazhensky, 
would be where exchange between departments I and II was not in balance, 
and the deficit of the department in question (more probably department 
II, which has a heavy dependence on peasant raw materials) had to be 
made up via exchange with the peasant sector. Then the balance we had 
before would be disturbed. The department which had to engage in direct 
exchange with P would only be able to acquire half the products it 
could formerly, meaning either a huge deficit in money terms, or an in- 
ability to reproduce its productive capital in the necessary physical 
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proportions. 
In reality the situation is not so simple. One look at the repro- 
duction scheme between pages 305-306 shows us that both departments of 
S must exchange a certain portion of their products with the private 
economy in order to obtain needed commodities. Each and every individ- 
ual exchange which took place would now bring to the state sector only 
half as many goods from P as before. SI would not be able to reproduce 
its variable capital, nor that part of c which consists of means of 
production produced by P. The imbalance would hit department II even 
more seriously, since it has such a large dependence on raw materials 
in the replacement of SIIc. 
In gross terms, the state economy's going over to equivalent ex- 
change, whose prices are set by the operation of the law of value, 
would mean that it would suffer a shortage of 1.5 billion. Yet the 
surplus product of S equals only two billion, and much of this consists 
of non-productive consumption, The deficit will eat away the entire 
accumulation fund, much of the fund of non-productive consumption, and 
even part of the existing stock of fixed capital. "Overall, this would 
mean total breakdown of the process of expanded reproduction, and, as 
long as significant non-productive consumption is maintained, it pre- 
cludes the possibility of even simple reproduction at the preceding 
year's level. ""10 
The simplicity of the example does not alter the importance of the 
result. The economy's technology and social structure have fixed ex- 
change between S and P in fairly definite proportions. The abolition 
of non-equivalent exchange would seriously disrupt these proportions, 
and in a way that would make it impossible for the state sector to ob- 
tain the necessary material elements of its productive capital. This 
is even more true when we consider that not only would S's prices fall, 
but those of the products of the private sector (which are kept below 
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the world market level by the monopoly of foreign trade) would rise. 
Consequently the disproportion would worsen from both directions: The 
state's production would sell more cheaply, while peasant products 
would be more expensive. Preobrazhensky's conclusion is well-founded: 
Given a discrepancy between world industrial prices and domestic 
industrial prices in the USSR, that is, when domestic prices of 
Soviet industry are much higher than world prices, an economic 
equilibrium that will ensure expanded reproduction in the state 
sector can only be brought about on the basis of non-equivalent 
exchange with the sectors of private production. This means that, 
given this sort of price discrepancy, the law of primitive social- 
ist accumulation is the law that can maintain the equilibrium of 
the entire system, above all in its relations with the world eco- 
nomy. This must of necessity operate until we have overcome the 
economic and technological backwardness of the economy of the pro- 
letarian state as compared to the advanced capitalist countries. 11 
Ii. Under-accumulation in the State Sector 
The example Preobrazhensky used in the previous part of the dis- 
cussion is largely hypothetical. Although he took a fairly accurate 
figure for total production in S, its breakdown into c, v, and surplus 
product is simply illustrative, showing what movements would take place 
if the preconditions of reproduction were not fulfilled. To this end 
he retained this first example when he sought to demonstrate the effects 
of insufficient accumulation in the state sector. 
If we accumulate one half the surplus product of state industry, 
i. e., one billion chervontsi, then four-fifths, or 800 million, will 
go to increase c, and 200 million to augment v. The product for the 
next year will be: 
8.8c + 2.2v + 2.2s = 13.2 
Preobrazhensky further presumes that equilibrium within the system as a 
whole will be secured if exchange with the private sector grows propor- 
tionately, to 3.25 billion. 12 If, on the other hand, accumulation were 
to fall short of this figure, due to an increase in non-productive con- 
sumption, or to an incorrect prices policy, and total only 700 of the 
first year's surplus product, then we would have: 
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8.56c + 2.14v + 2.14s = 12.84 
We have a relative shortage from before of 240 million in means 
of production, and of 60 in means of consumption, or 300 in all. Pro- 
duction as a whole will fall 360 million chervontsi short of our first 
example. Quite clearly a part of this shortage will fall upon petty 
production, whose exchange with S is equivalent to almost one quarter 
of the latter's output. In other words, P would experience a deficit 
of state-produced goods to the amount of 90 million. Preobrazhensky is 
primarily concerned here with what this shortage of 90 million will 
mean for P's future economic development. Although we will examine the 
effects of this goods famine in greater detail both in the next section 
of this chapter and in the ensuing chapters of this thesis, for the mo- 
mentwecan trace out the effects it will have on expanded reproduction 
in both the -state and petty-commodity sectors. 
Taking first of all peasant demand for means of consumption pro- 
duced in S, if, as Preobrazhensky postulates, two thirds of the total 
deficit takes this form, it will lead to a decline in personal consump- 
tion in P and a going over to in natura consumption of the peasantry's 
own products. This weakening of exchange relations between P and S can 
only lead to a retardation of the former's development, since it encour- 
ages the peasantry to produce by its own primitive methods substitute 
goods for those it would have purchased from SII. This in turn will 
reduce the export fund, which can only come from the state's purchase 
of a certain portion of peasant output. If the marketable share of 
that product contracts, the export fund--and potential socialist accum- 
ulation--must do so as well. Preobrazhensky also mentions the strength- 
ening of the role of the private middleman, due to the aggravation of 
the divergence between retail and wholesale prices the goods famine 
brings about. We need not go into this particular aspect of the matter, 
as he deals with it at great length in other writings. 
13 
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What is more serious is the other part of the 90 million deficit 
of state-produced goods. These have the form of means of production, 
and their absence can only undermine the state's attempts to modernize 
peasant agriculture. This would prove an even more immediate cause of 
the retardation of expanded reproduction in P, and its long-term effect 
would be an eventual shortage of peasant-produced commodities needed 
by the state sector, mainly raw materials. 
If we look at the example again, it is obvious that if peasant pro- 
duction expanded its exchangeable commodity-product from three billion 
to 3.25, and if the state could not keep pace with this growth, we have 
only two possible results. One would be the accumulation of unsold 
stocks in P., with a subsequent cutback of production and/or an increase 
of its in natura consumption, The other would be a series of sales 
from P to S without corresponding purchases, with a consequent increase 
in monetary accumulation within P. Even though we know from Preobra- 
zhensky's other discussions of this topic14 that such monetary accumula- 
tion (being deposited in Gosbank) would be a potential source of trans- 
ferring values from P to S (and hence a source of primitive socialist 
accumulation), we must also keep in mind that the purchases that do not 
take place would have been for state-produced means of production, prin- 
cipally for agricultural machinery and other implements that would im- 
prove technique in agriculture. Thus we already see that the goods 
famine is a severe, artificial impediment to expanded reproduction in P, 
compared to the possibilities that would exist if accumulation in the 
state sector had not slackened off. 15 
This leads Preobrazhensky to two conclusions: 1)That the volume 
of accumulation in the state sector is not arbitrary, but is subject to 
rather strict laws of proportionality; and 2)that any disturbance in 
the state sector's ability to maintain the necessary minimum level of 
accumulation does not retard merely the state sector, but the petty 
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production sector as well. 
16 
From here Preobrazhensky launches into a theoretically important 
discussion of the question of "over-production. '' Is such a phenomenon 
possible in the backward, developing economy of the USSR? 
To begin with, we have to decide what we mean by the term "over- 
accumulation. " If by "over-accumulation" we mean a relationship 
between production and consumption throughout society such that 
new means of production put into operation in both departments 
lead in the final analysis to so sharp an increase in the output 
of means of consumption that these goods cannot be absorbed by 
the consumer market at existing prices, as a result of which the 
corresponding accumulation in department I proves to be useless- 
well, then, such a phenomenon is quite well known in capitalist 
economy and must inevitably lead to a sales crisis, the ruin of 
numerous enterprises in both departments, a forced lowering of 
prices, and a fall in the rate of profit. 17 
It is certainly true that the state sector may produce a greater quan- 
tity of means of consumption than can be sold. Does this mean that we 
have over-production of the capitalist type? As soon as we look at the 
sources of this disproportion and the ways it can be rectified, we see 
that this is not the case. 
Preobrazhensky 
In From NEP To Socialism/posed a similar question. There he saw 
little difficulty in overcoming this type of "over-accumulation, " since 
he considered that it came solely from a misassessment by the state of 
its wages and prices policy. If means of consumption were accumulating 
unsold, then a rise in wages and/or a lowering of industrial prices 
would solve the problem. 
18 
This is far from the whole story, and Preo- 
brazhensky recognized this in VKA 22. A relative surplus of state-pro- 
duced means of consumption may mean that the expansion of these goods 
has exceeded the level permitted by the given technical base of the 
economy. The state can lower prices and raise wages only within cer- 
tain limits, and these are dictated by its ability to lower costs. Any- 
thing beyond this would be artificial and disrupt the balance of ex- 
change between the socialist and private sectors. In this case the 
over-production of means of consumption would signify a maldistribution 
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of the productive forces of the society. What is more, this is itself 
a product--and a sign--of too slow a process of technical re-equipment 
of state industry. This disproportion does not exist in the realm of 
exchange between the state and private sectors, nor does it come from 
"over-production" in SII, It stems from an improper distribution of 
social labor within the state sector and will persist until the state 
sector rearranges its productive capital in favor of the production of 
means of production. This alone would provide an economically justified 
rise in the consumption fund of both SI and SII, and a lowering of out- 
put prices throughout the state sector. 
This argument requires some clarification, both in its own right, 
and because of the obvious connection it has with what Preorbrazhensky 
was to argue in the early thirties. Marx, in Volume II of Capital, and 
Preobrazhensky, in VKA 17 and zakat Kapitalizma, argued that such shifts 
of productive capital are possible only if ample reserves of means of 
production and means of subsistence are on hand. Otherwise the trans- 
fer of capital will precipitate a crisis. Marx further specified the 
problem as stemming from an imbalance in the retirement and replacement 
of fixed capital. In other words, reproduction is also a temporal pro- 
cess. Even if the necessary material elements of reproduction are pro- 
duced, and they all exchange at the necessary values and in the correct 
proportions, if the momentary needs of each department do not all cor- 
respond in time, then the circuit will be broken nonetheless. It is 
not enough just to say that the productive resources of the state sec- 
is 
tor are improperly allocated and that this/an aggravating factor in the 
goods famine (which is the real, underlying actuality of "over-produc- 
tion" in the USSR). Even if all other conditions of equilibrium were 
satisfied, the Soviet economy would still come up against the pressing 
historical fact of its backwardness and the decimation of its fixed 
capital base. In the period after War Communism, the state economy 
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could expand rapidly merely on the basis of bringing idle plant and e- 
quipment back into operation and utilizing existing capital once again 
at full capacity, There was a great deal of slack of this kind, So 
long as it existed the potential crisis of insufficient production of 
means of production could remain somewhat disguised, 
With the end of this period of "restoration" the Soviet economy 
had stretched its existing capacity to the hilt. No further expansion 
could occur without the construction of new plants and new machines, 
This begins the period reconstruction. Preobrazhensky here called at- 
tention to the fact that an increase in the production of means of con- 
sumption requires the previous production of means of production worth 
many times the amount of the additional output in whose production they 
will eventually be employed. Yet these means of production themselves 
take time to construct, as do the plant and equipment to produce them. 
All of this demands a one--way withdrawal of values from the accumulation 
fund which will not yield any values--not even to cover their replace- 
ment--for some years to come. The result will be an inadequate supply 
of means of production and a retardation of the growth of SI. Further- 
more, this will also slow down the process of lowering costs of indus- 
trial means of production, thus making them less accessible to SII and 
to both departments of P, 
19 
The implications of this observation are immense, and Preobrazhen- 
sky did not accord them adequate attention, by any means, It is quite 
obvious that planning in the state sector must take this temporal dis- 
continuity of expanded reproduction in department I into account and 
plan in the present for itsneeds of fixed capital in the future. The 
longer this process is delayed the more serious and chronic the deficit 
of means of production will be in the years to come, and the greater 
the impediment that under-accumulation represents for needed expansion 
in the peasant sector. Thus the accelerated accumulation in the state's 
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production of means of production is a political priority of the first 
order. This means that Preobrazhensky is only partly correct when he 
states that we do not have over-accumulation in Marx's sense, but "sim- 
ply the material impossibility of harmoniously coordinating the develop- 
ment of all aspects of expanded reproduction with respect to time, " and 
that this is a problem inherent in the transition period itself. 
20 
This is true, but only conditionally. The technical fact that new plant 
and equipment will not produce means of production for "three to four 
years after the start of their construction" is not what characterizes 
the Soviet Union in this period. Preobrazhensky himself pointed this 
out later on in the same example. The reason this problem exists in 
the first place is that the Soviet economy must replace massive amounts 
of fixed capital all at once. Under Soviet conditions there can be 
neither a balance between retirements and replacements of fixed capital, 
nor adequate reserves to anticipate these replacements and the needed 
accumulation of fixed capital from year to year. The very nature of 
the problem says that department I of the state sector will tie up and 
absorb large quantities of social labor without producing any goods in 
return. We can talk of "over-accumulation" only in this very special 
sense, that the reconstruction period demands for a country as poor in 
capital as the Soviet Union a tremendous investment of material and hu- 
man resources in the production of means of production. This invest- 
ment will in its turn cause a temporary disproportion in the exchange 
between SI and the combined departments II of the state and private sec- 
tors. 
We have already indicated how this would work in our discussion of 
the reproduction of fixed capital. We have only to imagine that the 
share of accumulation going to increase the stock of fixed capital in 
department I grows. Then, even if the size of circulating constant 
capital and variable capital increased (as they must, though not in the 
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same proportions, since depleted fixed capital stock is being replaced 
and the total stock built up), the amount of production in I available 
for exchange with other departments will fall. Proportionality would 
only be possible if productive capital were transferred from department 
II to department I. If this is not possible there will be a shortage 
of labor power, not to mention raw materials, which must come from rel- 
atively backward agricultural production. The whole accumulation pro- 
cess will be bottled up--the only possible short-term solution being 
the increased exploitation of labor power. Now, if we add to this pic- 
ture the fact that this new investment will have a rather long gesta- 
tion period and will yield no values for some years, we see that the 
exchange fund of department I will lag even further behind the growth 
of department II. We will have an apparent over-accumulation in II, 
which, as Preobrazhensky emphasized repeatedly, represented a real def- 
icit in department I and an inability on its part to replace its pro- 
ductive capital. 
This was, in fact, Stalin's solution. Consumption was cut dras- 
tically, while the rate of exploitation of labor power underwent a 
forced rise, not the least through the militarization of labor in the 
camps. This was a solution that Preobrazhensky attacked in the draft 
article to Problemy Ekonomiki, which we have already referred to on 
previous occasions. It may seem a paradox that Preobrazhensky could 
warn of '? over-accumulation" in department I in the Soviet Union. Yet 
the argument is perfectly consistent. The massive transfer of resources 
into heavy industry soon outstripped the ability of other sectors to 
keep up. This "over-accumulation" was only relative. The means of 
production were genuinely needed in the absolute sense, but they could 
not be utilized because proportionality in the economy as a whole could 
not be maintained. Preobrazhensky called for a shift of resources back 
into department II and a rise in consumption as the only way in which 
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department II could retain proportionality with department I. Yet at 
the same time he recognized that this proportionality was itself unsus- 
tainable, given both the backwardness of industry (and its inability to 
compete on the world market) and the pre-industrial character of agri- 
culture (which means that agricultural production could not keep up with 
the growing demand for its' products that any industrialization drive 
would call for). We are back in the old circle. Industry cannot de- 
velop without a transformation of agriculture, while the revolution in 
the countryside cannot take place without access to modern technology 
and large-scale industry. Hence the attack on Preobrazhensky in 1932 
for allegedly advocating a revolution in the West as the only way out 
of this dilemma. His argument is an explicit denial of the possibility 
of socialism in one country, and his critics lost no time in picking 
this up. 
In another part of VKA 22 from the one we are currently dealing 
with Preobrazhensky again stressed the temporal dimension to expanded 
reproduction in the USSR, 
It is quite obvious that expanded reproduction of technical crops, 
since it requires means of production from the state sector, is 
most intimately connected in its development with the conditions 
of reproduction and accumulation in state heavy industry. But, 
on the other hand, expanded reproduction in department II of the 
state sector is intimately connected with progress in the expanded 
reproduction of technical crops in the peasant economy, from which 
it obtains its raw materials. Thus, as a result, expanded repro- 
duction of department II of the state sector requires the prior 
expanded reproduction of department I of the private sector--spe- 
cifically, that part of it which produces technical crops--while 
expanded reproduction of technical crops requires the prior ex- 
panded reproduction of the part of department I of the state sec- 
tor that provides it with the necessary additional means of pro- 
duction. Thus both state light industry and peasant production 
of technical crops have a common interest in seeing that accumula- 
tion in heavy industry, which must always precede the expanded re- 
production of these branches, be as rapid as possible. 21 
What we have established so far, however, says that attempts to effect 
such accumulation in department I of the state sector will exacerbate 
the goods famine in the short run, and hence retard the growth of agri- 
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culture. The temporal discontinuity in the replacement and accumulation 
of department I's constant capital, primarily its fixed capital, would, 
with each cycle of accumulation, temporarily disrupt the access of 
other departments to industrial means of production. Hence the tem- 
poral sequence of expanded reproduction, which places department I of 
the state sector at the center of the process, is broken. 
We should note that this marked a major change of emphasis from 
Preobrazhensky's argument in From NEP To Socialism. There, as we ob- 
served in our Introduction, he also argued that the Soviet Union would 
soon run into a dead end in its economic development if left to its own 
resources. A revolution in the West was the only alternative he could 
envisage, given capitalist hostility to the Soviet regime. Yet the 
breaking point of the economy was seen as agriculture itself, whose 
primitive technique would stifle attempts at expanded reproduction in 
the state sector as soon as the latter had completed the tasks of res- 
toration and embarked on positive accumulation. Now, however, the ar- 
gument is different; Preobrazhensky has located the problem one step 
further down the line, and finds the basic economic contradiction with- 
in the state sector and its inability to both restore its fixed capital 
and sustain the kind of growth that could alleviate the stumbling block 
of peasant agriculture. In both cases the political conclusions are 
the same: The need for immediate assistance from the Western proletar- 
iat. But this, along with the altered political climate from 1923, ex- 
plains why the argument in VKA 22 is more pessimistic. The impasse 
could only be resolved by access to the world division of labor and the 
ability to control the country's relations with the world market in a 
socialist direction. And this, Preobrazhensky demonstrated time and 
again, was not politically on the cards. 
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III. The Goods Famine and the Soviet Union's Relations With the World 
Market 
To complete our examination of the general structure of the goods 
famine we turn to that part of VKA 22 where Preobrazhensky showed how 
the shortage of industrially-produced means of production is actually 
reproduced in each new period of accumulation, due to the historically- 
given distributuion of the productive forces, and how this compels the 
Soviet Union towards maximum inter-relations with the world economy. 
Much of this conclusion is already implicit in what we have said so far 
--starting from Marx's analysis of the replacement of fixed capital and 
the role of "foreign trade" in making up any imbalances in the material 
composition of reproduction, to Preobrazhensky's account, detailed in 
the previous section, of how harmonious accumulation is impossible in 
all sectors simultaneously. 
We start with a scheme for expanded reproduction in the state sec- 
tor. Total output is the same as in our first examples, 12 billion 
chervontsi, but Preobrazhensky has broken production down into its re- 
spective departments, with a more realistic division of the productive 
capital between its constant and variable components. 
I. 2100c + 1400v + 1400s = 4900 Total production = 12,00022 II. 3550c + 1775v + 1775s = 7100 
We should note that the organic composition of capital is lower in de- 
partment I than in department II--three to two, as opposed to two to 
one--which is the reverse of the schemes for concrete capitalism in 
VKA 17, which reflected the normal state of affairs under capitalist 
production. We will return to this point later on, however. For ac- 
cumulation, Preobrazhensky assumes that half the surplus product in 
each department is accumulated, and half goes to non-productive consump- 
tion of the Soviet state. For department I this equals 700, for depart- 
ment II, 887.5. He introduces one complication. He assumes that one 
third of the consumption fund of I is reproduced via exchange with the 
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petty-commodity sector, or 700 [one third of (v+s/x)]. Likewise, one 
half of IIc also exchanges with P, or 1775. He does not construct a 
scheme which includes P, since Preobrazhensky postulates that exchange 
with P is fixed for each department in terms of a percentage of its 
output. Still, we can simplify his argument a little if we add to his 
scheme for the state sector one which shows the balance of exchange 
with P. We must keep in mind that these are not reproduction schemes 
per se, but simply show the active balance between the two sectors. 
If P shows the following balance of exchange with S: 
PI. ---c + 1775 consumption fund 
PII. 700c + ---- consumption fund 
then we will have the following for reproduction within S: 
SI. ----c + 933v + 467 consumption fund 
SII. 1775c + ---v + --- consumption fund 
There is quite clearly a deficit within the state sector of 375 in 
means of production, and a surplus of the same amount of state-produced 
means of consumption. * The disproportion emerges even more clearly if 
we take expanded reproduction for the next year. SI will accumulate 
700, of which 420 will go to increase c and 280 to increase v. SIT 
will accumulate 887.5, of which 591.7 goes to c and 295.8 to v. The 
capital for the year will appear as: 
Si. 2520c + 1680v + 840 consumption fund 
SII. 4141.7c + 2070.8v + 1035.4 consumption fund 
Again we assume that production within P has expanded in such a propor- 
tion that its exchange with S has remained stable in percentage terms-- 
i. e., SI realizes one third of its (v+s/x) and SIT one half of its c 
with P. Our balance of exchange will then be: 
PI. ---c + 2070.8 consumption fund 
PII. 840c + ------ consumption fund 
which leaves the following to be exchanged within S: 
SI. ------c + 1120v + 560 consumption fund 
SII. 2070.8c + ----v + ---consumption 
fund 
*There is an error in the vKA, which lists the deficit as 455. 
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The deficit of means of production now equals 390.8, i. e., it has grown 
larger than when we began, Preobrazhensky atrributes this "sharp and 
continuously rising shortage of means of production in our state sector" 
to the following factors: l)The interruption of foreign capital invest- 
ed in Soviet industry; 2)the decline of non-productive consumption in 
S, as compared with the level of personal consumption of the old bour- 
geoisie (this would lower the share, s/x, of SI's consumption fund that 
can exchange against SIIc); 3)the failure to replace fixed capital in 
previous years; 4)the consequent withdrawal of means of production for 
new construction which does not yet yield any output; 5)the general 
necessity of a more rapid accumulation in SI, brought about by the need 
to rapidly industrialize the country. 
We can actually learn a great deal more from these schemes than 
Preobrazhensky tells us, particularly if we compare them with those of 
VKA 17 (see above, Chapters 3-5). First off, we have a relative over- 
production in IIc. And yet the organic composition of capital is high- 
er is SII than in SI. How is this possible? We know from our previous 
study of concrete capitalism that, if SIIc/v is higher than SIc/v, there 
will be a tendency towards over-accumulation in SI, not SII, which will 
eventually necessitate a transfer of capital from i to II. Clearly 
this is not the case in the Soviet economy of the transition period. 
The reason that IIc far exceeds I(v+s/x), and that the distance 
between them is actually growing, is that the initial volume of capital 
in II is so much larger than in I. The mass of variable capital in II 
is so great that, even though it has a higher organic composition of 
capital, it produces so much surplus product that the growth of IIc ex- 
ceeds that of I(v+s/x). The tendency, however, will be towards a grad- 
ual slowing down of accumulation in SII, and a reduction of the deficit 
of means of production. 
This situation is almost exactly analogous to the one in VKA 17, 
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where Preobrazhensky takes a higher organic composition of capital in 
department II in order to overcome its own relative over-accumulation 
(see above, p. 169 and p. 200). There we saw that initially IIc would 
continue to grow faster than I(v+s/x), because more of s goes to a IIc 
that is already so much larger than the part of I's commodity-product 
against which it is exchanging. Soon, however, the relatively slower 
growth of IIv would retard the rate of growth of Hs, and accumulation 
as a whole in II, including the growth of its constant capital, would 
lag behind that in department I. The same will happen in our present 
example. After a few years the increase in the goods famine would stop, 
and the discrepancy would begin to contract. Eventually we would even 
have over-accumulation in department I. 
23 
This does not actually nullify the validity of Preobrazhensky's 
conclusions. In the first place, the tendency for accumulation in de- 
partment I to catch up with, and then surpass that in department II 
would take an inordinately long period of time to work itself out. The 
deficit would not even begin to contract for three years, much less el- 
iminate itself. The political and social consequences of this would 
be unacceptable for the Soviet state. If it did not overcome the goods 
famine rapidly this would cause significant disruption of the state's 
relations with the countryside. It would aggravate existing scarcities 
and accelerate the process of class differentiation in favor of those 
forces hostile to the proletarian dicatatorship, 
Far more important is the fact that the assumptions upon which we 
base these extrapolations are, quite frankly, invalid. The preponder- 
ance of capital in SII, and its higher organic composition of capital 
are the effects of the backwardness of the country. For expanded repro- 
duction to take place along the lines we traced out we have to assume 
that the economy will retain this same technical makeup. Furthermore, 
we also have to assume that P will grow proportionately with S, other- 
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wise SI would not realize one third of its consumption fund, and SIT 
one half of its constant capital in P in each separate year. This as- 
sumption is incompatible with the system we have just described. Even 
on its own terms, P cannot expand without an adequate growth of means 
of production from the state sector. 
24 Its own level of technology is 
too primitive to permit it to expand at the same rate as the industrial 
sector. If the goods famine was not rapidly erased then P could not 
sustain expanded, or probably even simple reproduction. This is even 
more true when we consider that this is still peasant agriculture, 
whose expansion is technically limited, no matter how great the supply 
of means of production from SI. For agriculture to keep pace with an 
expanding industrial sector, it would have to be transformed and put on 
a collective basis. Any or all of the above-mentioned circumstances 
would be sufficient to cause P to lag behind S. Then SI could not re- 
new its variable capital or maintain the workers in the military and 
state apparatus. Even more serious, SH could not replace all of its 
constant capital. The system would break down. Thus the very fact of 
a goods famine of state-produced means of production violates the prem- 
ise of a proportional growth of P. 
This still does not exhaust the problem. Accumulation and indus- 
trialization will not only mean that department I will grow faster than 
II. As SI accumulates it will at the same time change its technologi- 
cal foundations. It will not replace old, worn out fixed capital with 
machines of the same efficiency. It will replace them with machines 
which embody all of the technological improvements that have taken 
place since the time the original ones were put into operation. In ad- 
dition, accumulation by its very nature means that machines will replace 
workers on an increasing scale. As a result, as department I restores 
and reconstructs its industrial infrastructure, its organic composition 
of capital will rise, and rise rapidly. Fairly soon it will overtake 
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the organic composition of capital in SII, and then we will have the 
identical disproportion to what we outlined in VKA 17--there will be 
over-production in department II, and a deficit of means of production. 
If this "switch point" should occur before the previous tendency has 
worked itself out, i. e., if SIc/v becomes larger than SIIc/v while there 
is still a shortage of means of production from state industry, then 
the goods famine will grow worse. Even if it comes later on in the 
process of economic development, we will still have the same tendency, 
towards an over-accumulation in department 11.25 
Theoretically we might make up this deficit by transferring it on- 
to the peasant sector; We could rearrange the productive forces in P 
so as to increase output in PI. This, however, has rather limited pos- 
sibilities. Aside from the fact that the under-production in the state 
sector's department I would hinder any increase in the output of PI, we 
have this further complication. Growth in PI is an obvious condition 
for expanded reproduction in the state sector as a whole. But this 
growth, even if it was possible in the right magnitude, could not make 
up SII's deficit in its material form. As we will show in the next 
chapter, the peasant sector cannot provide either department II with 
means of production such as machines, cement, steel, artificial fertil- 
izer, or any of the myriad of means of production that can only be pro- 
duced within industry. In this sense the demands of department II of 
the state sector for the means of production produced in industry, on 
the one hand, and for those produced in agriculture, on the other, are 
additive, and not complementary. Accumulation in SII, while dependent 
upon the provision of industrial implements of labor, plant, etc., from 
SI, will automatically bring with it an increased demand for raw mater- 
ials and other products emanating from PI. 
Nor can we make up the deficit by transferring capital from SII to 
SI, The Soviet state has the political task to raise the standard of 
-329- 
living of the working population, as we argued rather extensively in 
our Introduction. The acquisition by the working class of a new con- 
sciousness and the working out of a new culture depend upon the state's 
ability to raise the standard of living of the working class. Any need 
to suppress this level of subsistence, while necessary for the country's 
industrialization, contradicts this basic demand. While some realloca- 
tion of productive forces from SII to SI is possible and necessary, it 
could never be sufficient to make up the shortage of means of produc- 
tion--not, that is, without rather dire political consequences. 
As a result we have uncovered a further contradiction inherent in 
the accumulation process. To our initial conclusion--that the need to 
replace such a large part of the country's fixed capital all at once 
will reduce the quantity of means of production that can actually func- 
tion in the present--we must add the discovery that industrialization 
brings with it an increase of the organic composition of capital in SI 
as compared to SII, and that in so doing it leads to a tendency towards 
relative under-accumulation in the state's production of means of pro- 
duction. In order to reverse this movement and overcome the deficiency 
in SI the economy would have to possess a flexibility in its reserves 
of fixed and circulating capital that it does not have. Once more we 
are left with the conclusion that the USSR cannot erase the goods fam- 
ine of means of production without aid from other industrialized coun- 
tries. 
What if the Soviet Union had access to the world division of labor? 
Foreign trade would certainly not be a panacea for the country's ills. 
It would not substitute for the need to industrialize the economy, to 
subordinate petty production, and establish the groundwork for planning. 
Yet none of these tasks can be carried out unless the entire economy 
can meet its demand for means of production. The question is whether 
or not the Soviet state can accomplish this with the meagre resources 
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of the domestic economy. This is not just a technical question, but 
one of the balance and development of class forces--i. e., it is poli- 
tical. It is in this context that we must view the Soviet Union's rela- 
tions with the world economy: As an attempt to gain access to the ad- 
vanced division of labor of the international economy on terms that 
would permit the preservation of the political and social character of 
the October Revolution. 
In this and other parts of his writings Preobrazhensky showed that 
neither department of the state sector could afford to wait for the 
state's department I to develop its capacity to provide adequate sup- 
plies of means of production. For department II foreign trade will cov- 
er its current shortage right away, as soon as it imports foreign-pro- 
duced means of production. More important, foreign trade will allow 
the state sector as a whole to get around the difficulty that for de- 
partment I to produce these means of production it would first have to 
construct the plant and equipment to do so. This, as we have seen, 
takes time and withdraws critically needed resources from the state's 
accumulation fund. As a result the foreign market can permit the Sov- 
iet economy to relieve the temporal discontinuity in the reproduction 
of its fixed capital. It is needless to add that by ameliorating the 
crisis in this way the entire state sector forestalls a breakdown in 
its general exchange relations with the countryside. 
Preobrazhensky adds that foreign trade will also serve as a prim- 
ary channel for transferring values from the private to the state eco- 
nomy--i. e., as a vehicle for primitive socialist accumulation. If the 
state has a deficit of 400 million chervontsi in means of production 
(our example showed a deficit of 390 in the first year), it can export 
agricultural products of P, say means of consumption, worth 200 million. 
With the foreign currency it obtains it can purchase means of produc- 
tion which cost 200 million at world market prices, but which would 
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cost 400 million if produced internally in the Soviet Union. The ex- 
port of peasant surpluses thus becomes a means for accumulation in the 
state sector. Conversely, we also see how the abolition of non-equiv- 
alent exchange would completely disrupt this process, wiping out the 
differential between world market prices and state procurement prices 
for peasant grain. 
26 
Finally, foreign trade can help make up deficits in certain mater- 
ial elements of production, e. g., particular raw materials, which the 
Soviet economy either cannot produce for technical reasons, or whose 
production is too costly or quantitatively inadequate. 
27 
All of these reasons prompt Preobrazhensky to conclude that the 
Soviet Union's close--and controlled--relations with the world capital- 
ist market are an essential lever of flexibility for the economy's con- 
tinued growth: 
Thus we arrive at the conclusion that the third precondition for 
equilibrium in our system is the closest possible link with the 
world economy, built upon the very distinctive nature of our ex- 
ports and imports. When there is a general deficit of domestic 
production of means of production, in particular when heavy indus- 
try is underdeveloped relative to the demands of the domestic 
state and private market and relative to the overall rate of in- 
dustrialization necessary for vie country, our planned import of 
means of production has to be of such a volume and material com- 
position as to serve, so to speak, as an automatic regulator of 
the entire process of expanded reproduction, without ceasing to 
be a source of accumulation. 
28 
That this world economy was a capitalist one presented other problems. 
To trade on the world market, the Soviet Union had to exchange value 
equivalents for whatever capitalist-produced means of production it 
would import. That means its agricultural production had to be of suf- 
ficient size that, taking non-equivalent exchange into account, it 
would equal the deficit of means of production in the state sector in 
value terms. In other words, the disproportions had to be of a mater- 
ial, and not absolute quantitative nature. If the state could export 
200 million in grains or raw materials and import 400 million in means 
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of production, this means that the deficit in the production of depart- 
ment I of the state sector had to equal 400. In value terms the sys- 
tem as a whole would, again allowing for non-equivalence, be in equi- 
librium, in the sense that we have derived the basic relationships for 
both simple and expanded reproduction under concrete capitalism (and 
implicitly for the Soviet economy) in previous chapters, Then it would 
merely be a case of exporting means of production that existed in the 
right quantitative, but wrong qualitative form, and importing the cor- 
responding amount of the ones that were needed. 
But the Soviet economy did not enjoy such equilibrium. It was not 
simply a question of peasant raw materials being effectively traded a- 
broad for industrial equipment. Peasant production was inadequate, and 
the state's own needs too great, for the foreign market to play the 
role of equilibrating the accumulation process within the Soviet econo- 
my. It could be a lever of accumulation, but it could not overcome the 
extensive shortages that were immanent to the Soviet system. Even if 
the Soviet Union could have overcome the political obstacles on the 
part of Western capitalism to its engaging in foreign trade, this would 
not have been enough. What it needed was aid, pure and simple. And 
this would not be forthcoming from any capitalist country. Only the 
Western proletariat would provide it. 
The following chapters will show, among other things, why partici- 
pation in the world division of labor on the basis of market exchange 
could not overcome the goods famine, and why Preobrazhensky's main pol- 
itical conclusion--the impossibility of socialism in one country--was 
irrefutable. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 
1. See above, p. 153. 
2. VKA 22, p. 29 (Spulber trans., p. 126). 
3. In the discussion which follows we introduce our own designation of 
SI and SII for the two departments of the state sector and retain 
K and P for the capitalist and petty production sectors respec- 
tively. 
4. Non-productive consumption, as Preobrazhensky points out, refers 
strictly to the relation of this type of consumption to production. 
Here he retains Marx's notion of the term, where productive con- 
sumption is that which immediately enters into production (wearing 
out of means of production, the consuming, i. e., exploitation of 
labor power--as distinct from the consumption of the laborer, 
which is individual consumption). Against this stands individual 
consumption, which sustains the laborers and capitalists. In the 
sense used here, however, Preobrazhensky is linking the distinc- 
tion of productive from non-productive consumption to that made by 
Marx between productive (that which creates surplus value) and 
non-productive (that which does not) labor. These categories, we 
should note, are devoid of moral connotations, except to the extent 
that we speak of class morality, i. e., those norms of behavior as- 
sociated with the divergent historical interests of conflicting 
classes. This is why Preobrazhensky emphasizes, quite correctly, 
that non-productive consumption may still be socially necessary. 
The Soviet regime will continue to need some form of state appara- 
tus, a military, etc., yet these parts of the population do not 
add material values to society's wealth, but rather withdraw values 
from it. In theory, of course, the category of non-productive 
consumption will disappear under socialism, just as our meaning of 
productive labor will be transformed away from that of Marx to 
refer to socially useful labor and nothing more. 
Not all of the non-productive consumption in Soviet society was so- 
cially necessary, however. The values which private middlemen 
withdrew in the course of domestic trade were neither productive 
nor socially necessary. Nor would many of the privileges accorded 
to bourgeois specialists or appropriated by the bureaucracy, over 
and above what was needed to maintain their particular forms of 
labor power or induce them to work, be considered socially nec- 
essary either (we are speaking, of course, of the period prior to 
the consolidation of power by Stalin and the bureaucracy). 
5. From NEP To Socialism, p. 81. 
6. The above discussion is drawn in large part from that in VKA 22, 
pp. 29-35. 
7. See above, pp. 75-6, Note 5. We should particularly draw attention 
to the reference there to Preobrazhensky's debate with Larin in 
Ekonomicheskie Krizisy pri NEP'e. Preobrazhensky attacked Larin's 
demand for a blanket milking of the peasantry by lowering agricul- 
tural prices and raising those of industry. This, Preobrazhensky 
maintained, had created a situation where the peasantry did not 
even have enough money on hand to pay its taxes, and its incentive 
to produce was stifled. He argued instead for a poicy of raising 
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peasant prices, along with a lowering of industrial prices. But 
both of these could only come about if they were justified by sav- 
ings in industrial production costs, accompanied by a rise in the 
productivity of labor, and by an expansion of the foreign market, 
which would open up the prospect of marketing larger sums of peas- 
ant produce abroad and hence the possibility of allowing the peas- 
antry to benefit, at least in part, from this improved marketing 
situation. 
8. The problem of non-equivalent exchange was not unique to the Soviet 
Union. As early as 1920, Gramsci made the following, extremely 
prescient observation about the tasks of a proletarian revolution 
in Italy and its policy towards the peasantry; 
"Italian capitalism has its deepest roots and the seat of its hege- 
mony in Northern Italy, in the industrial centers of Northern Ital- 
y. The Communist revolution, which in Italy presents itself as a 
revolution in industrial technique, as a problem of the equaliza- 
tion of the conditions of agricultural labor and the conditions of 
industrial labor, will have its major seat in the North, The class 
of factory workers will be confronted with the tremendous problem 
produced by the War: how can it succeed in building a State or- 
ganization that has the means to industrialize agriculture and is 
able to provide the peasants with the same conditions of labor as 
the workers, so that it will be possible to exchange one hour of 
agricultural labor with one hour of industrial labor, so that the 
proletariat is not destroyed by the countryside in the exchange of 
commodities produced in absolutely non-comparable conditions of 
labor? This problem, which the capitalist industrialists are un- 
able to solve, and which, if it is not resolved, will smash the 
bourgeois State, can be resolved by the workers, by a workers' 
State in Italy--as it has been resolved and is being resolved by 
the Russian workers' State. It will be resolved by the urban in- 
dustrial workers who will become the principal agents of the Com- 
munist revolution. " 
Antonio Gramsci, Soviets in Italy, Institute for Workers' Control 
Pamphlet Series No. 11, pp. 27-8. 
9. Throughout Preobrazhensky takes the 
sectors combined, both because of t 
for the capitalist sector and for a 
clear that the main relationship he 
is that between state industry and 
capitalist and petty-commodity 
he lack of adequate statistics 
nalytical simplicity. It is 
is concerned with in VKA 22 
peasant production. 
10, VKA 22, p. 37 (Spulber, p. 135). 
11. Ibid, p. 37 (Spulber, p. 135). Original emphasis. 
12. Exchange with peasant production should rise proportionately with 
the rise in S's total product, that is, by 10%, to 3,3 billion 
chervontsi. 
13. See From NEP To Socialism, pp. 22,52, and The New Economics, pp, 
98-103. 
14, See above, p. 211, Note 14. 
15, This, of course, reflects the contradictory nature of the period of 
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primitive socialist accumulation. Momentary growth in the peasant 
sector must be sacrificed for the inudstrialization of the state 
sector, which alone can ensure that agriculture expands in the 
future on a new technological and social basis. This case is sim- 
ilar to that of the wage fund of the workers in state industry, 
the expansion of which must also be retared in the interests of 
industrial accumulation--not without equally devastating political 
effects. 
16. VKA 22, p. 39 (Spulber, pp. 137-39). 
17. Ibid, pp. 39-40 (Spulber, p. 138). 
18. From NEP To Socialism, pp. 38-39 
19. VKA 22, p. 41 (Spulber, pp. 139-40). For Preobrazhensky's treat- 
ment of this problem within the general context of the accumulation 
of fixed capital under capitalism (in zakat Kapitalizma), see 
above, p. 231, and p. 239, Note 11 (the latter also refers to the 
relevant passages in capital), 
20. VKA 22, p. 42 (Spulber, pp. 140-41). Original emphasis. 
21. Ibid, p. 52 (Spulber, pp. 152-53). 
22. For his figures for the percentage breakdown of the product between 
departments I and II, Preobrazhensky cites Perspektivy Razvertyvan- 
iya Narodnogo Khozyaistva SSSR na 1926/27-1930/31 gg (Perspectives 
for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR from 
1926/27-1930/31), Gosplan SSSR, pp. 123-24. Preobrazhensky also 
states that the overall level of output in the state sector is very 
close to the figure he gives here (14.35 billion), but gives no 
source. The same is true of his figure for the proportion of the 
output of each department of the state sector that goes towards ex- 
change with the peasant sector. 
23. Taking accumulation for succeeding years, we would find that the 
deficit will increase in absolute terms up to year three, after 
which it will start to go down. 
24. The notion that SI would continue to provide P with an additional 
one third of each year's newly produced means of production, while 
running a systematic deficit within its own sector is untenable. 
At the very best the burden of the shortage of means of production 
would be distributed over both sectors, primarily by the alloca- 
tion of credits through the state bank; but in reality the peasant 
market for means of production would suffer severly. 
25. The question of whether or not we would have "prices of production" 
in the Soviet system is quite difficult to resolve. Industry op- 
erated according to certain profit criteria, well enough. But it 
would be hard to actually conclude that there existed an average 
rate of profit, and that this rate determined the distribution of 
social capital in the state sector. This is precisely where we 
see one of the fundamental ways in which the proletarian revolu- 
tion undermines the law of value--the distribution of productive 
forces in the state sector will be carried out largely according 
to plan, even if that plan is not a fully-conscious, socialist one, 
but is shaped by the need to modify state production according to 
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the dictates of the external market and the need to reconstruct 
state industry. Yet prices will not be the same as value. We 
must quite frankly admit that we do not at this point know how to 
resolve this problem. The deviation of prices from values within 
the state sector will come from two poles simultaneously: The 
profit and cost accounting of each individual enterprise (khozras- 
chet), which will vary depending on the state of the industry, the 
conditions of its existing plant and equipment, ability of indiv- 
idual managers to enforce labor discipline, etc., on the one hand; 
and the planned deviation arising from the increasing control that 
the state planning organs are able to exercise over production and 
allocation. The best we can do is make the provisional abstrac- 
tion that the deviation of prices from values is already reflected 
in the reproduction schemes, whose figures reflect non-equivalent 
exchange (an assumption that Preobrazhensky makes as well, though 
without taking up the question of prices of production and the 
tendencies that cause the deviation of prices from values in the 
Soviet economy). What makes this assumption unsatisfactory is 
that, while perhaps giving a fairly accurate picture within any 
given year, it says nothing about how the year's surplus product 
will be accumulated and divided up between branches of industry. 
In terms of tracing out the distribtuion of social labor, however, 
and the movement of real values between departments, the schemes 
will certainly detail all the basic tendencies of the system. If 
we assume that all deviations of prices from values are planned, 
and that state procurement and disposal prices are a vehicle for 
arranging the social capital in each production year, then the es- 
sential problem does not change--we can define the tendencies 
within the economy and state what conditions of proportionality 
dictate by way of transfers of capital and productive forces 
from one branch or department to another. It is only where the 
distribution of the productive forces and price-value relations 
are determined by the retention of capitalist organization of pro- 
duction that difficultires arise, and it is from these that, in 
the interests of simplification, we must abstract. 
26. This argument (VKA 22, p. 46) is dealt with in greater detail in 
The New Economics, pp. 104-05. 
27. VKA 22, p. 47 (Spulber, pp. 147-48). 
28. Ibid, pp. 47-8. Original emphasis. 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE CIRCULATION AND REPRODUCTION OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS OF THE PRODUCT IN BOTH SECTORS 
We now take up the question of circulation and the way in which 
the separate components of each sector's product are reproduced. A mixed 
commodity-socialist economy like the USSR is still a market economy, 
but of a modified sort. Clearly, as Preobrazhensky argues amply in The 
New Economics, From NEP To Socialism, and other writings, the market 
changes its form radically from what it is under capitalism. Exchanges 
within the state sector obey none of the regularities of the market in 
the classical sense, and state enterprises are increasingly freed from 
the complication of having to both produce goods in sufficient quanti- 
ties for use in other branches of production and by other enterprises, 
and having to realize these goods--and their value--through sale on the 
market. Here the market, which begins to exist in an increasingly at- 
tenuated and external form, gives way to the distribution of state re- 
sources according to a plan. At the other extreme, exchanges solely 
within the private economy very definitely reflect an almost "pure" 
market situation. In this realm the state can modify and influence the 
character of the market only to the extent that it intervenes politic- 
ally or increases the scope and weight of its own trading apparatus. 
We also have a huge grey area inbetween, where the state and private 
economies enter into mutual exchange with each other. Using an analogy 
with Trotsky's description of NEP, we might say that the task of the 
state sector is to widen its influence in this middle area. In so do- 
ing, it will eliminate the sphere of exclusively private economy, and, 
by drawing the latter into contact with the state sector, will trans- 
form and undermine this middle area as well. 
So far we have examined expanded reproduction mostly from the point 
of view of these "exchanges" within the state economy. We have dealt 
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with the interaction between S and P only in gross terms, Following 
Preobrazhensky, we assumed constant proportions of exchange between the 
two sectors because we only wanted to show how certain disproportions, 
mainly the goods famine of state-produced means of production, arose 
from within S itself, and how this in turn would affect reproduction 
in general terms in both S and P. Preobrazhensky now moves past this 
level of analysis to a more specific examiniation of the mutual ex- 
change between P and S. 
The fourth condition of equilibrium of our economic system is pro- 
portionality in the distribution of labor, in particular, propor- 
tionality in exchange between the state economy and the entire pri- 
vate economy within the country, both with respect to the value 
of that exchange at given price levels and with respect to its 
material composition. Here we assume equilibrium of value ex- 
change to be understood in a conditional sense, that is, in the 
sense of an equilibrium of non-equivalent exchange, or exchange 
as the mechanism of socialist accumulation. l 
Here we move from a straight value analysis (whose implications 
we have already seen to be immense) to an analysis that deals with the 
physical-material composition of reproduction, and how it complicates 
--and, in the USSR, exacerbates--the problem of expanded reproduction. 
To this end Preobrazhensky introduced a second scheme, which show- 
ed production in P. We must say that for all practical purposes it is 
irrelevant both to what he wished to demonstrate about the circulation 
process and to the argument he wanted to construct from it. We might 
be able to use the scheme we constructed in Chapter 2 to show the nec- 
essary relationship between the production and exchange of fixed versus 
circulating capital (see above, pp. 131,34), or even Preobrazhensky's 
first scheme of the mixed economy on page 153. But even these will not 
do, since they only deal with simple reproduction, and at a fairly ab- 
stract and elemental level. These schemes reveal all the essentials 
of the problem, but not the intricacies which come when we move on to 
expanded reproduction or consider exchange between all departments of 
all sectors. 
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In order to present the fullest possible picture of the inter-re- 
lation between the exchange circuit and reproduction in the Soviet eco- 
nomy, we have constructed another scheme which combines the essentials 
of the ones we have just mentioned, along with those we constructed in 
Part III to show the expanded reproduction of fixed capital, on the one 
hand, with Preobrazhensky's scheme which we inserted between pages 
305-306. The scheme has two sectors, and is broken down into depart- 
ments I and II for each. For the constant and variable capital in both 
departments of S, and for the constant capital and the consumption fund 
in both departments of P, we have used the subscripts (g) (for the Rus- 
sian, gosudarstevenniy, or "state"--this being to avoid confusion with 
"s" for surplus value) and (p) to designate that portion which is real- 
ized in (i. e., sold to, and purchased from) S and P respectively. For 
the surplus product of S we use the subscript (a) to indicate the part 
which is accumulated, and which has only indirect importance at the pres- 
ent stage of our analysis. The notation s/x(g) refers to the consumed 
part of the surplus product which is realized within S, and s/x(p) to 
that part exchanged with P. With the surplus product of P, (a) indi- 
cates the part that the petty-commodity sector accumulates (again, in 
the conditional sense that we can apply the term to petty production), 
and (ex) to the part that is expropriated by the Soviet state, either 
for the fund of non-productive consumption or for the fund of socialist 
accumulation. 
SI, [cg + cp] + 
SII. [c9 + CpI + 
PI. [cg + Cp] + 
PII. [cg + Cp] + 
[vg + Vp] + [s(a) + s/xg + s/xp] 
[vg + vp] + [s(a) + s/xg + s/xp] 
[consg + consp] + [s(a) + s(ex)] 
[consg + consp] + [s(a) + s(ex)] 
If we were actually performing a numerical analysis of expanded 
reproduction, the existence of the category Ps(ex) would complicate 
matters somewhat, We would have to include that part of it which went 
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to the fund of socialist accumulation in the new c and v of SI and SII; 
similarly, we would have to add the remainder, which goes to support 
the fund of non-productive consumption, to the consumption fund of the 
two departments in the state sector, We can partially get around this 
difficulty if we remember that, aside from direct payments, such as 
taxes, the state absorbs much of the product alienated from P via vari- 
ous forms of non-equivalent exchange, mainly its policy of planned pro- 
curement and disposal prices. To this extent we could eliminate s(ex) 
from our calculation, since it would already appear in either s(a) or 
s/x of the state sector. This would not, however, allow us to account 
for those portions of the peasant product that are alienated directly. 
Unfortunately we cannot deal with this question at any length without 
overstepping our analysis; we must first establish the basics of the 
circulation process before we can introduce complications. Although 
we will make a few observations about the reproduction of Ps(ex) later 
in this chapter, we will by no means be able to exhaust the problem. 
2 
Before we go on to discuss the general characteristics of the ex- 
change circuit, we should issue a cautionary reminder. It is clear 
from this scheme that the conditions of simple and expanded reproduc- 
tion are much more narrowly defined due to the specific proportions of 
each part of the product of each department which must exchange with 
other departments. We should not, however, become prisoners to our own 
construction which, no matter how great its complexity, still remains 
an abstract representation of concrete social processes and relations 
between human beings. While it may seem that the conditions of propor- 
tionality are extremely rigid, in reality even the Soviet economy of 
the 1920's would possess a good deal of flexibility. The exchange re- 
lationships could vary with changes in the state's procurement policy, 
its issuing of different types of agricultural credit, the peasantry's 
attitude towards hoarding or marketing a greater or lesser share of its 
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harvest, the opening up of new lands, the stability of the currency, or 
any of a whole range of variables. The significnat thing about the 
transition period is that, as the state sector increases its influence, 
this flexibility grows and the variables come more and more under the 
conscious control of the working class. Marxism tells us that people 
are free to act consciously and in a purposeful way, but that their 
thoughts and actions are always constrained by nature, which is histor- 
ically given and which they attempt to place under their control. Both 
society and the way people view that society are parts of this nature. 
Therefore thought and ideology are every bit as much material elements 
which help determine human action as anything else--providing we keep 
in mind that ideas themselves are a specific form of social relations 
and as such are inextricably connected with the relations of production. 
The purpose of any analysis of something like the reproduction 
schemes is to demonstrate what some of these constraints are at any giv- 
en moment. They help tell us the bounds within which people act. Such 
limits will exist under socialism, with the key difference that then 
human beings can confront them consciously and alter them in a purpose- 
ful direction. Under capitalism, with its innate anarchy and the reif- 
ied consciousness it imposes upon people, this is not possible, except 
in the most minute degree. Here our analysis throws into relief the 
contradictory nature of the Soviet Union and the impossibility of the 
transition period leading to this conscious control of nature without 
the intervention of the Western proletariat. This is true at the level 
of economics and at the level of the development of class conscious- 
ness, As we argued in our Introduction, the two are inseparable and 
form parts of the totality of Soviet society which was--and remains-", 
contradictory to the extreme. 
In the discussion of the reproduction of the individual elements 
of our scheme we will stick fairly closely to Preobrazhensky's argu- 
-342- 
ment. In a few cases the analysis is fairly straightforward, and we 
will offer nothing more than a brief, critical summary of his views, re- 
peating what Preobrazhensky said only for the sake of the completeness 
of our own theory. In other cases, however, this is not possible. In 
this part of VKA 22 Preobrazhensky attempted to trace out the process 
of circulation for each of the component parts of reproduction in the 
departments of P, and in this way revealed the inter-relations that ex- 
ist within the system as a whole, This is just what Marx did in such 
detail for pure capitalism in Volume II of Capital. Preobrazhensky, 
in order to do this for the Soviet economy, had to break new ground, 
and to us this constitutes the great importance of this section of the 
article. But, on the other hand, it also meant--particularly given the 
obviously hasty nature in which all of the VKA articles were written 
and the political climate of the time--that he was to infer conclusions 
from his premises without adequately elaborating how he reached them, 
just as we saw in the preceding chapter, where he generally failed to 
properly apply his findings from VKA 17 to his analysis of the goods 
famine. So once again we will have to spend some time, to fill in what 
we think is needed, and to use Preobrazhensky as a starting point to 
construct what we think is a more coherent picture of the problem of 
circulation in an historically new economy, 
Two cases are of exceptional note. The first is the internal ex- 
change of means of production between SI and PI; the second is the in- 
ternal exchange of means of consumption between SII and PII. Both of 
these add further major conditions of equilibrium beyond the central 
exchange of the combined consumption fund of departments I for the com- 
bined constant capital portion of departments II, and we will go into 
them in some detail, especially as regards their implications for the 
goods famine. Let us now turn to the reproduction of the material el- 
ements of department I of the petty-commodity sector. 
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The Reproduction of PIc: The difficulty of expanded reproduciton in 
department I of the peasant sector emerges as soon as we look at the 
reproduction of its constant capital. By now we have clearly estab- 
lished that a crisis can result in any market economy strictly within 
the sphere of circulation. We have also seen in our study of simple 
reproduction in a mixed economy that a crisis can ensue if the material 
conditions of reproduction are not met. In this section we will first 
see how a breakdown in the exchange circuit can prevent this realiza- 
tion of the material product, even when all of the goods demanded for 
continued production are in fact produced in the correct proportions. 
We will show that if there is an imbalance in the exchange between PI 
and SI, that reproduction can only take place through a very complex 
circuit which involves all departments of all sectors. Specifically, 
if PI sells less to SI than it requires in return, and if SI has actu- 
ally produced the means of production that PI needs, then PI must ac- 
quire a money equivalent of its deficit of means of production. It 
does this only if one of the departments II purchases less from SI than 
it sells, and if this same department then purchases more from PI than 
the latter buys in return. The fact that it must be the same depart- 
ment II which mediates the transaction between PI and SI is due to the 
fact that now all exchange must conform to the materially specific 
needs of production in all four departments. 
After we have traced out the path of circulation under "ideal" 
conditions, that is, where we assume that the problem is strictly one 
of circulation, and that the means of production PI needs have actually 
been produced, we will apply our findings to the conditions of a goods 
famine of industrially-produced means of production. We will again 
find that the disproportionality in the system can only be relieved by 
access to the world market. 
Preobrazhensky notes that a substantial part of PIc will be repro- 
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duced within the department itself, e. g., seeds, cattle, feed, animal 
products, sheep for production of wool, etc. By the same token another 
part of PIc can only be obtained from department I of the state sector 
(e. g., metal and coal, agricultural machines, artificial fertilizers, 
rail and water transport, etc. ). And here we have a problem: SI buys 
considerably less from PI than the other way around. SI requires less 
in means of production of agricultural origin, than the petty-commodity 
sector needs in machines and other industrially-produced means of pro- 
duction. The very nature of this imbalance dictates that it will be 
difficult to overcome. If PI needs means of production it can obtain 
them directly only from SI, which produces them. What is more, it can 
only exchange its own products against SIc, that part of SI's product 
which goes to replace its constant capital. All other exchange that SI 
carries out with P is with PII, that is, for means of consumption to 
replace its variable capital and to sustain the administrative appara- 
tus and other non-productive workers. In other words, PI cannot ac- 
quire the means of production it needs by exchanging its surplus of 
means of production against either SIv or SIs/x, since PI's product 
exists in the wrong natural form. 
How then is PI to realize its surplus of PIc and get the industri- 
al means of production it needs? Clearly the only possible solution 
would be for PI to dispose of its surplus in other departments, which 
also use raw materials and other agricultural products as means of pro- 
duction, If it sold more to SII and PH than it subsequently purchased 
in means of consumption, it would have a hoard of money with which to 
purchase the means of production it could not obtain directly from SI. 
This circuit, as we have said, is quite complex and demands that the 
money PI receives from other departments equal the money it requires 
for its purchases from SI. As far as our analysis goes, we come up a- 
gainst the difficulty that Preobrazhensky worked none of this out, but 
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merely arrived at this conclusion, seemingly out of thin air. Yet this 
is a crucial aspect of the goods famine and must be examined in more 
detail. 
In order to analyze this circuit of exchange we first have to as- 
surre, as we mentioned in our introductory remarks, that the goods fam- 
ine is not a problem in terms of society's physical output of means of 
production, in other words, that SI has actually produced the goods PI 
needs, but that PI cannot obtain them because of the specific imbalance 
between what PI and SI need to buy from each other. In this way we can 
show how the goods famine can arise out of the process of circulation, 
out of the fact that this is a market economy. Then, after showing how 
this disproportion operates under "ideal" conditions, when production 
is adequate on both sides, but exchange cannot take place, we can then 
analyze the case where the shortage of means of production of SI places 
a physical limit upon expanded reproduction in PI. 
To illustrate this more easily, let us fill in some figures--which 
are completely hypothetical--for our reproduction scheme on page 339. 
Si. (50008 + 500p)c + (2000g + 2000p)v + [2000a + (1000g + 1000p)]s 
SII. (25008 + 1500p)c + (12508 + 1250p)v + [1250a +( 750g + 500p)Is 
PI. (1000g + 2000p)c + (1000g + 1000p)cons. fund + surplus product 
PII. (3000g + 1000p)c + (17508 + 2000p)cons. fund + surplus product 
The quantity of means of production which SI must exchange in one form 
or another equals 6500. The means of production the other three de- 
partments require from SI also equals 6500. Thus there is no goods 
famine taking the system as a whole. We further assume that accumula- 
tion takes place at the end of the year, so that we do not have to 
break the figures for the accumulated part of each department's surplus 
product down into c and v. This would unnecessarily complicate our 
scheme without changing its essence. 
Our first scheme (p. 339, above) showed that SIc(p) must equal 
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PIC(g). In our present example this is not true. SI requires only 500 
in means of production from P, while P needs 1000 from S. The first 
step in the exchange circuit will be if SI purchases 500 in means of 
production from PI for money. It is more reasonable to assume that SI 
advances the money for exchange, because it has the resources of Gos- 
bank at its disposal, whereas for PI to advance the money would presume 
a hoard accumulated over a period of years, something more difficult, 
though clearly not unrealistic. This being the case, PI will then use 
this money to purchase 500 in means of production from SI. So far we 
have merely "cleared the accounts" of what can be mutually exchanged 
directly between SI and Pl. As things now stand, SI has obtained all 
that it needs in constant capital to begin production again, while P is 
still short of 500 in machines, tractors, and other industrial means of 
production. In addition, it has unsold stocks of 500 worth of raw ma- 
terials and intermediate goods of agricultural production. 
How is this shortage to be realized? As we pointed out above, PI 
cannot exchange any of its surplus against SIv or SIs/x because they 
exist in the wrong physical form. PI could acquire what it needs from 
SI if exchange took place as follows: 
SI must first of all realize its variable capital. It does this 
in two ways. First, it exchanges 2000 in means of production with SII 
for 2000 means of consumption. It does this directly, without money, 
through the system of state accounting and allocation of resources. 
Second, it exchanges 2000 in means of production with PII for the same 
quantity of means of consumption of peasant origin. This exchange, 
however, must take place on the market, and is therefore transacted via 
the medium of money. As things stand now, SI has obtained all that it 
needs to renew its variable capital, both in physical and monetary 
terms. It has all the means of consumption its workers must consume, 
and the money it would have advanced to PIT has returned to it as soon 
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as PII purchased 2000 in means of production from SI. As far as SII is 
concerned, it has renewed a part of its constant capital equal to 
2000c(g). It must still realize 500c(g) and 1S00c(p). PII has realiz- 
ed 2000c(g) and still has to renew 1000c(g) plus l000c(p). 
The major part of these outstanding balances are exchanged against 
the fund of non-productive consumption of SI. For PIT this is easy 
enough. It sells means of consumption worth 1000 to SI, and with the 
money it receives it buys 1000 in means of production. PIT has real- 
ized the remainder of its demand for means of production of SI [equal 
to 1000c(g)], and SI has obtained the 1000 means of consumption of pet- 
ty production its non-productive workers required. Exchange between SI 
and SII presents a problem, however. SI needs 1000 in means of consump- 
tion produced by state light industry, but SII needs only 500 in state- 
produced means of production. Furthermore, of the 2500 SIIc set aside 
for exchange with SI, 2000 have already exchanged against SIv, leaving 
only 500 for further exchange with SI. One look at our scheme tells 
us that SII actually does have the means of consumption to sell to SI, 
but to do it SII would have to dip into the products it had set aside 
for exchange with PI. As things stand now, this will work out. SII 
will sell 1000 in means of consumption to SI in exchange for 500 in 
means of production plus a credit at the state bank worth 500 chervon- 
tsi. SI has now advanced 500 in money, but still has 500 in means of 
production left unsold which SII did not need. SII has now realized 
all 2500 of its IIc(g). It has 1000 in means of consumption plus 500 
chervontsi left over for exchange with PI. 
But where is PI to find the means of production to sell? The ex- 
change of 1000 means of production is a fairly simple matter. SII pur- 
chases these 1000 for money, and PI then uses the latter to buy 1000 in 
means of consumption. PI has received all that it needs in physical 
form from SII (1000). SII is not as well off. It has disposed of the 
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entire physical equivalent of its constant capital, but still has 500 
in money left to exchange; and, what is more serious, it still needs 
500 in peasant - produced means of production. Perhaps PI could take 
these from what it has earmarked for exchange with PII. This is not 
likely, since there is no reason that PII would then issue PI the means 
of consumption it needs on credit, in anticipation that PI would some- 
how eventually be able to supply all that PII needs in peasant-produced 
constant capital. So, let us assume that PI holds off completing its 
exchange with SII, and proceeds right away to acquire the means of con- 
sumption it needs from PII. o It does this be selling means of produc- 
tion worth 1000, in exchange for the same quantity of PII's means of 
consumption. How do things stand up till now? 
SI has realized all of its constant and variable capital. It has 
acquired all of its fund of non-productive consumption but in the pro- 
cess has had to advance 500 in money, which it must get back, and has 
500 in means of production left unsold and sitting on its hands. 
SII has realized all of its IIc(g) plus 1000 IIc(p). It has a 
money reserve of 500 plus a need for 500 in means of production from PI. 
PI has realized its entire consumption fund. However, it still 
has 500 in peasant means of production left which it could not exchange 
with SI; not only that, but it needs 500 in means of production from SI 
which it did not have money to buy. 
PH is the only department that is all right. It has realized its 
entire demand for means of production, both from SI and P1, and it has 
disposed of all of its exchangeable means of consumption. 
Things will work out if PI takes the means of production it has 
set aside for exchange with SI--but which it could not sell--and sells 
them to SII. SH will then have all the means of production it needs 
from PI. PI will then have 500 in money which it can use to purchase 
the 500 in means of production that SI still has on its hands. PI will 
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then have its full constant capital component of 1000c(g). The money 
which SI advanced, when it purchased more from SIT than it sold, has 
returned to it, via Pl. The circuit is complete. 
The only reason that we can reproduce PIc(g) in this instance is 
because: a)SII sells more to SI than it requires from it in return; 
b)SII buys more from PI than PI needs from SII; and c)these two amounts 
are equal. It is not enough that SI(v+s/x) plus PI's consumption fund 
equal SIIc plus PIIc. Within that equality we have another. SIc(p) 
must equal PIc(g) (as we have shown in Chapter 2). If not, then we can 
only attain equilibrium if the surplus of what SIT sells to SI equals 
the surplus of what PI sells to SII, and if this in turn equals PI's 
deficit of means of production from SI. Our present scheme satisfies 
all of these conditions. 
If we arranged the figures differently, however, then circulation 
would be impossible to complete. If we set SII = (3000g + 1SOOp) and 
PH = (25008 + 1000p), the total demand of SII + PIT for state-produced 
means of production stays as before. So do all of our other figures. 
Now, however, it is PIT which sells more to SI than it buys. It there- 
fore must take part of its IIc, which it had set aside for exchange 
with PI, and then sell these 3000 means of consumption to SI. It buys 
only 2500 in means of production in return, and thus has 500 in money 
left over. In physical form PH has only 500 in peasant means of con- 
sumption to exchange with PI. Yet PI requires 1000 means of consumption 
from PII. We can push off the problem by making some further exchanges. 
Let PII take its 500 in money and 500 in exchangeable means of consump- 
tion and purchase 1000 means of production from PI. PIT will then have 
all the means of production it needs from both SI and PI. But PI will 
have only 500 of its consumption fund which must come from PII, and 500 
in money. Only PIT has nothing left to sell. 
What about SII? SII realizes all of its need for industrial means 
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of production by exchanging its 3000 IIc(g) with SI for 3000 SI[v+s/x(g)]. 
SII still requires 1500 in means of production from PI, while PI needs 
only 1000 in means of consumption from SII. We can perform this ex- 
change just as we did before. PI can sell to SII its 1000 consumption 
fund(g) plus the 500 means of production that SI would not buy. For 
this, however, SII advances 1500 in money. In this way SII realizes 
its entire IIc and PI has 1500 in money. With 1000 of this money it 
purchases the 1000 in means of consumption it needs from SII. 
Now we have quite a problem. PI does not have one hoard of money, 
but two. It has 500 from PIT and 500 from SII. It can take one of 
these hoards and purchase the means of production it wants from SI and 
which SI still has available. Yet it still has 500 in money left over. 
What is more, PI has a physical deficit of 500 in means of consumption 
from PII; and SII has 500 in unsold means of consumption which PI will 
not buy, in addition to having 500 in advanced money which it does not 
get back. The only way we could re-establish equilibrium would be if 
PI would change its purchasing habits and use this 500 in money to buy 
industrially-produced means of consumption and would cut down on its 
demand for products of PII by the same amount. This is the only solu- 
tion, so long as we remain within the confines of the system we have 
described. No matter how many different ways we might try and conduct 
the various exchanges, we will always have a hoard of money somewhere 
in the economy and an equal mass of means of consumption which cannot 
be sold because they are in the wrong physical form. 
We therefore arrive at an important relationship. If PIc(g) is 
greater than SIc(p), PI can only realize its deficit if the department 
II which sells more to SI than it purchases in return is the same de- 
partment that buys more from PI than PI buys back from it. 
Circulation follows an extremely intricate path here. As Marx 
said about capitalist reproduction, each discrete purchase and sale 
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creates an additional point of potential disruption. This is equally 
true of the mixed market system of commodity-socialism we are describ- 
ing. Even in our first example, where all the necessary conditions 
were satisfied, if there had been a failure to transform commodities 
either into other commodities or into money at any place along the line, 
then PI could not have obtained the means of production it needed from 
SI; conversely SI would have had unsaleable stocks, which would have 
appeared as "over-production" in spite of the economy's poverty. In 
our second case, although PI could, at least under some arrangements of 
the various exchanges, realize PIc(g), the circulation process would 
break down somewhere else. We have not even considered the case where 
the petty-commodity sector might interrupt the circuit of exchange by 
increasing its consumption of its own products, or by hoarding money 
and making up certain physical deficiencies in its elements of produc- 
tion by cutting its fund of consumption (we should not forget that many 
peasant agricultural products can serve alternatively as means of pro- 
duction or means of consumption). We have taken the system "on its own 
terms, " so to speak, and seen that disruptions can occur even if all 
the natural components of production in all departments are produced in 
the proper proportions. 
In such a case as our second example, we could overcome the prob- 
lem by exporting the surplus means of consumption of whatever depart- 
ment had them, and by importing means of consumption of the necessary 
type (depending upon which would most readily facilitate the completion 
of the required exchanges). This closely relates to some of the dif- 
ficulties that arise in the reproduciton of the consumption fund of 
both departments II, and we will put off any further consideration of 
this until then. Foreign trade would be a very definite way out of the 
dilemma if the breakdown of circulation had resulted in a shortage of 
means of production. The state could have purchased PI's surplus means 
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of production and exported them, either for foreign currency or for ad- 
ditional means of production; it could either have given the latter to 
pl, or issued an agricultural credit directly right at the start, which 
would have allowed PI to buy what it needed from SI without any delay. 
It is obviously much easier for the state to correct disproportion- 
alities that arise out of circulation than a capitalist economy. The 
centralized credit system would help alleviate "over-production" by 
making SI's surplus goods immediately accessible to P. Conversely, a 
temporary inability of SI to realize some of its fund of non-productive 
consumption, or a temporary accumulation of unsold stocks would not 
cause the same cutbacks in production and a general crisis as it would 
under capitalism. The matter would be different if took a more histor- 
ically realistic scheme, where the goods famine arises directly out of 
production in SI. There, if SI buys less from PI than the latter needs 
from SI, even if all the essential exchanges took place between SH and 
SI, and between SII and PI, PI could not realize the Ic(g) portion of 
its constant capital, because the means of production simply would not 
exist, 
We can illustrate this case very briefly. All we need to do is 
re-arrange SIIc from (25008 + 1500p) to (3000g + 1000p). Then we have 
the same example we first derived in Chapter 2, where all the condi- 
tions of simple reproduction were satisfied, except for the internal 
exchange in the respective departments I. A more interesting example 
would be if we kept SIIc(p) the same, and simply increased its constant 
capital by adding means of production from SI. Then SIIc would equal 
(3000g + 1500p). In this case all of SI's fund of non-productive con- 
sumption is realized, that is, it acquires the necessary quantity of 
means of consumption from SII, and sells their equivalent in means of 
production in exchange. It has no stocks of unsold means of produc- 
tion. If that happens, SII could purchase 1500 means of production 
in 
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P without too much trouble. It would merely buy the 1000g of PI's con- 
sumption fund plus the 500 of its constant capital it could not realize 
in SI. Then PI would have 1500 in money and would purchase 1000 means 
of consumption from SII, leaving it with the same money hoard of 500 
it had before. Only this time SI does not have the means of production 
to sell. PI has an accumulation of money which it cannot use to pur- 
chase anything. In this case PI will have to cut back production, due 
to an insufficiency of industrial means of production. SII's supply of 
raw materials will not keep pace with the demands of accumulation. If 
PI's output of means of production exceeds the demands of all three de- 
partments and it has exportable surpluses, then we can, as we noted be- 
fore, employ the world market as a means of acquiring the means of pro- 
duction PI must have. If these surpluses are inadequate, then the 
goods famine will persist until either SI or PI can raise its output 
beyond the level demanded by other departments. 
It is extremely interesting to note the effect of non-equivalent 
exchange here. It tends to exacerbate the crisis, If prices on state 
porducts were lowered, it would be far easier for PI to purchase a 
greater quantity of means of production from SI for the same amount of 
its own commodities. Non-equivalence means that SI purchases the com- 
ponent of its fund of non-productive consumption that comes from P rel- 
atively cheaply, and sells its products at relatively high prices. It 
gets more from P than it gives in exchange. This is certainly a contra- 
diction of the Soviet economy at this period in its development. It 
cannot abandon non-equivalent exchange, because the entire mechanism of 
accumulation in the state sector, and the latter's effort to subordinate 
petty production rest on it. By the same token, non-equivalent exchange 
helps deepen the goods famine and weaken the position of the proletar- 
ian state: It hampers expanded reproduction in the peasant sector and 
aggravates the social and political discontent amont those class forces 
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whose interestes would be better served by the overthrow of the Soviet 
3 
regime. 
The Reproduction of the Consumption Fund and Surplus product of PI: 
The reproduction of both these categories is fairly free of complica- 
tions, and we will add little to what Preobrazhensky had to say on the 
matter. The consumption fund of PI exists in the physical form of 
means of production--and it must exchange these against IIc of all 
three sectors (see the reproduction scheme between pages 30S and 306). 
If we look at our own scheme on page 339, we see one aspect of the con- 
is 
sumption fund which Preobrazhensky does not mention. This/simply that 
the more PI contracts its personal consumption, while maintaining the 
same absolute volume of what it produces for exchange, the easier it 
will be for it to make up any deficits it encounters in its acquisition 
of means of production from SI. It should be sufficiently obvious from 
our previous discussion that this would allow PI to sell more to PIT 
and to SII than it purchased in return, thus enabling PI to acquire the 
monetary hoard it needs to purchase means of production from SI. We 
need not dwell on this point at great length, except to add that it is 
true only if all of the other prerequisites are satisfied: E. g., that 
PI can obtain these means of production, either through foreign trade 
and Vneshtorg, or via the roundabout process of circulation that char- 
acterizes the Soviet economy. 
The surplus product of PI is a little more complex. It divides 
into three parts: Non-productive consumption (taxes, the portion that 
goes to maintain the state apparatus, expenditures on trade, etc. ); the 
part expropriated for the fund of socialist accumulation; and the fund 
of accumulation within PI proper. PI's product which goes towards non- 
productive consumption cannot be alienated in direct form, since it 
exists as means of production, which cannot be personally consumed--the 
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one exception being peasant-produced raw materials for military-related 
industry which can immedately enter production. Therefore this portion 
of the surplus product must be exchanged against IIc in the various 
sectors. In real terms, of course, the state would obtain most of this 
product through non-equivalent exchange, where it would enter as means 
of production in department II of the state sector, and in this way 
contribute to the latter's production of means of consumption for the 
state's non-productive workers; or alternatively, the state would ob- 
tain an equivalent for this part of PI's surplus product indirectly 
through exchange with other departments. The only other question of 
interest is the accumulated part of PI's surplus product. It must go 
to augment both the constant capital and consumption fund of PI, and 
each of these in turn will necessitate a quite variegated circuit of 
exchange to allow PI to obtain all these elements of reproduction in the 
correct natural form. We will take up the question of the reproduction 
of the expropriated part of the surplus product, PIs(ex), separately 
at the end of this chapter. 
The Reproduction of Plic: According to Preobrazhensky the constant 
capital of PIT has the peculiarity of being reproduced largely within 
its own department. This is because so much of it consists of natural 
by-products of peasant agricultural production of means of consumption 
(Preobrazhensky enumerates such things as: Seeds, manure, feed, breed- 
ing livestock, etc. ). Earlier, in VKA 17, Preobrazhensky claimed that 
it was PH which was the most insulated from whatever disproportional i- 
ties might arise in the process of reproduction. Being technologically 
the most backward, it could compensate for many of the difficulties 
it might encounter in marketing its production by altering its consump- 
tion fund and relying more or less upon its own production for its 
needs, as the situation would demand. 
4 This is no less true in the 
present instance. 
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This may in turn pose very definite difficulties in the realization 
of the products of all the other sectors which depend upon PIIc, either 
directly or indirectly, to mediate their mutual exchange--that is, 
those departments that must first realize part of their product through 
exchange against PIIc. Most immediately affected would be SI and PI, 
which must renew part of their variable capital and consumption fund, 
respectively, in exchange for means of consumption of peasant origin. 
In view of the relationship we derived for the reproduction of PIc(g), 
which depends on rather strict proportionality between the demands of 
SII and PIT for means of production from PI, on the one hand, and PI Is 
deficit of means of production from SI, on the other, we see the impor- 
tance of the failure of the Soviet state to progressively industrialize 
agriculture and undermine the basis of petty production. Only by elim- 
inating petty production, and placing agriculture on a collectivized, 
modern footing could the state sector free itself from dependence upon 
the fluctuations and irregularities common to department II of the 
petty-commodity sector. 
The other part of PIIc presents little trouble analytically. It 
consists of means of consumption and PIT must exchange it against the 
consumption funds of SI and PI, which have the shape of means of pro- 
duction, The mechanics of this process have been dealt with, albeit 
indirectly, in the course of our discussion of the reproduction of PIc. 
The Reproduction of the Consumption Fund of P11: The reproduction of 
PII's consumption fund presents the same theoretical problems as the 
reproduction of PIc(g). There we saw that as soon as we introduced 
mutual exchange between departments I of both S and P, reproduction 
could only take place through an intricate series of exchanges, This 
sharply increased the possibility of crisis in the economy, so much so, 
that if the respective demands of SIT and PH for state- and peasant- 
produced means of production were not of the appropriate proportions, 
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exchange could not completely take place and we would have a hoard of 
money and a stock of unsold means of consumption in the system. In the 
case where we examine the mutual exchange between SII and PII for means 
of consumption we obtain the identical result, with the crucial excep- 
tion that we have a stock of unsold means of production wherever we 
have an interruption of circulation, and so a cutback of production in 
one of the departments II is necessary. 
A glance at Preobrazhensky's scheme tells us that the major part 
of the consumption fund of PIT is reproduced in natura within PIT it- 
self. Nevertheless, it must still enter into limited exchange with SII. 
In the scheme we produced on page 345 we had mutual internal exchange 
between these two departments; not only that, but SIT purchased from 
PIT exactly what PIT bought from SII--1750 in both cases. Suppose 
that instead of the imbalance between SI and PI our scheme showed one 
between SII and PII. It would look like the following (we eliminate 
the accumulated portions of the surplus products for simplicity): 
SI. (50008 + 1000p)c + (2000g + 2000p)v + (1000g + 1000p)s/x 
SII. (30009 + 1000p)c + (12509 + 1250p)v + (10009 + 250p)s/x 
PI. (1000g + 2000p)c +( 750g + 1250p) consumption fund 
PII. (3000g + 1000p)c + (17509 + 2000 p) consumption 
fund 
Here SII needs only 1500 in means of consumption from PII, while 
the latter needs 1750 from SII, as before. We can relieve the dispro- 
portion the same way as with PIc(g), i. e., through a complicated pro- 
cess of circulation which involves all the departments in the economy. 
SII will purchase 1500 means of consumption from PII for money; PII will 
purchase 1500 means of consumption from SII. PII clearly has 250 means 
of consumption left unsold, and has a deficit of industrially-manufac- 
tured means of consumption of the same amount. Exchange then takes 
place precisely as we saw it earlier. 
SII requires 1000 means of production from the petty-commodity 
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sector, from PI. It buys these with money. Since PI needs only 750 of 
SII's means of consumption, this transaction is only possible because 
PI has 250 unsold means of production left over from its exchange with 
pII. Once PI buys the means of consumption it needs from SII, it has 
250 in money left over. As to PI's exchange with PII, PI needs 1250 of 
PII's means of consumption, which the latter must sell in order to re- 
plenish the part of its constant capital that comes from PI. The dif- 
ficulty is that PII has a total c of 4000, and has already sold 3000 
of these commodities to SI (which needed them to renew part of its var- 
iable capital and fund of non-productive consumption). It can still 
provide PI with what the latter needs, because it has 250 of unsold 
means of consumption which it could not dispose of in SII. It sells a 
total of 1250 to PI, and in return gets 1000 of peasant means of produc- 
tion, which it can use to restore the rest of its constant capital, 
plus 250 in money, which PI had received from SII. Finally, PIT can 
use this money to purchase the 250 in means of consumption from SII: 
a)Because it has acquired this money through other transactions; b)be- 
cause SH still has 2S0 in means of consumption available from when PI 
did not purchase the full equivalent of what it had sold to SII. Every- 
thing then turns out all right. All the necessary goods have been ex- 
changed, and the money that SII advanced when it made a purchase from 
PI without a subsequent sale, has returned to it. 
As in the case of the disproportionality in the exchange of means 
of production between PI and SI, the exchange only works out because 
the same department mediated the transactions between SII and PII. In 
this case it was PI. PI sold more to SII than it bought, and bought 
more from PII than it sold. It was only because of this that PH could 
obtain the money it required to buy from SII the goods it could not pur- 
chase through direct exchange. If we had located the disproportions 
differently, say PI still had to purchase more from PIT than it sold, 
ý. Y! 
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but that it was SI which bought less from SIT than the latter purchased 
in return, then circulation could not have been completed. Because the 
discrepencies between purchases and sales involved goods of different 
physical forms, we would have a money hoard in SII and unsold means of 
production in PI. Worse still, this money hoard in SII would represent 
a deficit in means of production from SI. 
S 
Even in our first example 
we see that the solution involves the other departments I shifting away 
from consumption of state-produced means of consumption towards those 
of PII--after all, P11 can only obtain the money it needs if it in- 
creases its sales of means of consumption to other departments. 
There is one crucial difference between internal exchange between 
the two departments I and that between the two departments II. In the 
former, we could make up the disproportion through foreign trade. We 
could export PI's surplus production and import agricultural ma Ines 
from the West; and we could do this even if the goods famine of SI's 
products was fairly severe, so long as PI had the agricultural surplus- 
es which the state could procure and market abroad. In theory we could 
do the same thing here. The state could simply purchase PII's unsold 
product on credit or by issuing notes, and market it abroad for the 
means of consumption that SII could not produce in sufficient quantity. 
Preobrazhensky was quick to warn, however, that this may be technically 
possible, given the nature of our reproduction schemes and the world 
market demand for grain, but it is not economically or politically feas- 
ible for the specific economy of the USSR. 
Because the state sector suffers a chronic deficiency of means of 
production it cannot afford to use a large part of the export fund to 
import means of consumption. First of all, given the shortage of state- 
produced means of consumption it could only acquire PII's surplus pro- 
duction by first advancing either money to PH (which the latter could 
not immediately use) or, more realistically, by advancing funds to the 
import fund, with which the state could purchase the needed means of 
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consumption abroad. The share of the import fund set aside for foreign 
means of production would diminish, and the goods famine of means of 
production would persist longer and more sharply that would otherwise 
be the case. Second, the state does not enjoy the luxury of being able 
to devote any significant part of the import fund to means of consump- 
tion, even if no advances were necessary, Preobrazhensky mentions the 
theoretical possibility that the foreign currency received by the state 
when it marketed PII's products abroad could go to both means of pro- 
duction and means of consumption--this is especially true if the state 
acquires the latter at cheaper world market prices and sells them more 
expensively domestically. As Preobrazhensky points out, however, such 
a solution only partially mitigates the problem, but does not eliminate 
what 
it. It still implies slowing down the rate of accumulation in SI from/ 
would be possible if these funds were not diverted into the purchase 
of means of consumption. Consequently, PII's marketable production 
will run systematically ahead of SII's ability to satisfy PIIrs demand 
for means of consumption of the state sector, We will then have a goods 
famine of means of consumption, and PIT will begin the familiar process 
of going over to in natura consumption of its own products and decreas- 
ing its production for the market. The only compensation for the Sov- 
iet state is a purely negative one. The state can fix procurement 
prices and keep them stable. It can, says Preobrazhensky, keep them 
stable at a low level largely because P has marketable production that 
it cannot sell; in short, this is the "result of the obstruction of the 
development of agriculture in the sphere of production of means of con- 
sumption; an obstruction which stems from the underdeveloped nature of 
our industry and inadequate actual accumulation within it, "6 
The Reproduction of the Surplus Product of PIi: The reproduction of 
PII's surplus is virtually identical to that of PI. The only exception 
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is that it exists in the natural form of means of consumption of peas- 
ant origin, largely grains and other farm products, as well as certain 
goods of handicraft industry. This fact means that as far as the fund 
of non-productive consumption is concerned, the state can alienate a 
large part of these goods directly. In terms of the accumulated part 
of PII's surplus product, it will be reproduced just as PIIc and the 
consumption fund, with the same peculiarity that a great deal of the 
portion that goes to increase constant capital is reproduced within 
PII itself. 
The Reproduction of Non-Productive Consumption: In discussing the re- 
production of the various constituents of production of the individual 
departments we have pointed out how non-productive consumption func- 
tions differently for each. For the departments of P it consists of 
means of production or means of consumption which are lost to the non- 
productive population. This would include expenditures on private 
trade, as well as the part of the petty-commodity sector's product that 
the state alienates to support the Soviet administrative apparatus, the 
military, and other non-productive workers. This fund of non-productive 
consumption is lost to P, when it could have gone either to increase 
its accumulation or to raise the level of consumption of the petty 
producers. 
In the state sector non-productive consumption functions differ- 
ently. It replaces the category s/x in capitalist expanded reproduc- 
tion, and consequently embodies certain contradictions. To illustrate 
this Preobrazhensky chose Marx's initial scheme for expanded reproduc- 
tion. Like the case where the organic composition of capital rises, 
is 
this/an inadequate example, since the organic composition of capital 
is unequal in the two departments, and this obscures the effects of a 
change in the division of SI's surplus product between what is accumu- 
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lated and what is personally consumed. 
Preobrazhensky wanted to show that if the share of non-productive 
consumption fell in the state sector (which was to be expected with the 
elimination of the capitalist class and the Tsarist bureaucracy), and 
thereby increased the portion of the surplus product that is accumulat- 
ed, then this would exacerbate the goods famine in the short run. The 
reasons are virtually identical to those associated with a rise in the 
organic composition of capital. In department I it would lower the 
consumption fund; at the other end, in department II, it would raise 
the demand for means of production. Yet we must emphasize that this 
is entirely a short-term disproportion, which arises solely from the 
new arrangement of the productive capital in the state sector that this 
fall in the consumed part of s brings about. If the fall in the per- 
centage of s going to non-productive consumption was uniform in both 
departments (say, from 50% to 25%), and if their organic compositions 
of capital were the same, then their respective rates of accumulation 
and growth will be the same as well. This much we know from our alge- 
braic presentation of accumulation in Chapter 4 (pp. 169-71, above). 
By way of illustrating the present problem, let us take Marx's original 
scheme, and adjust the capital in department II, so that the organic 
composition of capital is equal in the two departments (as we did on 
p. 171, above). At the same time, let us divide up the surplus product 
(assuming it is a scheme for the state sector) between s/x and s(a) 
in 
the proportion of 1: 3. Production in the state sector will then 
be: 
I. 4000c + 1000v + 250s/x + 750s(a) 
II. 1500c + 375v + 93.75s/x + 281.25s(a) 
I(v+s/x) has fallen to 1250; IIc is unchanged at 1500. If we were to 
carry out accumulation and production in the following year we would 
have: 
I. 4600c + 1150v + 287. Ss/x + 862.5s(a) 
II. 1725c + 431.25v + 107.8s/x + 323.4s(a) 
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I(v+s/x) = 1437.5. IIc = 1725, so there is a rather massive deficit 
of 287.5. What would be necessary would be a rearrangement of the pro- 
ductive forces in the state sector as a whole, so that proportionality 
was re-established between I(v+s/x) and IIc. Then, given the condi- 
tions we have assumed, i. e., equal organic compositions of capital and 
equal, though larger, rates of accumulation, proportionality would be 
maintained with each successive period of expanded reproduction. 
What is important is to note that a decrease in the state's non- 
productive consumption is a progressive step for the economy. Yet, as 
with the process of accumulation needed to restore its depleted fixed 
capital, in the short run it aggravates existing shortages of means of 
production. However, as Preobrazhensky himself noted, this dislocation 
would be temporary. It would be a necessary phase in the reconstruction 
process that would strengthen the economy's ability to provide these 
essential means of production in the future.? To show this we need 
only examine what would take place over a series of years if non-produc- 
tive consumption fell in department I, while everything in department 
II stayed as before. Initially I(v+s/x) would, as we observed, fall to 
1250,250 short of IIc. We already know what department I will look 
like after accumulation and a year Is production. Department II, on the 
basis of a rate of accumulation of 50%, will have s(a) equal to 187.5 
and will devote four-fifths of this (150) to augment IIc, bringing the 
latter to 1650. The deficit is actually reduced to 212.5. In the fol- 
lowing year, maintaining these respective rates of accumulation in each 
department, we would have: 
I. 5290c + 1322.5v + 330.6s/x + 991.9s(a) 
H. 1815c + 453.75v + 226.87s/x + 226.87s(a) 
The deficit falls still further to 161.9. Thus we see that this dis- 
proportion, which would persist for some years, lays the basis not only 
for eventually overcoming it, but for increasing the supply of means of 
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production from there on. 
In his own discussion of this question Preobrazhensky added that 
this increased accumulation in the state sector will cause further com- 
plications with regard to the state sector's relations with the country- 
side. For by increasing accumulation in the state sector's department 
II, the rise in accumulation brings with it an increased demand for raw 
materials, which will soon outpace the capacity of department I of the 
peasant sector to keep up. Now, the crisis in supply of industrial 
means of production arising from this particular cause will be abated 
over time. This is not so with regard to the supply of raw materials. 
The fall in non-productive consumption in the state sector will have 
no effect on accumulation in P, except to the extent that the state's 
long-term output of machines, fertilizers, and other means of produc- 
tion needed in the countryside, will allow the easier and more rapid 
modernization of agriculture in the future. Yet the logic of the sit- 
uation indicates that the bottleneck in the general supply of means of 
production coming from agriculture, mainly raw materials, will become 
quite severe. As with other factors we have seen to worsen the goods 
famine, the state would inevitably have to alleviate at least part of 
its shortage of means of production for its own department II by cut- 
Ling back its production for agriculture. Thus, at precisely the mom- 
ent when, given a tendency for accumulation in SH to go up, the output 
of industrial crops must increase, the state sector's department I will 
, have to cut back the amount of means of production it can make avail- 
able to the peasantry. 
As with non-equivalent exchange, the state sector could ease the 
problem by reducing the share of its non-productive consumption covered 
via alienation of values from the peasantry. This would give the lat- 
ter more resources for accumulation. This solution would soon under- 
mine whatever short-term benefits it might produce. In the first place, 
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it would meand the de facto abandonment of the policy of primitive soc- 
ialist accumulation, without which the state economy would be doomed 
to stagnation and eventual disintegration. Second, it could only stimu- 
late expansion in P at the expense of accumulation by the state econo- 
my off of the countryside. What the state gained by increasing its own 
rate of accumulation it would lose by reducing another, equally vital 
source of accumulation. The result would be that production in P would 
expand, well enough, while that in S would remain very much the same. 
Now, if P's output cannot be exchanged for products of state industry, 
then the petty producers will soon stop devoting their increased sur- 
plus to accumulation and expansion of production, and will put it to- 
wards their own in natura consumption. The state will lose part of its 
socialist accumulation fund, and agriculture will not boost its own 
production, since its increased output would be unmarketable. 
8 
By the same token, an actual increase in the share of non-produc- 
tive consumption in the state sector would--again temporarily--ease the 
goods famine. It would blunt accumulation in department II, while mom- 
entarily raising the exchange fund of department I. But all of this 
would stifle the growth of the state sector as a whole in the long run. 
This result is perfectly consistent with others we have found. Along 
with the need to maintain non-equivalent exchange and to restore the 
economy's stock of fixed capital, the tendency towards reducing non- 
productive consumption in post-capitalist society9--which is necessary 
and progressive-.. only heightens the crisis in the short term. 
The Reproduction of the Part of the Surplus Product of the Peasant 
Sector Expropriated for the Fund of Primitive Socialist Accumulation 
[Ps(ex)]; When we began our discussion of the circulation process and 
drew our reproduction scheme on page 339, we stated that the inclusion 
of the category Ps(ex), the part of the surplus product of the petty- 
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of 
commodity sector alienated for the fund/socialist accumulation, would 
add a great deal of complexity to any numerical analysis. As such we 
had to momentarily abstract from any consideration of it until a later 
stage. We did this by assuming that all of the alienated surplus pro- 
duct of P was obtained through non-equivalent exchange, and was already 
taken into account by our figures. This is only a simplifying assump- 
tion that we must now abandon. First of all, the presumption that non- 
equivalent exchange can be perfectly reflected in the state's procure- 
ment and disposal prices, which we would use in any concrete numerical 
analysis of reproduction, is not entirely valid. We must continue to 
use this abstraction, however, because to go beyond it would mean hav- 
ing to fully develop the question of whether or not, and to what extent 
prices of production are applicable to the Soviet system. We have al- 
ready stated the problems involved in this regard, and will not repeat 
them. 10 
Secondly, as we stated when first mentioning the subject, some of 
the expropriated surplus product is alienated directly. We ignored 
this fact in order to more clearly demonstrate the basic tendencies of 
the circulation process. Having done this we are now in a position 
to drop this part of our original abstraction, at least to the extent 
of qualitatively describing what effect the inclusion of this portion 
of Ps(ex) will have upon expanded reproduction. 
If we look at the reproduction scheme on page 339 we see that 
Ps(ex) will actually be added to the equations for S. It can in prin- 
ciple be divided up into the three basic categories of reproduction in 
each department of S. Some can go directly to maintain the non-produc- 
tive workers of S, i. e., will go immediately into the fund of consump- 
tion in each department. To this extent we have our usual distinction 
between the surplus product alienated from PI, which has the material 
form of means of production, and that obtained from PII, which exists 
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in the shape of means of consumption. The goods received from PIs(ex) 
--either in natura or via a monetary equivalent (e. g., as taxes) --can 
function directly as means of production to expand the output of means 
of consumption to be consumed by the non-productive workers of the 
state sector. For SI they will represent an addition to the exchange 
fund, s/x; for SIT they can serve directly as means of production. To 
the extent that the alienated products do not exist in the proper phys- 
ical form they can be exported, and the needed goods--probably means of 
production--imported. The goods received from PIT can function direct- 
ly as means of consumption for the non-productive workers of both SI 
and SII. Once again, should they not all be in usable physical form we 
will have them exported and the required goods imported. 
The part of Ps(ex) that is accumulated is far more interesting, 
for the possible uses of this portion of the alienated product each 
bring different results with them. Like any other aspect of the non- 
productive consumption fund, any increment to it will in the short run 
help relieve the goods famine of means of production, by increasing 
SIs/x. This is clearly true in our case here. The accumulated portion 
of Ps(ex) is quite another story. It will have to be divided up between 
SI and SII, and between c and v. If the bulk of this fund goes to SII, 
then this can only exacerbate the goods famine, because SIIc will rise 
while the exchange fund of SI will stay relatively the same. On the 
other hand, to the extent that SIIv as a whole rises, it will raise the 
demand among workers in that department for commodities produced in PII 
and will thus mollify the goods famine of industrially-produced means 
of consumption. This puts us back in the same old contradiction--the 
fact that the goods famine of means of consumption cannot be solved ex- 
cept at the expense of aggravating the goods famine of state-produced 
means of production, and vice versa. 
If the accumulated share of Ps(ex) is primarily devoted to SI, 
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then we have just the opposite result. It will ease the goods famine 
of means of production from SI (again, only by first exporting the pro- 
ducts of peasant agriculture and importing technologically advanced 
means of production from the West), since part of the accumulated val- 
ues will go to increase SIv. Perhaps more important is the fact that 
the portion that goes to augment SIc can, at least in theory, go a long 
way towards alleviating the contradiction we saw earlier--that is, that 
so much of SI's constant capital had to be completely renewed at one 
time, that there would be a discontinuity in this process, and a mass- 
ive quantity of values would have to be invested in this replacement 
without yielding any output in the short term. 
We should note that the fundamental contradiction we detailed in 
the previous section, when we outlined the reproduction of the fund of 
non-productive consumption, is mirrored almost exactly in the reproduc- 
tion of Ps(ex). Obviously if a given quantity of the alienated peasant 
surplus product goes to increase the fund of non-productive consumption 
in SI, this will do far more in the short run to overcome the goods 
famine of means of production than if this same amount were accumulat- 
ed. In the latter instance only a small fraction would enter into SI's 
exchange fund, the part that went to increase SIv. This is true even 
when we consider that the absolute growth of SIc will bring with it an 
automatic rise in that department's demand for means of production or- 
iginating in PI--which will help relieve the imbalance of exchange be- 
tween these two departments: The bulk of the additional increment in 
SIc produced within that department will consist of industrial fixed 
capital, so that it will have to purchase more raw materials, etc., 
from PI, 
By the same token, if the portion of Ps(ex) that goes into SII is 
used mainly to expand that department's consumption fund, e. g., to 
raise the wages of its workers or to increase the fund on non-productive 
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consumption, this will, by purely negative means, hold down SII's de- 
mand for new state-produced constant capital. Conversely, if accumula- 
tion in SII has priority over any increase in its fund of consumption 
this will, as already noted, only worsen the shortage of state means of 
production. 
It is when we look at the relation between Ps(ex) and expanded 
reproduction in P that we see the contradictions of the Soviet system 
most sharply. If this part of P's surplus product were not alienated 
for the fund of socialist accumulation then a great deal of it would go 
to expand production in both departments of P. This is a basic aim of 
the Soviet system--to promote the growth of agriculture. Yet we found 
earlier that this is only true if this growth of P does not outstrip 
that of S, for then it would greatly upset the balance in the economic 
relations between the two sectors which would, in political terms, mean 
a dangerous disruption in the balance of social forces within the coun- 
try. This finds its economic expression in the fact that an expansion 
of P without a simultaneous growth of SI would only worsen the situa- 
tion as regards the goods famine of means of production. P's demand 
for state-produced constant capital would go up with no increase in 
supply to match it. But this is only one symptom of the general dilemma 
that confronts the Soviet economy: Industry cannot expand except at 
the expense of agriculture. As such this aspect of the reproduction 
schemes merely summarizes in algebraic form what Preobrazhensky had 
more completely described as the law of primitive socialist accumula- 
tion. The state sector must accumulate, and in order to do so it must 
alienate values from the petty-commodity sector. In our schemes the 
category Ps(ex) can serve this function, but it need not necessarily 
do so, This, as we have shown in the present discussion, is a function 
of the size of Ps(ex) and its division between consumption and accumu- 
lation, on the one hand, and between the production of means of con- 
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sumption and means of production on the other. A long-term solution 
demands an emphasis upon accumulation and the production of means of 
production. Here, for instance, the expropriated surplus product can 
serve as a means of transferring social capital from production of 
means of consumption to that of means of production. If PIIs(ex), or a 
large part of it, were exported, and means of production imported, 
this is precisely what we would have. In all cases it serves as a 
vehicle for transferring values from P to S. 
Yet a policy in favor of industrial accumulation must be conscious- 
ly adopted. As we will show in more detail below, this means forego- 
ing short-term remedies. Conversely, an accent upon using Ps(ex) to 
increase consumption and production of means of consumption would re- 
present a "solution" to the goods famine dictated by the immediate 
needs of the peasantry and would condemn the country's overall economic 
and social development to permanent distortion. 
" 
Conclusion 
Preobrazhensky summarized the results of his analysis of the cir- 
culation and reproduction of the component parts of the product of each 
sector in the following relationships: 
If in the Soviet economy IIc of the state sector plus IIc of the 
private sector, minus the means of production which department II 
of the combined private sector obtains within its own department, 
is equal to v plus the non-productive consumption of department I 
of the state sector, plus the consumption fund and the non-produc- 
tive consumption fund of department I of the combined private sec- 
tor, then: 1)When department I of the combined private sector 
suffers a deficit of means of production of department I of the 
state sector, the disproportion may be eliminated only on the bas- 
is of ties with the world economy; 2)that part of the consumption 
fund of department II of the combined private sector which con- 
sists of means of consumption from state light industry must equal 
the part of the wages fund of department II of the state sector 
which consists of means of consumption purchased from department 
II of the private sector with wages--that is, the part that to a 
very great extent consists of means of consumption of peasant pro- 
duction; 3)if internal exchange of the consumption fund of depart- 
ment II of the combined private sector against a corresponding 
portion of IIv of the state sector reveals an excess of demand on 
the part of the private sector, the disproportion may be solved 
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either with the aid of ties with the foreign market, or by redis- 
tributing the national income in such a way as to provide resourc- 
es for additional development of department II of the state sec- 
tor--a solution which, however, would require an even more rapid 
development of heavy industry; 4)if the disproportion in the eco- 
nomy cannot be solved in any of these ways, a goods famine arises 
throughout the private economy, affecting both means of production 
and means of consumption produced in the state economy. l 
We should examine this passage in more detail. Preobrazhensky's 
first conclusion is that if the general condition of equilibrium- -that 
society's aggregate IIc equals its aggregate fund of consumption 
[(v+s/x) in Marx's schemes]--is satisfied, and if SIc(p) is less than 
PIc(g) (i. e., department I of the state sector requires fewer means of 
production of peasant origin than the other way around), then the def- 
icit can only be made up if the Soviet economy has access to the world 
market. We now know that the relationship is even more precise than 
Preobrazhensky specified. If the disproportion arises solely within 
the sphere of circulation, then it can be overcome only if one depart- 
ment purchases more from PI than PI buys in return, and if this differ- 
ence equals the amount of PI's deficit with SI. If the goods famine 
of state-produced means of production stems from an insufficiency of 
production within SI, then it can only be liquidated through foreign 
trade if adequate exportable surpluses already exist in the peasant 
sector. In other words, the goods famine need not originate solely 
within the realm of production. If the department II which mediates 
exchange between PI and SI does not purchase enough means of production 
from PI so that the latter has a sufficient hoard of money, then, even 
though SI may have produced the right quantity of means of production 
for the society as a whole, all of the necessary exchanges will not 
take place and PI's deficit will persist. In this case, however, it is 
considerably easier for the state to intervene and eliminate the crisis 
through the planned use of agricultural credit. 
His second conclusion is that, in the terms of our reproduction 
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scheme on page 357, the part of PII's consumption fund which it obtains 
from SII, must equal the portion of SII(v+s/x) which comes from the 
peasant sector. If it does not, then the same rules of circulation 
apply as with PI-SI, providing that the necessary means of consumption 
exist, and that the problem arises only in the process of circulation. 
PII can obtain the needed means of consumption only if one of the de- 
partments I purchases less from SII than it sells to it, and buys more 
from PIT than the latter buys back. If the various differentials of 
purchase and sale are not concentrated within one department I, then 
somewhere within the system a hoard of money will confront unsold means 
of production from one of the departments I, with a corresponding def- 
icit of means of production from the other department I in one of the 
departments II. Once again, so long as the problem is one of circula- 
lion, the state can intervene via a judicious credit policy and through 
its access to the world market. 
Related to this, Preobrazhensky's third conclusion is historically 
contingent. Foreign trade is not a viable way out of this particular 
dilemma in the USSR's present circumstances. This is because any ex- 
cess means of consumption it exports will not fully--or even predom- 
inantly-. go to import industrially-produced means of consumption from 
the West. The foreign currency the state obtains from such exports 
will have to go overwhelmingly towards the import of means of produc- 
tion for departments I of both S and P. 
We should also mention the contradictory role we have found both 
non-equivalent exchange and non-productive consumption to play. The 
maintenance of non-equivalence and the diminution of non-productive 
expenditure are two of the bedrocks of the state's policy of accumula- 
tion. Yet each aggravates the goods famine in the short run. This is 
no accident, nor an artifact of our schemes of expanded reproduction. 
The process of accumulation involves a great number of difficulties and 
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contradictions for the state sector precisely because it takes place on 
the foundations of a backward economy which does not possess adequate 
material resources for industrialization, This fact, plus the dominant 
weight of petty production--which, if left to itself, would spontane- 
ously develop along different lines than in a mixed commodity-socialist 
economy--mean that any short-term equilibrium can only be attained at 
the expense of the state sector's future growth and by reinforcing the 
entire legacy of backwardness that the state is trying to overcome. 
We have seen other ways in which the process of accumulation ex- 
acerbates the economic crisis in the immediate period. Our analysis 
suggests that left to itself, industrialization under conditions of 
proper proportionality--not to mention the constant political advance 
towards the socialization of society--is impossible. What remains is 
to apply what we have discovered so far, both in terms of the general 
tendencies of accumulation and the specific movements of the elements 
of the industrial capital of the different sectors--to an analysis of 
expanded reproduction and to our previous analysis of the accumulation 
of fixed capital. There we will see that the basic conditions of ex- 
change under the circumstances of the Soviet goods famine directly con- 
tradict the conditions of accumulation. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 11 
1. VKA 22, p. 48 (Spulber, p. 148). Emphasis added. 
2. About this problem, Preobrazhensky noted the following: "For the 
time being we will disregard the question of how to calculate re- 
production which is complicated by the alienation of the surplus 
value of the capitalist sector and the surplus product of the pet- 
ty bourgeois sector into the socialist accumulation fund. This is 
a methodological problem of major importance. Its solution brings 
up the question of the relationship between domestic prices and 
those on the world market. " (VKA 22, p. 32, fn). We have given 
a detailed discussion of this problem on pp. 365-70, below. 
3. There is a diffence between offering state-produced means of pro- 
duction cheaply to the peasant sector, via planned us of agricul- 
tural credit, and abandoning non-equivalent exchange. The former 
is essential to any policy of industrialization and modernization 
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of agriculture, but would only be possible on a sustained basis if 
the general structure of non-equivalence is preserved as a source 
of primitive socialist accumulation. For an earlier discussion of how the elimination of non-equivalent exchange could relieve the 
goods famine in the short run, see "Ekonomicheskie Zametki III, " 
p. 76. 
4. VKA 17, p. 43, 
5. Suppose we alter the scheme so that PI purchases more from PIT than 
it sells, but it is SI which purchases less from SIT than vice 
versa: 
Si. (50008 + 1000p)c + (2000g + 2000p)v +( 750g + 1000p)s/x 
SII. (3000g + 1000p)c + (12508 + 1250p)v + (1000g + 250p)s/x 
PI. (1000g + 2000p)c + (1000g + 1250p) consumption fund 
PII. (3000g + 1000p)c + (1750g + 2000p) consumption fund 
PIT has 250 unsold means of consumption which it must exchange for 
money somewhere in the economy, so that it can then purchase 250 
in means of consumption from SII, which it cannot obtain through 
direct exchange. This much is the same as before. Only this time 
SII has a deficit not of peasant means of production, but of those 
of state industry. It sells only 2750 of its 3000 IIc(g) to SI, 
since the latter needs only that many means of consumption from 
SII. SII cannot make these up, let's say, by selling more means 
of consumption to PI than the latter will provide in means of pro- 
duction, because exchange between the two is now in balance. 
Similarly, PIT can meet PI's demand for means of consumption of 
peasant origin only if we assume that PI has a hoard of money it 
can advance, since it will buy 1250 from PH but sell only 1000 
means of production back to it. But then PI will still have 250 
unsold means of production. PII can use the money it obtains from 
PI to purchase the extra means of consumption it needs from SII, 
which has them available as a result of the imbalance in its ex- 
change with SI. What we have left over is that SH has money 
worth 250 and a shortage of the same amount of means of produc- 
tion of state industry. PI has 250 unsold means of production and 
has advanced 250 in money which it cannot get back. Reproduction 
cannot continue on the old scale. SIT would have to alter the 
technical makeup of its production, lessen its demand for indus- 
trial means of production and increase its productive consumption 
of means of production from PI, i. e., SIT would have to assume a 
relatively more backward form of production. 
6. VKA 22, p. 56 (Spulber, pp. 156-57). 
7. Ibid, p. 59 (Spulber, p. 161). "... the transition to a lower level 
of non-productive consumption and to a higher level of accumula- 
tion... inevitably alters the proportions of exchange between 
de- 
partments I and II, increasing department II's demand for means 
of production and decreasing their temporary supply. In that 
case, the country's economy becomes more progressive 
from the 
standpoint of the development of the productive forces, the sur- 
plus product grows throughout society, the aggregate gross and net 
output of society grows faster, and accumulation grows more rap- 
idly; but the actual transition onto the new path--the growth of 
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the relative share of department I--has to cause a temporary dis- 
proportion throughout the economy. " (Original emphasis). 
8, This case is identical to the growth in the peasant budget after 
the Revolution and the elimination of the peasantry's old obli- 
gations to the state and the landowning class, The peasantry 
had more monetary resources, while the supply of commodities on 
whose purchase this money could be spent declined with the war 
and the Civil War. Thus there was less incentive for the peas- 
antry to increase its output. For Preobrazhensky's analysis of 
this phenomenon as a major source of the goods famine, see "Eko- 
nomicheskie Zametki I--O Tovarnom Golode" ("Economic Notes I--On 
the Goods Famine"), in Pravda, December 15,1925, 
9. In reality we must make certain modifications in the assumption 
that non-productive consumption will fall with the overthrow of 
the capitalist regime. Preobrazhensky cautions that the Soviet 
state will continue to have considerable non-productive expenses, 
although these will tend to decline over time as the administra- 
tion becomes more efficient and the needs of defense go down with 
an end to the country's capitalist encirclement. But these points 
were well into the future, even hypothetically--and as we know 
they remained as such in the real historical development of the 
USSR. Nevertheless, Preobrazhensky had ý.. covered an important 
tendency in the economy. If non-productive consumption declines 
as compared with the pre-revolutionary level, this will demand a 
new division of social labor from before (independent of those 
factors which also call for a new kind of proportionality from 
what pertained under capitalism). Yet there is no denying that 
the fall in non-productive consumption had quite definite politi- 
cal prerequisites--primarily the defeat of the bureaucracy and the 
evolution of proletarian democracy. 
10. Pages 335-36, Note 25. 
11, If we recognize that the policy of drift which the Stalin-Bukharin 
group followed in the 1920's, with its concessions to the short- 
term interests of the peasantry (in particular, the better off 
peasantry), meant the persistence of the goods famine; and that 
this perpetuated the economic dislocations of the period and fore- 
stalled those actions which could have helped overcome the back- 
wardness of the Soviet Union--policies which would have been both of 
an economic and political character--then we must see Stalin's 
"solution" and the consequent history of the USSR as just such a 
permanent distortion. 
12. VKA 22, pp. 56-7 (Spulber, p. 158). 
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CHAPTER 12 
THE ACCUMULATION OF FIXED CAPITAL UNDER CONCRETE CAPITALISM 
When Preobrazhensky took up his analysis of expanded reproduction 
under concrete capitalism it was in order to see how capitalist pene- 
tration of the petty-commodity sector afforded the former a greater 
ability to overcome some of its inherent tendencies towards economic 
stagnation. He did this strictly at the level of a value analysis, and 
abstracted from the fact that the capitalist and petty commodity sec- 
tors produce qualitatively different kinds of products. Later, in VKA 
22, he took up this question of the material exchange between sectors, 
but only at a fairly simple stage, and not within the context of ex- 
panded reproduction. Even here we had almost completely to reconstruct 
the analysis, using our own tools and deriving conclusions that Preo- 
brazhensky himself had been unable to reach. 
There is still one major gap in the analysis--not just Preobra- 
zhensky's, but our own--that we have to fill in. Material dispropor- 
tionalities must originate from somewhere and will be reproduced in a 
particular way. We have already seen one way this occurs in the repro- 
duction of fixed capital. Conversely, if expanded reproduction is to 
proceed smoothly, society must account--to the extent that its level of 
technique and its specific social relations permit--for the manner in 
which particular use values enter into, and emerge from the processes 
of production and consumption. This we have also done in part, in our 
analysis of the replacement of fixed capital under simple reproduction 
and in our discussion of the goods famine and the reproduction of the 
product of the various sectors, in Chapter 11. We will see further 
that, in solving the problem of the accumulation of fixed capital under 
both concrete capitalism and in a commodity-socialist economy like the 
the USSR, all departments of both sectors are affected, and that not 
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only their gross production, but its material composition, must con- 
stantly adapt to the need to maintain equilibrium in the system as a 
whole. Out of necessity we abandon the separation we have made up to 
now between our analyses of the volume of expanded reproduction, on the 
one hand, and that of the material aspects of exchange, on the other: 
Each imposes certain conditions on the process of expanded reproduc- 
tion, which must be met simultaneously if economic activity is to go on 
without disruption. 
For this part of our investigation we have slightly modified Preo- 
brazhensky's scheme for "concrete" capitalism from VKA 17 (see above, 
Chapter 5, p. 194). 
KI. 5000 fixed capital: 
2000(500f + 1500c)c + 500v + 250s/x + 250s(a) = 3000 
KII. 3000 fixed capital: 
1200(300f + 900c)c + 300v + 150s/x + 150s(a) = 2000 
Total production in the capitalist sector = 5000 
PI. 1500c + 1500 consumption fund = 3000 
PII. 1050c + 2100 consumption fund = 3150 
Total production = 6150 
We have broken KIc and KIIc down into their fixed and circulating com- 
ponents, assuming the same proportions as in our examples in Part III. 
Similarly, we have raised the organic composition of capital in KII, 
so that it is equal to that in KI. This will eliminate those dispropor- 
tions that would have arisen from unequal organic compositions of cap- 
ital, and will allow us to trace the effects of the accumulation of 
fixed capital in their "pure" form. 
For the moment we leave out of account mutual exchange between 
KI 
and PI and between KII and PII. This assumes that there is no qualita- 
tive difference between the means of consumption produced by KII and 
PII. As for KI and PI, we assume that KI produces means of production 
that will serve both as fixed and as circulating constant capital, 
while PI produces only circulating capital, at least so far as 
its ex- 
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change with K is concerned. Both KI and PI are self-sufficient in con- 
stant capital, i. e., they produce all of their own means of production. 
It will be noticed that we have not broken Plc and PIIc down into fixed 
and circulating components, nor have we assumed any stocks of fixed 
capital in either department of P. This is realistic if we assume that 
P's technique is relatively backward and that its implements of labor 
all wear out and must be replaced within a year. Thus to speak of 
"fixed" capital, as of any form of "capital" per se, is entirely condi- 
tional when dealing with the petty-commodity sector. We can speak of 
fixed capital in a contingent sense, insofar as certain implements of 
labor will have a longer period of turnover than the commodities they 
produce, i. e., their value remains fixed, at least in part, outside the 
process of production and the immediate circulation of commodities. 
But on a yearly basis we have no distinction between fixed and circu- 
lating capital in the petty-commodity sector, as their periods of turn- 
over are the same. 1 
Later, in Chapter 13, we will modify these assumptions, and allow 
P to acquire means of production from the industrial sector (K or S), 
some of which will be fixed capital and whose lifetime will be greater 
than one year. There we will be able to trace out how, in the process 
of giving K or S greater ability to overcome its own imbalances, P's 
technique changes and creates a growing interdependence between depart- 
ment II of the industrial sector and PI on the one hand, and between PI 
and KI (or SI) on the other. These mutual inter-relationships of the 
different departments of each sector upon the material products of each 
other constitute the very crux of the Soviet goods famine, and our re- 
sults provide a striking confirmation of Preobrazhensky's analysis in 
VKA 22. 
Returning to our scheme on the preceding page, the changes we in- 
troduced into Preobrazhensky's original figures do not change the basic 
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conditions of equilibrium between the two sectors. Within K there is 
a deficit of means of production of 450, which is exactly offset by a 
surplus of means of production in P of the same amount. In the same 
way, if we carry out accumulation and extend production in K and P we 
get the same problem as in VKA 17: The growth in P is not enough to 
balance the rising shortage of means of production within K. 
Accumulation in KI will see, out of KIs(a) = 250,178.6 go to new 
fixed capital, 53.6 to additional KIc(c), and 17.9 to increase KIv. In 
KII the accumulation fund equals 150, and so 107.1 go for fixed capital, 
32.1 for circulating constant capital, and 10.7 for addition to KIIv. 
At the end of the year this gives: 
KI. 5178.6 fixed capital: 
2071.4(5l7.8f + 1553.6c)c + 517.9v + 259s/x + 259s(a) 
KII. 3107.1 fixed capital: 
1242.8(310.7f + 932.13c)c + 310.7v + 155.4s/x + 155.4s(a) 
The deficit between II's demand for means of production and I(v+s/x) 
has grown to 562.3. If P grows by two per cent, as in Preobrazhensky's 
example in VKA 17, then we have: 
PI. 1530c + 1530 consumption fund = 3060 
PII. 1071c + 2142 consumption fund = 3213 
Total production = 6273 
P's balance for exchange with K rises by only nine, to 459, which falls 
way short of even the rise in K's deficit of means of production. Even 
if we follow Preobrazhensky's example further, and let all of the rise 
in P go to PI, this is not nearly enough: 
PI. 1561.5c + 1561.5 consumption fund = 3123 Total = 6273 PII. 1050c + 2100 consumption fund = 3150 
The quantity of means of production PI would have available to exchange 
with KII would still equal only 511.5, leaving an overall shortage of 
better than 50. The rise in PI's exchange fund is only half of the 
growth in KII's shortage of means of production from KI. 
We will recall that at this point Preobrazhensky solved the prob. - 
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lemof under-accumulation in KI by effecting a transfer of productive 
resources within P, in such a way that the growth in PI was sufficient 
to offset the persistent under-production in KI. This sort of simple 
rearrangement of capital in the petty-commodity sector, which, as Preo- 
brazhensky cautioned, would do only so long as we stayed inside the 
bounds of a simple value analysis, will no longer suffice. We must 
remember that KII's deficit is overwhelmingly one of fixed capital, 
which can only come from KI. There is no increase in PI that can al- 
leviate this shortage, given its specific material form. But what if 
we allow KII to decrease the share of its constant circulating capital 
that comes from KI and purchase more of it from PI? Then perhaps there 
will be a rearrangement of production within P alone that, along with 
a parallel alteration in the use forms of the means of production pro- 
duced by KI, would permit the capitalist sector to obtain all of the 
means of production it needs and in the correct material proportions. 
Suppose that in our initial scheme on page 377, KIv consists in 
natura of 125 fixed capital and 375 circulating constant capital, and 
that KIs/x is made up of 62.5 fixed capital and 187.5 circulating con- 
stant capital. In this case KII's deficit in material terms is 112.5 
in fixed capital and 337.5 circulating constant capital. Assume furth- 
er that in the next period some of KI's production is for advance or- 
ders on the part of KII, so that it begins to adapt the material com- 
position of its output to KII's actual needs, say, fifty per cent of 
new I(v+s/x) constituting machines, buildings, etc., and other means 
of production which will enter into KII's production as fixed capital, 
and fifty per cent being raw materials, intermediate products (e. g., 
steel, cloth, etc. ) which will serve for KII as the circulating part 
of its constant capital. Therefore, of the 26.85 which makes up the 
additional KI(v+s/x), about 13.4 will be fixed capital and 13.4 circu- 
lating. If we add up these figures we find that at the end of the 
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first year's production II requires some 407.1 in either new or replace- 
ment fixed capital and 932.1 in circulating constant capital. KI's 
supply of fixed capital, on the other hand, is 200.9, and its supply of 
circulating capital is 575.9. The total deficit then, equals 206.2 
fixed capital and 356.2 circulating constant capital. 
Let all of this 356.2 deficit in circulating capital come out of 
the 459 that PI has available for exchange with K. This leaves approx- 
imately 103 in raw materials, etc., which can function as elements of 
circulating capital in either KI or KII. If PI sells this 103 to KI, 
then the latter no longer has to reproduce this much circulating con- 
stant capital in natura within its own department, as part of KIc. For 
the moment let us assume (the implications of this assumption we will 
deal with presently) that with a modicum of difficulty KI has the re- 
serves necessary to switch its production of this value equivalent of 
the circulating constant capital it obtains from PI to the production 
of fixed capital. It would then have 103 in fixed capital available 
for exchange with KII. In this way KII's deficit would be reduced to 
103.2, or about 103. 
Thus production in P must shift, so that it increases in PI and 
declines in PII, while satisfying these two conditions: a)There is an 
overall growth in P of 2%, and b)there is a marketable surplus of 206 
in raw materials that PI can exchange with KI, or 562 in all. 
2 We can 
determine the relative sizes of PI and PIT with these two equations: 
(1) PI + PII = 6273 
(2) 1/2 PI - 1/3PII = 562 
PI must equal 3183.6 and PH 3089.4, giving: 
PI. 1591.8c + 1591.8 consumption fund = 3183.6 Total = 6273 PII. 1029.8c + 2059.6 consumption fund = 3089.4 
PI's consumption fund exceeds PIIc by 562. If PI sells 356 of this to 
KIT to replace all of the constant portion of its circulating capital, 
then PI will have 206 left over to sell to KI. KI would then have this 
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same volume of newly produced fixed capital to sell to KII, thus making 
up the entire deficit. 
To see how exchange would work out, we must break our scheme down 
further into the various components of each department's product that 
are exchanged with different sectors. This scheme is similar to those 
we used in Chapter 11, and the process of exchange in fact proceeds 
along similar lines. 
KI. 2071.4(517.8f_k + 1347.6c_k + 206c_p)c + 517.9(133.9f + 384c)v + 
+ 259(67f + 191.9c)s/x + 259s(a) 
KII. 1242.8(310.7f_k + 576c-k + 356c_p)c + 310.7v + 155.4s/x + 
+ 155.4s(a) 
PI. 1591.8c + 1591.8(1029.8p + 562k) consumption fund 
PII. 1029.8c + 2059.6 consumption fund 
We have introduced the additional subscripts, k and p, to indicate 
those parts of the product whose reproduction depends on purchases from 
more than one sector. Thus KI reproduces all of its own fixed capital 
and 1347 of its Ic(c). Another portion of Ic(c), however, equal to 
206, can only be reproduced if KI is able to purchase it from PI. Sim- 
ilarly, with KII, except here we must remember that there is an addi- 
tional 96.4 in fixed capital that was accumulated by KII, but whose 
value (90% of the initial addition to the fixed stock) has not entered 
into its product. As for P, PI, although it reproduces all of its own 
constant capital, must purchase 562 of those means of consumption that 
make up its consumption fund from KII. PII, on the other hand, has all 
of its product reproduced entirely within P. 
KII needs to acquire 407.1 in fixed capital, and has set aside the 
same amount of means of consumption out of its annual product to pur- 
chase it with. KI, however, neither has that much fixed capital for 
sale (it has not produced it), nor does it require that much in means 
of consumption to realize KI(v+s/x). This, of course, was the basic 
ý. _, ý: 
ýý`ý 
-383- 
problem we set out to solve. KI and KII can make straight exchanges of 
200.9 fixed capital from KI against the same amount of means of consump- 
tion from KII; they can do the same for 576 in constant circulating 
capital. With these exchanges KI has obtained all of the means of con- 
sumption it requires for both its workers and consumption of its cap- 
italists. KII, however, still has 206 and 356 in means of consumption 
on its hands, destined for exchange against fixed and circulating cap- 
ital respectively. 
Looking at PI, it quite obviously realizes 1029.8 of its consump- 
tion fund via mutual exchange with PII. The other part of the consump- 
tion fund, 562, must be purchased from KII, and will be a little more 
difficult to reproduce. 356 of this 562 will not be much of a problem, 
as KII must purchase that much in raw materials from PI, and PI can use 
the money KIT advances for this purpose (assuming that KIT makes the 
first purchase in the exchange) to buy 356 in means of consumption. 
PI can reproduce the other 206 of its consumption fund in the following 
manner: KI produces only 1347.6 of its 1553.6 KIc(c). The other 206 
it must obtain from PI. This is, however, a purchase without a cor- 
responding sale on the part of KI, since PI produces all of its own 
means of production. From this sale of raw materials, and other forms 
of circulating constant capital, PI receives 206 in money which it uses 
to buy the means of consumption it needs from KIT. But where do these 
means of consumption come from? We recall that at the very beginning 
of the circulation KIT had 407 in means of consumption set aside to ex- 
change for that much fixed capital. Of this it could exchange only 
200.9 with KI. This meant that it had 206 in means of consumption that 
could not be realized unless one of the departments of P bought them. 
This is what PI now proceeds to do, as it requires means of consumption 
of just that amount. 
So far we have KI which has realized all of its I(v+s/x) and 
has 
ý;: ' 
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managed to acquire all of the raw materials it needed from pj. In 
terms of the use values it must have to begin production again next 
year, it has reproduced all of its constant capital as well. But in 
the process it has had to advance 206 in money for the purchase of 
means of production from PI, which it did not get back because PI made 
no return purchase from KI. Parallel with this KI has 206 in fixed 
capital left unsold, for it had produced these to be exchanged for raw 
materials from PI--fixed capital, then, that PI did not need and hence 
did not purchase. PI, too, made a purchase without a subsequent sale, 
but this was to KII, when it bought 206 more in means of consumption 
than it sold means of production in return. As for PI, it has realized 
its entire consumption fund, although by a somewhat roundabout circuit 
of exchanges. It has sold all of the means of production it had pro- 
duced for exchange and has acquired all that it needs in means of con- 
sumption. It advanced no money for any of the exchanges, and has no 
surplus funds left over from one-way sales-without-purchases. This 
leaves us with KII. This department has obtained all of the means of 
production it needs to reproduce its KIIc(c); conversely, it has man- 
aged to sell all of the means of consumption it had produced to replace 
that portion of its constant capital. What is more, it has sold all of 
the means of consumption that made up its exchange fund for new and 
replaced fixed capital. The difficulty here was that all of these 
means of consumption were intended for sale to KI, so that KII could 
receive back all of the fixed capital it needed; only KI, as we saw, 
needed only a portion of these, equal to 200.9. The other 206 were 
sold to PI, which required a greater value of means of consumption from 
KII that it was able to sell to it in means of production. This leaves 
KII with a shortage of 206 in fixed capital, and a hoard of money of an 
identical amount. 
In sum, after all the exchanges so far we are left with KI, which 
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has 206 unsold means of production which can function only as fixed 
capital, and which has advanced 206 in money which it has not been able 
to get back; and KII, which has a hoard of 206 in money over and above 
what it advanced towards its various exchanges and a simultaneous short- 
age of 206 in fixed capital. Clearly enough, KII uses this money to 
purchase the fixed capital KI has not yet sold. Then KII has reproduc- 
ed all of its constant capital plus its stock of accumulated fixed cap- 
ital, while KI gets back the money it advanced. All other material 
requirements of reproduction are satisfied. 
Observations 
The example we have just investigated is not, of course, an en- 
tirely accurate historical picture of developing capitalism, Produc- 
tion in the petty-commodity sector was greater than in K, and we pre- 
sumed parallel growth in both sectors. In part this was because it 
made our exposition a good deal simpler: If we had presumed that P's 
production was falling, i. e., that capitalism was constantly encroach- 
ing upon petty-commodity production, this would not have changed the 
nature of the problem or its solution. In another sense this way of 
constructing our example is extremely important. Preobrazhensky took 
the figures he did for K and P in VKA 17 because this reflected the 
realities of specifically Russian capitalism, out of which the 
Soviet 
economy had come. There the problem was precisely one of how agricul- 
tural and industrial production would grow in tandem and 
in mutual in- 
and 
ter-connection with each other, /how the one's growth was conditioned 
upon that of the other. 
In reality we would not have had all of the rearrangements of 
the 
social capital taking place solely within P. If the physical propor- 
tions in our schemes had not worked out exactly as technically 
demanded, 
then we would have needed to transfer capital and productive resources 
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both from PIT to PI and from KII to KI. If, for instance, PI had not 
been able to provide for all of the 356 in circulating capital of peas- 
ant origin plus the 206 needed by KI, we would have required a shift of 
means of production and labor power into KI so that the latter could 
have boosted its output of both types of constant capital, This was 
indeed the case with the Soviet goods famine, which we will examine in 
the next chapter. 
What our schemes do accurately reflect is the growing tendency for 
developing capitalism to increase its dependence upon raw materials and 
other elements of its circulating capital that are produced by other 
modes of production. Only in this way was department I of the capital- 
ist sector able to satisfy KII's demand for fixed capital: Not only by 
pushing off some of the latter's total demand for constant capital onto 
PI, but because in expanding its own production it increasingly requir- 
ed these sorts of raw materials as well. Eventually, of course, cap- 
italism subordinated these areas of petty production and brought them 
within its own sphere of production relations. And in this case, as 
capitalism would absorb more of the petty-commodity economy, while at 
the same time achieving a level of technique that demanded greater 
quantities of raw materials and new methods of extracting and process- 
ing them, we would see that more and more of the adjustments necessary 
for economic equilibrium would have to take place within capitalism it- 
self. Thus with capitalism's development comes an ever-greater need 
to structure its production towards the demands of the future, along 
with a chronic, if not growing inability to do so. This in turn mir- 
rors the future course of events in the Soviet Union under NEP, which 
we will take up in more detail below. There we will see that there 
could be no stable equilibrium based on mutual growth of the peasant 
and state sectors, but that sooner or later the state sector would have 
to oust petty production altogether, To the extent that the dispropor- 
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tions we have uncovered are inherent in any system of production that 
has not completely freed itself from the law of value and worked out 
entirely new methods of allocating its labor power, the state sector 
would have to bear a larger and larger weight of the economic adjust- 
ments that had to be made to maintain expanded reproduction within the 
system as a whole. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat--even in 
a transition period as highly contradictory as was that of the USSR-- 
this can only mean one thing: The replacement of spontaneous regula- 
tion of economic events by planning. 
Our schemes also demonstrate how it is impossible to solve the 
problem of expanded reproduction of the various material elements of 
productive capital without also solving the problem of their exchange. 
By starting from an analysis of expanded reproduction we in fact derived 
the very schemes for the exchange of the different material components 
of that reproduction that we investigated in our last chapter. The 
same rules we arrived at there apply here, We could solve our problem 
of the accumulation of fixed capital only because, in addition to hav- 
ing all the discreet use values that make up each department's constant 
capital produced in the correct proportions, they were capable of be- 
ing exchanged, i. e., realized as money. Here it was department II of 
the capitalist sector that, in effect, acted as mediator of an unequal 
exchange between PI and KI. KI purchased more means of production from 
PI than vice versa, 
3 
and if these two departments were able to acquire 
the right kinds of means of production and means of consumption they 
required it was because one department II, and only one department II, 
mediated this exchange. It was every bit as important for KI to obtain 
the circulating constant capital it had to have from PI--and without 
which it could not have continued production even on the old scale, 
much less expand it in line with KII's increased need for fixed capi- 
tal--as it was for KII to have the fixed capital of which it was short. 
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If it had been PII, instead of KII that had needed fewer raw ma- 
terials from PI than the latter needed means of consumption in exchange, 
then even though KI could still have obtained the means of production 
from PI it needed, the rest of the circuit would have broken down. 
PI's exchange with KII would have been in balance, and even though PI 
would have had a hoard of money (from KI) it would not have passed this 
money on to KII. On the contrary, PI would have been short a certain 
quantity of means of consumption of a particular type and would have 
had a sum of money it could not spend; while KII would have still had 
to go without the fixed capital it desperately needed from KI: Not 
because they had not been produced, but because exchange could not take 
place in the right circuit. That it should have been KII that mediated 
this unequal exchange was in the nature of our problem. For at the 
same time PI was mediating an unequal "exchange" between KI and KII, 
that is, an "exchange" between the elements of their constant capitals, 
where KII required means of production from KI but could not obtain 
them because it only had for exchange a product KI could not use in its 
present physical form. 
Finally, our example reaffirms our previous conclusion that the 
problem of the accumulation of fixed capital could be solved only if 
there is a growing shift within the overall social product towards the 
production of means of production as a whole, and, within that produc- 
tion, an increasing emphasis on the production of fixed capital. At 
the start of the process we saw that the use form of KI Is constant cap- 
ital was identical with the value relations of the means of production 
that went into it, i. e., one fourth fixed capital and three-fourths cir- 
culating capital. At the end this proportion had to change to 32.5% 
fixed and 67.5% circulating capital. This change would be demanded 
with each and every year of accumulation, even if total production in 
KI did not have to exceed what it could obtain off its own accumulated 
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surplus value. 
4 But this is seen even more strikingly when we drop our 
assumption that P purchases no fixed capital from the industrial sec- 
tor, and where the deficit of fixed capital emanates not just from KII, 
but from every other department of the economy which must purchase 
these types of means of production. For the analysis of this question, 
however, we will leave the realm of concrete capitalism and deal with 
it in the context of the goods famine in the Soviet economy during the 
period of primitive socialist accumulation. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 12 
1. "On the average, the larger the fixed capital in proportion to the 
total capital, the longer is its relative (not absolute) period of 
reproduction; and the smaller it is, the shorter its relative per- 
iod of reproduction. Implements form a much smaller part of handi- 
craft capital than machinery does of machine-production capital. 
But handicraft implements wear out much more quickly than machin- 
ery. " Theories of surplus value, I, p. 243, Original emphasis. 
2. The marketable surplus of PI = 459. If it sells 356 to KII, and 
the remaining 103 to KI, there must be a further 103 also made 
available for sale to KI, since the overall deficit within K is 
562. 
3. This is the reverse of the situation we had in Chapter 11, when 
discussing exchange in the Soviet system. There department I of 
the state sector purchased fewer means of production from the 
countryside than vice versa. We will show in our next chapter 
that this is a basic contradiction within the Soviet economy. 
4. Again we must caution against confusing the value composition of 
Ic with the material form of its product. Also, it will be no- 
ticed that we tailored the distribution of the different products 
of KI unevenly between KIc, KIv, and KIs/x. This was for sim- 
plicity. We know KI must produce 407 in fixed capital, or 32.5% 
of its total output. If we had distributed this ratio accordingly 
over all the categories of I's product it would have made no dif- 
ference in the solution to the problem, though it would have ren- 
dered the explanation of how exchange would have to take place 
unnecessarily more difficult than it already is. 
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CHAPTER 13 
THE GOODS FAMINE IN THE USSR 
In the last chapter we assumed that all of the constant capital in 
the peasant sector was reproduced in the course of a single year, and 
that neither department of P purchased any means of production from KI. 
The inter-relation between the two modes of production was very much 
one where the petty-commodity sector adjusted its production so as to 
provide the capitalist sector with vitally needed means of production. 
In doing this petty production afforded capitalism a leeway it would 
not have otherwise had, which allowed it to restructure its own output 
and thereby satisfy all of the material preconditions of expansion. 
Whether or not the petty-commodity sector actually grew did not really 
affect the nature of the problem or its solution. The fact that we al- 
lowed P to grow in our example merely meant that the transfers of pro- 
ductive resources within that sector had to be less severe than if we 
in 
had assumed production/P contracted. This condition is unrealistic and 
must now be dropped. In its real course of development capitalism had 
to extend its supply of raw materials. It had first to penetrate those 
non-capitalist areas of the world where these raw materials could be 
produced, and then to subordinate that production to capitalist methods 
and technique, None of this, of course, occurred in pure form. Cap- 
italist methods of production would be introduced into essentially prim- 
itive social and economic formations, and although the coherence of 
these societies would be broken down, they did not themselves become 
capitalist, but remained subordinated by those capitalist powers that 
had originally dominated them. If British capital establishes an elec- 
tronics plant in Brazil, we must include its product under K and not P 
in our schemes, even though that factory will exist in the midst of a 
society where there are large, even dominant vestiges of petty produc- 
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tion. The workers will depend on the peasantry for much of their means 
of consumption, and the factory itself may need a substantial portion 
of its raw materials from non-capitalist farms. Many of the workers 
will be only one or two generations off of the countryside, bringing 
with them habits and ways of thinking that will break down in the course 
of their proletarianization. The tendency of capitalism is to trans- 
form all production into capitalist production--but not capitalist pro- 
duction or social relations all of the same type. Trotsky's combined 
and uneven development was not a Russian phenomenon but an imperialist 
one. , 
In the period following the Revolution the Soviet Union confronted 
this problem in a rather different form. Its dominance over petty pro- 
duction was in no way guaranteed by any sort of economic superiority 
enjoyed by the state sector. Quite to the contrary, peasant agricul- 
ture prevailed over state industry, at least in weight if not in im- 
portance. More to the point, the very condition of economic growth in 
the state sector was the development of agriculture a)as a source of 
raw materials for both departments in the state sector, b)as a source 
of means of consumption, so that the standard of living of the working 
class and the population as a whole could rise, c)as a source of expor- 
table commodities with which the Soviet Union could obtain means of pro- 
duction it could not itself produce. But, as we elaboraded in Chapter 
10, this development in agriculture also had preconditions, primarily 
the prior growth of the industrial sector. The state economy was 
caught in an insoluble dilemma. For agricultural production to rise 
it had to be transformed; it had to cease being peasant agriculture and 
become socialist. In economic terms--and this was by no means a strict- 
ly economic question, as we have argued throughout--the most pressing 
difficulty the society faced was the poverty and narrowness of its 
in- 
dustrial base, primarily its poverty of plant and equipment. Here the 
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problems of accumulation of fixed capital we have outlined so far take 
on a particularly extreme form, Expanded reproduction is not a ques- 
tion of the perpetual re-establishment of "equilibrium" between the 
various branches of production; for the initial disproportionalities 
were so great that equilibrium could not be established except through 
the 
a radical transformation in/whole fabric of the economic and social 
structure. Preobrazhensky devoted his last articles to proving this 
point and demonstrating the inevitable necessity of a revolution in the 
West and massive aid to the Soviet Union. It is interesting that none 
of the exposition we have laid out so far, nor that which follows--all 
of which we consider to be quite new in terms of the analysis of ex- 
panded reproduction-actually obviates or contradicts Preobrazhensky's 
conclusions. 
Let us take our original scheme for P. Only now we make a dis- 
tinction between those means of production that P produces itself and 
those which it purchases from the state sector. For the sake of sim- 
plicity we assume that PI's own production consists entirely of circu- 
lating capital, while all that it obtains from SI is fixed capital. 
This will not amount to very much relative to PI's total constant cap- 
ital, but it necessitates that we now distinguish between the relative 
times of turnover of the two types of means of production. We assume, 
then, that all those means of production produced by PI, whether they 
be implements of labor or raw materials, are reproduced within the 
year, but that the fixed capital purchased from SI has the same lifetime 
as any other fixed capital produced within the state sector, i, e., ten 
years. This being the case, P would look as follows: 
PI. 1000 fixed capital: 
1500(100f + 1400c)c + 1500 consumption fund = 3000 
Total = 6150 
PII. 500 fixed capital: 
1050(50f + 1000c)c + 2100 consumption fund = 3150 
If we again let total production grow by two per cent and distribute 
it 
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proportionately between PI and PII, we must now calculate how much of 
PI's 60 and PII's 63 new product must go to their stocks of fixed cap- 
ital. The simultaneous equations we need to determine these figures 
are quite simple, since we've no distinction between variable capital 
and surplus value. If t stands for the total growth in production, x 
for the portion that goes to the stocks of fixed capital, and y the part 
that goes for new circulating constant capital, then for PI 
(1) x+y+(. lx + y) =t 
(2) l. 4x -y=0 
x= 25.6% of t, and y= 35.8% of t 
And for PH 
(3) x+y+ 2(. lx + y) =t 
(4) 2x -y=0 
x= 13.9% of t, and y= 27.8% of t. 
Total production in P is then: 
PI. 1015.4 fixed capital: 
1523(101.5f + 1421.5c)c + 1523 consumption fund = 3046 
PII. 508.8 fixed capital: 
1068.4(50.9f + 1017,5c)c + 2136.8 consumption fund = 3205.2 
PI's surplus does not simply equal its consumption fund less PIIc. 
Part of PII's constant capital, plus all of its additional fixed capi- 
tal are realized in SI, as part of SI(v+s/x). PI therefore has to re- 
produce only 1017.5 of PIIc. This leaves 505.5 available for exchange 
with SI. This does not really help overcome the aggregate shortage of 
means of production, since the production of those means of production 
that will replace PII's used up fixed capital now falls upon SI. Tak- 
ing production in S as the same as K in the previous chapter, we have 
an "internal" deficit of 562 in means of production between SI and SII. 
We now have to add to this 50 fixed capital as a replacement for last 
year's PIIc(f), plus another 8.8 that PH has accumulated. So the 
total demand on SI for means of production--at least as far as SI(v+s/x) 
is concerned--is 620.8. For the economy as a whole there is a shortage 
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in means of production of 115.3. Once again we must rearrange produc- 
tion in P, so that PI has enough means of production that it can sell 
to S to allow SI to adapt its own production of fixed capital to meet 
society's increased demand. Only now we have to remember that PI and 
PII represent the values of the annual products of these two depart- 
ments, and do not include the value of fixed capital that has not pass- 
ed as wear and tear into PIc and PIIc. This is a new constraint we have 
to include in working out the shift that will have to occur within P 
towards increased production in PI. 
If x is the value of PI's additional annual product that must go 
to increase its purchases of fixed capital from SI, and if x' is the 
same value for PII, then we can express the total products of PI and 
PH by the following equations: 
(5) PI = 2[. 1(x + 1000) + 1.4(x + 1000)] = 2(1. Sx + 1500) 
(6) PIT = 3[. 1(x' + 500) + 2(x' + 500)] = 3(2.1x' + 1050) 
The condition we have to satisfy is that PI's consumption fund less 
PIIc(c) equals SII's deficit of means of production plus the deprecia- 
tion fund from PH [PIIc(f)] plus the new fixed capital in PIT (x'), 
This gives us: 
(7) (1,5x + 1500) - (2x' + 1000) = 562 + 50 + x' 
which rearranges into: 
(7-a) 1.5x - 3x' = 112 
Now, we also know that our total additional product in P equals 123. 
From equations (1) through (4) we know that PI's share of this equals 
3.9x, and PII's 7.2x'. So we have another equation for the total ac- 
cumulation in terms of x and x': 
(8) 3.9x + 7.2x' = 123 
Solving equations (7-a) and (8) we get x= 52.2. This is what we must 
add to the fixed capital stock in Pl. Solving for x', however, we get 
a somewhat surprising result; x' = -11.2. That is, we must cut pro- 
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duction in PIT by so much that its stock of fixed capital actually dim- 
inishes. This does not have the same meaning for a peasant economy as 
it would under capitalism or for the state sector of a commodity-soc- 
ialist or even socialist economy. The production of raw materials and 
food stuffs can and will take place on one and the same peasant farm, 
and their processing can be carried out, if not in the same handicraft 
workshops, at least in those which would require very little modifica- 
tion to handle one or the other type of commodity. If PII's fixed cap, 
ital falls by 11.2, this means nothing more than that out of the total. 
peasant working day the amount of labor power devoted to the production 
of raw materials and other means of production has risen at the expense 
of that going to produce means of consumption. The same agricultural 
machines that before were used to produce food crops and other consum- 
er goods are now applied to the production of means of production. 
Even so, as our equations are set up this negative result for x' 
introduces a serious artifact. Equation (7) states that the marketable 
surplus in PI's consumption fund must allow for the addition to PII's 
fixed capital. If means of production are actually shifted over to 
production of means of production PII obviously does not require any 
new fixed capital from SI, and the latter does not have to produce any r, 
for that purpose. A negative value for x', however, implies, at least 
according to equation (7), that SI actually can cut production by that 
amount, which it does not do, and would not do unless these means of 
production were re-employed by SI itself. The result would be that the 
difference between PIts consumption fund and PIIc(c) would underesti- 
mate the actual social demand for fixed capital. To eliminate this ar- 
tifact we have only to recognize that the negative value for x' on the 
left hand side of equation (7) has a real economic meaning--it allows 
us to determine PII's reduced technical requirements for circulating 
capital due to its smaller application of fixed capital; but on the 
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right hand side of the equation it makes no sense at all--the addition- 
al fixed capital PIT requires from Si is zero. SI does not cut its 
production because PH has transferred fixed capital to PI. These 
means of production still exist, but in another sphere of agricultural 
production. They must be replaced over time, and their employment will 
give rise to a surplus product in PI that will call forth an even 
greater output of fixed capital from SI in the future. Finally, we 
should note that as these means of production fall within department I 
of the petty-commodity sector their depreciation is covered out of SIc, 
and no longer from SI(v+s/x). Taking all of these considerations into 
account we can reformulate equation (7) as follows: 
(7-b) (1.5x + 1500) - (2x' + 1000) = 562 + . 1(x' + 500) 
which is the same as 
(7-c) 1.5x - 2. lx' = 112 
Solving equations (7-c) and (8) we get x= 56.3 and x' = -13.1. Depart- 
ment I of the petty-commodity sector will add 56.3 to its fixed capital 
stock. Of this 43.2 are newly acquired in the course of accumulation 
and 13.1 are already-existing fixed capital taken over from the produc- 
tion of food-stuffs and other means of consumption. Conversely, PH 
will see its own stock of fixed capital decline by this same 13.1. 
Knowing the values of x and x' allows us to determine production 
in PI and PIT and its material composition: 
PI. 1056.3 fixed capital: 
1584(105.6f + 1478.4c)c + 1584 consumption fund = 3168 
PII. 486.9 fixed capital: 
1022.5(48.7f + 973.8c)c + 2045 consumption fund = 3067.5 
We can take the gross figures for production in the state sector from 
page 382, above. In order to reveal the process of exchange, the cir- 
cuit that each part of the separate commodity-capitals travels in order 
to be realized, we will have to introduce some critical modifications-- 
a consequence of the fact that department I of the state sector is no 
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longer producing fixed capital just for SII, but for both departments 
of P as well. 
SI. 5178.6 fixed capital: 
2071.4(517.8f_g + 1154.5c_g + 399.2c_p)c + S17.9(101.4f_g + 
+ 32.5f_p + 384c_g)v + 259(50.8f_g + 16.2f_p + 191,9c_g)s/x 
SII. 3107.1 fixed capital; 
1242.8(310.7f_g + 576c-g + 356c. p)c + 310.7v + 155.4s/x 
PI. 1584(105.6f_g + 1478.4c_p)c + 1584(973.8c^p + 610.2c_g)cons fd 
PII. 1022. S(48.7f_g + 973.8c_p)c + 2045 consumption fund 
One look at the scheme tells us that for SII to realize the entire 
fixed capital portion of its constant capital and accumulation fund all 
four departments must be involved in the process of circulation. Take 
SI(v+s/x) first. In the example we set for concrete capitalism we as- 
sumed that neither PI nor PH purchased fixed capital from SI, As a 
result all of SI(v+s/x) went towards satisfying the material require- 
ments of SII for fixed and circulating constant capital. Now the sit- 
uation has changed. PI and PIT each have a small stock of fixed cap- 
ital, part of which wears out each year and has to be replaced. In 
addition they have accumulated new fixed capital which, like the part 
that is up for renewal, can only come from SI. Therefore we have re- 
arranged SI(v+s/x) to reflect this fact. Because of the material form 
of its product, PI cannot realize any of its fixed capital against the 
consumption fund of SI. It can only exchange means of production for 
means of production--i. e., a part of PIc (plus its accumulation fund) 
exchanges against a portion of SIc. This is not the case with PII. PII 
must replace 48.7 of worn out fixed capital, for which it has set aside 
a like quantity of means of consumption for exchange against SI(v+s/x). 
Conversely, SI has produced 48.7 in fixed capital for use in the culti- 
vation of food crops, which represent an equivalent of 32.5 of SIv and 
16.2 of SIs/x. In return SI receives 48,7 in means of consumption that 
it either cannot or need not obtain from SII. Since in the present 
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example P11's stock of fixed capital has declined, with some of it be- 
ing transferred over to the production of raw materials, there is no 
accumulation of fixed capital to worry about. What is left of that 
fraction of SI(v+s/x) that exists physically as fixed capital, amount- 
ing to 152.2, is exchanged with SII, and we will deal with it in a 
moment. 
The part of SIc(c) that is reproduced within PI deserves some at- 
tention. Although they are indistinguishable from a material point of 
view, we must divide it into two distinct components. One, equal to 
254.8, will go to make up the deficit of fixed capital in SII, which 
that department cannot get directly through exchange against SI(v+s/x); 
we have described its circulation on pages 382-85, above. These are 
means of production which were to be sold to PI, in exchange for the 
latter's raw materials, and which became available for sale to SIT when 
PI did not follow up its own sale to SI with a compensating purchase. 
The other part of SIc(c-p) consists of means of production, worth 144.4, 
which will go to replace PI's used up fixed capital and add to its 
fixed capital stock. They exchange against the constant capital and 
fixed capital accumulation fund of PI. Thus we see that in their func- 
tion, and in their role in the process of circulation these two sub- 
divisions within SIc(c-p) are economically, as well as conceptually, 
discreet. 
All of this means--not unexpectedly--that the total demand for 
fixed capital has risen sharply. As it stands, we have let all of PII's 
fixed capital needs come out of SI(v+s/x), so that the entire deficit 
from that end falls on SII. As a result SII lacks 254.8 in fixed cap- 
ital, instead of 206, as before. SIT can make this up only under two 
conditions: a)PI purchases 254.8 more from SIT than the other way 
around, and b)PI buys 254.8 less from SI in fixed capital than SI buys 
from PI in raw materials and other means of production that replace 
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part of SIc(c). There is the further condition that these unsold means 
of production in SI actually have the use form of fixed capital. Any- 
thing else would not solve the problem. SI could easily have 254.8 in 
means of production lying around as a result of a purchase-without- 
sale. But unless they exist physically as machinery and buildings for 
manufacturing enterprises in SII, or of tractors, ploughs, etc., for 
state farms, they will not be of much use. If these superfluous means 
of production were durable and could be stored without loss of utility 
or becoming out-dated, then perhaps SI could cut down its production 
of intermediate materials in the next period and switch over to greater 
output of fixed capital. We ignore for the moment the feasibility of 
such shifts. We know that they constantly take place under capitalism, 
though in a haphazard and turbulent way, and that they must take place 
--and be planned for--under socialism. We also know that this presup- 
poses the pre-existence of ample reserves of fixed and circulating cap- 
ital and excess productive capacity. We have dealt with this before 
and will return to it below. What is important here is the fact that 
even if these kinds of rapid adjustments were possible, in the present 
case they could only occur after the fact, after the economy had to 
suffer through serious shortages of fixed capital for at least a year, 
that is, after a real bottleneck, if not stagnation, in the process of 
expanded reproduction. 
Regardless of how we distribute their respective demands, the fact 
remains that SIT and PH together require 455.8 in fixed capital while 
there is only 200.9 in all of SI(v+s/x). The only possible way to make 
this deficit up is out of SIc, which necessarily brings with it an ex- 
tremely complex circuit of exchanges involving all departments, SIc 
must contain 254.8 fixed capital over and above its own needs and those 
of PI. Otherwise there would just be a mutual exchange between SI and 
PI, and no fixed capital would be freed for sale to the departments 
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that produce means of consumption (in the present example, SII). This, 
however, does not finish the story with SIc. In addition to the 254.8 
fixed capital it must also have on hand another 144.4 which do go for 
mutual exchange with PI. The latter must have these means of produc- 
tion in order to replace 100 of its old stock of fixed capital, to re- 
store 1.3 of the fixed capital taken over from PII, and to add to its 
stock 43.1 in fixed capital which has been accumulated (remembering 
that we can only speak of accumulation in a conditional sense when 
talking about the peasant sector). If SI's total production remains 
fixed, if SIc stays at 2071.4, the only way that SI can have these 
means of production available is if it alters the material composition 
of its constant capital replacement fund, so that a greater share of 
it can function as fixed capital in the other three departments. Its 
own demand for circulating constant capital does not decline by any 
means. The value of fixed and circulating capital in SIc stays at 25% 
and 75% respectively. But now it must produce less of its own raw ma- 
terials. It must acquire them from somewhere else, from the petty-com- 
modity sector, so that it can transfer this production to that of fixed 
capital. All we have to do is compare the share of fixed capital in 
SI's total product with what it was under pure and concrete capitalism. 
Under pure capitalism, where we assumed that capitalism solved the prob- 
lem of under-accumulation of fixed capital strictly internally, by 
shifting capital from department II to department I, the breakdown of 
I's product between fixed and circulating constant capital was 25% and 
75% in that order. This corresponded to the value composition of c(f) 
and c(c) in IIc. With each year of accumulation this percentage would 
change, in favor of the production of fixed capital. If we take the 
scheme on page 298, we see that, after transferring capital from de- 
partment II to department I, the share of fixed capital in the value 
of I's total product rises to 29.5%. Contrast this, however, with the 
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situation under concrete capitalism, where we assumed that petty pro- 
duction did not use fixed capital in its own production, but that it 
adjusted its output of raw materials and other means of production to 
permit KI to go over to the increased manufacture of fixed capital. 
There the share of the latter in KI's product rose to 32,5%. Now, in 
our analysis of a commodity-socialist economy, where we take into ac- 
count that peasant agriculture is in the process of gradual moderniza- 
tion through the acquisition of heavy agricultural machinery, we see 
that SI's production of fixed capital must rise even further, to over 
39%. Once again, this took place without the transfer of any capital 
from SIT to SI, or from P to S, Fixed capital is the sole part of the 
social product that comes from only one department, SII, PI, and PH 
each have different technical requirements, and SI's production of fix- 
ed capital must conform to all of them if expanded reproduction is to 
proceed smoothly. The requirements of expanded reproduction have dic- 
tated a highly specific division of labor between state and petty pro- 
duction of means of production on the one hand, and, within the state 
sector, between the production of fixed and circulating capital, on 
the other. 
' 
What would this mean for the Soviet economy in its period of prim- 
itive socialist accumulation? In assuming that both the state and pet- 
ty-commodity sectors grow, our scheme accurately describes Soviet con- 
ditions, at least in its basic outlines, Still, this is true only gen- 
erally; it abstracts from certain specific problems of the Soviet eco- 
nomy that we must now take up. 
We have a situation of mutual dependence between the various de- 
partments, This interdependence is not without hierarchy, however. It 
is true that both departments of the state sector rely increasingly 
upon PI for their supplies of raw materials. But when we made the as- 
sumption that petty production begins to purchase fixed capital from 
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SI, we introduced a fundamental structural change into the entire eco- 
nomy. For this brings with it a growing dependence on the part of 
peasant agriculture upon the state sector. This is not the same kind 
of dependence as when SI or SII have to find their raw materials in the 
petty-commodity sector. The state economy can eventually extend its 
breadth so as to provide most of its own raw materials and other circu- 
lating constant capital. In fact, if it does not, its own existence 
will be threatened. The reverse is not true. PI can never produce its 
own fixed capital. Once P starts to replace its own implements of lab- 
or with those of state industry, this transforms the character of its 
production to its roots. Its dependence on state industry is not based 
on trade--the crucial thing is certainly not that P must find vital 
markets in S, or rely on state trading organs to sell certain of its 
products and purchase others. This is above all a dependence on tech- 
nique, which will recast the organization of labor power in the coun- 
tryside. To acquire fixed capital from the state sector is no one-time 
venture. If P introduces some fixed capital into its production now, 
it must inevitably demand greater quantities with each passing year. 
In VKA 22 Preobrazhensky concluded that there was actually a tem- 
poral sequence to expanded reproduction in the USSR. There he stated 
that, if department II of the state sector was to continue to develop, 
it could not outstrip its raw materials base, i, e., department I of the 
peasant sector, This department, however, had different conditions of 
reproduction than SII, in that it represented a more backward mode of 
production, which (given its existing level of technology and its par- 
ticular social relations) would hamper its rate of growth. PI could 
not keep pace with SIT without the prior acquisition of means of pro- 
duction from department I of the state sector, that is, without an ac- 
celerating movement towards mechanized, and sooner or later, collectiv- 
ized agriculture. Quite clearly the precondition of this development 
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in PI is the primary expansion of state production of means of produc- 
tion. 
For the purposes of illustration, let us take accumulation and 
production for another year. Only now let us say that as P begins to 
replace its own, more primitive tools with modern ones from SI, it 
grows not by two per cent, but by five. This is not unrealistic when 
we keep in mind that the fixed capital P puts into use does not consist 
solely of machines, but will also include fertilizers and improved 
seeds from state farms or agricultural laboratories. There are also a 
number of elementary improvements in the methods of cultivation that 
require no new outlays of capital at all, but rather the dissemination 
of this knowledge by trained agronomists and the political intervention 
of party cadre to encourage the peasantry to reorganize their farms and 
habits of work, and to apply new techniques, The latter can deeply 
affect the manner in which human labor is applied to agriculture and, 
although the reproduction schemes cannot possibly reflect them, they 
will greatly raise the level of production in the short run. 
Beginning with the state sector, the accumulated part of SI's sur- 
plus product is equal to 259, so that it will add 185 to its fixed cap- 
ital, 55.5 to its circulating constant capital, and 18.5 to SIv. SII, 
whose accumulation fund is 155.4, will divide it as follows: 111 to 
new fixed capital, 33.3 to circulating constant capital, and 11.1 to 
SIIv. In P, we assume that total production grows by five per cent, 
and that it divides up proportionally to the size of the two 
depart- 
ments. How this new "capital" will break up between the different 
kinds of means of production is easily calculated from equations 
(1) 
through (4) on page 393, Our total scheme is then: 
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SI. 5363,6 fixed capital: 
2145.5(536.4f + 1609.1c)c + 536.4v + 268,2s/x + 268.2s(a) 
SII. 3218.1 fixed capital: 
1287,2(321.8f + 96S. 4c)c + 321.8v + 160.9s/x + 160,9s(a) 
PI. 1096.9 fixed capital: 
1645.5(109.7f + 1535.8c)c + 1645.5 consumption fund = 3291 
PII. 508.2 fixed capital: 
1066.8(50.8f + 1016c)c + 2133.6 consumption fund = 3200.4 
Total production in P= 6491.4 
SI(v+s/x) comes to 804.6, while SII must replace its entire 1242,8 of 
constant capital from the year before and add another 144.3 in means 
of production through accumulation. This makes SII's total demand for 
means of production equal to 1387.1. There is a deficit of 582.5. 
Since SI is the only supplier of fixed capital, we must also take into 
account the demand for these particular means of production from PI and 
PII. PI must replace 105.6 used up fixed capital from last year's pro- 
duction and add 40.6 for the coming year. Likewise, PH has to replace 
48.7 fixed capital and add 21.3. PI obtains its fixed capital via ex- 
change against SIc, and so we can leave that aside for the time being. 
PII, on the other hand, can only acquire the 70 fixed capital it needs 
if it can sell means of consumption of the same value; in other words 
this part of PIIc exchanges directly against SI(v+s/x) and so we have 
to include it in our figure for SI's general deficit of means of pro- 
duction, This brings the total shortage to 652.5. 
In terms of values PI--whose consumption fund is 629.5 more than 
PIIc(c)--can cover nearly all of SI's shortage (96.5%, in fact). We 
would need only a minor reordering of production within P to raise PI's 
surplus to the requisite level. From the point of view of use values 
the picture is quite different. Once again department I of the state 
sector is obliged to devote an even larger portion of its working year 
to the production of fixed capital. 
To calculate the final arrangement of production in P we adjust 
-405- 
equations (S) through (8) to fit the conditions imposed by another 
year's accumulation in S and the corresponding five per cent growth in 
p, PI's consumption fund less PIIc(c) must equal the internal deficit 
of means of production within S plus the fixed capital replaced and 
added in PII. Thus we have: 
(S') PI = 2[. l(x + 1056.3) + 1.4(x + 1056.3)] = 2(1. Sx + 1584.5) 
(6') PH = 3[. 1(x' + 486.9) + 2(x' + 486.9)] 
= 3[(. 1x' + 48.7) + (2x' + 973.8)] 
from which we get 
(7') (1.5x + 1584.5) - (2x' + 973.8) = 582.5 + 48.7 + x' 
which gives 
(7-a') 1.5x - 3x' = 20.5 
As total production in P from the previous year was 6235.5, a five per 
cent growth would yield a new product equal to 311.8. So we have for 
equation (8') 
(8') 3.9x + 7.2x' = 311.8 
solving for x and x' we find that x= 48.1 and x' = 17.2, so that P 
is 
then: 
PI. 1104.4 fixed capital: 
1656(110.4f + 1545.6c)c + 1656 consumption fund = 3312 
PII. 504.1 fixed capital: 
1058.4(50.4f + 1008c)c + 2116.8 consumption fund = 3175.2 
Total production in P= 6487.2 
This shift of productive resources from PH to PI has caused production 
in PI to rise by 21 and that in PIT to fall by just over 25. 
Produc- 
tion as a whole has dropped in comparison with the figures 
before re- 
arranging it, due to the extra fixed capital that PI has had to add 
to 
its stock, and whose full value does not pass into the annual product. 
In order to follow the course of exchange we must break the total 
scheme down into its various material parts. 
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SI, 214S. S(536.4f_g + 1182.6c_g + 426. Sc_p)c + 436.4(99.3f_g + 
+43,9f_p + 393.2c_g)v + 268.2(49.6f_g + 22f_p + 196.5c_g)s/x 
SII. 1287.2(321.8f_g + 589.7c_g + 375.7c_p)c + 321.8v + 160.9s/x 
PI. 1656(110.4f_g + 1545.6c_p)c + 1656(1008c_p + 648c_g) cons fd 
PII, 1058.4(50.4f_g + 1008c_p)c + 2116.8 consumption fund 
SI(v+s/x) has 148.9 fixed capital available for exchange with SII, 
which is actually lower than the year before. This is because we let 
PII's entire demand for fixed capital come out of SI's consumption fund. 
In reality the state sector would probably be disposed to cover its own 
needs first, at least to the extent possible, but allowing PII's whole 
fixed capital requirement to be disposed of right off does not change 
the essentials of the problem and makes its exposition a bit easier. 
In any case, SI(v+s/x) totals 804.6, of which 148.9 is fixed capital 
for SII, 65.9 fixed capital going to PII, and 589.7 is circulating con- 
stant capital for SII. SII, as we know from the scheme on page 404, 
requires 421.7 in fixed capital and 965.4 to reproduce SIIc(c). Thus 
it has a deficit of 272.8 fixed capital and 375,7 in raw materials and 
other forms of circulating constant capital that must now come from PI. 
PI in turn has set aside 648 of its consumption fund which must be re- 
alized via sale to the two departments in the state sector. If 375.7 
of this goes to make up the rest of SIIc(c), then 272.3, or virtually 
the entire shortage of fixed capital, is left over. Circulation pro- 
ceeds as before. PI sells these 272.3 in raw materials, etc., to SI, 
and with the money it receives it buys the means of consumption that 
form part of SH IIs fixed capital renewal and accumulation fund. This 
in turn permits SIT to purchase the rest of the fixed capital it needs 
to carry out expanded reproduction. Finally, PI must itself obtain 
153.7 fixed capital (105.6 worn our existing stock, 48.1 for its expan- 
sion), for which it must sell a like number of raw materials to SI. 
This brings the fixed capital component of SIc to 426.5. 
-407- 
Once again, the share of fixed capital in SI's product [excluding 
SIs(a)] has risen, from 39% to 39.9%. Although this is not as steep an 
increase as before, it is enough that if the proportion of fixed cap- 
ital had stayed the same there would have been a shortage of 20. 
This example shows that as the growth of the peasant sector accel- 
erates with the modernization of agricultural technique, the economy 
as a whole becomes increasingly self-sufficient in terms of the values 
produced by the different departments. PI is quantitatively able to 
cover nearly all of SII's deficit of means of production. Only PI's 
surplus production, over and above what it must produce for PII, does 
not exist in a form that is entirely suitable for SII. Some of PI Is 
raw materials SIT will need to make up what it cannot obtain from the 
state sector. The remainder, however, must be sold to SI, which in 
turn must sell an equivalent amount of fixed capital back to SII. That 
is, SI's production of its own circulating constant capital must rel- 
atively fall, and its output of fixed capital must rise, This is the 
basic condition of expanded reproduction in a commodity-socialist eco- 
nomy such as the Soviet Union in the 1920's. 
For department I of the petty-commodity sector to grow at this re- 
quired rate it must have access to a constantly increasing supply of 
agricultural machinery from state industry. If, for instance, depart- 
ment I of the state sector was not able to shift its production over 
from circulating capital to fixed capital fast enough, or in the nec- 
essary proportions, then the state could have acquired PI's excess 
means of production for export and used the foreign currency thus ac- 
quired to purchase these elements of fixed capital abroad. This would 
alleviate some of the problem, but not all. PI must still have this 
surplus production, and to do this, and at the rate sufficient to 
keep 
pace with the demands of accumulation in the state sector, it 
has to 
continually transform its technological base. No matter how we approach 
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the problem we cannot escape the conclusion that the lynch pin of the 
entire process of economic development in the USSR is the abundance of 
fixed capital and the prior expansion of state production of means of 
production. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 13 
1. For the sake of clarity, let us quickly describe how circulation 
would take place. SI has a balanced exchange with PII, as well 
as with SIIc(c). It has a deficit of fixed capital with SII = 
254.8. Imagine that it immediately exchanges 144.4 with PI to 
cover the latter's fixed capital requirements. This leaves, out 
of the total means of production worth 399.2 destined for exchange 
with PI, 254.8. These exchange exactly as in our previous example. 
SI buys this much additional raw materials from PI. PI effects an 
equal exchange (= 356) with SII. It takes the 254.8 in money re- 
ceived from SI and buys an additional, equal amount of means of 
consumption from SII, to cover its entire consumption fund. SI, 
as we know, had these 254.8 available for sale due to the imbal- 
ance in its original exchange with SI (its deficit in fixed cap- 
ital). Thus SII takes the money--initially advanced by SI-I-and 
purchases the fixed capital it needs from SI, which the latter 
had produced for sale to PI, but which PI did not need, and hence 
did not purchase. 
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CONCLUSION 
At the close of VKA 22 Preobrazhensky gave a summary of what he 
considered the primary contradictions in the Soviet system. We should 
not see these as simply the conclusions drawn from this single article, 
but rather as Preobrazhensky's final assessment of the state of USSR 
in the light of all of his previous analysis of the various aspects of 
the transition period. 
We have only to present the very broadest outlines of the founda- 
tions of dynamic equilibrium in the economic system of the USSR in 
order to show the totality of economic and social contradictions 
that are inevitably revealed by our development towards socialism 
under the conditions of our isolation. 
Accumulation based on non-equivalent exchange versus the necessity 
of eliminating this non-equivalence--together with the lack of 
correspondence of these processes in time. 
Accumulation at the expense of the surplus product of the workers 
versus the inevitability of a systematic growth of wages. 
The necessity, in the interests of reducing the "birth pains of 
industrialization, " of the fastest possible integration into the 
world division of labor and an increase in foreign credit versus 
the growing hostility shown towards the USSR by the entire capi- 
talist world. 
Accumulation at the expense of peasants who produce industrial raw 
materials and of the peasantry in general versus the necessity of 
stimulating expanded reproduction of these raw materials as much 
as possible. 
Accumulation at the expense of peasant exports of articles of con- 
sumption versus the necessity of stimulating these exports under 
conditions of an extremely slow reduction of industrial prices. 
The economic necessity of having the peasant economy produce more 
for the market versus the social necessity of materially maintain- 
ing the part of the peasantry that produces least for the market-- 
namely the poor peasants and the weak groups of the countryside. 
The necessity of lowering prices on the basis of the rationaliza- 
tion of production versus the struggle with growing unemployment. 
l 
Aside from the contradictions Preobrazhensky enumerates here, we 
have, 
in the course of our analysis, uncovered further contradictions within 
the transition period in the USSR, which we can distinguish as operat- 
ing at two different levels. First, we have those tendencies at work 
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within the process of accumulation and which affect that process in its 
most general dimensions. 
1. Because so much of the country's fixed capital must be replaced 
all at once, and because this requires a great investment of social 
labor with no ensuing production from this fixed capital for several 
years in the future, accumulation in department I of the state sector 
actually leads to under-production in that department in the short run. 
We know that expanded reproduction does not just depend on the 
proper proportionality between its material elements at the moment. 
The reproduction of these component parts of the social product must 
also correspond in time. Any major variation in the rate of replace- 
ment of fixed capital in any of the departments will cause serious 
disruptions in the process, bringing with it either the threat of 
crisis or stagnation. What was the situation in the Soviet Union at 
this time? As we have already noted, after the Civil War, when the 
country moved from its period of restoration, where it concentrated on 
bringing previously abandoned plant and equipment back into operation, 
it could grow fairly rapidly and without major replenishment of its 
capital stocks. Once this phase of the transition period was complete, 
however, and the economy had to undertake the reconstruction of 
its now 
almost totally amortized and worn out fixed capital, the whole temporal 
proportionality was disrupted. Entire blocks of fixed capital were now 
used up, demanding replacement, over and above normal additions 
from 
accumulation. This, as Preobrazhensky described it, necessitated a 
one-way withdrawal of productive resources, both means of production 
and labor power, from the economy without any return of values 
back in- 
to circulation for some time to come. This went way beyond the normal 
problem of gestation of fixed capital construction, since 
it applied 
not just to new plant and equipment, but to the renewal of already-ex- 
isting means of production which had to be replaced in the 
here and now, 
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lest there be a total collapse. 
Taking our example from Chapter 13, suppose that in our initial 
scheme the state had had to deplete its stock of fixed capital from 
5000 to 4000. It could maintain production at the old level if it in- 
creased the amortization of its fixed capital, provided ample supplies 
of raw materials and other circulating capital existed. This, as we 
have shown in Chapter 9, would have the same effect as drawing reserves 
of fixed capital into production. Now, at some point this depleted 
plant and equipment must be replaced, in addition to the normal wear 
and tear of any particular year's depreciation. This could, as Preo- 
brazhensky argued in VKA 22, absorb virtually all of the accumulation 
fund in the state sector. In our hypothetical example, we could easily 
imagine that this 1000 in totally-consumed fixed capital must be re- 
placed in, say, five years--i. e., at the rate of 200 per year. Thus, 
out of the 250 accumulation fund in department I of the state sector, 
we must withdraw 200 right away, before any other accumulation takes 
place. This leaves only 50 for the normal additions to fixed and cir- 
culating constant capital, and to variable capital in SI. Instead of 
SIc(c) equalling 1553.6, it would total only 1510,7; instead of SI(v+s/x) 
being 776.9, it would be only 755.4, The deficit of means of production 
would make itself felt both in terms of SI's exchange with SII, and its 
exchange with PI. SIc(c-p), for instance, would now be 386.7, so that 
either PI or SII--and probably both together--would be short means of 
production by this amount. 
2. Accumulation in department I of the state sector exacerbates 
the goods famine of state-produced means of production for another 
reason. One economic phenomenon that expresses the backwardness of the 
Soviet economy is the fact that the organic composition of capital in 
department I of the state sector is actually lower than that in depart- 
ment II. All other conditions being equal, this would produce a ten- 
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dency towards over-accumulation in department I, which, given the ex- 
isting shortage of means of production produced by that department, 
would mean a tendency for it to catch up with the demands placed on it 
by the economy as a whole. This, however, is an artifact of the mom- 
ent in time at which we began our analysis. The growth of SI automat- 
ically brings with it a rapid rise in the organic composition of capi- 
tal, which will lead to a relative "over-accumulation" in department 
II of the state sector, and a corresponding deficit of means of produc- 
tion from SI. All this will take place in an economy where there is 
already a severe structural shortage of means of production, and where 
the transfer of productive forces into department I from other sectors 
and other departments is extremely difficult and produces in its turn 
further dislocations. 
3. Regardless of whether or not the goods famine in means of pro- 
duction exists in physical form, department I of the peasant sector 
could still suffer a deficit of products of SI if circulation does not 
take place in the proper proportions between all departments of all 
sectors. Non-equivalent exchange aggravates this situation by reducing 
PI's ability to accumulate the necessary monetary hoard via exchange 
with SH (or PII), which it could then use to purchase the means of 0 
production it requires from SI. Even if the state made its means of 
production available to PI cheaply through credit, non-equivalent ex- 
change would still cause PI great difficulties by affecting its exchange 
with SII. In the same way, non-equivalent exchange makes it extremely 
difficult for PH to overcome its internal exchange imbalance with SII, 
causing PH to go over to in natura consumption of its products and a 
boycott of the market. 
Yet non-equivalent exchange is a sine qua non for the survival of 
the Soviet system, and as such its role is highly contradictory. Given 
the fact that the means of production demanded by the peasant sector 
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genuinely do not exist, it holds down peasant demand for the products 
of SI, and thereby makes more means of production available for the 
state sector. In addition it is a vital source of accumulation off of 
the petty-commodity sector. Here it acts to depress peasant demands 
upon state production while laying the groundwork for an increased sup- 
ply of means of production in the future. But, as we also stressed in 
our previous discussion of this topic, it does so at the great cost of 
retarding the productive capacity of the peasant sector, the sector 
that, from the point of view of its existing production relations, is 
in most dire need of modernization. 
The state sector must stimulate peasant production, not suppress 
it. The real exchange of values between the producers of agricultural 
raw materials and state industry must be equal. If they are not this 
is only a reflection of the fact that this exchange is not and cannot 
be equal when the state does not produce enough means of production, 
and that the imbalance can only be redressed temporarily by means of 
non-equivalent exchange. This is not just a balancing act of supply 
and demand. It is one, and only one, vehicle for developing the state 
sector, so that it can produce the necessary means of production in the 
future. This is the precondition for the growth of agricultural out- 
put, which must otherwise stagnate and be bound to its feudal past dur- 
ing a period when its growth must keep in line with that in SH and 
must outstrip that in SI in adding to the export fund. The shortage of 
means of production in the present runs counter to the needs of expand- 
ed reproduction in the longer run, where there will have to be an ever- 
expanding output of agricultural raw materials, both from the peasant 
sector per se and from modernized state cultivation which supplants 
petty production. 
In the examples we used in the preceding chapter, we see readily 
what would happen if, assuming these schemes are based on non-equiva- 
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lent exchange, this condition was relaxed. In the scheme on page 406, 
both SI and SII, whose exchange with PI for raw materials is in bal- 
ance, would suddenly suffer a severe shortage of raw materials once in- 
dustrial prices fell and peasant prices rose, both in line with the 
world market. Exchange, and ultimately production, would break down. 
Conversely, this lowering of the price of SI's fixed capital sold to 
PI would allow the latter department to buy more means of production, 
but only by lowering the supply available for SII. Or, if SI made sure 
that it filled SII's demand first of all, the shortage of fixed capi- 
tal in PI would persist. 
4. One of the state's major tasks is to reduce non-productive con- 
sumption. To do this, however, will worsen the deficit of means of 
production in the short term, since it will reduce the share of SI's 
product that can be exchanged with departments II of both sectors, on 
the one hand, and increase the demand for means of production by SII, 
on the other. If any of this reduction is passed onto P, by lessening 
its burden of the non-productive consumption fund, the deficit will ex- 
tend at least to PII, and possibly to PI, whose demand for means of 
production from industrial origin will rise. 
These four points constitute what we would call the general con- 
tradictions within the process of accumulation in the backward commodi- 
ty-socialist economy. At another level there are further contradic- 
tions, which more precisely reflect the conflict between the specific 
material conditions of expanded reproduction, and the conditions of ex- 
change imposed by the poverty of the state sector and the goods famine. 
In Chapter 11 we derived the conditions for reproduction in terms 
of exchange between the state and peasant sectors, under the concrete 
historical constraints imposed by the Soviet Union's backwardness: Its 
depleted plant and equipment, the predominance of peasant agriculture, 
and the tendency for the petty-commodity sector's demand for state 
in- 
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dustrial goods to outstrip the latter's ability to produce them. We 
posed the following problem: If, as Preobrazhensky states, department 
I of the petty production sector requires more means of production from 
department I of the state sector than vice versa, i. e., if peasant 
agriculture demands more means of production of industrial origin than 
state industry requires raw materials and other forms of circulating 
constant capital from the countryside, then stagnation within the peas- 
ant sector, and ultimately within the economy as a whole, can be avert- 
ed only under a very precise relationship of exchanges between all de- 
partments of both sectors. Specifically, department II of the state 
sector must purchase less from the state sector's department I than it 
sells; it must then purchase more from department I of the peasant 
sector than it sells to it in return. In addition, these two differ- 
ences must be the same as one another, and they must equal the short- 
age of industrially produced means of production within PI. 
What are the conditions of accumulation and expanded reproduction? 
Here SII must purchase more from SI than it sells, and buy less from PI 
than the other way around. The conditions are exactly the reverse as 
those for circulation under conditions of a goods famine. What is more, 
under expanded reproduction, there is a relatively tight division of 
labor, where PI can only produce the correct amount of means of produc- 
tion--and without which none of the necessary exchanges would balance-- 
because its own demand for fixed capital is met by SI. This latter is 
an equal exchange between SI and PI, so that the mere existence of a 
goods famine between SI and PI contradicts the very premise of expanded 
reproduction. If SI cannot meet PI's demand for fixed capital in toto, 
then the latter's production will fall short of what is required, and 
expanded reproduction will either slow down markedly or actually revert 
to simple or declining reproduction. 
We see that the conditions of exchange, given a shortage of state- 
-416- 
produced means of production in PI, contradict the conditions of ex- 
change under expanded reproduction: 1)With the former PI sells less to 
SI than it needs to buy, For expanded reproduction it must sell more. 
2)With the goods famine SIT needs fewer means of production from SI 
than it sells back in means of consumption, Under expanded reproduc- 
tion the very problem is that SIT has a deficit of means of production, 
primarily fixed capital. 3)During the goods famine in PI, SH must buy 
more from PI than vice versa. Otherwise PI cannot overcome this def- 
icit of means of production and the goods famine will become chronic. 
Under expanded reproduction SIT in fact has to buy less from PI, so as 
to acquire the money it needs to buy fixed capital it still lacks. 
This result is no less important for the fact that it confirms 
the original laws of symmetry we detailed when analyzing concrete cap- 
italism--namely that when there is a shortage of means of production in 
department II of the industrial sector this can only be made up if 
there is a relative surplus of means of production in the peasant sec- 
tor. What is more, we have now found that, because the two departments 
I produce different types of means of production, the internal exchange 
between them must show an unequal set of exchanges "in favor" of PI. 
This precisely mirrors capitalism's relations with the colonial world, 
where it bought more raw materials than it sold back in means of produc- 
tion, and sold back to the colonies finished consumer goods. The fact 
that this was at the same time an exploitative relationship, based on 
non-equivalent exchange, political and military domination, and the 
permanent disfigurement of the colonial economies is something our 
schemes cannot show, and again points to their very real limitations. 
What we also learn from these schemes, hower, is that this same 
basic relationship must take place in the Soviet economy--only it can- 
not. One reason SI buys less from department I of the peasant sector 
is that its own industry has been so decimated, while the economy of 
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the countryside is literally starved of means of production. This is 
not the "normal" state of affairs for a developed economy. The lesson 
is important: If either PI or SII has a shortage of means of produc- 
tion from SI, it can overcome this deficit only if the other department 
has a relative surplus in its exchange with the state sector's depart- 
ment i. But expanded reproduction, as the real course of movement 
within the society, reveals a tendency towards under-production of 
means of production, principally fixed capital, within SI. Therefore, 
if PI simultaneously shows a shortage of means of production from the 
state sector, there will be a goods famine and neither SII nor PI can 
obtain its full complement of fixed and circulating constant capital 
from SI. The goods famine means that the conditions for the realiza- 
tion of SII's demand for state-produced means of production and those 
for the realization of PI's demand for similar means of production ir- 
reconcilably contradict each other. The one can obtain the means of 
production it requires only at the expense of the other, because state 
industry cannot supply enough means of production for society as a 
whole. 
On what basis could this contradiction be resolved? Preobrazhen- 
sky posed this same question in his "Ekonomicheskie Zametki II" ("Eco- 
nomic Notes II"). There he argued that the state's poverty of means of 
production, and the surplus demand on the part of the peasant sector 
for products of state industry had only two possible solutions. If 
these same disproportions had occurred in a capitalist economy they 
would have been liquidated by bringing new capital into the deficit 
branches of production and by importing the needed means of consumption, 
both accompanied by a rise in prices on the commodities that were in 
short supply. In other words, equilibrium would be restored on the 
basis of. the law of value. 2 In the Soviet economy, as we have stressed 
repeatedly, this is impossible, for it would contradict everything 
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which the Revolution and the effort to construct socialism stand for 
and depend upon. On the other hand, any short-term attempts to allev- 
iate the disproportions from within the system could well take this 
form. State prices could fall, means of consumption could be imported 
(not forgetting that there was a shortage of these as well in the coun- 
tryside, although we have not included this in our scheme) at the ex- 
pense of imports of means of production, attractive concessions could 
be given to induce foreign capital into the country. All of these 
would destroy the attempt at socialist construction and would pose only 
one of two alternatives: Either they would condemn the economy to even 
worse dislocations in the future, due to its failure to accumulate; or 
they would introduce new tendencies into the society, whose ultimate 
end would be the abolition of Soviet power and the restoration of cap- 
italism. 
The other solution, the one Preobrazhensky posed throughout the 
twenties, is to increase accumulation in the state sector. The ques- 
tion remains: How? 
What we have seen so far is that expanded reproduction in a com- 
modity-socialist economy, such as the USSR in the 1920's, is only pos- 
sible if the peasant sector assumes an increasingly greater share of 
the total social production of those means of production that serve as 
the circulating portion of the constant capital of the separate depart- 
ments. This, and only this, will permit state industry to alter the 
physical composition of its own output so as to provide for the increas- 
ing demand within all departments for fixed capital. To the extent 
that this is not possible due to the material needs for different types 
of means of production, e. g., the role of agricultural products 
in cir- 
culating constant capital declines as compared to fuel, minerals, aux- 
iliary products, etc., produced by the state sector, then there must 
be a transfer of productive capital from department II of the state 
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sector to department I. In any event a rapid growth in agricultural 
production of means of production is absolutely essential for such a 
commodity-socialist system to utilize the world market as a lever for 
smoothing out the inevitable disproportionalities that will arise. 
Against this we have seen that, even under these "ideal" condi- 
tions, the backwardness of peasant agriculture will throttle the entire 
process of expanded reproduction. Soon state industry would outpace 
its supplies of raw materials, as Marx noted when he discussed how 
developing capitalism itself depended upon other modes of production 
for a substantial part of its means of production. Here is a glaring 
contradiction within our reproduction schemes. They dictate that peas- 
ant agriculture take on an increasing share of the provision of a vital 
portion of society's means of production (its circulating constant cap- 
ital). But this ignores the fact that this is peasant agriculture, and 
that its capacity for growth is not unlimited. The real solution is 
that agricultural production must be transformed. One mode of produc- 
tion must succumb to another, both in terms of technique and of its 
production relations. On the one hand this indicates that the precon- 
dition of this revolution in agricultural technique is the prior devel- 
opment of state industry. On the other hand this must be a conscious 
political choice made by the workers' state. The extension of indus- 
trialization, its application to agriculture, the consequent demands of 
proportionality must first of all be understood and the necessary pol- 
icies undertaken if this subordination of petty production is to take 
place. 
The manifest backwardness of the Soviet economy--the poverty of 
its industry, the predominance of petty production over the state sec- 
tor, the need to replace its fixed capital stock not gradually, but all 
at one time--all of these phenomena make expanded reproduction virtual- 
ly impossible in the Soviet Union in the period of primitive socialist 
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accumulation. Our analysis of the conditions of expanded reproduction 
in the Soviet economy shows that department I of the state sector can- 
not simultaneously satisfy a shortage of means of production in both 
the state sector's department II and the peasant sector's department I. 
Previously we had concluded that if the unsaleable exchangeable 
product of the petty-commodity sector were acquired through the use of 
credits or by other means for the state export fund, then the necessary 
means of production could be imported with the foreign currency thus 
acquired. Preobrazhensky considered this one of the prime methods of 
primitive socialist accumulation. Here the main barrier seemed to be 
political. Yet we also noted that even here the backwardness of the 
economy made this ostensible lever of accumulation another bottleneck 
in the economy's development. There we said that for goods to be pur- 
chased on the world market they must be exchanged for--the state must 
first of all have the goods to sell. For the world market to have any 
effect on Soviet growth--regardless of the political obstacles involved 
--peasant production must reach a certain level, it must attain a min- 
imally advanced technique. The symmetry by which the sum of means of 
production produced in both sectors--allowing for non-equivalent ex- 
change--is equal to the demand for means of production in both sectors 
would have to prevail for the world market to actually solve the goods 
famine, which would then be a function of the fact that the Soviet eco- 
nomy's production of means of production was in the wrong material 
form, 
where any actual shortages could be made up via the differentials be- 
tween Soviet and world market prices. 
The existence of the goods famine, particularly the poverty of 
fixed capital, precludes this, both in the present and in the 
future. 
State industry cannot provide those means of production essential 
to 
anticipate the demand for agricultural raw materials during subsequent 
periods of reproduction, Thus the Soviet economy requires a radical 
421- 
rearrangement of the total social capital, in order to increase the 
specific weight of heavy industry. This, as we showed in our Introduc- 
tion, was true for political reasons, as well as economic ones. 
Although the state may need this rearrangement of productive forc- 
es, it cannot achieve it, both because the other departments of the 
economy are themselves too poor to transfer enough resources into the 
state sector's department I without severe disruptions extending through- 
out the economy, and because there are not sufficient reserves of fixed 
and circulating capital to allow these transfers to take place. A pol- 
icy of primitive socialist accumulation is the precondition for the 
development of the state sector, but it is not in and of itself ade- 
quate to meet the task. Nor is simple access to the world market. 
What is needed is aid, pure and simple, the material assistance of 
other socialist countries. This is apolitical problem of the first 
order. We are thrown back to Preobrazhensky's own conclusion in 1927. 
We have shown that the Soviet Union cannot extract itself from perpet- 
ual economic crisis because of the contradictory nature of the society 
and the economy--a contradiction embodied in that between the law of 
value and the law of primitive socialist accumulation. The demands of 
expanded reproduction contradict the reality of the goods famine. The 
two cannot be reconciled. A policy of drift and uncertainty over in- 
dustrialization would only drive the economy deeper into this dead end 
and sharpen the class conflicts within it to the detriment of the 
proletariat. 
The victory of the Left Opposition in the struggle against Stalin 
would not in itself have been sufficient to bring the Soviet Union out 
of its impasse. It was the necessary condition for a solution to the 
country's difficulties, but it was not the answer itself. As we have 
intimated, the solution was also political, but it lay outside the con- 
fines of the USSR. Preobrazhensky wrote: "The sum of these contradic- 
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tions shows how closely our development towards socialism is connected 
with the necessity of breaching our socialist isolation, not only for 
political but also for economic reasons, and of relying in the future 
on the material resources of other socialist countries. "3 
The syntax of this sentence is significant. It presupposed that 
the political reasons for the impossibility of socialism in one country 
were already understood among Marxists. Preobrazhensky's task was then 
to demonstrate that economically the theory was a presecription for 
disaster. Today Marxists have a different problem. Socialism has come 
in many circles to be equated with economics, and the argument against 
socialism in one country is seen as a technical question. Politics 
has been forgotten. Yet it was as a political thinker and as an acti- 
vist that Preobrazhensky entered the struggles of the 1920's. Economic 
ideas were--and remain--political weapons. This is a principle of 
Marxism that must from time to time be rediscovered, and the processes 
by which this has been done are part of the history of our movement. 
It is a history we must understand if we are to revitalize socialism 
and turn it into a living reality. 
NOTES TO CONCLUSION 
1. VKA 22, p. 70 (Spulber, pp. 172-73). 
2. "Ekonomicheskie Zametki II" ("Economic Notes II"), Bolshevik, No. 
6, March 31,1926, pp. 60-61. 
3. VKA 22, p. 70 (Spulber, p. 173). 
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